Incident at Heathrow
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V2500 Cowl Video....
As always, these videos are staged in a nicely lit, dry and stress free environment. They don't portray reality, where, out on the line, it may be cold and dark and oil and water is dripping on your face as you close the cowls.
I can see that there will be some kind of kneejerk reaction to this incident. New time-consuming safety procedures/paperwork will be implemented adding to the burden of the engineer, yet not being allowed the extra (ground) time by beancounters/management (in reality).
I see this happening in my own airline.Comment on sensors: Sensors are fine, up to the point where they start breaking down themselves. Engines cowls don't provide a very friendly enviroment. Then you start getting intermittent nuisance messages which eventually lead to complacency (perhaps a factor in the Lauda Air 767 engine reverser tragedy). Having said that, they may just work for fan cowls, as cowls can be visually, tactilely checked if there is a doubt (unlike reverser components).
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I just got a little annoyed by the repeated references to the V2500 as a product designed and/or manufactured by Airbus and the subsequent questioning as to why Airbus failed to redesign the offending parts.
The comparison with the DC10 cargo door is not out of place. They were also relying on "someone" to check that the door was properly closed. If, God forbid, there was a crash with loss of life everyone would be saying exactly the same thing "Ah, sure this happened before but nobody did anything about it".
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I do apologise if this has been asked before but do you really have to open the cowling to service the engine / IDG oil? In the 737s there are small access hatches on the sides of the engine cowling, I'm sure there is something similar in the IAE cowling too. Please feel free to correct me if I got it wrong.
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Not all "BA" are the same
Agree with Rik. As a lowly frequent flyer, it seems there is no doubt the crew did a fantastic job. Well done guys and this IS what we expect from full service airlines. However, let's see why this happened. IF it was poor maintenance and ignoring FAA advice, then ...
Avherald now has that same picture originally from a German publication, with a magnified view:
Incident: British Airways A319 near London on May 24th 2013, problems with both engines, doors on both engines missing
The old donks do look a little motheaten.
Whatever transpired before takeoff will eventually come out - the flying afterwards was well done.
Incident: British Airways A319 near London on May 24th 2013, problems with both engines, doors on both engines missing
The old donks do look a little motheaten.
Whatever transpired before takeoff will eventually come out - the flying afterwards was well done.
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Who says it was just oil servicing that required the cowls open? There are a multitude of reasons why they were opened that night, servicing, part number checks, lessor inspections, trouble shooting.
I have carried out many lessor inspections on overnight stops and we always ask for the cowls to be opened.
I have carried out many lessor inspections on overnight stops and we always ask for the cowls to be opened.
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Oh Dear Lord!
The time has surely come for this website (or forum) to be censored in order that the tripe, drivel and absolute 
spouted by pax, armchair captains, plane-spotters, playstation jockeys, the ignorant and the illiterate can be weeded out.
Posts by ILS27 and so many others reduce this 'site to a social-network place full of clueless gossiping teens
spouted by pax, armchair captains, plane-spotters, playstation jockeys, the ignorant and the illiterate can be weeded out.Posts by ILS27 and so many others reduce this 'site to a social-network place full of clueless gossiping teens
I suppose at BA the flight crew does not do a preflight inspection before flight, when departing from their home base. That is done by the AMT...?
At least this is how we do it in our airline. I never do the preflight at my home base, only at outstations.
At least this is how we do it in our airline. I never do the preflight at my home base, only at outstations.
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It is normal practice nowadays for the airframr manufacturer to have the engine manufacturer to supply the power plant package to hang on the wing, including the nacelle. Differences in engine design will mean that the cowling and inspection hatches will be different for for a IAE or GE powered aircraft. All engine related checks are regulated by the power plant supplier, which lets Airbus off the hook in case of some failure. 40 years ago when I was flogging aircraft, things were lot simpler, no engine choice and the customer only got to choose the paint job!!!
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Can somebody explain why an aircraft returns to LHR causing further disruption to both the airports and airlines operations. Given that there are other suitable 'quieter' airports to divert to LTN,STN,MSE for example where the impact of the arrival would not cause such upheaval. I appreciate that the passenger and crews safety is of paramount importance but was wondering if there is a procedural input into a diversion of this type as to where to land.
