Another Air France incident
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Framer : Interesting. I am not expert on Airbus CRM, but in my world ( smaller A/C and ATC) we are taught and we teach not to follow instincts but rather procedures. Also that one person, and only one is controlling and giving orders , especially during an abnormal situation. But maybe AF SOPs are different.
In this case we do not have the CVR , so we do not know if the taking over by PNF was perceeded by words like : "I have it" or " You take over " .
But knowing how the BEA writes reports, if following the pilots interviews,they would have been convinced that this had been the case, they would have mentioned it in the report. They keep refering to PF/ Pilot monitoring.
A few points on the report indicate a rather assertive PNF: the taking over the PA address to pax after the falling handset ( but again we do not know , that might have been preceeded by an order from the Capt) , the manual A/P disconnection and and the subsequent side stick inputs.
But surprisingly , the speeds selection , the later disengagement of A/T and pushing the thottles to TOGA were performed by the PF, so it may looks as if 2 people were trying to solve a turbulence/overspeed indication problem separately.
Maybe this was coordinated, I was not there, we do not have a CVR, so all this is mere speculation of course.
But this sentence on the report :
could indicate that the PNF actions were not coordinated with PF.
Trying to understand, not to point fingers.
In this case we do not have the CVR , so we do not know if the taking over by PNF was perceeded by words like : "I have it" or " You take over " .
But knowing how the BEA writes reports, if following the pilots interviews,they would have been convinced that this had been the case, they would have mentioned it in the report. They keep refering to PF/ Pilot monitoring.
A few points on the report indicate a rather assertive PNF: the taking over the PA address to pax after the falling handset ( but again we do not know , that might have been preceeded by an order from the Capt) , the manual A/P disconnection and and the subsequent side stick inputs.
But surprisingly , the speeds selection , the later disengagement of A/T and pushing the thottles to TOGA were performed by the PF, so it may looks as if 2 people were trying to solve a turbulence/overspeed indication problem separately.
Maybe this was coordinated, I was not there, we do not have a CVR, so all this is mere speculation of course.
But this sentence on the report :
102 seconds after the upset began, the aircraft was descending through 36,500 feet, the pilot flying finally notices the autopilot had disconnected and begins to operate his side stick.
Trying to understand, not to point fingers.
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Trying to understand, not to point fingers.
The results of this politic are commented at large in those forums ....
As an interested observer of remarks here, could the following have any relevance to this incident?
Report: Two Skywest AT72 and Sunstate DH8D at Gladstone on May 16th and May 17th 2012, takeoff in night conditions without runway lights
Inattention/Change blindess/Expectation bias.....
Report: Two Skywest AT72 and Sunstate DH8D at Gladstone on May 16th and May 17th 2012, takeoff in night conditions without runway lights
Inattention/Change blindess/Expectation bias.....
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Hi,
Another event (this one was fatal) is the Bluegrass Comair accident
Comair Flight 191 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Another event (this one was fatal) is the Bluegrass Comair accident
Comair Flight 191 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Last edited by jcjeant; 6th Nov 2012 at 08:00.
Re: upset report; rather surprised nobody has thought fit to comment on their radar setting technique;-
During climb, at about FL180, both crew members adjusted their navigation displays to a range of 320nm, the weather radar was set to maximum gain and a tilt angle to alternate between -0.5 and -1.0 degrees.
Both on 320 nm scale? In the climb? In ITCZ territory?! I find the roughest rides when flying through those small green blobs that appear seemingly out of nowhere at close range (i.e "dry" clouds that don't reflect well on radar, but are nevertheless well on the way to fully developed CB's; a lot of unseen energy pushing them all the way up to 35,000 ft).
But on a lighter note, liked this comment,
I think the most shocking thing about this whole incident is that someone
managed to get an A343 into a rapid climb...
During climb, at about FL180, both crew members adjusted their navigation displays to a range of 320nm, the weather radar was set to maximum gain and a tilt angle to alternate between -0.5 and -1.0 degrees.
But on a lighter note, liked this comment,
I think the most shocking thing about this whole incident is that someone
managed to get an A343 into a rapid climb...
