" FAA concerned about increase in manual handling errors"
In order to facilitate the latter mandate all Airlines to require their pilots log a particular number of manual flying hours per year.
A start might be to turn the whole thing round and require crews to do manual, raw data ILS's on CAVOK, low wind days, unless a good reason prevented it?
The trouble is; once fleet managers start to insist on use of automation to keep the incidence of pilot c*ck-ups and ASR's low, then the pilots start to get rusty, with the result that there will be more c*ck-ups and ASR's when circumstances such as technical problems force them to fly manually.
However, if we all were required to practise raw data flying albeit within the confines of an ILS on good weather days only, then we might keep our skills honed a little better?
The trouble is; once fleet managers start to insist on use of automation to keep the incidence of pilot c*ck-ups and ASR's low, then the pilots start to get rusty, with the result that there will be more c*ck-ups and ASR's when circumstances such as technical problems force them to fly manually.
However, if we all were required to practise raw data flying albeit within the confines of an ILS on good weather days only, then we might keep our skills honed a little better?
Last edited by Uplinker; 20th Jan 2013 at 01:19.
This is a repost from the thread http://www.pprune.org/safety-crm-qa-...ml#post7649826, which may be relevant to this discussion:-
“Therefore a closer examination of the character of handling factors is required …”
As a starting point there are some interesting views in the presentation ‘Responding to Emergencies and Abnormal Situations’. :-
The first section reviews several themes contributing to events (albeit checklist related) and identifies the importance of linking knowledge through concepts to action (flying skills - expertise).
Slide 26 onwards presents a very interesting view of the domain of core operating skills – flying, operating, and managing; and that it is amongst these where problems of the higher level operational skills are seen.
The implication is that the perception of poor operational flying skills is actually a symptom of weak strategic management (Prioritisation, Anticipation, Planning, Recognition), and mental activity (Mental Flight Path Control, Rules of Thumb, Gates and Triggers, Event Flow Patterns, Generic Response Patterns, Situational Concepts, Time Management) slide 33.
And because this is where the “action takes place” – the mental activities, then “this is where problems are avoided”, slide 35
The remainder of the presentation involves cogent argument as to what the specific issue are, and perhaps how they might be addressed with training.
“Therefore a closer examination of the character of handling factors is required …”
As a starting point there are some interesting views in the presentation ‘Responding to Emergencies and Abnormal Situations’. :-
The first section reviews several themes contributing to events (albeit checklist related) and identifies the importance of linking knowledge through concepts to action (flying skills - expertise).
Slide 26 onwards presents a very interesting view of the domain of core operating skills – flying, operating, and managing; and that it is amongst these where problems of the higher level operational skills are seen.
The implication is that the perception of poor operational flying skills is actually a symptom of weak strategic management (Prioritisation, Anticipation, Planning, Recognition), and mental activity (Mental Flight Path Control, Rules of Thumb, Gates and Triggers, Event Flow Patterns, Generic Response Patterns, Situational Concepts, Time Management) slide 33.
And because this is where the “action takes place” – the mental activities, then “this is where problems are avoided”, slide 35
The remainder of the presentation involves cogent argument as to what the specific issue are, and perhaps how they might be addressed with training.
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Originally Posted by Centaurus
As there is no way you can have an audit trail for manual flying during line flying then it opens the way for wide spread cheating. That is a common thing in fake logging of instrument flight time on line - no audit trail. As far as simulator logging of hand flying is concerned that means the sim instructor must keep the log which gets messy. And don't forget it is a good bet that many sim instructors are themselves addicted to automation.
If it is important, it can be done.
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How does one " manually fly" a non-manual (FBW, "protected", Airbus) airplane?
If McBoeing guys are having problems hand flying, they need more practice. If Airbus guys are having problems hand flying, it's because the bus has turned on them.
If McBoeing guys are having problems hand flying, they need more practice. If Airbus guys are having problems hand flying, it's because the bus has turned on them.
Easily!
You click off the A/P, pull the throttles out of the detent, look out of the window, stir the stick with your left hand and move those throttle thingies back and forward with your right to keep the bus going where YOU want it to go.
I did it when my copilot activated a secondary flight plan just as we captured the loc. Complete non event hand flying to a visual approach and landing
You click off the A/P, pull the throttles out of the detent, look out of the window, stir the stick with your left hand and move those throttle thingies back and forward with your right to keep the bus going where YOU want it to go.
I did it when my copilot activated a secondary flight plan just as we captured the loc. Complete non event hand flying to a visual approach and landing
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How does one " manually fly" a non-manual (FBW, "protected", Airbus) airplane?
If McBoeing guys are having problems hand flying, they need more practice. If Airbus guys are having problems hand flying, it's because the bus has turned on them.
If McBoeing guys are having problems hand flying, they need more practice. If Airbus guys are having problems hand flying, it's because the bus has turned on them.
How does one " manually fly" a non-manual (FBW, "protected", Airbus) airplane?
However, once you get your head round this, it is no problem to fly manually - just don't stir the stick too much because then you will be fighting the flight control computers. Just nudge it where you want it to go.
As there is no way you can have an audit trail for manual flying during line flying then it opens the way for wide spread cheating. That is a common thing in fake logging of instrument flight time on line - no audit trail. As far as simulator logging of hand flying is concerned that means the sim instructor must keep the log which gets messy. And don't forget it is a good bet that many sim instructors are themselves addicted to automation.
