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Asiana flight crash at San Francisco

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Asiana flight crash at San Francisco

Old 10th Jul 2013, 21:03
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Korean newspapers running stories on "mechanical failure" etc. is just typical face-saving nonsense.
Not much different from CNN's headline
"Pilot had only 43 hours of experience"...
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Old 10th Jul 2013, 21:09
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Why didn't they do the RNAV(GPS)28L approach (as we did a couple of weeks ago in a b772), disengage the A/P at DA then hand fly the darn thing to the r/way like they do at every CAT 1 ILS they probably do everywhere else in nice wx, and still have A/T back up.
Perhaps the chief pilot at the airline is going to ask them that when they get home.
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Old 10th Jul 2013, 21:11
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Why didn't they do the RNAV(GPS)28L approach (as we did a couple of weeks ago in a b772), disengage the A/P at DA then hand fly the darn thing to the r/way?
Elementary, my dear nightowl: this bunch never, ever stabilised the approach!
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Old 10th Jul 2013, 21:28
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Wednesday press conference streaming now

The briefing just started. It is available at CNN stream of NTSB July 10 afternoon briefing
It seems to have started a little over 25 minutes late.
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Old 10th Jul 2013, 21:29
  #1525 (permalink)  
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twochai

Well we don't know why they weren't stabilised but given SFO ATC's penchant for keeping jets high that may be grossly unfair. I've very rarely been given a gentle feed in UNDER the glideslope. Its normally gear down and full flap attacking the glide from above. I've tried it without the ILS so PAPIs only would be a challenge. Not sure which RNAV approaches are in the FMC.

Also, from an earlier post it looked as if this flight was flown level at 11,000 feet which is more typical, in my experience, with a 28R approach. Did they get a late runway switch?
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Old 10th Jul 2013, 21:31
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My last landing into SFO in June involved a right turn on to south for 28R pointing directly at another aircraft being positioned for 28L. We were kept at 6000' for noise abatement reasons on the north side of the bay. When we called visual with the opposing aircraft we were turned on to a heading of 260 deg where we called visual the field. The controller then cleared us for a visual approach and gave us speed control 180kts to 5nm. We were so far above the glide path the only option was to dirty up, full flap and gear, ignore the speed restriction, close the throttles to idle and turn the flight director off.. All done at 5000 ft no ILS G/P no PAPIs available. We stabilised at company minimum and only after my colleagues on the Flight Deck gave their assent to continue did I make the decision to land. It was certainly challenging, made that bit trickier by the absence of PAPIs.

I do hope the whole SFO ATC environment thing is reviewed as a result of this crash. Both published visual approach procedures are designed around noise abatement and often result in high feed ins. The requirement to have two aircraft closely spaced, (the runways are 750 ft apart) is driven by the need to launch aircraft off 01R/01L, oftentimes after you have already been cleared to land. So at short finals you are watching traffic beside you and watching traffic on the other two runways crossing directly ahead, all the time keeping on top of your own instrument scan. The use of RNAV is moot.

Maybe it is time to have a little think again...

Last edited by nigegilb; 10th Jul 2013 at 21:34.
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Old 10th Jul 2013, 21:40
  #1527 (permalink)  
 
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Nigegilb, you make a valid point here, the only US destination I fly to is HNL and they do similar things there. However, it is ALWAYS the PIC's responsibility to assess and, if necessary, turn down such speed requirements.

