Asiana flight crash at San Francisco
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Asiana now confirms that Trainer was 1st day on the job.. add that to the fact that trainee had only 43 hours on the 777.. what a deadly combination!!
Asiana crash: Airline says pilot trainer new to the job
Asiana crash: Airline says pilot trainer new to the job
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It sounds to me like if the G/S was not out of service, this accident would not have happened. Therefore, the airport shouldn't be allowed to operate without it. Period. The proof is in the pudding.
You mean a 10000 hr professional pilot can't land a 777 without a G/S yet we general aviation pilots with barely 1/100 of the experience can land on runways with no G/S every day? If he can't do it without G/S then he should be in a different line of work, he has no business in a cockpit of a large airliner carrying passengers for hire. BTW, nobody was holding a gun to his head to land there, he could have said - sorry guys but I only land on runways with G/S and go somewhere else.
Last edited by olasek; 10th Jul 2013 at 22:49.
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Shade Master ILS (localizer and g/s) we systems designed in the vacuum tube era to guide pilots towards the runway when they couldn't see it do to clouds. But they still had to break out of the clouds and see the runways to land. It was never intended as a must have in nice weather.
And some aircraft don't handle coupled ILS approaches that well, the MD-80 comes to mind.
And some aircraft don't handle coupled ILS approaches that well, the MD-80 comes to mind.
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L@sers
Asiana Flight 214: Both Pilots Were Well-Rested, The NTSB Says : The Two-Way : NPR
The two main pilots on Asiana Airlines Flight 214, the jetliner that crash-landed at San Francisco International Airport Saturday, had each gotten eight hours of sleep the night before their trip to San Francisco, says the National Transportation Safety Board.
The agency's chief, Deborah Hersman, provided that information and other updates to the media and the public on the investigation into the crash that killed two passengers and injured dozens.
Here are details from today's briefing:
The flying pilot had the day off before the flight began. He says he got 8 hours of sleep, and came to the airport six hours before the flight. He was in the cockpit about 30 minutes before the trip began.
The instructor pilot also says he had 8 hours of sleep, and spent some time relaxing with his family. He came to the airport at 2:20 p.m.
In the cockpit, the two main pilots worked about 4 hours and 15 minutes, and then the relief crew of another two pilots took over for the middle of the flight. The original two pilots came back for the final hour and a half of the trip.
The flying pilot says that he saw a flash of bright light that temporarily blinded him, at around 400 or 500 feet. Hersman says they're looking into possible causes.
Update at 5:55 p.m. ET:
Hersman goes over where the 12 flight attendants were sitting. The flight attendant who was leading the crew was at the front. Two attendants were pinned by one or more emergency ramps; both were hospitalized, one with a broken bone in her leg.
In , Hersman said flight attendants had been ejected from the plane. She speaks more about that today; she also clarifies that all passenger seating remained on the aircraft.
The seatbelts in business class had both shoulder and lap belts, Hersman says. Passengers in the rear cabin had lap belts only.
The first emergency response teams arrived at the scene within five minutes.
The flight attendants say they directed passengers to exits that seemed most efficient; they also tried to fight fires, and worked to free those who had been pinned.
Hersman says investigators have not yet spoken to all the flight attendants, especially those who remain in the hospital. They are also hoping to speak to any passengers who wish to talk.
"The NTSB will likely be releasing the runway" in the next 24 hours, and possibly tonight, Hersman says.
Update at 5:40 p.m. ET: On Automation And Plane's Approach
Referring to a slideshow of the plane's approach to the airport over the water, Hersman describes how the plane came in.
At 11:26, Asiana 214 checked in for final approach, and did not get an immediate reply. They soon checked in again, and were given a landing clearance — when the plane "was about a mile-and-a-half from the threshold," Hersman says.
The evidence shows that "in the last two and a half minutes of the flight," there were multiple modes enabled of auto-pilot and auto-throttle, Hersman says.
