ATR72 Incident at FCO
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I remember that 45 knot crosswind limit on the ATR42(for takeoff) which seemed awfully high. The turbulence in many airports will be significant to say the least. On the other hand, I have been to airports in the middle of nowhere with no terrain or trees around where a 30 knot crosswind in a smooth approach.
I would be curious to know where the manufacturers do their crosswind tests and what the turbulence is like during those tests. It could be misleading some pilots into trying high crosswind ops in places with much more turbulence.
ATR: Operators have freedom to set crosswind limits
|
09 December, 2015
| BY: David Kaminski-Morrow
| London
Crosswind limits for ATR turboprops are not fixed thresholds and carriers should adapt them to suit their own operation, the airframer insists.
ATR’s response follows concerns expressed by Romania’s civil aviation safety authority that crosswind limits published in the flight crew operating manual are too high.
The authority had formally commented on the limits during the inquiry into a Carpatair ATR 72 landing accident at Rome which substantially damaged the aircraft.
Investigators found the turboprop’s crew had conducted the approach at high speed in strong gusting crosswinds.
ATR’s operating manual lists maximum demonstrated crosswinds, for a dry runway approach, of 35kt for the ATR 72 and 45kt for the ATR 42.
But the Romanian authority believes the published limits should be reduced because the aircraft becomes difficult to handle close to these thresholds.
ATR points out, however, that the airframer does not define the crosswind limit because it is not part of the certification.
Although the operating manual features demonstrated values, ATR states: “Typically operators define their own crosswind limits and incorporate those within their standard operating procedures.”
ATR also emphasises the Carpatair inquiry’s conclusion regarding the excessive approach speed of the aircraft. The airframer says it recommends “adherence to the quoted approach speeds”.
It intends to give “feedback” to the investigation into the 2 February 2013 accident, which was carried out by Italian authority ANSV.
I would be curious to know where the manufacturers do their crosswind tests and what the turbulence is like during those tests. It could be misleading some pilots into trying high crosswind ops in places with much more turbulence.
ATR: Operators have freedom to set crosswind limits
|
09 December, 2015
| BY: David Kaminski-Morrow
| London
Crosswind limits for ATR turboprops are not fixed thresholds and carriers should adapt them to suit their own operation, the airframer insists.
ATR’s response follows concerns expressed by Romania’s civil aviation safety authority that crosswind limits published in the flight crew operating manual are too high.
The authority had formally commented on the limits during the inquiry into a Carpatair ATR 72 landing accident at Rome which substantially damaged the aircraft.
Investigators found the turboprop’s crew had conducted the approach at high speed in strong gusting crosswinds.
ATR’s operating manual lists maximum demonstrated crosswinds, for a dry runway approach, of 35kt for the ATR 72 and 45kt for the ATR 42.
But the Romanian authority believes the published limits should be reduced because the aircraft becomes difficult to handle close to these thresholds.
ATR points out, however, that the airframer does not define the crosswind limit because it is not part of the certification.
Although the operating manual features demonstrated values, ATR states: “Typically operators define their own crosswind limits and incorporate those within their standard operating procedures.”
ATR also emphasises the Carpatair inquiry’s conclusion regarding the excessive approach speed of the aircraft. The airframer says it recommends “adherence to the quoted approach speeds”.
It intends to give “feedback” to the investigation into the 2 February 2013 accident, which was carried out by Italian authority ANSV.
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Gift of Tongues.
1stspotter (your #3),
Don't you just love Google translations #! Of course, it means "going off the runway" or (more pedantically) "off the Aircraft Movement Area" (as we used to call it - do we still ?)
# No mockery intended: Google knows more Italian than I do ("ciao" and "arrivederci", and I'm done).
Danny42C.
...letting the aircraft from the corridor of asphalt assigned to the control tower...
# No mockery intended: Google knows more Italian than I do ("ciao" and "arrivederci", and I'm done).
Danny42C.
