Asiana flight crash at San Francisco
Join Date: Apr 2009
Location: Oakland, CA
Age: 72
Posts: 427
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
The problem was mode confusion not the inability to fly a visual approach.
Last edited by olasek; 22nd Jul 2013 at 06:16.
Originally Posted by junebug172
...For that to be true, however, a pilot must have basic stick and rudder skills. That's something not found too often with an initio pilots at foreign carriers.
These pilots are trained right into automation instead of learning the basic skills of airmanship.
These pilots are trained right into automation instead of learning the basic skills of airmanship.
Shares in shipping lines, anyone?
bubbers
Best not make comments like that unless you want folks to throw the likes of Colgan and Comair 5191 back at you.
Now back to the thread.
We make our pilots fly properly
Now back to the thread.
Last edited by wiggy; 22nd Jul 2013 at 06:23.
Join Date: Jul 2013
Location: on an island
Age: 81
Posts: 27
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
olasek
At this point in time, stating that the crew had an "inability" to monitor the approach is a bit of a stretch. However, it definitely appears that they did not monitor it, nor control it. The mishap investigators' job will be to determine why the approach was not monitored or controlled. As the AA "magenta" video points out, automation can lead to bad habits and inappropriate dependency.
I investigated a number of mishaps where highly proficient pilots made horrible errors, simply by assuming the maneuver or mission being conducted was just like every one before it, and thus overlooked what most would identify (after the fact) as obvious indications that things were otherwise. As I noted back a ways, one of the most sage pieces of advice we received in flight school was, "No flight should be treated as routine until the post mission debrief." The critical thing in any mishap investigation is to learn the "why" and then get other aircrew members to avoid or deal with that "why".
I doubt this crew was presented any "surprises" in arrival and approach to SFO. Every "complicating" factor that has been thrown out (fatigue, visual approach, lack of familiarity, etc) was known (or the info readily available) before takeoff.
It is irrelevant. The problem was much more basic - inability to monitor approach.
I investigated a number of mishaps where highly proficient pilots made horrible errors, simply by assuming the maneuver or mission being conducted was just like every one before it, and thus overlooked what most would identify (after the fact) as obvious indications that things were otherwise. As I noted back a ways, one of the most sage pieces of advice we received in flight school was, "No flight should be treated as routine until the post mission debrief." The critical thing in any mishap investigation is to learn the "why" and then get other aircrew members to avoid or deal with that "why".
I doubt this crew was presented any "surprises" in arrival and approach to SFO. Every "complicating" factor that has been thrown out (fatigue, visual approach, lack of familiarity, etc) was known (or the info readily available) before takeoff.
Last edited by tilnextime; 22nd Jul 2013 at 07:34.
Join Date: Sep 2009
Location: Retired-ville
Posts: 402
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
With so many comments concerning incompetence bordering on negligence, it is interesting that the authorities have seen fit to allow them to travel/escape back to Korea. There must be a good reason for that, right??
If one compares what the authorities would do with say a cross-border Mexican long-haul truck driver, who let's say was involved in a significant, but single vehicle accident causing the deaths of multiple pedestrians, where culpable negligence seemed likely, I doubt the truck driver would be allowed to leave pending their decision on whether to press charges in relation to the deaths.
That the US have allowed the prime suspects in the Asiana crash to leave the US, would either be indicative of pressure from for example the State Dept to prevent their detention turning into a political hot potato for the current administration, or, just possibly the NTSB investigation may not have enough evidence of culpable negligence to recommend charges being brought against the Asiana crew.
It begs the question - does being incompetent, when it results in a crash and deaths, mean that crew such as this, should be held fully accountable for their woeful lack of ability and awareness, and be subject to the appropriate legal system?
IIRC, Capt Barry Woods was interrogated for 2 days before being charged, and he was not allowed to leave Korea after the Cheju incident.
Double standards anyone?
If one compares what the authorities would do with say a cross-border Mexican long-haul truck driver, who let's say was involved in a significant, but single vehicle accident causing the deaths of multiple pedestrians, where culpable negligence seemed likely, I doubt the truck driver would be allowed to leave pending their decision on whether to press charges in relation to the deaths.
That the US have allowed the prime suspects in the Asiana crash to leave the US, would either be indicative of pressure from for example the State Dept to prevent their detention turning into a political hot potato for the current administration, or, just possibly the NTSB investigation may not have enough evidence of culpable negligence to recommend charges being brought against the Asiana crew.
It begs the question - does being incompetent, when it results in a crash and deaths, mean that crew such as this, should be held fully accountable for their woeful lack of ability and awareness, and be subject to the appropriate legal system?
IIRC, Capt Barry Woods was interrogated for 2 days before being charged, and he was not allowed to leave Korea after the Cheju incident.
Double standards anyone?
Join Date: Apr 2009
Location: Oakland, CA
Age: 72
Posts: 427
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
You got it all wrong, NTSB has no power to charge Korean pilots (or any other pilots) with anything, their role is to investigate accidents, write reports and suggest remedies, if anybody wants to charge these pilots it would have to be somebody in Korea. Since this was a foreign crew they could not even take their blood samples. Criminal prosecution of pilots after accidents is quite rare. In the US you would have to prove not just a negligence but 'criminal negligence', basic incompetence is not grounds (in the US) for criminal prosecution.