Our original post continues:
Of airliners' automatic systems, Hersman says "They can be simple, or they can be sophisticated."
In the the Boeing 777's case, they're sophisticated, she says. But she adds that pilots can fly by hand, taking off, traveling, and landing without any automation if they choose.
On the other hand, "You can have limited visibility — you can not be able to approach the airport in visible conditions — and the airplane can land itself."
She says that automation "can help maintain a level of safety and efficiency in the cockpit," noting that the systems can conserve fuel.
"Pilots are trained to monitor," Hersman says. And they designate between two pilots, with one flying and one monitoring.
The agency's chief, Deborah Hersman, provided that information and other updates to the media and the public on the investigation into the crash that killed two passengers and injured dozens.
Here are details from today's briefing:
The flying pilot had the day off before the flight began. He says he got 8 hours of sleep, and came to the airport six hours before the flight. He was in the cockpit about 30 minutes before the trip began.
The instructor pilot also says he had 8 hours of sleep, and spent some time relaxing with his family. He came to the airport at 2:20 p.m.
In the cockpit, the two main pilots worked about 4 hours and 15 minutes, and then the relief crew of another two pilots took over for the middle of the flight. The original two pilots came back for the final hour and a half of the trip.
The flying pilot says that he saw a flash of bright light that temporarily blinded him, at around 400 or 500 feet. Hersman says they're looking into possible causes.
Update at 5:55 p.m. ET:
Hersman goes over where the 12 flight attendants were sitting. The flight attendant who was leading the crew was at the front. Two attendants were pinned by one or more emergency ramps; both were hospitalized, one with a broken bone in her leg.
In , Hersman said flight attendants had been ejected from the plane. She speaks more about that today; she also clarifies that all passenger seating remained on the aircraft.
The seatbelts in business class had both shoulder and lap belts, Hersman says. Passengers in the rear cabin had lap belts only.
The first emergency response teams arrived at the scene within five minutes.
The flight attendants say they directed passengers to exits that seemed most efficient; they also tried to fight fires, and worked to free those who had been pinned.
Hersman says investigators have not yet spoken to all the flight attendants, especially those who remain in the hospital. They are also hoping to speak to any passengers who wish to talk.
"The NTSB will likely be releasing the runway" in the next 24 hours, and possibly tonight, Hersman says.
Update at 5:40 p.m. ET: On Automation And Plane's Approach
Referring to a slideshow of the plane's approach to the airport over the water, Hersman describes how the plane came in.
At 11:26, Asiana 214 checked in for final approach, and did not get an immediate reply. They soon checked in again, and were given a landing clearance — when the plane "was about a mile-and-a-half from the threshold," Hersman says.
The evidence shows that "in the last two and a half minutes of the flight," there were multiple modes enabled of auto-pilot and auto-throttle, Hersman says.
Our original post continues:
Of airliners' automatic systems, Hersman says "They can be simple, or they can be sophisticated."
In the the Boeing 777's case, they're sophisticated, she says. But she adds that pilots can fly by hand, taking off, traveling, and landing without any automation if they choose.
On the other hand, "You can have limited visibility — you can not be able to approach the airport in visible conditions — and the airplane can land itself."
She says that automation "can help maintain a level of safety and efficiency in the cockpit," noting that the systems can conserve fuel.
"Pilots are trained to monitor," Hersman says. And they designate between two pilots, with one flying and one monitoring.
Last edited by ImbracableCrunk; 10th Jul 2013 at 22:55.
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Shademaster: "I'm guessing my fellow passengers would all agree with me."
Erm, no. As a "fellow passenger" I'd prefer to know that the pilots could actually fly the plane. One day, for one reason or other they may be forced to land it somewhere that doesn't have a G/S or pretty lights or other fancy stuff. You know, like they used to.
Erm, no. As a "fellow passenger" I'd prefer to know that the pilots could actually fly the plane. One day, for one reason or other they may be forced to land it somewhere that doesn't have a G/S or pretty lights or other fancy stuff. You know, like they used to.
