Asiana flight crash at San Francisco
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MD80
Well, I'm certainly pleased that you're no customer of mine. Back seat pilots with no stomach for flying - I do not need.
Truly, you are speaking from utter ignorance. If you were as bright as you think you are you would know that humans become tired, and when they become tired they progressively require help to accomplish a complex task. Eventually, they become incapable of completing that task, but happily the law limits a pilot's hours so that the ultimate limit is not reached.
You say, "Those landing aids are there not to make your job easier, but to facilitate operations in adverse conditions." No, they're also there to make the approach easier, so that you have extra capacity to handle other matters simultaneously, or to enable you to do more work - more sectors, more hours. In Britain, Douglas Bader wrote a report allocating 'points' to different routes and airports. An available ILS carried very few points, whilst a field with no aids carried lots of points. The airline could roster pilots up to a certain number of 'points' per month. So you did more work if you went to 'easier' airfields.
I don't know what level of 'performance' is required from you in your job if you are tired, but after 39 years of flying aeroplanes, chum, I don't need lectures from passengers.
Well, I'm certainly pleased that you're no customer of mine. Back seat pilots with no stomach for flying - I do not need.
Truly, you are speaking from utter ignorance. If you were as bright as you think you are you would know that humans become tired, and when they become tired they progressively require help to accomplish a complex task. Eventually, they become incapable of completing that task, but happily the law limits a pilot's hours so that the ultimate limit is not reached.
You say, "Those landing aids are there not to make your job easier, but to facilitate operations in adverse conditions." No, they're also there to make the approach easier, so that you have extra capacity to handle other matters simultaneously, or to enable you to do more work - more sectors, more hours. In Britain, Douglas Bader wrote a report allocating 'points' to different routes and airports. An available ILS carried very few points, whilst a field with no aids carried lots of points. The airline could roster pilots up to a certain number of 'points' per month. So you did more work if you went to 'easier' airfields.
I don't know what level of 'performance' is required from you in your job if you are tired, but after 39 years of flying aeroplanes, chum, I don't need lectures from passengers.
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"....slightly high passing 4000"
So approx. 10 nm's out ? And out by about plus 500 feet ?
Vertical Speed set at 1,500 feet per minute.
"...at 500 feet they realized they were low (PAPI 3 Red. 1 white)"
So approx. 1 (1.5) nm's out ?
How did they not get on track before then ?
A constantly 500 feet out ? (until you lose all your energy and it's too late).
So approx. 10 nm's out ? And out by about plus 500 feet ?
Vertical Speed set at 1,500 feet per minute.
"...at 500 feet they realized they were low (PAPI 3 Red. 1 white)"
So approx. 1 (1.5) nm's out ?
How did they not get on track before then ?
A constantly 500 feet out ? (until you lose all your energy and it's too late).
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The chain as i see it in reverse.
1.Did not watch the speed..all 3 pilots
2.Did not watch the profile..all 3 pilots
3.Did not call go around ..all 3 pilots
4.Did not get the ILS
4.Did not fly to SFO before in the 777
5.Did not do training before this flight
6.Did not sleep properly due to a pang of anxiety as this is first landing in sfo on a 777
7.Did not sleep properly due to a pang of anxiety as this would be the first time in RHS as a trainer.
8.Did not schedule properly, paired a absolutely new trainer on a long ocean voyage with a trainee capt. [scheduler].
9. Did not form a sop regarding training pairing [ chief of training]
10.Did not see the need for a bit more emphasis on type conversion from AB to B.[chief of training].
11. Did not ...list is endless.
throw in the tech stuff some where in between.
To call it a simple pilot error would be an ERROR.
1.Did not watch the speed..all 3 pilots
2.Did not watch the profile..all 3 pilots
3.Did not call go around ..all 3 pilots
4.Did not get the ILS
4.Did not fly to SFO before in the 777
5.Did not do training before this flight
6.Did not sleep properly due to a pang of anxiety as this is first landing in sfo on a 777
7.Did not sleep properly due to a pang of anxiety as this would be the first time in RHS as a trainer.
8.Did not schedule properly, paired a absolutely new trainer on a long ocean voyage with a trainee capt. [scheduler].
9. Did not form a sop regarding training pairing [ chief of training]
10.Did not see the need for a bit more emphasis on type conversion from AB to B.[chief of training].
11. Did not ...list is endless.
throw in the tech stuff some where in between.
To call it a simple pilot error would be an ERROR.
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737OPR,
It's interesting to note then that as Korean pilots are, apparently, incredibly worried about flying a visual approach then surely their adrenaline would've been pumping and they would have been paying a bit more attention and would have been performing better.
It's interesting to note then that as Korean pilots are, apparently, incredibly worried about flying a visual approach then surely their adrenaline would've been pumping and they would have been paying a bit more attention and would have been performing better.
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Just reading the newspaper interviews about passengers opening doors themselves and helping people out the aircraft down the slides.