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"Tower reported the current winds at 22 knots gusting up to 37 knots from 250 degrees and issued clearance to land on runway 16L. The captain advised he wanted to maintain an approach speed of 130 KIAS, the first officer agreed, the captain invited the first officer to put his hands onto the control column to follow/feel his control inputs for the landing. The landing gear was extended and the flaps were selected to 30 degrees, the approach was stable as the aircraft descended through 1000 feet AGL with the speed being around 130 KIAS fluctuating +/- 10 knots. After the autopilot was disconnected an airspeed of about 125 KIAS was maintained.
The aircraft touched down 2.6 degrees nose down, nose gear first, near the runway center line about 560 meters past the runway threshold in controlled flight but bounced, the captain called out "hop! hop! hop!" upon recognizing the bounce, neither pilot called for a go-around, the captain provided nose down inputs causing the aircraft to sharply touch down a second time nose gear first causing the nose gear to collapse and bounce again, both pilots provided conflicting control inputs thereafter, the captain providing nose down inputs while the first officer provided nose up inputs possibly triggering the interlock to separate left and right control column. Due to the now disconnected flight controls and conflicting control inputs the aircraft rolled slight left and touched down again heavy on the left main gear causing the left main gear to be damaged and bouncing again now with a right bank angle of about 10 degrees, the aircraft touched down a last time causing the collapse of the right main gear. After the last touchdown the aircraft slid for 400 more meters turning around by about 170 degrees until coming to a stop. After the aircraft stopped the two flight attendants initiated an emergency evacuation of the aircraft and collected the passengers outside the aircraft at the lawn.
First emergency vehicles reached the accident site 10 minutes after the aircraft came to a stop. A triage was setup at the site and doctors took care of the injured. 2 crew and 5 passengers received minor injuries. The aircraft was substantially damaged beyond economic repair.
The ANSV analysed that the crew was composed not homogenous due to the extreme difference in experience with the captain's far superior experience. On the other hand, the ANSV argued, the first officer had just completed his type rating and had fresh knowledge.
The ANSV analysed that although the wind data transmitted to the crew exceeded the demonstrated aircraft crosswind capabilities the captain remained confident that he could manage a safe landing nonetheless, reinforced by the fact that other aircraft had managed a safe landing, too. However, in the light of the weather information available the landing should have been aborted in view of the weather conditions being near or above the maximum permissable.
The omission of the landing brief proved fatal - the maximum weather data would have been part of the briefing reminding both crew of the maximum cross wind component they would be able to conduct a safe landing in.
In addition, the omission of the landing brief led to the acceptance of an incorrect approach speed of 130 KIAS by both crew and prevented a discussion between the pilots whether landing in Rome or a diversion to the alternate was advisable. The ANSV stated: "it is reasonable to assume that the first officer had refrained from pointing out the incorrect approach speed given the considerable difference in experience levels."
The ANSV analysed that no technical factors contributed to the accident.
The ANSV analysed that the weather, while not precluding the flight activity, presented significant challenges not to be underestimated in flight preparation and during conduct of the flight. Evidence from the flight data and cockpit voice recorder however made the investigation conclude, that windshear was not involved.
The ANSV analysed that during the descent towards Rome the "Descent" Checklist was read and executed properly by the first officer, however, upon the point "landing briefing" the captain stated that had already been done, a briefing thus did not occur. The briefing however would have been crucial in identifying limits of the approach, e.g. 35 knots maximum demonstrated cross wind, and landing as well as establishing the criteria and procedure for a missed approach. Handling techniques would also have been discussed during that briefing as well as the performance values including Vapp being reviewed.
The ANSV analysis of the landing has already been incorporated in the sequence of events during landing (description of bounces).
The ANSV continued analysis: "From the time tower alerted emergency services it took 10 minutes until the first vehicle of the fire brigades reached the wreckage, although the wreckage was straight in front of the fire station #1 about 400 meters from the station." The accident occurred in night time conditions, the general visibility however was unrestricted. It appeared that the fire fighters were unable to locate taxiway "DE" as identified by tower. Tower on the other hand never mentioned the coordinates according to the grid map laid down in the emergency response plans. As result fire services started a search for the wreckage driving down to the end of the runway, scanning the left hand edge of runway 16L on the way back, turned around and scanning the right hand edge of the runway now spotting the wreckage 10 minutes after the initial alert."
