Concorde crash: Continental Airlines cleared by France court
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@BEagle - no-one is disputing that errors, some of which were significant, were made by AF (and the F-BTSC crew) on the day. As a contributor I have a deep and abiding respect for, could you explain the reasoning behind continued stress on this already accepted point?
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@BEagle - no-one is disputing that errors, some of which were significant, were made by AF (and the F-BTSC crew) on the day. As a contributor I have a deep and abiding respect for, could you explain the reasoning behind continued stress on this already accepted point?
The BEA in the recommendations also don't stress about some irregularities attributable to Air France
It makes recommendations about baggage .. tire .. means for recording data .. administrative documents .. and also a note on maintenance
Nothing about the fact of downwind take off .. weight unfulfilled .. etc.
It's very interesting to read some of the answers (in court) of the chief of the BEA (At those day Mr Louis Arslanian)
Unfortunately all those "minutes" are in french and I have not find a english translation so far
http://procesconcorde.fenvac.org/?m=20100202
Last edited by jcjeant; 14th Dec 2012 at 23:52.
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Originally Posted by BEA Report (EN) p170 s2.5.1 para2
This excess fuel did not attract any comment from the Captain, apart from his remark that they were going to take off at the aircraft’s structural limits. Equally, the controller’s announcement of a tailwind did not lead to the slightest comment from the crew, which is, as we have seen, surprising.
Originally Posted by BEA Report (EN) p174 s3.1 para5
Taking into account the fuel not consumed during taxiing, the aircraft’s takeoff weight in fact exceeded the maximum weight by about one ton.
Last edited by DozyWannabe; 15th Dec 2012 at 00:12.
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In the eyes of at least one august body, the accepted myth has undergone game change.
This was a complex and data filled conclusion, this original theory, that Continental was exclusively responsible, criminally for BTSC's demise.
The balance has been lost, the equilibrium disturbed, so a new look at the available data is well worth a chat.
Who would instead claim there is nothing new to assess, traditional importances to be re-evaluated, and conclusions to rock?
No stronger proof against truth, save an unwillingness to encounter discomfort in its pursuit....
Comfort the afflicted.....but afflict the comfortable...
Sheesh
This was a complex and data filled conclusion, this original theory, that Continental was exclusively responsible, criminally for BTSC's demise.
The balance has been lost, the equilibrium disturbed, so a new look at the available data is well worth a chat.
Who would instead claim there is nothing new to assess, traditional importances to be re-evaluated, and conclusions to rock?
No stronger proof against truth, save an unwillingness to encounter discomfort in its pursuit....
Comfort the afflicted.....but afflict the comfortable...
Sheesh
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This thread was initiated because that judicial decision was overturned by a different judge* - nothing more than that. The conclusions and report of the investigation (neither of which apportioned responsibility) still stand.
[* - A feature of the judicial process is that different judges can and will draw different conclusions when presented with the same or similar evidence depending on their interpretation of legal statute.]
Last edited by DozyWannabe; 15th Dec 2012 at 01:55.
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Seems pretty clearly covered to me (and I found these paragraphs in under 30 seconds with the "Find" function)...
My remark was about the chapter "Recommendations"
The BEA in the recommendations also don't stress about some irregularities attributable to Air France
Note that the lax of AF pilots is another time noted in the BEA final report of the AF447
But again .. in the recommendations .. nothing clearly said about the "AF culture" (or lax) who seems to be in many AF accidents a common factor
Last edited by jcjeant; 15th Dec 2012 at 03:29.
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@jcj:
In "Recommendations":
With all due respect, I recommend you take some time to read the document you claim is missing information before making those claims public, because it can do nothing but harm your argument if your supposition is incorrect.
In "Recommendations":
Originally Posted by BEA Report (EN) p179 s4.2.4
The technical investigation brought to light various malfunctions relating to the operation of the aircraft, for example the use of non-updated flight preparation data, the absence of archiving of certain documents or incomplete baggage management. Equally, omitting the left bogie spacer was a consequence of non-respect of established procedures and of the
failure to use the appropriate tool. Consequently, the BEA recommends that:
failure to use the appropriate tool. Consequently, the BEA recommends that:
- the DGAC undertake an audit of Concorde operational and maintenance conditions within Air France.
