Asiana flight crash at San Francisco
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I thought it had been established from the NTSB that VS mode was engaged not FLCH.
The NTSB Chair is very clear about what she is passing on, and not to draw inferences beyond that.
IIRC she said that one Flt Crew member recalled, at ~4000 (?)', they were in V/S ~1500'/m. It was purely the interview recollection at one point in time from 1 person / interview.
Very different from a (theoretical/future) NTSB report aspect that the FDR revealed the ATHR mode active/engaged at the time the speed fell below target.
I think the NTSB chair is doing an excellent job is clarifying what she is saying... and I think we should do our best to honour that clarity.
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Air Line Pilots Association issued this statement. They don't seem to be liking NTSB's daily conferences much.
The Air Line Pilots Association said it was "stunned by the amount of operational data" the board has released. Without the proper context and detailed analysis, according to the union, "prematurely releasing" such information "encourages wild speculation."
ALPA, among other things, called on the NTSB to determine if the pilots had adequate training to use onboard navigation aids for a visual approach, on a day when the primary ground-based landing aids for the strip had been turned off due to runway improvements. The union also urged the board to look at whether there were differences between what the pilots saw on their instruments, versus information subsequently downloaded from the plane's flight-data recorder.
The Air Line Pilots Association said it was "stunned by the amount of operational data" the board has released. Without the proper context and detailed analysis, according to the union, "prematurely releasing" such information "encourages wild speculation."
ALPA, among other things, called on the NTSB to determine if the pilots had adequate training to use onboard navigation aids for a visual approach, on a day when the primary ground-based landing aids for the strip had been turned off due to runway improvements. The union also urged the board to look at whether there were differences between what the pilots saw on their instruments, versus information subsequently downloaded from the plane's flight-data recorder.
Last edited by ross_M; 10th Jul 2013 at 08:02.
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I thought it had been established from the NTSB that VS mode was engaged not FLCH.
But even if so, if FLCH set to zero is potentially a likely disaster scenario (as it seems from the discussion here; perhaps not the culprit in this case.) it deserves a closer look.
Last edited by ross_M; 10th Jul 2013 at 08:05.
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Props are for boats!
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STAR or CCQ training adequate?
The report says the pilot had B-737 experience and his recent experience was A320. I wonder what was his 777 conversion rating an abbreviated STAR course or full length conversion. Don't know if it has any bearing, but if you coming off an Airbus onto a Boeing or vice versa a STAR or CCQ course may not be adequate. Irrespective if you have Boeing time already.
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Coming from past experience here. A Go around with thrust at idle is very different from a go around with engine stable at approach thrust. If you Go Around with idle thrust rotate like you would normally do like you have been trained you will loose even more speed as the engines take a while to spool up. This is why a lot of operators want you stable by 500 minimums including thrust stable at landing thrust, so if you do have to go around the thrust is there available. My opinion and only my opinion is that the nose went up for the G/A and the speed decayed. Then they got the stick shaker before the engines had time to spool up.
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Originally Posted by nitpicker330
HPSOVL:-- so how do you explain a 777 qualified crew member current on type and a member of the crew NOT noticing their unusual attitude and low IAS?? Not to mention not noticing the thrust levers were closed...
He had nothing else to do in the jump seat other than monitor what the two buffoons were doing 2 feet in front of him.
Either he's stupid or HE DIDN'T SPEAK UP.
He had nothing else to do in the jump seat other than monitor what the two buffoons were doing 2 feet in front of him.
Either he's stupid or HE DIDN'T SPEAK UP.
1.) They were unduly focused on the glideslope/approach.
2.) They were overly distracted by the training of the PF since this was his first landing on the 777 and they wanted him to be successful.
3.) As someone else has pointed out elsewhere in the thread, the PF may have had a case of "perfectlanding-itis" since it was his first on type and he wanted to impress his trainers.
4.) The PF may have been apprehensive/less confident since this was his first landing on type at this airport causing him more stress than usual. Also see # 3.
5.) PM may have been distracted by other things such as checklists, communication and/or the other gazillion things pilots have to worry about during approach.