Last edited by justawanab; 10th Jul 2013 at 23:00.
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From earlier in the thread, I believe someone stated that certification standards mandate that Go Around thrust is effective within 8 seconds of throttle application. However, it is usually effective in less time, such as 5 seconds.
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olasek,
I want to take issue with some of the things you've said. I am guessing from 'we GA pilots' that you are indeed a GA pilot who flies around in a C172 or the like?
I am an ex military pilot. I am used to flying VFR at low level in bad weather, maybe at night. I didn't practice much IFR flying, so when it did come about I had to work hard to keep up even though it was less technical. That was because it wasn't well practiced.
We can assume the 777 guys on this aircraft were very very proficient at IFR flying, decent profile, avionics manipulation, managing the automatics ect ect - but they probably weren't that well practiced with a visual approach.
My point is, if you do something day in day out you get good at it and no matter how easy the thing you rarely do is (or perceived to be) there is a good chance you'll screw it up because you don't practice it.
To summarize, you're rant about how these guys should have picked a different career ect ect ect is total f**king horses**t. You don't have a clue what you are talking about - I do. I have done demanding, technical, multi discipline flying.
I think there is some truth in what an earlier poster said. Someone has to make a choice - if people aren't practicing visual approaches enough then the industry should either a) give them more practice b) make IFR approach mandatory - a diversion with out a instrument system to get you on the ground. It doesn't seem to me that you can have it both ways or just say 'You're a pilot - you should be able to do it'. You can't un-crash after someone has screwed up out of bravado or what ever it is.
I want to take issue with some of the things you've said. I am guessing from 'we GA pilots' that you are indeed a GA pilot who flies around in a C172 or the like?
I am an ex military pilot. I am used to flying VFR at low level in bad weather, maybe at night. I didn't practice much IFR flying, so when it did come about I had to work hard to keep up even though it was less technical. That was because it wasn't well practiced.
We can assume the 777 guys on this aircraft were very very proficient at IFR flying, decent profile, avionics manipulation, managing the automatics ect ect - but they probably weren't that well practiced with a visual approach.
My point is, if you do something day in day out you get good at it and no matter how easy the thing you rarely do is (or perceived to be) there is a good chance you'll screw it up because you don't practice it.
To summarize, you're rant about how these guys should have picked a different career ect ect ect is total f**king horses**t. You don't have a clue what you are talking about - I do. I have done demanding, technical, multi discipline flying.
I think there is some truth in what an earlier poster said. Someone has to make a choice - if people aren't practicing visual approaches enough then the industry should either a) give them more practice b) make IFR approach mandatory - a diversion with out a instrument system to get you on the ground. It doesn't seem to me that you can have it both ways or just say 'You're a pilot - you should be able to do it'. You can't un-crash after someone has screwed up out of bravado or what ever it is.
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I don't think the glide slope itself was the issue....but what appears to have happened is the pilot instinctively tried to keep the plane on the glide scope by increasing the angle of attack to the point the he could no longer see the runway out of the window. What didn't happen early enough was to realize why this was happening...i.e. why is the nose so high?
Because he assumed the speed was controlled by the aircraft, it was dismissed as a possible cause.
Because he assumed the speed was controlled by the aircraft, it was dismissed as a possible cause.
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The A/T and G/S issues are almost red herrings. The A/T was doing exactly what it had been commanded to do. (if it was in FLCH.)
Can the same be said for the crew?
I fly the 777. Let me say that again - I fly the 777. It doesn't fly me.
On approach when the flaps are out of 'UP' my hands are on the thrust levers. They only leave there to make MCP changes. As most pilots would know, many times you have to override the T'Ls (eg in gusty conditions - although bugging up can fix that) to ensure they provide the commanded speed. More often for a decaying speed than for an increasing speed.