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Special Investigation: "Air France the free fall"
Unfortunately this AF A319 rejected TWY T/0 at Sofia and the loss of separation on 7 Sept 2012 between A319 F-FRXC and B735 OK-XGB on approach to Prague, when AF F-FRXC allegedly deviated from standard procedures after way point ERASU and reportedly ended up in the flightpath of the Czech Airlines B735 already established on finals, seem to fit in with the gist of a recent investigative French TV reportage on AF:
Having said that, on the LBSF incident, not necessarily to excuse the AF-crew or to say anything negative about LBSF (on the contrary, its a fine airport), but just to point out that AF normally is at parking positions 1-4 on the east-side of T2. With most of the time T/O being from RWY 27, AF would take TWY L and H to RWY 27. Or in the more rare case of T/O from RWY 09 (like in the incident flight) they will take TWY K, turn left unto H, turn right onto B and then the first right onto RWY 09. For some reason AF-1587 were on TWY J (south and parallel to TWY H, turned right onto B and (as if they thought they were on the "normal" TWY H) turned from B the first to the right, not onto RWY 09 (which from J is the second to the right), but onto....TWY H. Explicable, but not immediately excusable.
BR,
D Bru
Having said that, on the LBSF incident, not necessarily to excuse the AF-crew or to say anything negative about LBSF (on the contrary, its a fine airport), but just to point out that AF normally is at parking positions 1-4 on the east-side of T2. With most of the time T/O being from RWY 27, AF would take TWY L and H to RWY 27. Or in the more rare case of T/O from RWY 09 (like in the incident flight) they will take TWY K, turn left unto H, turn right onto B and then the first right onto RWY 09. For some reason AF-1587 were on TWY J (south and parallel to TWY H, turned right onto B and (as if they thought they were on the "normal" TWY H) turned from B the first to the right, not onto RWY 09 (which from J is the second to the right), but onto....TWY H. Explicable, but not immediately excusable.
BR,
D Bru
Last edited by D Bru; 4th Dec 2012 at 00:13.
I know there are always two sides to a story but this is unbelievable (in reference to the above video).
With the revival of the Concorde story elsewhere on the forum and the crash of 447, Air France needs to get their act together but probably won't.
It's a shame really because there are many people that work at Air France that sure seem to want to make it a safe carrier.
With the revival of the Concorde story elsewhere on the forum and the crash of 447, Air France needs to get their act together but probably won't.
It's a shame really because there are many people that work at Air France that sure seem to want to make it a safe carrier.
Half way through makes the point that the Airbus chief test pilot and bosses of BEA and the DGAC were at the same flying school in 1965 together...
Another old boys network..looking after each other?
Another old boys network..looking after each other?
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Totally unacceptable .
After reading through the thread, I am sorry to say this is gross operational error.
Totally unacceptable from ATPL pilots.
Understandable if you are low time PPL pilot, and yes humans make errors, but these types of errors should not be happening on commercial flight deck period.
2 pilot crew, 2 pilots fail to recognize this? State of the art airplane. Please no excuses.
The traveling public deserves better.
Totally unacceptable from ATPL pilots.
Understandable if you are low time PPL pilot, and yes humans make errors, but these types of errors should not be happening on commercial flight deck period.
2 pilot crew, 2 pilots fail to recognize this? State of the art airplane. Please no excuses.
The traveling public deserves better.
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AF Safety Culture
After reading all your posts and pretty much being aware of what AF does offer us in terms of "incident news", let me share this with you.
On one hand; it is pretty clear Air France has a Safety Culture problem, and I ain't telling you anything you don't already know, judging by all what we see and know.
It is quite common to approach Safety Culture as an Iceberg. What you see is only the small portion of it, the rest of the incidents, problems, cracks in the safety system are usually hidden.
This is because Air France was, until recently (I think, correct me on this one, but I think 10-15 years ago the French Government held 50 % of the shares) a French company, with a French public service company culture, with French Standards and French "wisdom", French know-how and French Standards. And, guys, I am not French, but they have been building and flying airplanes for quite a while! So they are good engineers too and they know it, and unfortunately, they are not used to others telling them what to do.
However, they have failed to adapt to what´s called "Bench-marking" and "Best recommended practices", Yes in part of an obvious "language barrier", but mostly because of a cultural barrier and a failure to accept that times have changed and that standards are not only French, but worldwide. And excuse me for saying this, but standards are also Anglo Saxon, namely British (who have a very developed and mature Safety Culture), American (Trend setters and the largest regulator worldwide) and Australian, among others (Germany, Netherlands, Canada and a few others).