6.) Landing over water may have created an illusion where they didn't notice their speed/altitude until too late.
7.) The approach was so close, that it appeared to be almost do-able until the very last seconds.
8.) THEY ALL ASSUMED THE AUTO-THROTTLE WOULD TAKE CARE OF THEIR SPEED.
9.) They were lulled into a false sense of security by clear weather; which may have also made them more hesitant to go-around, since "any pilot can land in these conditions!"
10.) THEY ALL ASSUMED THE AUTO-THROTTLE WOULD MAINTAIN SPEED
11.) It was at end of a long-haul flight.
The FO in the backseat DID notice they were too slow and called out "Speed!" 7 seconds before impact.
It took the Training Captain a precious 5 seconds to realize the auto-throttles weren't maintaining speed and he called go-around 2 seconds before crash.
Had he acted immediately to go-around, when FO called the speed issue, perhaps he could've saved it.
They did what they were suppost to do, just 10 seconds too late.
---------------------------------
Also this isn't the first time a training captain or safety pilot get distracted by their duties as trainers and it causes an accident. Although it's designed to provide an extra layer of safety, it has probably been a factor in some accidents! - Like the over-reliance on automation, it lulls you into a false since of security by thinking someone else is monitoring/taking care of things.
Same thing with the weather. Remember that statistically, most mid-air collisions occur in sunny, VFR weather! Things catch you when you least expect!
--------------------------------
To the infallible 'Super-Pilots' slagging these guys, THIS COULD EASILY HAVE BEEN YOU!
How would you feel if that one mistake or oversight - out of the countless you have made or have seen made - resulted in the deaths of two of your passengers?
I think these guys deserve our complete sympathy and support. It's a terrible tragedy all around.
Last edited by Knot Apilot; 10th Jul 2013 at 16:16.
Nitpicker/Flap 5,
Not looking to apportion blame (clearly) but just looking to understand how someone could get into this position.
A visual approach from a slightly high position in a 320 is flown:
He was flying A/P off, F/D off, levers in one position.
In the 320 you would monitor airspeed carefully, to ensure IAS was above target - just to ensure idle thrust. Regain the profile at just above 500 (as they did) and then, in a 320:
What I am suggesting is that it is possible, at this point, to become complacent with speed. I am not saying it is right, I am saying that it is a possible failing of modern pilots. Because the machine always works, it will work today.
So for the PF, it may have been easy to revert to 320 operating mode. His levers haven't moved (as expected), he has regained the profile at 500 thus avoiding a G/A due unstable and now he just has to guide the A/C to the touchdown markings.
Now, at around 300' it has all gone wrong. For the PF:
The CVR recording from below 600' may well provide the biggest clues, and may provide the key to ensuring this doesn't happen again.
Furthermore, some nasty A/T failures in the sim for pilots working on highly reliable, highly automated a/c may be worthwhile too. An unannunciated thrust lock at 400' with the thrust set slightly too low in a 320.... I would bet that that would catch out a good 5% of pilots, even western ones.
Not looking to apportion blame (clearly) but just looking to understand how someone could get into this position.
A visual approach from a slightly high position in a 320 is flown:
- A/P off, F/D off (bird on), levers in one position.
He was flying A/P off, F/D off, levers in one position.
In the 320 you would monitor airspeed carefully, to ensure IAS was above target - just to ensure idle thrust. Regain the profile at just above 500 (as they did) and then, in a 320:
- The thrust levers don't move
- Speed is looked after for you
- You have full flight envelope protection
What I am suggesting is that it is possible, at this point, to become complacent with speed. I am not saying it is right, I am saying that it is a possible failing of modern pilots. Because the machine always works, it will work today.
So for the PF, it may have been easy to revert to 320 operating mode. His levers haven't moved (as expected), he has regained the profile at 500 thus avoiding a G/A due unstable and now he just has to guide the A/C to the touchdown markings.
Now, at around 300' it has all gone wrong. For the PF:
- His right hand is indicating situation normal (for him, in 320-reverted mode) but,
- He will be confused about the sagging flight path and increasing pitch.
The CVR recording from below 600' may well provide the biggest clues, and may provide the key to ensuring this doesn't happen again.