Thanks in advance
This question in no way detracts from the excellent airmanship involved in this specific incident, my question is of a general nature.
Thanks in advance
This question in no way detracts from the excellent airmanship involved in this specific incident, my question is of a general nature.
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I am very surprised by some comments regarding actual circumstances of maintenance activities being 'difficult' eg it's dark, cold, stressful, etc. and potential 'knee-jerk' reactions and 'time consuming' changes to procedures in response to whatever exactly happened.
Hello? We're talking about 75 passengers and crew flying over the heavily built-up capital of the UK.
They were very lucky that the cowls separated when they did without damaging the airframe. Given the starboard engine fire, can you imagine the consequences of the flight having been unable to make it back to LHR coming down anywhere along the approach to LHR?
Hello? We're talking about 75 passengers and crew flying over the heavily built-up capital of the UK.
They were very lucky that the cowls separated when they did without damaging the airframe. Given the starboard engine fire, can you imagine the consequences of the flight having been unable to make it back to LHR coming down anywhere along the approach to LHR?
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Uninformed comment
This thread has attracted a lot of very uninformed comment from people who have clearly never flown an airliner or opened and closed a set of cowls on a large fan engine.
The first thing I have to say is a big "well done" to the crew, your actions resulted in a sucsesfull outcome in an unusual situation and in my view any critsisum of the crew is totaly unwarranted. ( more about the "walk around" inspection by the crew later).
It is by now clear that the engine cowls had been left unlatched and these large composite structures departed from the aircraft due to the airflow and it is likely that the departing cowl damaged part of the engine fuel system. ( if this was a CFM56 I would have speculated that the cowl had damaged the outputs from the HMU that use fuel pressure to control the turbine and rotor active clearance control. This was a V2500 so comment on the likelyhood of this requires comment from someone who knows the V2500).
No doubt the BA engineering management are looking to hang someone for this maintenance error but it is likely that the root of this error is he fact that BA maintainence has been understaffed for some time and dispite finally belatedly realizing this it takes three years to get new maintenance staff online and a lot longer to get them to be 100% effective, so BA maintenance is well behind the drag curve on recruitment and manning levels. I am going to speculate that undermanning and the extra pressure of work put on those staff is at the root of this maintenance error ?
Could this mantanence error been picked up on the flight crews "walk around" inspection ? To this I have to say a very big YES !!!
At one time I had a nine inch flat blade screwdriver and one of the used of this was to check engine cowl security ( the other was to check the fuel dip sticks). I like all pilots are prohibited from having this tool as in this age of security paranoia I am not trusted as captain of the aircraft to carry such a dangerous weapon. If the guy doing the walk around inspection had access to a screwdriver he might have picked up the maintenance error but without such a tool there is no chance to do so.
So here we might well have the first clear link between the oppressive security culture and its adverse effect on flight safety.
The AAIB will no doubt investigate all of this bit just like the departure of the windshield from the BA BAe 1-11 twenty years or so back it is likely to be largely a human factors investigation.
The first thing I have to say is a big "well done" to the crew, your actions resulted in a sucsesfull outcome in an unusual situation and in my view any critsisum of the crew is totaly unwarranted. ( more about the "walk around" inspection by the crew later).
It is by now clear that the engine cowls had been left unlatched and these large composite structures departed from the aircraft due to the airflow and it is likely that the departing cowl damaged part of the engine fuel system. ( if this was a CFM56 I would have speculated that the cowl had damaged the outputs from the HMU that use fuel pressure to control the turbine and rotor active clearance control. This was a V2500 so comment on the likelyhood of this requires comment from someone who knows the V2500).
No doubt the BA engineering management are looking to hang someone for this maintenance error but it is likely that the root of this error is he fact that BA maintainence has been understaffed for some time and dispite finally belatedly realizing this it takes three years to get new maintenance staff online and a lot longer to get them to be 100% effective, so BA maintenance is well behind the drag curve on recruitment and manning levels. I am going to speculate that undermanning and the extra pressure of work put on those staff is at the root of this maintenance error ?
Could this mantanence error been picked up on the flight crews "walk around" inspection ? To this I have to say a very big YES !!!