Last edited by olasek; 22nd Jul 2013 at 08:07.
Join Date: Dec 2005
Location: Middle Kingdom
Posts: 33
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Automation was designed to reduce your work load, not fly your airplane because you can't.
Join Date: Feb 2000
Location: Alaska, PNG, etc.
Age: 60
Posts: 1,550
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
With so many comments concerning incompetence bordering on negligence, it is interesting that the authorities have seen fit to allow them to travel/escape back to Korea. There must be a good reason for that, right??
Your assumption that this somehow proves something about the competence of the pilots is flawed from the very start.
Autothrottle will wake up a few knots before the stall, let's say 107 kt.
Join Date: Oct 2009
Location: UK
Posts: 1,270
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Hi Wizofoz,
If that was the scenario, then it's a pity that the pilots did not wake up either.
With clues like the Thrust Levers are still back at idle, and the aircraft is getting very heavy in pitch requiring trimming and pulling back on the elevator, and an usually high nose up attitude, etc.
Autothrottle will NOT wake up.
With clues like the Thrust Levers are still back at idle, and the aircraft is getting very heavy in pitch requiring trimming and pulling back on the elevator, and an usually high nose up attitude, etc.
Join Date: Dec 2002
Location: Inside an airplane
Posts: 58
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Stabilized approach criteria:
Aircraft fully configured for landing with all checklist completed.
Rate of descent, speed and thrust compatible to be maintained until flare over the touchdown zone.
Aligned with the runway centerline, if there is one, and with the target touchdown point insight following visual references (PAPI - VASI - etc...)
Preferably hand flying the airplane after disconnecting auto-pilot and auto-throttle.
On one of my MOT checks I was asked the EPR to be maintained during final approach. In that particular day (after mentioning the weight, density altitude and other factors affecting EPR settings) was 1.05. This case was just a gross pilot error and lack of monitoring from the other crew in the cockpit.
A perfectly airworthy aircraft flown to the ground, no excuses.
Not the first time, not the last time.
There is no magic pill to give a pilot experience and the Alteon guys are no miracle mans.
The case here is more cultural than any other thing and will take centuries to fix it.
My 0.005 cents
Aircraft fully configured for landing with all checklist completed.
Rate of descent, speed and thrust compatible to be maintained until flare over the touchdown zone.
Aligned with the runway centerline, if there is one, and with the target touchdown point insight following visual references (PAPI - VASI - etc...)
Preferably hand flying the airplane after disconnecting auto-pilot and auto-throttle.
On one of my MOT checks I was asked the EPR to be maintained during final approach. In that particular day (after mentioning the weight, density altitude and other factors affecting EPR settings) was 1.05. This case was just a gross pilot error and lack of monitoring from the other crew in the cockpit.
A perfectly airworthy aircraft flown to the ground, no excuses.
Not the first time, not the last time.
There is no magic pill to give a pilot experience and the Alteon guys are no miracle mans.
The case here is more cultural than any other thing and will take centuries to fix it.
My 0.005 cents
Join Date: Nov 2007
Location: SEA
Posts: 113
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Lake...allow me to disagree, a visual approach or any approach for that matter involves speed monitoring, basic scanning....A/T on or not. This was not a speed excursion, we are taking about 30 knots. In a cessna if your approach speed decreases 30%, you crash. The automatics in a 777 are quite straight forward, in FLCH you pitch for speed, throttles at idle....VNAV you thrust for speed throttles move to look for the window speed. I have to stand by my comment, this was about training, company culture and rusty, if existent, basic flying skills. I wouldn't even hold these guys accountable if throughout the years they were told that they were competent.
Join Date: Jun 2001
Location: Rockytop, Tennessee, USA
Posts: 5,898
Likes: 0
Received 1 Like
on
1 Post
IIRC, Capt Barry Woods was interrogated for 2 days before being charged, and he was not allowed to leave Korea after the Cheju incident.
Double standards anyone?
Double standards anyone?
.It is possible that the OZ 214 pilots would also have more risk of prosecution in South Korea so I'm not sure I'd call it a double standard:
However, before leaving San Francisco on Friday, the pilots told associates they are concerned that their government intends to hit them with criminal charges for lapses in the cockpit.
Last edited by Airbubba; 22nd Jul 2013 at 14:07.
Join Date: Jul 2002
Location: Ireland
Posts: 596
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I wouldn't even hold these guys accountable if throughout the years they were told that they were competent.
In an incredibly highly regulated profession such as aviation, a person is not primarily hired to fly a plane because they are a good pilot. They are hired because they have fulfilled a certain amount of regulatory criteria involving, hours flown, training modules successfully completed, written examinations passed, check rides flown, sim sessions done etc. etc.