Air France Safety Culture needs to be completely overhauled, with clear lines of what´s called a "Just Culture" being drawn. Air France needs to change into a "world class" airline and not only a French Class Airline, as tough as it might be to accept, they will have to accept to speak better English on the radio and conform to International Best Practices, be them Australian, American, German or Ugandan.
And for this, you need to go on hard-talk with Unions and major stakeholders in the company. And on this matter, I'm not quite sure they really want to do it , so hopefully, a few guys inside AF can realize that things have changed.
Thank you and Merry Christmas to yall. Safe flying to everyone...
On one hand; it is pretty clear Air France has a Safety Culture problem, and I ain't telling you anything you don't already know, judging by all what we see and know.
It is quite common to approach Safety Culture as an Iceberg. What you see is only the small portion of it, the rest of the incidents, problems, cracks in the safety system are usually hidden.
This is because Air France was, until recently (I think, correct me on this one, but I think 10-15 years ago the French Government held 50 % of the shares) a French company, with a French public service company culture, with French Standards and French "wisdom", French know-how and French Standards. And, guys, I am not French, but they have been building and flying airplanes for quite a while! So they are good engineers too and they know it, and unfortunately, they are not used to others telling them what to do.
However, they have failed to adapt to what´s called "Bench-marking" and "Best recommended practices", Yes in part of an obvious "language barrier", but mostly because of a cultural barrier and a failure to accept that times have changed and that standards are not only French, but worldwide. And excuse me for saying this, but standards are also Anglo Saxon, namely British (who have a very developed and mature Safety Culture), American (Trend setters and the largest regulator worldwide) and Australian, among others (Germany, Netherlands, Canada and a few others).
Air France Safety Culture needs to be completely overhauled, with clear lines of what´s called a "Just Culture" being drawn. Air France needs to change into a "world class" airline and not only a French Class Airline, as tough as it might be to accept, they will have to accept to speak better English on the radio and conform to International Best Practices, be them Australian, American, German or Ugandan.
And for this, you need to go on hard-talk with Unions and major stakeholders in the company. And on this matter, I'm not quite sure they really want to do it , so hopefully, a few guys inside AF can realize that things have changed.
Thank you and Merry Christmas to yall. Safe flying to everyone...
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On one hand; it is pretty clear Air France has a Safety Culture problem, and I ain't telling you anything you don't already know, judging by all what we see and know.
Looking at my airline, we have incidents from altitude deviations (or level busts) to nav errors and runway incursions. Do we have a "Safety Culture" problem? Not according to the FAA. Sh!t happens on the line, and no one can't tell me that LH, BA, VS etc. are immune from things going wrong. It depends if and how one reports it. Since this is a mainly British/US bulletin board, I am not surprised to sense (a little) bias.
In other words: My poo doesn't stink.
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Hi,
Squawk7777
Just curious .. how many passengers and crews your airline has kill during the last ten years ?
Squawk7777
Looking at my airline
Last edited by jcjeant; 21st Dec 2012 at 22:15.
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look at American Airlines, US Air or Swiss(air) for example. Sometimes people get lucky, sometimes not. The number of pax killed does not entirely reveal the "safety culture" picture. It much more complex than that.
Last edited by Squawk7777; 21st Dec 2012 at 22:26.
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Deaths related to flying hours may not be a perfect way to give an operator safety rating. However it is something that is difficult to hide and for practical purposes is an excellent guide.
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Not sure I agree with you on that. I had the pleasant near death experience by flying with a now defunct Mexican airline called Aerolineas Internacionales. Perfect safety record. On paper. Am still amazed that this airline did not kill any pax.
Talk to contractors that fly for a large airline out of the Korean Peninsula. Most of them will admit (after a few hops-related beverages) that they can't explain the good safety record. It's all relative.
Talk to contractors that fly for a large airline out of the Korean Peninsula. Most of them will admit (after a few hops-related beverages) that they can't explain the good safety record. It's all relative.
Last edited by Squawk7777; 21st Dec 2012 at 22:35.
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7777,
There is a lot of truth in what you say,but I did say the system wasn't perfect. The best thing about the statistical method is that fatal air accidents quickly become a matter of public record. Even those not in the business have sufficient information to avoid airlines with higher than normal deaths.
The standard of airlines that are unsafe but with no fatal accident is mostly hidden and when it isn't, it is subject to perception. Those in the business, like you and me, have more information and avoid these airlines.