Last edited by DozyWannabe; 15th Dec 2012 at 03:28.
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"Dare" has nothing to do with it (because anyone can post here) - the fact is that you have made several claims regarding the BEA report which are demonstrably untrue.
Taking this on a whimsical tangent, if this discussion were being held in a court of law you'd be risking a perjury charge. Why do so when all it takes to verify the content of the report is to read it?
Taking this on a whimsical tangent, if this discussion were being held in a court of law you'd be risking a perjury charge. Why do so when all it takes to verify the content of the report is to read it?
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If the procedural errors had been caught at an earlier stage it would have been unlikely to result in the cancellation of the flight - indeed it would have more than likely departed at a similar time and in the same manner as it did on the day.
coulda/woulda/shoulda...
the incident occured to *that* aircraft at *that* time, under *those* specific circumstances.
what's your agenda here DW?
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Dozy,
The rhetoric of a Court is not the same than a web forum rhetoric. Here we try to "think " together in a team work and brainstorming method. In the world village we need to write the progression of elaborating a more acurate doctrine.
The rhetoric of a Court is not the same than a web forum rhetoric. Here we try to "think " together in a team work and brainstorming method. In the world village we need to write the progression of elaborating a more acurate doctrine.
DozyWannabe, do you actually understand the mandatory requirements of aircraft scheduled performance?
Do you understand the effect of OAT and W/V on RTOW?
A commercial air transport aircraft such as Concorde may not commence the take-off run if ATOW > MTOW or RTOW, whichever is the lesser.
However, at no point in the 14 seconds between receiving take-off clearance and commencing the take-off roll did any of the crew comment on the need to review their take-off performance figures.
Do you understand the effect of OAT and W/V on RTOW?
A commercial air transport aircraft such as Concorde may not commence the take-off run if ATOW > MTOW or RTOW, whichever is the lesser.
However, at no point in the 14 seconds between receiving take-off clearance and commencing the take-off roll did any of the crew comment on the need to review their take-off performance figures.
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the TC (type Certificate)
my bold and underline.
are you getting the point yet, as you dont seem to understand the very basics.. as "[you are] still at a loss trying to understand the intent of these posts. "
Outside the limitations as set forth by the TC, invalidates the TC and the Airwothiness Cert.. the aircraft may still be capable of performing if it is 1kg over weight, that is irrelevent, it invalidates the TC and subsequently the Airworthiness Cert.; Same if it has parts missing that are part of the design as approved.
[...]
A type certificate, is awarded by aviation regulating bodies to aerospace manufacturers after it has been established that the particular design of a civil aircraft, engine, or propeller has fulfilled the regulating bodies' current prevailing airworthiness requirements for the safe conduct of flights under all normally conceivable conditions (military types are usually exempted). Aircraft produced under a type certified design are issued a standard airworthiness certificate.
A type certificate, is awarded by aviation regulating bodies to aerospace manufacturers after it has been established that the particular design of a civil aircraft, engine, or propeller has fulfilled the regulating bodies' current prevailing airworthiness requirements for the safe conduct of flights under all normally conceivable conditions (military types are usually exempted). Aircraft produced under a type certified design are issued a standard airworthiness certificate.
- A type certificate (TC) is a design approval issued by the civil aviation authority (CAA) of a given country (such as the US FAA and EU EASA) when the applicant demonstrates that a product complies with the applicable regulations. The TC normally includes the type design, the operating limitations, the type certificate data sheet (TCDS), the applicable regulations, and other conditions or limitations prescribed by the CAA. The TC is the foundation for other approvals, including production and airworthiness approvals. TC's are normally issued for airframes, engines and propellers.
- An "airworthiness certificate" is only issued to an aircraft that is properly registered and was found to conform its TCDS and be in a condition for safe operations. The airworthiness certificate is valid and the aircraft may be operated as long as it is maintained in accordance with the rules issued by the CAA
are you getting the point yet, as you dont seem to understand the very basics.. as "[you are] still at a loss trying to understand the intent of these posts. "
Outside the limitations as set forth by the TC, invalidates the TC and the Airwothiness Cert.. the aircraft may still be capable of performing if it is 1kg over weight, that is irrelevent, it invalidates the TC and subsequently the Airworthiness Cert.; Same if it has parts missing that are part of the design as approved.
