Aircraft Crash in Moscow
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Another unnecessary crash made in Russia.
How about using SOPs
-Spoilers Green ( A320 style)
-Reverse Green
-80 kts
-60 kts
There were two pair of eyes ( I hope brains as well) assisting PF, but I did not help.( PNF and flight engineer)
Could this happen with A320 or Emb 145. if we apply full reverse and reverse doors will not open for some reason. Should FADEC and/or ECU or similar software allow only idle thrust, no matter how much you move levers back.
How about using SOPs
-Spoilers Green ( A320 style)
-Reverse Green
-80 kts
-60 kts
There were two pair of eyes ( I hope brains as well) assisting PF, but I did not help.( PNF and flight engineer)
Could this happen with A320 or Emb 145. if we apply full reverse and reverse doors will not open for some reason. Should FADEC and/or ECU or similar software allow only idle thrust, no matter how much you move levers back.
Last edited by pupu; 26th Jan 2013 at 12:33.
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Seems to me, with my limited knowledge of the aircraft, that the first order of the day after touchdown should have been to get the weight on the gear. The bank angle caused by the crosswind should have been a pretty obvious signal that they were not on the ground solidly.
Isn't their a spoiler or speed brake handle/switch that can be manually activated to at least bring up some of the spoilers?
Then worry about engaging reverse. The PF seems to have rushed the landing process.
I've only flown one type of AC with spoilers, but they made a huge difference in crosswind landing performance. Of course, I could see them deploy in the cockpit mirrors on that aircraft. PF in this instance had to check an indicator to verify spoiler deployment.
Isn't their a spoiler or speed brake handle/switch that can be manually activated to at least bring up some of the spoilers?
Then worry about engaging reverse. The PF seems to have rushed the landing process.I've only flown one type of AC with spoilers, but they made a huge difference in crosswind landing performance. Of course, I could see them deploy in the cockpit mirrors on that aircraft. PF in this instance had to check an indicator to verify spoiler deployment.
There appears to be an increasing tendency for crews to rely on reverse thrust to stop the aircraft. Certificated landing performance should ensure a safe landing within the assessed ‘factored’ conditions, thus the priority should be to get the aircraft on the ground (right place and speed), deploy spoilers and start braking, and then follow up with reverse.
Reverse thrust in many aircraft may have the lowest probability of working reliably; hence it is not used in certificated landing performance (exceptions apply with risk mitigation, e.g. contaminated runways).
Reverse thrust in many aircraft may have the lowest probability of working reliably; hence it is not used in certificated landing performance (exceptions apply with risk mitigation, e.g. contaminated runways).
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Originally Posted by Clandestino
So, the pilots realize that despite their pulling reverser levers fully back, engines are producing full forward thrust. They promptly and correctly diagnose the problem which they have never seen before and decide to take it airborne while holding the reverse levers where they are. They climb away to safe altitude and airspeed which would allow transition from full reverse selection forward to climb power , all the time being lucky reversers don't deploy while airborne.
Problem with this scenario is it is too much to expect even of Dan Dare or Pirx the pilot.
Problem with this scenario is it is too much to expect even of Dan Dare or Pirx the pilot.
For similar circumstances, Clandestino has already assured his way to Paradise, at least he was lucky the REV did not deploy while airborne ...
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It is inconceivable to me that anyone would land a jet aircraft without verifying that spoilers are deployed on touchdown. It should be a mandatory callout by the PNF & verified by the PF. If auto deployment doesn't work, for whatever reason, then immediately pull the handle manually. Only when the a/c is firmly on the ground can wheel braking or reverse thrust be expected to properly operate. If this simple routine had been followed here, we would not be writing this thread.
Originally Posted by BobM2
It is inconceivable to me that anyone would land a jet aircraft without verifying that spoilers are deployed on touchdown.
What you think should have occurred in this or any other accident does not and cannot explain other people's behaviour. One needs to understand why this occurred even if it makes no sense to those looking at this or any other accident with the benefit for example, of all the comments on this thread thus far.
For this to occur the available data must be examined. This means SOPs and training of same, to organizational standards, to maintenance practices, to dissemination of critical safety information throughout the organization, all need to be examined for comparison to what occurred so that causal pathways might be roughly determined to "see" what this crew saw prior to the accident. We already have some information from previous, similar occurrences, (reverse not available).
Last edited by PJ2; 27th Jan 2013 at 22:54.
I might guess that PJ2's post could refer, in part, to Kulverstuka's #475, taken from another post but seeming to describe an atmosphere on the flight deck resembling road rage.
Quote:
CPT at approach when 2P commented "Speed 280 kph too high" replied "You better did not piss me off".