Furthermore, some nasty A/T failures in the sim for pilots working on highly reliable, highly automated a/c may be worthwhile too. An unannunciated thrust lock at 400' with the thrust set slightly too low in a 320.... I would bet that that would catch out a good 5% of pilots, even western ones.
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- At 200 feet he noticed the four PAPIs were red, the airspeed was in the hatched(sp?) area on the Speed Tape. He recognized that the auto-throtles were not maintaining speed and he established a GO-AROUND Attitude.
- He went to push the throttles forward but stated the other pilot had already pushed the throttles forward.
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The triple is, absolutely, automation done almost 100% correct. It is the easiest airliner to fly, by far, and the most intuitive for pilots coming from something other than an airbus.
The stuff up a visual approach, in visual conditions, is appalling, but I am only surprised it has taken this long. Many carriers around the world are using FOQA data recorders for punishment of their pilots. The result is the CP's and pilots are reluctant to hand fly, or turn the auto-throttles off, ever. While this may reduce the number of exceedences on a daily basis, it destroys pilot proficiency.
I flew as an airbus captain for 2 asian carriers. The 320 has an AP limit of 100 after takeoff. Both airlines I flew for,almost every single pilot I flew with turned the AP on at 100.1 feet, and turned it off at the last moment legal by SOP and FCOM on landing. Autothrust was used exclusively. I can't tell you how many landings they stuffed up in perfect weather. I probably did 15 go arounds in 4 years because my flying partner could not safely land in VMC conditions. Double that number for stuffed up approaches.
If you don't maintain your flying skills, you lose them. It is especially bad on long haul flying as you don't get many landings and takeoffs anyway.
Asiana, Air France, and the last couple of regional crashes in the US were all due to the inability to BASICALLY FLY AN AIRCRAFT.
The stuff up a visual approach, in visual conditions, is appalling, but I am only surprised it has taken this long. Many carriers around the world are using FOQA data recorders for punishment of their pilots. The result is the CP's and pilots are reluctant to hand fly, or turn the auto-throttles off, ever. While this may reduce the number of exceedences on a daily basis, it destroys pilot proficiency.
I flew as an airbus captain for 2 asian carriers. The 320 has an AP limit of 100 after takeoff. Both airlines I flew for,almost every single pilot I flew with turned the AP on at 100.1 feet, and turned it off at the last moment legal by SOP and FCOM on landing. Autothrust was used exclusively. I can't tell you how many landings they stuffed up in perfect weather. I probably did 15 go arounds in 4 years because my flying partner could not safely land in VMC conditions. Double that number for stuffed up approaches.
If you don't maintain your flying skills, you lose them. It is especially bad on long haul flying as you don't get many landings and takeoffs anyway.
Asiana, Air France, and the last couple of regional crashes in the US were all due to the inability to BASICALLY FLY AN AIRCRAFT.
Air Line Pilots Association issued this statement. They don't seem to be liking NTSB's daily conferences much.
The Air Line Pilots Association said it was "stunned by the amount of operational data" the board has released. Without the proper context and detailed analysis, according to the union, "prematurely releasing" such information "encourages wild speculation."
The Air Line Pilots Association said it was "stunned by the amount of operational data" the board has released. Without the proper context and detailed analysis, according to the union, "prematurely releasing" such information "encourages wild speculation."
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I can't believe some of the posts blaming the manufacturer, airport, etc.
Sadly, the swiss cheese analogy contributes to this excusing away of human error.
This is not a statement on the cause of the Asiana mishap, but on the statements being made that led to the quoted post:
Typically most crew, weather, airport and aircraft "frailty" issues are known (or at least available) to the members of the crew prior to push back from the departure gate, and thus should be taken into account as part of their pre-flight preparations. In short, the holes in these slices of cheese are known to the crew, and those slices should be positioned to keep these holes from "lining up" before the aircraft left the ground.
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HundredPercentPlease - a good summary, I feel, but I would like clarification on what you say about 'normality' of throttle lever position for PF - as I understand it, the 320 levers would be well forward in the same situation with engines at or near idle?
