Lionair plane down in Bali.
Some 737 pilots in SE Asia would sometimes carry in their navigation bag, bottles of commercially available Rainex car window rain repellent, which was quite effective. At $5 a bottle, it was good insurance. Of course it had to wiped on to the windscreen before engine start if the forecast indicated heavy rain at the destination.
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The root causes of this accident cannot be simply sheeted home to the crew and the crew alone.
How about 1) Regulator MIA
2) Poor training
3) Corporate culture
4) Chief pilot attitude
5) Peer pressure
6) Company SOP's
There are probably a dozen other systemic latent failures still firmly cemented in place. All of the above reasons are pure guess work on my part, (however backed up by 40 years in the industry seeing it all happen again and again).
I am only guessing that all of the other culprits hiding behind desks will get away absolutely Scott free, and the poor old crew will get it in the neck. Unusually the crew are able to actually talk about what happened, in this instance, normally they would be in the morgue, and be unable to attempt to defend themselves.
The sobering reality is, the buck finally stops @ the flight deck, we, collectively, can stop this happening again by having our own "sensible SOP's".
OBEY THE BLOODY RULES"!!
I am bumping my gums in vein, because somewhere, someone, will do the same thing again. The only excuseable ways of loosing your life in an aircraft are, struck by a meteor, in in flight bomb, an uncontained fire, and a heart attack!! All other reasons are avoidable. The next crew to do something silly because of, peer pressure, lousy corporate culture, poor regulatory oversight, poor training, etc. etc. will probable not be able to talk about it.
How about 1) Regulator MIA
2) Poor training
3) Corporate culture
4) Chief pilot attitude
5) Peer pressure
6) Company SOP's
There are probably a dozen other systemic latent failures still firmly cemented in place. All of the above reasons are pure guess work on my part, (however backed up by 40 years in the industry seeing it all happen again and again).
I am only guessing that all of the other culprits hiding behind desks will get away absolutely Scott free, and the poor old crew will get it in the neck. Unusually the crew are able to actually talk about what happened, in this instance, normally they would be in the morgue, and be unable to attempt to defend themselves.
The sobering reality is, the buck finally stops @ the flight deck, we, collectively, can stop this happening again by having our own "sensible SOP's".
OBEY THE BLOODY RULES"!!
I am bumping my gums in vein, because somewhere, someone, will do the same thing again. The only excuseable ways of loosing your life in an aircraft are, struck by a meteor, in in flight bomb, an uncontained fire, and a heart attack!! All other reasons are avoidable. The next crew to do something silly because of, peer pressure, lousy corporate culture, poor regulatory oversight, poor training, etc. etc. will probable not be able to talk about it.
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Indonese syndrome
Count the number of MONTHS..before the next statistic...if not weather ity is plane trtouble if not plane trouble it is pilot trouble if not pilot trouble it is rergulation trouble and if not that...it is airline growin too quickly trouble..but trouble will always be there..w.be forewarned!
The sobering reality is, the buck finally stops @ the flight deck, we,
collectively, can stop this happening again by having our own "sensible SOP's".
collectively, can stop this happening again by having our own "sensible SOP's".
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You are absolutely correct the Pelair ditching is a black mark on Australia's aviation record. The "system" did its absolute best to make sure that he crew copped ALL of the blame.
It is what public servants do best, when he s&$t hits the fan it is a disaster, however if a public servant can be nailed for it, that is a really really big catastrophe.
The Senate report makes for very interesting reading, actually it is quite sickening as to just how low some public servants can stoop!
It is what public servants do best, when he s&$t hits the fan it is a disaster, however if a public servant can be nailed for it, that is a really really big catastrophe.
The Senate report makes for very interesting reading, actually it is quite sickening as to just how low some public servants can stoop!
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pilotchute:
You're probably referring to a Garuda A300 approaching Medan.
The controller who simply forgot about a large hill and turned a DC 10 into it whilst he was vectoring them to the approach?
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The Preliminary Report was released by the NTSC on 14 May 2013.
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Paragraph 1.12
The initial photographs revealed that the vertical stabilizer, right stabilizer, wings and
control surfaces were in good condition with minimal damage. The right engine and
both main landing gear had detached from the main wreckage.