Last edited by stuckgear; 15th Dec 2012 at 08:45.
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186.7 might have been the RTOW for the planned conditions, but emphatically not for the actual conditions.... Given the tailwind component, the crew should have recalculated RTOW and taken the reciprocal runway, rather than giving a Gallic shrug of the shoulders, announcing <<Top!>> and risking it.....
The crew might have been aware of that, "simply" by looking at the windsock.
Or it could have been they didn't care ("cavalier attitude")?
But then, why an early and slow rotation, which seemed aimed to bring relief to the U/C, being close/a little over the limit?
Seems some of the last posts on this page are more and more about being "against" a certain member, whom I think makes valuable contributions. I therefore regret that, much.
Would it not be more useful to discuss the matter at hand without using a tone aimed (IMO) to harm? 
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Seems some of the last posts on this page are more and more about being "against" a certain member, whom I think makes valuable contributions. I therefore regret that, much. 
Would it not be more useful to discuss the matter at hand without using a tone aimed (IMO) to harm?
Would it not be more useful to discuss the matter at hand without using a tone aimed (IMO) to harm?
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I've stayed out of this rehash....
In the end I have a relatively simple question.
At what point does a demonstrated lack of professionalism in a complex operating environment override any other relevant components of the accident.
AF maintenance was demonstrably unprofessional.
AF operations was demonstrably unprofessional.
AF PIC was demonstrably unprofessional.
AF flight engineer was demonstrably unprofessional.
You can argue that in reviewing this event in totality that AF demonstrated such a complete lack of professionalism in every aspect of it's operations that an accident of this type was unavoidable at some point regardless of the specific triggering event.
When you further recognize that specific sworn testimony from the fire fighters on hand does raise a level of doubt regarding the root cause and actual moment the fire started. Given that these individuals are specifically trained in observation and were in place specifically in case of this type of event I am amazed how easily there observations are dismissed by some.
In the end AF seems to have developed such significant cultural issues that its actual standard of performance much more closely resembles that of a 3rd world flag carrier then that of a "1st world" nation...
In the end I have a relatively simple question.
At what point does a demonstrated lack of professionalism in a complex operating environment override any other relevant components of the accident.
AF maintenance was demonstrably unprofessional.
AF operations was demonstrably unprofessional.
AF PIC was demonstrably unprofessional.
AF flight engineer was demonstrably unprofessional.
You can argue that in reviewing this event in totality that AF demonstrated such a complete lack of professionalism in every aspect of it's operations that an accident of this type was unavoidable at some point regardless of the specific triggering event.
When you further recognize that specific sworn testimony from the fire fighters on hand does raise a level of doubt regarding the root cause and actual moment the fire started. Given that these individuals are specifically trained in observation and were in place specifically in case of this type of event I am amazed how easily there observations are dismissed by some.
In the end AF seems to have developed such significant cultural issues that its actual standard of performance much more closely resembles that of a 3rd world flag carrier then that of a "1st world" nation...
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SLF
"At what point does a demonstrated lack of professionalism in a complex operating environment override any other relevant components of the accident."
Generally, after the fact, and often not even then.
People who work in association with eachother (vendor, regulator) develop a camaraderie that often trumps duty, and integrity. It doesn't take much in a "complex operating environment".
Why did EASA relax inspections on the TRENT 700 prior to QF32? How did Thales remain on the 330? "Judgment calls" occasionally lay on the lax side of decisionmaking. Unfortunately, in many accidents, the fact that "regulation" is seen as "interpretive" results in the need to polish turds...after the fact
You ask the important question, Sedona.
"At what point does a demonstrated lack of professionalism in a complex operating environment override any other relevant components of the accident."
Generally, after the fact, and often not even then.
People who work in association with eachother (vendor, regulator) develop a camaraderie that often trumps duty, and integrity. It doesn't take much in a "complex operating environment".
Why did EASA relax inspections on the TRENT 700 prior to QF32? How did Thales remain on the 330? "Judgment calls" occasionally lay on the lax side of decisionmaking. Unfortunately, in many accidents, the fact that "regulation" is seen as "interpretive" results in the need to polish turds...after the fact
You ask the important question, Sedona.