There is, despite 'objections' from some here, a real parallel with the Turkish at AMS regarding lack of speed monitoring, and again a TC with a jumpseat pilot. As others have said, a 'trend' which needs stopping PDQ.
There is, despite 'objections' from some here, a real parallel with the Turkish at AMS regarding lack of speed monitoring, and again a TC with a jumpseat pilot. As others have said, a 'trend' which needs stopping PDQ.
Ok here is my 0.00001 cent's worth.
Here comes the BIG reason why the autothrottle is ON (normally) during any approach on a 777, as opposed to any older type of boeing.
The tripple is fly by wire. You don't need to trim the airplane, exept when you are changing the airspeed. So configuration changes (flaps) have no influence on your in-trim condition.
Example: config = 180kts flaps 5. You want to configure further for landing. So you ask for gear down flaps 20, and if you want to leave your speed at 180 kts, YOU DO NOT HAVE TO TRIM. All effects such as ballooning due to more flaps, are trimmed away automatically. Also, the autothrottle will help you enormously by adding more thrust due to more drag. This added thrust would normally create a pitch up effect due to the under-wing mounted engines, but.....THIS EFFECT IS ALSO TRIMMED AWAY.
If you turn off the autothrottle, you will have to add thrust youself. All your own inputs for manual thust changes are going to be trimmed away by the auto trim function. So basically YOU are flying the aircraft, and someone else( the autotrim) is trimming!!!
This is cumbersome and sort of more difficult, but not impossible. Maybe not desireable after a long haul flight though.
However.
When you turn off the pmc's this will also turn off the autotrim (and much more such as the autopilot). this is great fun because it will turn your 777 in a large 737!!
We had to do this some time ago in a type recurrent.
Here comes the BIG reason why the autothrottle is ON (normally) during any approach on a 777, as opposed to any older type of boeing.
The tripple is fly by wire. You don't need to trim the airplane, exept when you are changing the airspeed. So configuration changes (flaps) have no influence on your in-trim condition.
Example: config = 180kts flaps 5. You want to configure further for landing. So you ask for gear down flaps 20, and if you want to leave your speed at 180 kts, YOU DO NOT HAVE TO TRIM. All effects such as ballooning due to more flaps, are trimmed away automatically. Also, the autothrottle will help you enormously by adding more thrust due to more drag. This added thrust would normally create a pitch up effect due to the under-wing mounted engines, but.....THIS EFFECT IS ALSO TRIMMED AWAY.
If you turn off the autothrottle, you will have to add thrust youself. All your own inputs for manual thust changes are going to be trimmed away by the auto trim function. So basically YOU are flying the aircraft, and someone else( the autotrim) is trimming!!!
This is cumbersome and sort of more difficult, but not impossible. Maybe not desireable after a long haul flight though.
However.
When you turn off the pmc's this will also turn off the autotrim (and much more such as the autopilot). this is great fun because it will turn your 777 in a large 737!!
We had to do this some time ago in a type recurrent.
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Hang on a moment tillnexttime; nobody is trying to blame ”the other guy”. The more plausible posters are trying to understand all the causal factors in order to learn from the event.
I think when the flight data is collated and reproduced in a sim there will be a better understanding. Its far too simplistic to simply say they were stoopid.
I think when the flight data is collated and reproduced in a sim there will be a better understanding. Its far too simplistic to simply say they were stoopid.
Last edited by HPSOV L; 10th Jul 2013 at 09:01. Reason: spelling
The Air Line Pilots Association said it was "stunned by the amount of operational data" the board has released. Without the proper context and detailed analysis, according to the union, "prematurely releasing" such information "encourages wild speculation."
If the accident had happened in the UK would AIB be issuing such statements?
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I did think Deborah handled the presentation well, but I agree with it being a little 'premature' since it is based only on statements and 'observations' before both CVR and FDR have been analysed (unless, of course, a 'sneak' view has been had). We must treat the 'information' released as preliminary and not jump to conclusions.
Out of interest, are the IAS's being quoted from observed data (ADSB or radar) or crew statements?
Out of interest, are the IAS's being quoted from observed data (ADSB or radar) or crew statements?