You can audit this if you are prepared to use the data available properly, or add cockpit cams. The data on any aircraft designed in the last 40 years will identify if the AP is connected.
IMC vs VMC, cam is the only solution, which would also lift the value of the stabilised approach data when the program has implemented different IMC to VMC criteria.
The addiction to automation is a result of the direction that the manufacturer, regulator, human factors and compliance programs have pushed the operation. It is true that deviations from the automation are much easier for the instructor to identify, or anomalous use of automation modes, but the industry was pushing towards "the promised land" of reduced human error through automation without heeding the warning on the packet (under MSG %...) that distancing the human from the control process loop increases the likelihood of SA failure as we have seen on repetitive occasions over the last 20 years. The loss of basic flying skills, having pilots in a RPT aircraft that would be lost in a C150 let alone a Pitts S1 is so depressing I think I will go and have a quiet sob in the corner over the demise of professionalism in this industry, the final insult of the bean counters, bureaucrats and the shortsighted.
The history of IFLOC in the last 20 years has been an abject disgrace. We originally fell to earth as aircraft filed through inadequate materials and knowledge, then we ploughed fields on the sides of mountains or short of runways, and now we float down vertically in stalls such as AF447/TK1351 to arrive inelegantly in the bottom of a splash or a shallow grave, or more akin to a lawn dart (splashdown) such as Silkair, Flash or Adam air. The disneyland rides given are an embarrassment to the industry, and a direct result of the same industry's direction.
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The Red Button
A number of posters earlier had suggested a red button to turn off some or all the Automatics.
As a York F/O in 1953, a new switch was fitted to my control column so that I, as F/O, could disconnect the A/P. The other A/P controls were by the Captain's left hand. The Training Captain with whom I was flying said that there had been a " hard over" by this kind of A/P, ( possibly on a Tudor (?), which was also built by Avro ) and this would allow me to regain normal control, hand flying.
( Some of the radio controls were not accessible from the F/O's seat. But I controlled the fuel, u/c, flaps and sychronised the props !)
As a York F/O in 1953, a new switch was fitted to my control column so that I, as F/O, could disconnect the A/P. The other A/P controls were by the Captain's left hand. The Training Captain with whom I was flying said that there had been a " hard over" by this kind of A/P, ( possibly on a Tudor (?), which was also built by Avro ) and this would allow me to regain normal control, hand flying.
( Some of the radio controls were not accessible from the F/O's seat. But I controlled the fuel, u/c, flaps and sychronised the props !)
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Some errors are too easy
" Some of the radio controls were not accessible from the F/O's seat..."
The VHF selectors were behind my left ear. The ADF was manually tuneable from below and behind my bottom.
As a very newly promoted F/O ( now paid an extra £100 pa.) we took some of the British Olympic Team to the 1952 Helsinki Olympics. Our route was via two NDBs, "Oboe Jig Jig" and " Oboe Jig Yoke" which should prevent us violating a Prohibited Area. The two NDBs had frequencies 5 Kcs apart.
I cannot recall which of the other three Flight deck crew tuned the ADF. ( Captain, 2nd. Officer or Radio Officer, we had one of each then !).
Those who remember Morse Code will have noted that the last letter of each of the identifiers, "Jig" and "Yoke", differ by having a Dot and a Dash transposed.
( YES, I should have checked, too.)
We violated. We had an investigation, delaying our departure.
Some months later I got a letter from the Ministry telling me "not to do it again."
I have not been to Helsinki again.
Was that what they meant ?
The two NDBs retained their identities and frequencies for at least ten more years - I used to check their listings from time to time, but never went there... That was what the Ministry said.
Idlewild used to give a " HAMPTON 4 DEPARTURE "which was sometimes read back as " HAMPTON FOR DEPARTURE"
Elsewhere " CLEARED TO FIVE ZERO" ... Or was that " TWO FIVE ZERO"
The VHF selectors were behind my left ear. The ADF was manually tuneable from below and behind my bottom.
As a very newly promoted F/O ( now paid an extra £100 pa.) we took some of the British Olympic Team to the 1952 Helsinki Olympics. Our route was via two NDBs, "Oboe Jig Jig" and " Oboe Jig Yoke" which should prevent us violating a Prohibited Area. The two NDBs had frequencies 5 Kcs apart.
I cannot recall which of the other three Flight deck crew tuned the ADF. ( Captain, 2nd. Officer or Radio Officer, we had one of each then !).
Those who remember Morse Code will have noted that the last letter of each of the identifiers, "Jig" and "Yoke", differ by having a Dot and a Dash transposed.
( YES, I should have checked, too.)
We violated. We had an investigation, delaying our departure.
Some months later I got a letter from the Ministry telling me "not to do it again."
I have not been to Helsinki again.
Was that what they meant ?
The two NDBs retained their identities and frequencies for at least ten more years - I used to check their listings from time to time, but never went there... That was what the Ministry said.
Idlewild used to give a " HAMPTON 4 DEPARTURE "which was sometimes read back as " HAMPTON FOR DEPARTURE"
Elsewhere " CLEARED TO FIVE ZERO" ... Or was that " TWO FIVE ZERO"