The 'issues' of automatics are not issues for anyone who does the job they have been employed to do - fly the jet. Yes they can catch you out by commanding an undesired outcome - which is really due to lack of knowledge or understanding of the system, not because the automatics did something they weren't designed to do.
On approach a pilot is controlling configuration, attitude and speed to provide or ensure the correct flightpath. And among a million other things that means guarding and watching the thrust levers and commanded thrust. If the thrust and speed isn't being controlled then a pilot isn't flying the jet. The jet is flying them. The 'trap' of FLCH (and yes it is, although one must question why it was even being used at that stage of the approach) should not happen to somebody who is doing their job of flying the jet - ie ensuring the T/Ls are giving the correct thrust setting for the desired speed.
If a pilot can't fly a close to 3 degree approach in CAVOK conditions with light winds without a G/S then they shouldn't be flying a jet. That doesn't mean hand-flying (although they should be able to do it) but simply using the automatics to do it. There are enough ways to utilise the FMC to provide vertical path guidance that even a pilot with a poor external judgement of flightpath can use the system to show them where they are.
And, more importantly, if a pilot can't recognise and acknowledge that on a particular occasion due to whatever reasons (ATC, late configuring etc) they aren't on the correct profile and need to give it away for another try (it's happened to everyone) then they shouldn't be flying a jet.
So, if what has been reported so far is accurate, were these guys doing what they have been paid to do - fly the jet?
Can the same be said for the crew?
I fly the 777. Let me say that again - I fly the 777. It doesn't fly me.
On approach when the flaps are out of 'UP' my hands are on the thrust levers. They only leave there to make MCP changes. As most pilots would know, many times you have to override the T'Ls (eg in gusty conditions - although bugging up can fix that) to ensure they provide the commanded speed. More often for a decaying speed than for an increasing speed.
The 'issues' of automatics are not issues for anyone who does the job they have been employed to do - fly the jet. Yes they can catch you out by commanding an undesired outcome - which is really due to lack of knowledge or understanding of the system, not because the automatics did something they weren't designed to do.
On approach a pilot is controlling configuration, attitude and speed to provide or ensure the correct flightpath. And among a million other things that means guarding and watching the thrust levers and commanded thrust. If the thrust and speed isn't being controlled then a pilot isn't flying the jet. The jet is flying them. The 'trap' of FLCH (and yes it is, although one must question why it was even being used at that stage of the approach) should not happen to somebody who is doing their job of flying the jet - ie ensuring the T/Ls are giving the correct thrust setting for the desired speed.
If a pilot can't fly a close to 3 degree approach in CAVOK conditions with light winds without a G/S then they shouldn't be flying a jet. That doesn't mean hand-flying (although they should be able to do it) but simply using the automatics to do it. There are enough ways to utilise the FMC to provide vertical path guidance that even a pilot with a poor external judgement of flightpath can use the system to show them where they are.
And, more importantly, if a pilot can't recognise and acknowledge that on a particular occasion due to whatever reasons (ATC, late configuring etc) they aren't on the correct profile and need to give it away for another try (it's happened to everyone) then they shouldn't be flying a jet.
So, if what has been reported so far is accurate, were these guys doing what they have been paid to do - fly the jet?
Last edited by ramius315; 10th Jul 2013 at 23:32.
"What other warning signals does the 777 give, apart from the stick shaker, when an aircraft is this low, slow and high AOA?"
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From earlier in the thread, I believe someone stated that certification standards mandate that Go Around thrust is effective within 8 seconds of throttle application. However, it is usually effective in less time, such as 5 seconds.
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To the journalist answering about seniority and racism. As an earlier comment described there are various measures of seniority. For example, age is one measure of seniority and so is class-level in school (freshman, sophmor, junior, senior). Membership in the Korean Air Force seems to bestow seniority above equally suited civilian pilots. I believe earlier info indicated the Pilot Flying was ahead of Pilot Monitoring (Training Captain) at aviation academy. The hours of flying experience which is the usual measure of seniority in US aviation may not be how pilots in Korean culture measure seniority, or it may only supersede some other measures of seniority. That is what the I-See-Racism-Everywhere posters are missing.