Ive done Crew Training, (albeit never flown due to unknown medical reasons at the time), and part of the training was to check out the door prior to any evac, obviously checking to see if there is/was fire.
Would normal passengers think or be likely to check this first, or would the mentality be, 'Oh
, get out -> Door open ->Jump'
Ive done Crew Training, (albeit never flown due to unknown medical reasons at the time), and part of the training was to check out the door prior to any evac, obviously checking to see if there is/was fire.
Would normal passengers think or be likely to check this first, or would the mentality be, 'Oh
, get out -> Door open ->Jump'
willfly380, I may be wrong about this (and if so, whacks to the noggin accepted) but would you want to add to your list something related to the 180 @ 5 ATC call ...
"Didn't say no to the controller." One now and again has to do that.
As of the info currently available, one doesn't know what their approach planning process/brief was for the visual approach (IIRC, NOTAM for ILS was available) to the runway. With that in mind, you may be able to make the case for their desired/expected approach profile to get hurried or disrupted by accepting that ATC call, which was probalby aimed at a sequencing issue ATC was working (as they tend to do at busy airports ... ) That has the potential of putting a crew behind the aircraft, or in catch-up mode, in working to get the approach stable in time and on profile.
Granted, pilots deal with this near busy airports every day, because that is part of the business.
"Didn't say no to the controller." One now and again has to do that.
As of the info currently available, one doesn't know what their approach planning process/brief was for the visual approach (IIRC, NOTAM for ILS was available) to the runway. With that in mind, you may be able to make the case for their desired/expected approach profile to get hurried or disrupted by accepting that ATC call, which was probalby aimed at a sequencing issue ATC was working (as they tend to do at busy airports ... ) That has the potential of putting a crew behind the aircraft, or in catch-up mode, in working to get the approach stable in time and on profile.
Granted, pilots deal with this near busy airports every day, because that is part of the business.
Last edited by Lonewolf_50; 10th Jul 2013 at 14:48.
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737, not at all, I agree with you. But one persons engine failure could be another's visual approach (based on testimony of Korean pilots on this thread), possibly they were performing better than 'normal', scary thought, or maybe they were maxed out. Who knows.
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willfly380 ... To your interesting list might I add:
Had an autopilot/autothrottle system which was capable of allowing the aircraft to be driven into the ground automatically.
This has been alluded to up thread but seemed to receive little comment. I appreciate that training should eliminate the risk, but the inherent abiilty of automatic systems to do exactly the worst possible thing (minimise power, ignore airspeed and altitude) appears to be a potential factor.
Had an autopilot/autothrottle system which was capable of allowing the aircraft to be driven into the ground automatically.
This has been alluded to up thread but seemed to receive little comment. I appreciate that training should eliminate the risk, but the inherent abiilty of automatic systems to do exactly the worst possible thing (minimise power, ignore airspeed and altitude) appears to be a potential factor.
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The autothrottle can support stall protection when armed and not activated. If
speed decreases to near stick shaker activation, the autothrottle automatically activates in the appropriate mode (SPD or THR REF) and advances thrust to maintain minimum maneuvering speed (approximately the top of the amber band) or the speed set in the mode control speed window, whichever is greater. The EICAS message AIRSPEED LOW displays.
Note: When the pitch mode is FLCH or TOGA, or the airplane is below 400 feet above the airport on takeoff, or below 100 feet radio altitude on approach,
the autothrottle will not automatically activate.
speed decreases to near stick shaker activation, the autothrottle automatically activates in the appropriate mode (SPD or THR REF) and advances thrust to maintain minimum maneuvering speed (approximately the top of the amber band) or the speed set in the mode control speed window, whichever is greater. The EICAS message AIRSPEED LOW displays.
Note: When the pitch mode is FLCH or TOGA, or the airplane is below 400 feet above the airport on takeoff, or below 100 feet radio altitude on approach,
the autothrottle will not automatically activate.
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AstonZ ... Exactly ... "if" and "will not". Thereby creating an automatic potential failure mode.
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Not necessarily so
Nitpicker
While your assertion (That's why all Airlines have stabilized approach criteria AND competent crews follow it.) surely sounds fine and upstanding, the facts are different. Both ASIAS (US Domestic) and STEADS (ICAO International) data and FSF studies show that between 3% and 5% of all flights engaging in air commerce experience an unstable approach. Approximately 5% of those flights actually conduct a Go Around.
While we all believe we are highly professional and can come on these boards and assert ALL COMPETENT pilots adhere to stable approach criteria, the facts are a small percentage of us, accounting for an incredibly huge number of operations every day, DON'T adhere to these policies. Hanging these guys out to dry for doing what 4% of us do every day, only because they had a bad outcome, does not lend itself to correcting the real problem.
While your assertion (That's why all Airlines have stabilized approach criteria AND competent crews follow it.) surely sounds fine and upstanding, the facts are different. Both ASIAS (US Domestic) and STEADS (ICAO International) data and FSF studies show that between 3% and 5% of all flights engaging in air commerce experience an unstable approach. Approximately 5% of those flights actually conduct a Go Around.