Quote:
CPT at approach when 2P commented "Speed 280 kph too high" replied "You better did not piss me off".
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I think there may have been three poorly defined solutions on the flightdeck, no one working with another. Their velocity at runway end was 140 mph. That is flying speed, I think, and no wheel tracks were visible in the snow at the top of the berm before the pit.
I think at least one pilot was thinking, "pull".
I think at least one pilot was thinking, "pull".
broadreach;
While it seems pretty straightforward a thing to draw conclusions from such a statement, (ed. the reference statement made by a crew member), I think we really have to be cautious. We don't know context, the people, what caused the remark, when it occurred in the approach and what was going on immediately prior to and after the comment. On the face of it, it seems obvious, but that is precisely what I think is important to avoid, at least until all is known.
Regarding the post, I was more thinking in general terms regarding pilot, aircraft, organizational behaviours in the sense that in drawing early conclusions regarding how things unfolded prior to knowing as much as possible an, "asked-and-answered" perception can curtail further enquiry and understanding and thus miss important, new information. (It's like naming something...once named, an object is then psychologically-categorized and can thus become "invisible" to perception...)
It's nothing new of course...this is a pretty standard approach - I'm just offering the view that expressing ideas on how a crew should have behaved doesn't add to an understanding of what happened. This is different than positing a theory then finding all information available to build a foundation (or not), for the theory.
I'd be interested in the visibility of the reverse-thrust indications for example. I'd be interested in the actual design of the thrust reverse system, which, given circumstances, I think requires very close examination. Crew duty day, schedule pressures etc need to be examined, (all obvious stuff!).
On the other hand, the potential for a successful takeoff should not form a part of any final report not because it wasn't possible but because no report should legitimate a procedure which has been established in the industry as a prohibited and non-standard response. While the possibility may be interesting and even discussed at great length, the case is not arguable without altering long-standing industry policies on going around after reverse thrust has been selected.
I might guess that PJ2's post could refer, in part, to Kulverstuka's #475, taken from another post but seeming to describe an atmosphere on the flight deck resembling road rage.
Regarding the post, I was more thinking in general terms regarding pilot, aircraft, organizational behaviours in the sense that in drawing early conclusions regarding how things unfolded prior to knowing as much as possible an, "asked-and-answered" perception can curtail further enquiry and understanding and thus miss important, new information. (It's like naming something...once named, an object is then psychologically-categorized and can thus become "invisible" to perception...)
It's nothing new of course...this is a pretty standard approach - I'm just offering the view that expressing ideas on how a crew should have behaved doesn't add to an understanding of what happened. This is different than positing a theory then finding all information available to build a foundation (or not), for the theory.
I'd be interested in the visibility of the reverse-thrust indications for example. I'd be interested in the actual design of the thrust reverse system, which, given circumstances, I think requires very close examination. Crew duty day, schedule pressures etc need to be examined, (all obvious stuff!).
On the other hand, the potential for a successful takeoff should not form a part of any final report not because it wasn't possible but because no report should legitimate a procedure which has been established in the industry as a prohibited and non-standard response. While the possibility may be interesting and even discussed at great length, the case is not arguable without altering long-standing industry policies on going around after reverse thrust has been selected.
Last edited by Jetdriver; 28th Jan 2013 at 02:07.
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Whats the other russian aviation forum besides aviaforum.ru where this guy Мамаладзе posted
PJ2,
Apologies if I appeared to be putting words in your mouth! Your previous mention "... with the benefit for example, of all the comments on this thread thus far" immediately brought Kulverstuka's post to mind.
IIRC there have been other references suggesting an unpleasant atmosphere but without saying why. Considering an identical aircraft in the same airline had suffered a similar overrun a short time before, one might expect heightened awareness of the danger, moreso with a very light load. Something must have seriously distracted them.
Apologies if I appeared to be putting words in your mouth! Your previous mention "... with the benefit for example, of all the comments on this thread thus far" immediately brought Kulverstuka's post to mind.
IIRC there have been other references suggesting an unpleasant atmosphere but without saying why. Considering an identical aircraft in the same airline had suffered a similar overrun a short time before, one might expect heightened awareness of the danger, moreso with a very light load. Something must have seriously distracted them.
Hi broadreach;
No apologies needed - no appearance of such perceived!...I thought your example a good one and only was attempting to ensure a broader reading of the point. In informal discussion it is so easy to let hindsight bias slip into the conversations that I thought an emphasis would be helpful. An interim report should be out shortly (30 days) so perhaps some flight data will be part of any such report.