As this is highly target-driven, an ab initio student pilot transitions psychologically from 'learning to fly' to completing an increasingly complex series of tasks which end up with yet another 'box' being ticked. When the required number of boxes have been ticked, hours have been flown, sim sessions completed the student is not so much 'able' to fly as 'allowed' to fly. After all, many driving schools don't teach you to drive, they simply teach you to pass the driving test.
Anyway, back to the original point.
Does a 'modern', qualified pilot actually really know that they can fly competently or do they simply trust the 'system' to make that judgement about them?
You often see the phrase 'only a PPL' used on this forum as a self-put down or a justification for 'not posting something very useful to the debate'. At the risk of ruffling feathers, I would suggest that a qualified PPL has as accurate an assessment of their own flying skills if not more so, than a newly-qualified or low-time First Officer on a modern jet transport.
Join Date: Sep 2001
Location: Connecticut, USA
Age: 64
Posts: 252
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Vehicle that ran over girl not equipped with latest technology:
Rig that hit Asiana crash victim didn't have heat sensor installed - SFGate
Rig that hit Asiana crash victim didn't have heat sensor installed - SFGate
Does a 'modern', qualified pilot actually really know that they can fly competently or do they simply trust the 'system' to make that judgement about them?
One would hope that any decent training system would engender the idea of self analysis and criticism.
I recall a conversation with one of my trainers in a previous company as to how shocked he was that an experienced pilot on type who had joined from another company could barely control the aircraft on one engine (twin jet) during required maneuvers.
Personally I wouldn't want to just "scrape" through any regulatory check (especially as Captain or even Training Captain) but rather excel in the basic maneuvers to a standard well above the minimum.
One wonders whether these pilots are trained to think accordingly?
Join Date: Mar 2010
Location: Often in Jersey, but mainly in the past.
Age: 79
Posts: 7,807
Received 135 Likes
on
63 Posts
Personally I wouldn't want to just "scrape" through any regulatory check
My old RAF Form 5995 Certificate of Competency (like a Licensing Log Book, if you will) has pages and pages of certification - including (counting) 10 ATCEEB endorsements - including 3 as a Local Examining Officer at different Units. <pause for applause>
How much scrutiny, in that context, do Airline Captains/FOs get?
Is there an annual internal check?
Is there any external body that checks individuals, or the airline's checkers?
… or is it just down to the Company, reporting their licensing decisions to their National aviation authority?
"Quis custodes ipsos custodes", or something like that.
Last edited by MPN11; 22nd Jul 2013 at 16:20.
Join Date: Jan 2006
Location: US
Posts: 2,205
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Carlsberg -
420,000 lbs, flaps 30, Vref 132. Bug 137 kts.
Stall speed is 106 kts(777 uses 1.25 Vso).
The concept of a hand on the throttles, or resting on the throttle quadrant behind the throttles, even with A/T's 'ON' and actually checking the N1's when the A/T's move is becoming a thing of the past.
But to do it on final, with speed decaying, and not catch it for so long? I don't care what automation confusion existed, from 500' until approx. 100', or less, the plane was below Vref, with throttles at idle, idle N1's, and no one did anything. That's Piloting 101, not automation 401.
The speed in the MCP is set to 137kt, which includes 5 kt for the wind.
Vref is 132 kt, which is 1,3 stall speed
Stall speed is 101 kt.
Autothrottle will wake up a few knots before the stall, let's say 107 kt.
Auto throttle will not keep the speed at 137 kt in FLCH mode.
Vref is 132 kt, which is 1,3 stall speed
Stall speed is 101 kt.
Autothrottle will wake up a few knots before the stall, let's say 107 kt.
Auto throttle will not keep the speed at 137 kt in FLCH mode.
420,000 lbs, flaps 30, Vref 132. Bug 137 kts.
Stall speed is 106 kts(777 uses 1.25 Vso).
The concept of a hand on the throttles, or resting on the throttle quadrant behind the throttles, even with A/T's 'ON' and actually checking the N1's when the A/T's move is becoming a thing of the past.
But to do it on final, with speed decaying, and not catch it for so long? I don't care what automation confusion existed, from 500' until approx. 100', or less, the plane was below Vref, with throttles at idle, idle N1's, and no one did anything. That's Piloting 101, not automation 401.
MPN11,
In my last 6 monthly sim check, I had behind me a company/CAA examiner. Behind him was the company/CAA chap who checks all the examiners. And on that day, behind him, was the CAA boss man who checks the checker checker.
The dinasours on here who just close the case with "they failed to see so they are incompetent" I am so glad are not part of any investigation team. In fact, jumping to conclusions like that would cause them to fail our sim checks! We have know exactly WHY they failed to monitor, and make sure it never happens again. I have a feeling there will be sweeping changes throughout the industry.
In my last 6 monthly sim check, I had behind me a company/CAA examiner. Behind him was the company/CAA chap who checks all the examiners. And on that day, behind him, was the CAA boss man who checks the checker checker.
The dinasours on here who just close the case with "they failed to see so they are incompetent" I am so glad are not part of any investigation team. In fact, jumping to conclusions like that would cause them to fail our sim checks! We have know exactly WHY they failed to monitor, and make sure it never happens again. I have a feeling there will be sweeping changes throughout the industry.
