787 review called for
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This is a state of the art aircraft with a huge number of innovations, including the use of composite materials, so there are bound to be teething troubles. Boeing and the US government had a big vested interest in getting this aircraft out and there must come a time when they have to say 'Just get it out there and we'll sort out the clitches as they arise'. The point where the manufacturer has to jump is a fine one and in any case is governed by commercial and politicalpressures. Watch this space . . .
Last edited by Sunnyjohn; 12th Jan 2013 at 11:12. Reason: added 'and political'
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glad rag:
Randy Babbitt was replaced as the Administrator. His assistant became acting administrator and was recently confirmed by Congress as the permanent Administrator. He probably had to pass muster with the power brokers at Boeing to obtain is confirmation by Congress.
Have there been any changes to the FAA [broadly speaking] since the original certification process for the 787 was completed?
Paxing All Over The World
EEngr
Forgive my innocence but - surely ANY company designing a complex device has manufacturing involved from Day 1?
Since Boeing have been doing this for a few years now, they know the way to get departments pulling together. Unless, of course, they have got carried away by some new fangled mgmt speak guru and trend in ways to save money - on paper.
It's just that, being an old bloke who has been around the block before, I have seen a few reinventions of the wheel that were found not to be quite as good as was originally stated.
That would call into question the whole "design team" philosophy Boeing advertised, where members of manufacturing sat in on preliminary design meetings to identify those that were unproducable.
Since Boeing have been doing this for a few years now, they know the way to get departments pulling together. Unless, of course, they have got carried away by some new fangled mgmt speak guru and trend in ways to save money - on paper.
It's just that, being an old bloke who has been around the block before, I have seen a few reinventions of the wheel that were found not to be quite as good as was originally stated.
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PAXboy:
Sometimes the corporate memory forgets aspects of what made the old design a success, and omits a vital detail in a new design. I've seen this happen in a 1980s prop design that overlooked vital details from a 1930s prop.
OTOH, sometimes a good idea gets poorly implemented, and the chosen corrective action is to revert to an old but proven design, and the Brand X "corporate memory" is to never make that mistake & try that new idea again. Until:
1) The boss retires or is replaced, and new decision-makers derive a newer successful design - or
2) the Brand Y competitor beats them to a successful implementation, possibly putting Brand X out of business.
... I have seen a few reinventions of the wheel that were found not to be quite as good as was originally stated.
OTOH, sometimes a good idea gets poorly implemented, and the chosen corrective action is to revert to an old but proven design, and the Brand X "corporate memory" is to never make that mistake & try that new idea again. Until:
1) The boss retires or is replaced, and new decision-makers derive a newer successful design - or
2) the Brand Y competitor beats them to a successful implementation, possibly putting Brand X out of business.
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Quite right, look at the number of "Rocket Science 101" mistakes NASA has made over the years! 
You'd think they couldn't possibly make such a basic mistake, let alone have it get through to a mission state; then yet another mission goes crashing into a planet ... or doesn't fit ... or can't see ... or ....
The bottom line is, don't believe that just because projects have been successful in the past, that fact will necessarily make another project successful in the future.
You'd think they couldn't possibly make such a basic mistake, let alone have it get through to a mission state; then yet another mission goes crashing into a planet ... or doesn't fit ... or can't see ... or ....The bottom line is, don't believe that just because projects have been successful in the past, that fact will necessarily make another project successful in the future.
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“The safety of the traveling public is our top priority,” said U.S. Transportation Secretary Ray LaHood. “This review will help us look at the root causes and do everything we can to safeguard against similar events in the future.”
Sooooo....if this is the FAA s priority, why have they not fixed/ mandated locking of the access to the E/E bay from the pax compartment in all Boeings of 767 or larger size including 787? Now is a chance to do so...private video below to demonstrate...
Go to
Youtube
See if you think LiIon batteries are as much of a risk as what is depicted in the video and email me your thoughts so I can push regulation to fix it ... Or 9/11 is repeatable ...IMHO.
Sooooo....if this is the FAA s priority, why have they not fixed/ mandated locking of the access to the E/E bay from the pax compartment in all Boeings of 767 or larger size including 787? Now is a chance to do so...private video below to demonstrate...
Go to
Youtube
See if you think LiIon batteries are as much of a risk as what is depicted in the video and email me your thoughts so I can push regulation to fix it ... Or 9/11 is repeatable ...IMHO.
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“The safety of the traveling public is our top priority,” said U.S. Transportation Secretary Ray LaHood. “This review will help us look at the root causes and do everything we can to safeguard against similar events in the future.”
Says in wiki that Mr. Lahood is a Republican politician from Illinois.
Majored in education and sociology.
So we are extremely humbled and comforted that a politician appointee places safety ahead of whatever is in second place.....
Better to keep quiet and be thought a fool..... I await the day a politician actually Defers to those with expertise. Like Mike Sinnett, or any engineer from Boeing....
There are many things that need to be changed in the new connected world, perhaps a new effort at discretion in public discourse.