Last edited by gtseraf; 10th Jul 2013 at 21:40.
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Old 10th Jul 2013, 21:46
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What other warning signals does the 777 give, apart from the stick shaker, when an aircraft is this low, slow and high AOA?
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Old 10th Jul 2013, 21:48
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I recall a Turkish 737 with 3 crew burying itself in a field short of AMS.. Autothrust took some of the blame, even with a clear error indicated on the PFD. -They were behind the aircraft.
A 777 crew who clearly recognized and safely landed an aircraft from a Low Energy situation. -They were ahead of the Aircraft
And now a 777; in all likelihood behaving exactly as designed (though the design may now be improved -FLC behavior et al) spread all over SFO and CNN.
The crew appear to have been several seconds behind the jet
ULH is challenging, and both B&A have made huge inroads into reducing that stress and increasing safety, however, the notion proposed here by several; that a visual landing in a Wide Body jet in VMC on a 2+mile runway is approaching the limits of their skill set..
I fear releasing the 12 hour student to do same at another Californian Airport was a grave mistake..
Thousands of crews have operated hundreds of Aircraft into SFO, and very few of them clipped the sea wall and killed people. it's unfortunate our profession is being brought into disrepute; especially having to explain the trainer/student scenario on this trip, clearly it's a shock to the general public, though i suggest the situation for surgeons may not be dissimilar.
Coward & Burkhill always looked good after 038. They look even better today..
Flight safety is a matter of probabilities. Most of the systems that you fly are 10^-7 reliable. That does not mean they will always work it means that they have a low probability of failure. Pilots are some of the least reliable parts of the system - read NASA ASRS for a few hours and you will realize that. It is essential to realize that you may screw up and that is the reason the system is 10^-7 and not 10^-8 it is also why the PM should be watching like a hawk. The more approaches that are made the more likely the one in 1000.000 error will occur. It is a straight numbers issue.

Inadequate flight crew monitoring has been cited by a number of sources as a problem for aviation safety. In a review of 24 Controlled Flight Towards Terrain (CFIT) accidents, the International Civil Aviation
Organization found that in half, the “crew did not monitor properly” (ICAO, 1994). The National Transportation Safety Board determined in a special study of crew-caused air carrier accidents that 84 percent of the 37 reviewed accidents involved inadequate crew monitoring or challenging (NTSB, 1994).
Following a 1995 accident involving an air carrier collision with trees on final approach to Hartford, Connecticut, the NTSB stated, “If the First Officer had monitored the approach on the instruments...he would have been better able to notice and immediately call the Captain’s attention to the altitude deviation below the minimum descent altitude” (NTSB, 1996). In addition to NTSB data, prior reviews of ASRS reports related to problems associated with poor intra-cockpit relations reveal that many of these reports also involve inadequate monitoring.
http://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rs/56_...Inadequate.pdf

ASRS report volume: Averaging 5,962 reports / mo, 285 per working day
http://tinyurl.com/n2lufj2


You WILL make an error just hope that your PM identifies it before it is too late.
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Old 10th Jul 2013, 21:50
  #1530 (permalink)  
 
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28L on first clearance.

Originally Posted by BBK
Did they get a late runway switch?
In today's briefing she said that the "first landing clearance" issued at 11:21 was for 28L.

In other news left pending:
She stated that multiple autopilot and autothrust mode transitions are observed in the last 2.5 minutes. This appears to be an FDR observation--in contrast to the mode comment mentioned yesterday, which was an accounting of a flight crew interview.
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Old 10th Jul 2013, 21:54
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asiana flight crash at san francisco

the undershoot area has not helped the situation. it consists mainly of water, not considered to be of much use to non-amphibian aircraft. where it joins the land there is a large immovable obstacle, namely the seawall which took out this aircraft. (does that meet undershoot obstacle criteria?) I would have thought more solid ground is required in the undershoot area, say for the distance taken up by frangible approach lighting if runway shortening is not an option.
( or the obvious alternative of moving the threshold down the runway thus allowing an undershoot area in which an aircraft can actually undershoot in one piece. the present one seems unfit for purpose...)
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Old 10th Jul 2013, 22:06
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The flying pilot says that he saw a flash of bright light that temporarily blinded him, at around 400 or 500 feet. Hersman says they're looking into possible causes.
Now he's claiming it was a laser?

Of course, he was so skilled, he didn't say anything on the CVR. . .
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Old 10th Jul 2013, 22:10
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Sheesh I can see the media headlines already. What a load of BS.
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Old 10th Jul 2013, 22:16
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"What other warning signals does the 777 give, apart from the stick shaker, when an aircraft is this low, slow and high AOA?"

There is a plethora of clues. We practiced this on the 777 sim with an autothrottle failure after the Turkish accident as well as being shown the FLCH trap.

The following clues are shown on the Primary Flight Display.

Normal pitch is around about level on approach. The pitch gradually increases, up to about 10 degrees when you get very slow.

The airspeed trend vector indicates a decrease in airspeed will happen.

The airspeed decreases.

Yellow bars start to appear on the speed ribbon.