While we all believe we are highly professional and can come on these boards and assert ALL COMPETENT pilots adhere to stable approach criteria, the facts are a small percentage of us, accounting for an incredibly huge number of operations every day, DON'T adhere to these policies. Hanging these guys out to dry for doing what 4% of us do every day, only because they had a bad outcome, does not lend itself to correcting the real problem.
Last edited by pipeliner; 10th Jul 2013 at 15:19.
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aston - that looks remarkably like the Airbus system as described earlier - is that definitely 777?
1. 777 Thrust increases to maintain "Min Manoeuvre speed" (Airbus if it triggers goes TOGA and a bit tricky to get out of it!)
2. FLCH on 777 disables it (for whatever reason) - on Airbus no normal mode can disable it except <100R (when likely too late anyway)
The crucial aspect in aston's post I had not NB'd is that the mode also triggers the "AIRSPEED LOW" EICAS. So v-v, if in FLCH it seems you will not get the "AIRSPEED LOW" EICAS either?
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I think too much is being read into the fact that this was the Line Training Captain's first trip as such.
WillFly380 has questioned the wisdom of pairing a new LTC with a trainee Captain. A new LTC has to start somewhere, and a trip, not with a trainee Captain, but an experienced Captain converting to type seems as good a starting point as any. He could have had a 250hr cadet on his plate, although that may have focused his attention somewhat more. No, the answer to this quandry does not lie in the training office.
Line training issues aside, the ability of near on 25,000hrs of combined flight time crew to not notice the bleed off of 30 knots below Vref is somewhat alarming no matter what the type of approach.
The fact that the approach was not thrown away at 500 feet for not being stable is of concern. 'Hundred Percent Please', #1398, tells us
"So for the PF, it may have been easy to revert to 320 operating mode. His levers haven't moved (as expected), he has regained the profile at 500 thus avoiding a G/A due unstable and now he just has to guide the A/C to the touchdown markings."
Regaining profile at 500 with thrust at idle is not avoiding G/A as unstable. From the information released, at 500', the speed was 134kts cf a Vref of 137kts and with a downward trend so the approach was unstable on a least 2 counts. A big chance a avoiding what was to follow missed.
The auto-throttle response or lack of it, should I say, is another point of interest. Surely at 500' when they "regained the profile", an inside scan would have revealed a downward trending speed and no AT wake-up. Surely time to "push 'em up"? But no, the aircraft fell off the profile and into three reds on the PAPIs and then four reds before the crew woke up to their plight, by which time the stable door was wide open and the horse was a cloud of dust on the horizon. This on a visual approach where eyes should have been on the runway and therefore the PAPIs.
I believe the CVR will provide shed more light on this accident than the FDR.
WillFly380 has questioned the wisdom of pairing a new LTC with a trainee Captain. A new LTC has to start somewhere, and a trip, not with a trainee Captain, but an experienced Captain converting to type seems as good a starting point as any. He could have had a 250hr cadet on his plate, although that may have focused his attention somewhat more. No, the answer to this quandry does not lie in the training office.
Line training issues aside, the ability of near on 25,000hrs of combined flight time crew to not notice the bleed off of 30 knots below Vref is somewhat alarming no matter what the type of approach.
The fact that the approach was not thrown away at 500 feet for not being stable is of concern. 'Hundred Percent Please', #1398, tells us
"So for the PF, it may have been easy to revert to 320 operating mode. His levers haven't moved (as expected), he has regained the profile at 500 thus avoiding a G/A due unstable and now he just has to guide the A/C to the touchdown markings."
Regaining profile at 500 with thrust at idle is not avoiding G/A as unstable. From the information released, at 500', the speed was 134kts cf a Vref of 137kts and with a downward trend so the approach was unstable on a least 2 counts. A big chance a avoiding what was to follow missed.
The auto-throttle response or lack of it, should I say, is another point of interest. Surely at 500' when they "regained the profile", an inside scan would have revealed a downward trending speed and no AT wake-up. Surely time to "push 'em up"? But no, the aircraft fell off the profile and into three reds on the PAPIs and then four reds before the crew woke up to their plight, by which time the stable door was wide open and the horse was a cloud of dust on the horizon. This on a visual approach where eyes should have been on the runway and therefore the PAPIs.
I believe the CVR will provide shed more light on this accident than the FDR.
Meanwhile as the debate rages here, the Chosun Ilbo and the Korea Herald seem to be, perhaps quite naturally, suggesting mechanical failure:
Automatic throttle faulty in crash: pilot-The Korea Herald
Automatic throttle faulty in crash: pilot-The Korea Herald
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I really really hope the I assumed go-around attitude and went to push the throttles forward is a got lost in translation kinda thing.
I mean if the EPR isn't up and you pull a lot of pitch.........
I mean if the EPR isn't up and you pull a lot of pitch.........