The aircraft touched down 2.6 degrees nose down, nose gear first, near the runway center line about 560 meters past the runway threshold in controlled flight but bounced, the captain called out "hop! hop! hop!" upon recognizing the bounce, neither pilot called for a go-around, the captain provided nose down inputs causing the aircraft to sharply touch down a second time nose gear first causing the nose gear to collapse and bounce again, both pilots provided conflicting control inputs thereafter, the captain providing nose down inputs while the first officer provided nose up inputs possibly triggering the interlock to separate left and right control column. Due to the now disconnected flight controls and conflicting control inputs the aircraft rolled slight left and touched down again heavy on the left main gear causing the left main gear to be damaged and bouncing again now with a right bank angle of about 10 degrees, the aircraft touched down a last time causing the collapse of the right main gear. After the last touchdown the aircraft slid for 400 more meters turning around by about 170 degrees until coming to a stop. After the aircraft stopped the two flight attendants initiated an emergency evacuation of the aircraft and collected the passengers outside the aircraft at the lawn.
First emergency vehicles reached the accident site 10 minutes after the aircraft came to a stop. A triage was setup at the site and doctors took care of the injured. 2 crew and 5 passengers received minor injuries. The aircraft was substantially damaged beyond economic repair.
The ANSV analysed that the crew was composed not homogenous due to the extreme difference in experience with the captain's far superior experience. On the other hand, the ANSV argued, the first officer had just completed his type rating and had fresh knowledge.
The ANSV analysed that although the wind data transmitted to the crew exceeded the demonstrated aircraft crosswind capabilities the captain remained confident that he could manage a safe landing nonetheless, reinforced by the fact that other aircraft had managed a safe landing, too. However, in the light of the weather information available the landing should have been aborted in view of the weather conditions being near or above the maximum permissable.
The omission of the landing brief proved fatal - the maximum weather data would have been part of the briefing reminding both crew of the maximum cross wind component they would be able to conduct a safe landing in.
In addition, the omission of the landing brief led to the acceptance of an incorrect approach speed of 130 KIAS by both crew and prevented a discussion between the pilots whether landing in Rome or a diversion to the alternate was advisable. The ANSV stated: "it is reasonable to assume that the first officer had refrained from pointing out the incorrect approach speed given the considerable difference in experience levels."
The ANSV analysed that no technical factors contributed to the accident.
The ANSV analysed that the weather, while not precluding the flight activity, presented significant challenges not to be underestimated in flight preparation and during conduct of the flight. Evidence from the flight data and cockpit voice recorder however made the investigation conclude, that windshear was not involved.
The ANSV analysed that during the descent towards Rome the "Descent" Checklist was read and executed properly by the first officer, however, upon the point "landing briefing" the captain stated that had already been done, a briefing thus did not occur. The briefing however would have been crucial in identifying limits of the approach, e.g. 35 knots maximum demonstrated cross wind, and landing as well as establishing the criteria and procedure for a missed approach. Handling techniques would also have been discussed during that briefing as well as the performance values including Vapp being reviewed.
The ANSV analysis of the landing has already been incorporated in the sequence of events during landing (description of bounces).
The ANSV continued analysis: "From the time tower alerted emergency services it took 10 minutes until the first vehicle of the fire brigades reached the wreckage, although the wreckage was straight in front of the fire station #1 about 400 meters from the station." The accident occurred in night time conditions, the general visibility however was unrestricted. It appeared that the fire fighters were unable to locate taxiway "DE" as identified by tower. Tower on the other hand never mentioned the coordinates according to the grid map laid down in the emergency response plans. As result fire services started a search for the wreckage driving down to the end of the runway, scanning the left hand edge of runway 16L on the way back, turned around and scanning the right hand edge of the runway now spotting the wreckage 10 minutes after the initial alert."