The initial photographs revealed that the vertical stabilizer, right stabilizer, wings and
control surfaces were in good condition with minimal damage. The right engine and
both main landing gear had detached from the main wreckage.
It will be interesting to see if they briefed the approach minimums on the CVR. If they failed to, that would indicate intent to proceed until visual.
Now, this is how you do it boys ...
http://www.facebook.com/photo.php?v=537103489687891
Not hard is it? Quick, decisive decision to go around. None of this BS, handing over to the captain to do the GA as was the case with Lion Air.
http://www.facebook.com/photo.php?v=537103489687891
Not hard is it? Quick, decisive decision to go around. None of this BS, handing over to the captain to do the GA as was the case with Lion Air.
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This is how you you do it
[QUOTE] Quick, decisive decision to go around /QUOTE]
Really? I heard absolutely no reposnse to the Auto "Minimums" call just continued as if to land but no statement to that effect (or otherwise) There were a few words muttered at "approaching decision height" but the G/A occurred significantly later, I assume due to reduced viz. And thats ok with no fuss and calm methodical execution but hardly the perfect example of "this is how you do it boys"
Really? I heard absolutely no reposnse to the Auto "Minimums" call just continued as if to land but no statement to that effect (or otherwise) There were a few words muttered at "approaching decision height" but the G/A occurred significantly later, I assume due to reduced viz. And thats ok with no fuss and calm methodical execution but hardly the perfect example of "this is how you do it boys"
Last edited by Starbear; 13th Jun 2013 at 10:37.
My point is that in the video they were still visual at the minima and perfectly ok to continue the approach. It was when they lost sight of the runway that they quickly and decisively decided to go around. And this is what the Lion Air crew should have done.
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I fly B738 and often on NPA's using VNAVPTH. It's very good and inevitably pops us out of cloud with 2R 2W: assuming the NPA glide path matches the PAPI. I've just read the interim report of this accident. I assume they were also using VNAVPTH and that the glide path would intercept the RWY about the touchdown zone. The TCH is usually elevation + 50' in the LEGS page.
The report stays, as confirmed by CVR, that at MDA (550'-ish) there not visual but continued descending. The captain took over at 150' and a GA was initiated at 20'-ish. At no time did the EGPWS alarm sound as they did not enter the envelope.
This would suggest that they did not stuff the nose down and enter a hi-ROD and so trigger 'sink rate.' They impacted the water 300m from the threshold. This is 600m from the normal touchdown point.
My curiosity is how? If they were on profile at MDA, in trim, on speed etc via the automatics, and they did not trigger 'sink rate' how could they end up so short.
I see they did disconnect the automatics at minimums, and continued the descent manually. There was a slight reduction in attitude and a slight increase in speed; but could this have put them so short? The FD must have been screaming (silently) to raise the nose. Perhaps both pilots were searching outside. Either way, my thoughts about being in trim and thus on a correct glide path still stand. To be so short I'm surprised they did not get 'sink rate'.
Any thoughts?
The report stays, as confirmed by CVR, that at MDA (550'-ish) there not visual but continued descending. The captain took over at 150' and a GA was initiated at 20'-ish. At no time did the EGPWS alarm sound as they did not enter the envelope.
This would suggest that they did not stuff the nose down and enter a hi-ROD and so trigger 'sink rate.' They impacted the water 300m from the threshold. This is 600m from the normal touchdown point.
My curiosity is how? If they were on profile at MDA, in trim, on speed etc via the automatics, and they did not trigger 'sink rate' how could they end up so short.
I see they did disconnect the automatics at minimums, and continued the descent manually. There was a slight reduction in attitude and a slight increase in speed; but could this have put them so short? The FD must have been screaming (silently) to raise the nose. Perhaps both pilots were searching outside. Either way, my thoughts about being in trim and thus on a correct glide path still stand. To be so short I'm surprised they did not get 'sink rate'.
Any thoughts?
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This would suggest that they did not stuff the nose down and enter a hi-ROD and so trigger 'sink rate.' They impacted the water 300m from the threshold. This is 600m from the normal touchdown point.
Thinking about it, it is actually as form of 'art' they were unable to keep the airplane stable but at the same time, were JUST able to avoid a GPWS alert...