This is well documented in Malcolm Gladwell's book. It has been noted in a previous accident, I think KAL at Guam. You and other American flying pilots who measure exerience only in flight hours may stop looking for seniority issues at flight hours, but there is comment from other pilots in various Asian countries, airlines, and jobs reporting what they see, as it differs from what they have seen in America and EU. Aren't different cultures allowed to have their own views on things or are modern leftist politics now mandating all cultures are identical in all situations?
This is well documented in Malcolm Gladwell's book. It has been noted in a previous accident, I think KAL at Guam. You and other American flying pilots who measure exerience only in flight hours may stop looking for seniority issues at flight hours, but there is comment from other pilots in various Asian countries, airlines, and jobs reporting what they see, as it differs from what they have seen in America and EU. Aren't different cultures allowed to have their own views on things or are modern leftist politics now mandating all cultures are identical in all situations?
Last edited by Tscottme; 10th Jul 2013 at 23:31.
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Three air crew in the cockpit ALL failed to perform the most basic task of fling an aircraft - monitoring and managing speed. Perhaps the most critical task on short final. The speed was already well below designated at 20-25 seconds out ... and yet none of the 3 flight crew by all appearances noticed until just 7 seconds from impact.
The Captain claims he believed the auto thrust was managing power/speed, which is an incredible admission - at least to me. Just because you THINK the aircraft systems are managing does NOT absolve any pilot from monitoring and taking action if the automated systems are wrong.
I simply cannot wrap my mind around the fact that high time air transport pilots, operating "heavy's" can fail such a base level key task as proper power management/speed control.
One question I do have ... is it possible that the Captain, who in his training role occupies the right seat and assumes the FO role and responsibilities, was simply rusty on the FO tasks? Doesn't IMO absolve the pilot flying - as he too should have been doing a primary scan of the key flight parameters - incl power and speed.
The Captain claims he believed the auto thrust was managing power/speed, which is an incredible admission - at least to me. Just because you THINK the aircraft systems are managing does NOT absolve any pilot from monitoring and taking action if the automated systems are wrong.
I simply cannot wrap my mind around the fact that high time air transport pilots, operating "heavy's" can fail such a base level key task as proper power management/speed control.
One question I do have ... is it possible that the Captain, who in his training role occupies the right seat and assumes the FO role and responsibilities, was simply rusty on the FO tasks? Doesn't IMO absolve the pilot flying - as he too should have been doing a primary scan of the key flight parameters - incl power and speed.
course_proile
From your post(I also have no "quote" facility) you state, inter alia,
"We can assume the 777 guys on this aircraft were very very proficient at IFR flying, decent profile, avionics manipulation, managing the automatics ect ect - but they probably weren't that well practiced with a visual approach.
My point is, if you do something day in day out you get good at it and no matter how easy the thing you rarely do is (or perceived to be) there is a good chance you'll screw it up because you don't practice it.
To summarize, you're rant..."
You also claim to be an ex military pilot. This claim seems most unlikely as you can not spell descent and don't know the difference between "you're", contraction or you are, and "your", possessive pronoun. Normally one overlooks such errors but when a poster is very rude and comes over all superior then he should be held to account don't you think?
From your post(I also have no "quote" facility) you state, inter alia,
"We can assume the 777 guys on this aircraft were very very proficient at IFR flying, decent profile, avionics manipulation, managing the automatics ect ect - but they probably weren't that well practiced with a visual approach.
My point is, if you do something day in day out you get good at it and no matter how easy the thing you rarely do is (or perceived to be) there is a good chance you'll screw it up because you don't practice it.
To summarize, you're rant..."
You also claim to be an ex military pilot. This claim seems most unlikely as you can not spell descent and don't know the difference between "you're", contraction or you are, and "your", possessive pronoun. Normally one overlooks such errors but when a poster is very rude and comes over all superior then he should be held to account don't you think?