No apologies needed - no appearance of such perceived!...I thought your example a good one and only was attempting to ensure a broader reading of the point. In informal discussion it is so easy to let hindsight bias slip into the conversations that I thought an emphasis would be helpful. An interim report should be out shortly (30 days) so perhaps some flight data will be part of any such report.
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And now we have another incident...
Link to Avherald
Link to Avherald
A Red Wings Tupolev TU-204, registration RA-64043 performing flight WZ-112 from Chelyabinsk to Moscow Vnukovo (Russia) with 91 passengers and 7 crew, landed on Vnukovo Airport's runway 19 at 06:30L (02:30Z). During roll out the crew brought the thrust levers into minimum reverse, the right hand thrust reverser however did not fully slide into the open position. The crew did not apply higher reverse thrust settings on the right hand engine and slowed the aircraft safely.
Rosaviatsia reported the right hand thrust reverser did not slide into the full open position after minimum reverse was selected, the crew therefore did not apply higher reverse thrust settings on the right hand engine and completed a safe roll out. It is not yet known what caused the thrust reverser to not fully slide into the open position.
Rosaviatsia reported the right hand thrust reverser did not slide into the full open position after minimum reverse was selected, the crew therefore did not apply higher reverse thrust settings on the right hand engine and completed a safe roll out. It is not yet known what caused the thrust reverser to not fully slide into the open position.
Under the heading of "Interim Report - IAC" on this link in Wiki, the following seems to indicate updates on January 28, 29 & 31. Is anyone able to translate?
PJ2
Я Н В А Р Ь
31 января 2013
Комиссия Межгосударственного авиационного комитета завершила расследование авиационного происшествия с самолетом ЕЭВС СМ-2000П RA-0491G, принадлежащим частному лицу, 06.04.2012 г. в Калужской области.
Наиболее вероятной причиной катастрофы самолета СМ-2000П RA-0491G явились неграмотные действия командира воздушного судна при выполнении вынужденной посадки, которые привели к выходу самолета на режим сваливания и последующему столкновению с землей.
Необходимость вынужденной посадки была обусловлена остановом двигателя в полете, наиболее вероятно, из-за полной выработки топлива.
Способствующими факторами авиационного происшествия явились:
• недостаточная практика полетов, малая натренированность и недостаточная профессиональная подготовка КВС;
• отсутствие контроля за выработкой топлива со стороны КВС.
По результатам расследования разработаны рекомендации по повышению безопасности полетов.
Окончательный отчет: 29 января 2013
Во исполнение Постановления Совета по авиации и использованию воздушного пространства при Межгосударственном авиационном комитете (МАК) в рамках Проекта ИКАО-МАК RER/01/901 был создан Координационный совет по безопасности полетов вертолетов в СНГ (IHST-CIS). 20 декабря 2012 г. в МАК было проведено организационное совещание IHST-CIS, а 29 января 2013 г. – рабочее совещание IHST-CIS, в работе которого приняли участие представители МАК, Ространснадзора, авиапрома, вертолетных авиакомпаний, сертификационных центров и научно-исследовательских организаций.
В ходе данных совещаний был утвержден Проект Положения о Координационном совете по безопасности полетов на вертолетах (IHST-CIS), а также его состав и структура, произведено предварительное формирование рабочих групп экспертов и намечены планы дальнейших работ.
28 января 2013
Комиссией по сертификации аэродромов и оборудования Межгосударственного авиационного комитета (Комиссией МАК) проведён комплекс работ по серти-фикации аэродромного знака с внутренним подсветом АСКИ.676659.002, щита гарантированного питания ЩГП-М АСКИ.656458.001, элементов кабельной сети параллельного электропитания светосигнального оборудования в системах ОМИ АСКИ.305621.001-01 Общества с ограниченной ответственностью «Аэросвет» (Россия).
На основании положительных результатов проведённых работ Комиссией МАК Обществу с ограниченной ответственностью «Аэросвет» выданы Сертификаты типа:
- № 563 - на аэродромный знак с внутренним подсветом АСКИ.676659.002 и варианты его исполнения АСКИ.676659.002-01 – АСКИ.676659.002-27;
- № 568 - на щит гарантированного питания ЩГП-М АСКИ.656458.001 на номинальный ток 250 А и варианты его исполнения АСКИ.656458.001-01, АСКИ.656458.001-02 на номинальный ток 400 А и 630 А с программой центрального контроллера АСКИ.00310-01;
- № 569 - на элементы кабельной сети параллельного электропитания светосигнального оборудования в системах ОМИ АСКИ.305621.001-01.