At one time I had a nine inch flat blade screwdriver and one of the used of this was to check engine cowl security ( the other was to check the fuel dip sticks). I like all pilots are prohibited from having this tool as in this age of security paranoia I am not trusted as captain of the aircraft to carry such a dangerous weapon. If the guy doing the walk around inspection had access to a screwdriver he might have picked up the maintenance error but without such a tool there is no chance to do so.
So here we might well have the first clear link between the oppressive security culture and its adverse effect on flight safety.
The AAIB will no doubt investigate all of this bit just like the departure of the windshield from the BA BAe 1-11 twenty years or so back it is likely to be largely a human factors investigation.
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All incidents of this type have occurred despite multiple visual checks by engineers and pilots, clearly a misleading design which must be fixed
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Interesting piece on BBC Radio 4 just now. Their presenter happened to be at Swanwick yesterday recording a piece about future London airports, and asked the top man there about the decision to bring an aircraft in difficulty back to Heathrow over a large populated area with limited options, rather than go to say Stansted.
Controller chief's answer was that ultimately it is the pilot and crew who make the decisions, and they (ATC) are there to assist the crew. So presumably the implication is that ATC cannot "insist" that an aircraft diverts away from a populated area in case --in this instance--the crew might have found themselves committed to a Heathrow approach and the other engine failed.
Hell of a responsibility on the crew, maybe unfairly so.
Controller chief's answer was that ultimately it is the pilot and crew who make the decisions, and they (ATC) are there to assist the crew. So presumably the implication is that ATC cannot "insist" that an aircraft diverts away from a populated area in case --in this instance--the crew might have found themselves committed to a Heathrow approach and the other engine failed.
Hell of a responsibility on the crew, maybe unfairly so.
Last edited by EGCA; 25th May 2013 at 07:04.
Excellent and well informed post A & C.
However, lets not assume the cowls were left unlatched until the facts are known eh. Unlikely as it sounds, there could be a common mechanical failure or external factors.
Agnostique75
Indeed, you missed the fact that Rolls Royce was one of the founders of IAE and remains a huge supplier even though it sold it's share holding in the group a couple of years ago.
Nothing to do with cowlings/latches though.
However, lets not assume the cowls were left unlatched until the facts are known eh. Unlikely as it sounds, there could be a common mechanical failure or external factors.
Agnostique75
It is always unpleasant to see facts get in the way of a good session of Airbus bashing…
Nothing to do with cowlings/latches though.
Last edited by TURIN; 25th May 2013 at 07:26.
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Turin
Yes you are correct about my speculation as to the security of the cowl latches but it is difficult to come to any other conclusion.
It is clear from video evidence that the upper attachment of the cowls was secure and the simultaneous failure of multiple fasteners on two engines is so unlikely that I think it can be dismissed.
In short the evidence for the cowls being unsecured is overwhelming and knowing how they are secured I can't see any other explanation for the departure of the cowls on both engines.
The reason that the system failed to pick up this error before the aircraft left the ground is what is unclear BA has clearly got some very good flight crew but engineering has always been the Cinderella department of BA both in terms of finance and the way highly trained staff are treated by the management, I have to speculate that the reasons for this error are buried deep in the culture within BA maintenance as with the BAe1-11 incident, add to this the removal by airport "security" of the flight crews ability to double check the cowl security and all the holes in the Swiss cheese line up.
I am sure that the AAIB will get to the truth of the matter.
It is clear from video evidence that the upper attachment of the cowls was secure and the simultaneous failure of multiple fasteners on two engines is so unlikely that I think it can be dismissed.
In short the evidence for the cowls being unsecured is overwhelming and knowing how they are secured I can't see any other explanation for the departure of the cowls on both engines.
The reason that the system failed to pick up this error before the aircraft left the ground is what is unclear BA has clearly got some very good flight crew but engineering has always been the Cinderella department of BA both in terms of finance and the way highly trained staff are treated by the management, I have to speculate that the reasons for this error are buried deep in the culture within BA maintenance as with the BAe1-11 incident, add to this the removal by airport "security" of the flight crews ability to double check the cowl security and all the holes in the Swiss cheese line up.
I am sure that the AAIB will get to the truth of the matter.
Last edited by A and C; 25th May 2013 at 07:31.
Unfortunately, I have to agree. 