Below those are red bars

Once you enter the yellow bars you are unable to apply any more nose up trim as the aircraft understandably thinks it is not a good idea.

The pitch limit indicators appear. If your pitch reaches them you stall.

On the central Eicas a low speed warning message appears with an aural warning.

The stick shaker goes off.

Any pilot familiar on type gets very uneasy very early on and would take action to recover at the first clue, throw in jetlag and delayed reactions and it should still happen by the second or third clue.

The problem is all this is happening around about 200 feet at a point when one tends to transition to looking forward at the runway with occasional glance at airspeed and rate of descent. Not being aligned may well have been an additional distraction.
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Old 10th Jul 2013, 22:17
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to me it's simple It sounds to me like if the G/S was not out of service, this accident would not have happened. Therefore, the airport shouldn't be allowed to operate without it. Period. The proof is in the pudding.

Not an airline professional. Just a passenger killing time following this thread. I'm guessing my fellow passengers would all agree with me. My $0.02.
No G/S.?!?!

I'll bet if there were pilots on the jet that were not children of the magenta line, this accident wouldn't have happened.. Just my two bazookums

Last edited by captjns; 10th Jul 2013 at 22:18.
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Old 10th Jul 2013, 22:18
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Relief FO not silent

In today's briefing, Hersman specifically said that the jump-seated relief F/O called "sink rate". She did not tie it to a specific time or event in the sequence, nor did she suggest that the Pilot Flying did or did not respond to the call.
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Old 10th Jul 2013, 22:20
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We can make all transportation safe. No trucks on the highway if raining or icy. No ships on the sea unless seas are below 6 ft swells and visibility at least 3 miles.

When we get done with the other sectors of transportation shutting down everything not operating under ideal conditions we can require all approaches must be ILS's, no speed restrictions on final. All landings must be autoland because some pilots have trouble hand flying and God forbid no crosswind landings over 10 knots because some pilots can't do that either.

Or we can require competent operators that can handle less than ideal conditions safely because they are qualified to do so. If you can't handle it you can't be allowed to operate until you can. I thought we already operated this way however with check rides, line checks, etc.
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Old 10th Jul 2013, 22:20
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"It sounds to me like if the G/S was not out of service, this accident would not have happened"
I think RNAV(GPS) vertical guidance was available. This was mentioned in this post: http://www.pprune.org/7934022-post1553.html

Also it was published: http://nbaa.org/ops/airspace/regiona...approaches.pdf

The inop GS was NOTAM'd so it wasn't a surprise. If they didn't feel good about hand flying a visual approach w/o GS, why not use a synthetic glideslope via RNAV(GPS)? Regardless of the approval status, couldn't it be used in an advisory mode under VFR?
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Old 10th Jul 2013, 22:21
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It sounds to me like if the G/S was not out of service, this accident would not have happened. Therefore, the airport shouldn't be allowed to operate without it. Period. The proof is in the pudding.
From outside the profession, and it is interesting to hear the view of a layman, it is an easy assumption to make - but wrong!
Unfortunately, even with a GS available, some crews at differing airports, when cleared for a visual, will switch off all the automatics and fly manually. It begs the question if they can't cope with it, why accept it.
It loads up the PF a little more, the PM suddenly has to do a lot more monitoring, and a similar outcome to the Asiana stuff up can easily ensue.
So in the SFO case, whilst possibly a factor for poorly trained or ill disciplined crews, it should not be a cause. The Korean media can crap on all they like about Autothrust problems, but sadly it seems most peoples original suspicions of the cause look likely to be true.
As many have said, if you can't fly a visual approach, even whilst monitoring the parallel traffic 1/4 mile ahead, monitoring X-runway take offs on 01, and getting your own aircraft on a STABILISED approach, you should not be operating that type of aircraft.
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Old 10th Jul 2013, 22:21
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Something I found interesting on today's NTSB briefing is that according to Chairman Hersman, Asiana 214 had shoulder and lap belts in business class and only lap belts in economy.

I rode OZ in business class a few months ago but it was an A330 and I don't remember a shoulder belt but I was tired, enjoying champagne, and may not have noticed.

Some high points of today's briefing here:

Asiana Flight 214: Updates From The NTSB Investigation : The Two-Way : NPR
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