From earlier in the thread, I believe someone stated that certification
standards mandate that Go Around thrust is effective within 8 seconds of
throttle application. However, it is usually effective in less time, such as 5
seconds.
There was a infamous story making the rounds back during my graduate study days about a biz jet that landed gear up. The flight crew insisted that the config warning never sounded - until the CVR was played back to them, with the config warning horn blaring during most of final
. I recall being a passenger on a turboprop years ago in SE Asia (pre 9/11, the cockpit 'door' was a curtain) where I heard multiple warnings going off during final but they continued on and made a fine landing. I think sometimes the flight crews get so accustomed to some of the warnings going off that they simply tune them out - too many audio warnings can be just as bad as not enough.
I suspect the primary focus of the investigation is going to be the human factors element of:
How did the crew fail to engage the autothrottle (and not know it), and
How did the crew fail to notice the falling airspeed until it was too late.
A simple task
The idea that a major airport such as San Francisco should simply turn off the ILS glide slope for a few months because they wanted to relocate the antenna seems to me to be preposterous. I work in Bank and Hedge Fund IT. What we do in similar circumstances is to install a new one, test it out of operational hours, once satisfied that it is working we wait for a suitable out of use window and make the switch. We then test the hell out of it and if satisfied leave it in use OR revert to the old one.
None of our stuff is life critical.
San Fran airport might have saved a few million dollars by not using a similar procedure - Hopefully the victims of their careless exposure of innocent people to unnecessary risk will ensure that it costs then dearly.
Exactly how much does an antenna cost? It is after all in essence only a few wires.
Ford Pinto anyone?
None of our stuff is life critical.
San Fran airport might have saved a few million dollars by not using a similar procedure - Hopefully the victims of their careless exposure of innocent people to unnecessary risk will ensure that it costs then dearly.
Exactly how much does an antenna cost? It is after all in essence only a few wires.
Ford Pinto anyone?
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I have flown in Korea and am aware of Asiana's different attitude towards CRM and other safety issues. I flew with some really competent and modern first officers and met some great captains. From what I could tell, some of the rest would risk 307 lives in a heartbeat rather than break their nationally entrenched seniority code. Add to that some ridiculous idea that one's reputation is severely damaged with a landing that isn't smooth, reinforced by frequent reading of QARs
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Just curious, I found a couple of cockpit images of the 777, some show a separate airspeed indicator in the center & some do not have one.
Without: http://farm4.staticflickr.com/3202/3...3cd759c8_o.jpg
With: http://farm6.staticflickr.com/5301/5...6d2b324a_o.jpg
Does this mean the ones without only show the airspeed on the large screens? Just curious about redundancy.
Without: http://farm4.staticflickr.com/3202/3...3cd759c8_o.jpg
With: http://farm6.staticflickr.com/5301/5...6d2b324a_o.jpg
Does this mean the ones without only show the airspeed on the large screens? Just curious about redundancy.
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course_profile ...
I stick with what I said and I am not going to lower myself to your rude language. Whether you are who you claim to be is another matter.
I did not place the blame anywhere, if the "system" is to blame for these guys inadequate training (there were noteworthy problems in the past with Korean's pilots training) then fix the system but I am sticking with my main point that if someone is flying into KSFO with a big cargo and has no clue how to shoot a visual approach with no aid from G/S then he doesn't belong in the cockpit.
I stick with what I said and I am not going to lower myself to your rude language. Whether you are who you claim to be is another matter.
I did not place the blame anywhere, if the "system" is to blame for these guys inadequate training (there were noteworthy problems in the past with Korean's pilots training) then fix the system but I am sticking with my main point that if someone is flying into KSFO with a big cargo and has no clue how to shoot a visual approach with no aid from G/S then he doesn't belong in the cockpit.
Last edited by olasek; 11th Jul 2013 at 00:05.