Обязательные для выполнения ограничения и указания по технической эксплуатации указанного оборудования содержат эксплуатационные документы, ука-занные в Ограничениях к Сертификатам типа.
На элементы кабельной сети параллельного электропитания светосигналь-ного оборудования в системах ОМИ АСКИ.305621.001-01 введено специальное ог-раничение: кабели армированные и муфта распределительная могут использо-ваться при температуре окружающей среды не ниже минус 50 °С.
Основные характеристики оборудования приведены в Приложениях 1–3.
Дополнительную справочную информацию можно получить по адресу:
Общество с ограниченной ответственностью «Аэросвет» (ООО «Аэросвет»),
Россия, 115230, г. Москва, проезд Электролитный, д. 3, стр. 2,
пом. 43 - 54, тел./факс: (495) 937-26-32.
PJ2
Я Н В А Р Ь
31 января 2013
Комиссия Межгосударственного авиационного комитета завершила расследование авиационного происшествия с самолетом ЕЭВС СМ-2000П RA-0491G, принадлежащим частному лицу, 06.04.2012 г. в Калужской области.
Наиболее вероятной причиной катастрофы самолета СМ-2000П RA-0491G явились неграмотные действия командира воздушного судна при выполнении вынужденной посадки, которые привели к выходу самолета на режим сваливания и последующему столкновению с землей.
Необходимость вынужденной посадки была обусловлена остановом двигателя в полете, наиболее вероятно, из-за полной выработки топлива.
Способствующими факторами авиационного происшествия явились:
• недостаточная практика полетов, малая натренированность и недостаточная профессиональная подготовка КВС;
• отсутствие контроля за выработкой топлива со стороны КВС.
По результатам расследования разработаны рекомендации по повышению безопасности полетов.
Окончательный отчет: 29 января 2013
Во исполнение Постановления Совета по авиации и использованию воздушного пространства при Межгосударственном авиационном комитете (МАК) в рамках Проекта ИКАО-МАК RER/01/901 был создан Координационный совет по безопасности полетов вертолетов в СНГ (IHST-CIS). 20 декабря 2012 г. в МАК было проведено организационное совещание IHST-CIS, а 29 января 2013 г. – рабочее совещание IHST-CIS, в работе которого приняли участие представители МАК, Ространснадзора, авиапрома, вертолетных авиакомпаний, сертификационных центров и научно-исследовательских организаций.
В ходе данных совещаний был утвержден Проект Положения о Координационном совете по безопасности полетов на вертолетах (IHST-CIS), а также его состав и структура, произведено предварительное формирование рабочих групп экспертов и намечены планы дальнейших работ.
28 января 2013
Комиссией по сертификации аэродромов и оборудования Межгосударственного авиационного комитета (Комиссией МАК) проведён комплекс работ по серти-фикации аэродромного знака с внутренним подсветом АСКИ.676659.002, щита гарантированного питания ЩГП-М АСКИ.656458.001, элементов кабельной сети параллельного электропитания светосигнального оборудования в системах ОМИ АСКИ.305621.001-01 Общества с ограниченной ответственностью «Аэросвет» (Россия).
На основании положительных результатов проведённых работ Комиссией МАК Обществу с ограниченной ответственностью «Аэросвет» выданы Сертификаты типа:
- № 563 - на аэродромный знак с внутренним подсветом АСКИ.676659.002 и варианты его исполнения АСКИ.676659.002-01 – АСКИ.676659.002-27;
- № 568 - на щит гарантированного питания ЩГП-М АСКИ.656458.001 на номинальный ток 250 А и варианты его исполнения АСКИ.656458.001-01, АСКИ.656458.001-02 на номинальный ток 400 А и 630 А с программой центрального контроллера АСКИ.00310-01;
- № 569 - на элементы кабельной сети параллельного электропитания светосигнального оборудования в системах ОМИ АСКИ.305621.001-01.
Обязательные для выполнения ограничения и указания по технической эксплуатации указанного оборудования содержат эксплуатационные документы, ука-занные в Ограничениях к Сертификатам типа.
На элементы кабельной сети параллельного электропитания светосигналь-ного оборудования в системах ОМИ АСКИ.305621.001-01 введено специальное ог-раничение: кабели армированные и муфта распределительная могут использо-ваться при температуре окружающей среды не ниже минус 50 °С.
Основные характеристики оборудования приведены в Приложениях 1–3.
Дополнительную справочную информацию можно получить по адресу:
Общество с ограниченной ответственностью «Аэросвет» (ООО «Аэросвет»),
Россия, 115230, г. Москва, проезд Электролитный, д. 3, стр. 2,
пом. 43 - 54, тел./факс: (495) 937-26-32.