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"At what point does a demonstrated lack of professionalism in a complex operating environment override any other relevant components of the accident."
Never as the reason for the accident was the DC10 strip on the runway,see the posts of AlphaZuluRomeo and DozyWannabe who both clearly explain how without that piece of metal the accident wouldn't have happened.
That doesn't mean that a "demonstrated lack of professionalism" if proved shouldn't be addressed.
The difference of opinion highlighted in many of the previous post is in my view caused by trying to prove that "a demonstrated lack of professionalism" trumps the DC10 strip on the runway.
Never as the reason for the accident was the DC10 strip on the runway,see the posts of AlphaZuluRomeo and DozyWannabe who both clearly explain how without that piece of metal the accident wouldn't have happened.
That doesn't mean that a "demonstrated lack of professionalism" if proved shouldn't be addressed.
The difference of opinion highlighted in many of the previous post is in my view caused by trying to prove that "a demonstrated lack of professionalism" trumps the DC10 strip on the runway.
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Again,
We have sworn testimony from a professional firefighting crew specifically trained to deal with potential issues specific to the Concorde...after all that's why they were there
who state (and this is multiple individuals) that the fire appeared to start prior to the estimated point of impact with the titanium strip.
Given both the training and specific reason they were present they meet the criteria for expert witnesses. This casts a measure of doubt on the debris being the actual cause of the fire.
Now lets go beyond that and look at other variables. While the asymmetrical engine thrust undoubtedly caused a significant portion of the drift the missing spacer has significant potential to add to that drift...potentially causing the impact with lighting etc...
While computer projections project that regardless of flight crew actions the wing/control elements would have burned through...we do not know if proper action by the FE would have allowed continued flight until that point and what the margin of error for the projection is. Regardless of it being 1% or .0000001% the FE's actions are what doomed the plane at that moment. The actual crash occurred when/where it did because of his inappropriate conduct.
The reality is that no one truly objective can say with certainty that the titanium strip caused the fire or that if the flight engineer acted correctly the plane had zero chance for a controlled crash landing that would have allowed for some survivors.
We have sworn testimony from a professional firefighting crew specifically trained to deal with potential issues specific to the Concorde...after all that's why they were there
who state (and this is multiple individuals) that the fire appeared to start prior to the estimated point of impact with the titanium strip. Given both the training and specific reason they were present they meet the criteria for expert witnesses. This casts a measure of doubt on the debris being the actual cause of the fire.
Now lets go beyond that and look at other variables. While the asymmetrical engine thrust undoubtedly caused a significant portion of the drift the missing spacer has significant potential to add to that drift...potentially causing the impact with lighting etc...
While computer projections project that regardless of flight crew actions the wing/control elements would have burned through...we do not know if proper action by the FE would have allowed continued flight until that point and what the margin of error for the projection is. Regardless of it being 1% or .0000001% the FE's actions are what doomed the plane at that moment. The actual crash occurred when/where it did because of his inappropriate conduct.
The reality is that no one truly objective can say with certainty that the titanium strip caused the fire or that if the flight engineer acted correctly the plane had zero chance for a controlled crash landing that would have allowed for some survivors.
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Was Continental Responsible For the Concorde Crash? « Heritage Concorde
I note in the photo of the skid marks leading to the frangible RW light fixture a pronounced linear oscillation by number three tyre..... (the shimmy)
At two hundred mph, that might have been snubbed by the missing thrust washer/spacer? Its production of drag could not have helped the attempt to regain the centerline?
From "Heritage Concorde"
"By the day of the accident the shear bush had moved a full seven inches out of alignment to the point where the two washers were almost touching."
I note in the photo of the skid marks leading to the frangible RW light fixture a pronounced linear oscillation by number three tyre..... (the shimmy)
At two hundred mph, that might have been snubbed by the missing thrust washer/spacer? Its production of drag could not have helped the attempt to regain the centerline?
From "Heritage Concorde"
"By the day of the accident the shear bush had moved a full seven inches out of alignment to the point where the two washers were almost touching."
Last edited by Lyman; 16th Dec 2012 at 04:35.