Says in wiki that Mr. Lahood is a Republican politician from Illinois.
Majored in education and sociology.
So we are extremely humbled and comforted that a politician appointee places safety ahead of whatever is in second place.....
Better to keep quiet and be thought a fool..... I await the day a politician actually Defers to those with expertise. Like Mike Sinnett, or any engineer from Boeing....
There are many things that need to be changed in the new connected world, perhaps a new effort at discretion in public discourse.
Last edited by Lyman; 13th Jan 2013 at 04:17.
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Sometimes the corporate memory forgets aspects of what made the old design a
success, and omits a vital detail in a new design. I've seen this happen in a
1980s prop design that overlooked vital details from a 1930s prop.
OTOH,
sometimes a good idea gets poorly implemented, and the chosen corrective action
is to revert to an old but proven design, and the Brand X "corporate memory" is
to never make that mistake & try that new idea again. Until:
1) The
boss retires or is replaced, and new decision-makers derive a newer successful
design - or
2) the Brand Y competitor beats them to a successful
implementation, possibly putting Brand X out of business.
I can thoroughly recommend Trevor Kleitz's book "Lessons from Disasters" which looks at this in the Chemical and process industries.
Lessons from Disaster: How Organisations Have No Memory And Accidents Recur - Trevor A. Kletz - Google Books
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Troika
EEngr
32 years ago i learned at HP in Palo Alto on the Troika:
Representatives of R&D, manufacturing and marketing with project managers each 10 ~15 days in meetings for every product. (a true feedback system)
I consider a risk a product to be developed 'open loop". A good one must be developed in this "safe" environment.
32 years ago i learned at HP in Palo Alto on the Troika:
Representatives of R&D, manufacturing and marketing with project managers each 10 ~15 days in meetings for every product. (a true feedback system)
I consider a risk a product to be developed 'open loop". A good one must be developed in this "safe" environment.
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Testability
EEngr
Certification of an A/C is not the way to verify items like a battery of this type.
Just a curiosity:
I disassembled several laptop and cell phone lithium battery packs. They have a quite complex protection scheme with some temperature and ea. cell voltage monitoring. It seems mandatory a much more complex system when using lithium batteries in aviation. The recharger/load limiter should be designed "integrated" (in design) with the pack. This is critical to the battery reliability.
I remember my surprise when first found "complex circuitry with microprocessors, etc." inside a video camera we was using in skydiving. This was in 1998.
And i remember when in University read a russian book on batteries. They seemed far more complex than what i was studying like Theory of Circuits in Millman Taub books like. Batteries of today are fantastic but she are dangerous and complex. And can present surprises. (Like the women.
)
Some points i covered in an earlier post.
Certification of an A/C is not the way to verify items like a battery of this type.
Just a curiosity:
I disassembled several laptop and cell phone lithium battery packs. They have a quite complex protection scheme with some temperature and ea. cell voltage monitoring. It seems mandatory a much more complex system when using lithium batteries in aviation. The recharger/load limiter should be designed "integrated" (in design) with the pack. This is critical to the battery reliability.
I remember my surprise when first found "complex circuitry with microprocessors, etc." inside a video camera we was using in skydiving. This was in 1998.
And i remember when in University read a russian book on batteries. They seemed far more complex than what i was studying like Theory of Circuits in Millman Taub books like. Batteries of today are fantastic but she are dangerous and complex. And can present surprises. (Like the women.
)Some points i covered in an earlier post.
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Political bureaucrats
Bear,
We may never learn what caused this incident.
We may never learn what caused this incident.
perhaps a new effort at discretion in public discourse.
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Mother nature "control mechanisms"
barit1:
1) The boss retires or is replaced, and new decision-makers derive a newer successful design - or
2) the Brand Y competitor beats them to a successful implementation, possibly putting Brand X out of business.
I.e. the "feedback system" works in the long term correcting what could be avoided since the beginning.
1) The boss retires or is replaced, and new decision-makers derive a newer successful design - or
2) the Brand Y competitor beats them to a successful implementation, possibly putting Brand X out of business.
I.e. the "feedback system" works in the long term correcting what could be avoided since the beginning.
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I wonder if any of these issues could have something to do with the aircraft being in long term storage before delivery? Weren't the first 30 or so frames completed and stored in Seattle pending certification? Could such storage perhaps have had some adverse effects on the failing components?
No emergencies of course as yet.
Thanks for the link to Trevor Kletz's book. I enjoyed scanning that.
Whilst Aviation has learnt a bit from Chemicals and Oil, who have been doing (designing, running etc) dangerous stuff for much longer, even in Chemicals, Klttz is right to remind us that NO organisation has a memory.
Organisations have people, and EPIs (Engineering Procedural Instructions) and so on. They do not have memories.
Whilst Aviation has learnt a bit from Chemicals and Oil, who have been doing (designing, running etc) dangerous stuff for much longer, even in Chemicals, Klttz is right to remind us that NO organisation has a memory.
Organisations have people, and EPIs (Engineering Procedural Instructions) and so on. They do not have memories.