There is a lot of truth in what you say,but I did say the system wasn't perfect. The best thing about the statistical method is that fatal air accidents quickly become a matter of public record. Even those not in the business have sufficient information to avoid airlines with higher than normal deaths.
The standard of airlines that are unsafe but with no fatal accident is mostly hidden and when it isn't, it is subject to perception. Those in the business, like you and me, have more information and avoid these airlines.
Last edited by autoflight; 22nd Dec 2012 at 05:18.
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Squawk7777, bull's eye on that one!
You are so right, one of the roots of the problem in AF Safety Culture is what you just said, the reporting culture. I am not so sure what their standard is over their reporting policy over there, but after working in 3 continents, they are all very different. In Asia, some airlines would require mandatory reporting of exceeding of 30 kts during taxi, with disciplinary action if it was found it was a violation, whereas in North America, it would not trigger anything, hence people would less likely report it (in North America)
This is what I mean by "French Standards". There are no more "National" standards in this business, everyone pretty much has to abide by IOSA as the golden standard of Operational Safety, and regulators are more and more aligning flaws and caveats between their regulations and "world class" or international best practices in terms of SMS, FRMS, NOSS and all the shenanigans...
You are so right, one of the roots of the problem in AF Safety Culture is what you just said, the reporting culture. I am not so sure what their standard is over their reporting policy over there, but after working in 3 continents, they are all very different. In Asia, some airlines would require mandatory reporting of exceeding of 30 kts during taxi, with disciplinary action if it was found it was a violation, whereas in North America, it would not trigger anything, hence people would less likely report it (in North America)
This is what I mean by "French Standards". There are no more "National" standards in this business, everyone pretty much has to abide by IOSA as the golden standard of Operational Safety, and regulators are more and more aligning flaws and caveats between their regulations and "world class" or international best practices in terms of SMS, FRMS, NOSS and all the shenanigans...
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"Safety" is an instantaneous compilation of results. As such, it describes very little, and is used in contextual ways to placate fear, or sell stock.
In a cultural context, there are better ways to get a handle on performance, better still, to develop a culture that respects and mitigates RISK. Open and free reporting, (disclosure), internal and external, gives sufficient data to predict performance.
There is no "final score", and safety must describe 'in progress' all facets of risk.
In a setting of performance analysis, risk analysis can beneficially permeate the culture, and set a system wide 'tone'. Unfortunately, some companies manipulate, or ignore, best practice. Any principal officer who uses the word "luck" has provided a clue to the ID of such a firm...
In a cultural context, there are better ways to get a handle on performance, better still, to develop a culture that respects and mitigates RISK. Open and free reporting, (disclosure), internal and external, gives sufficient data to predict performance.
There is no "final score", and safety must describe 'in progress' all facets of risk.
In a setting of performance analysis, risk analysis can beneficially permeate the culture, and set a system wide 'tone'. Unfortunately, some companies manipulate, or ignore, best practice. Any principal officer who uses the word "luck" has provided a clue to the ID of such a firm...
Last edited by Lyman; 22nd Dec 2012 at 05:36.
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Lyman :agree with you except on one thing : Luck does plays a role , always did.
Taking AF ( but only as an example , could take another airline ) was there anything controlled that prevented Toronto to become 200+ casualty instead of zero ?, same could be said for Habsheim, Brest or Pau more recently )
Been long enough in this business to know you can pile up statistics anyway you like , can hide anything you like or boost anyhing you like using numbers .
Safety is a culture, an immaterial thing, not easily translated in a mathematical formula.
clippermaro : you are right on the mark this old culture is more AF than : "French" . Other French airlines have not necessarily kept the same culture ( Air Carraibes comes to mind) although other still do.
The French air Force is not at all like this anymore since a long time .
Taking AF ( but only as an example , could take another airline ) was there anything controlled that prevented Toronto to become 200+ casualty instead of zero ?, same could be said for Habsheim, Brest or Pau more recently )
Been long enough in this business to know you can pile up statistics anyway you like , can hide anything you like or boost anyhing you like using numbers .
Safety is a culture, an immaterial thing, not easily translated in a mathematical formula.
clippermaro : you are right on the mark this old culture is more AF than : "French" . Other French airlines have not necessarily kept the same culture ( Air Carraibes comes to mind) although other still do.
The French air Force is not at all like this anymore since a long time .
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A synonym for safety is care. Luck runs two ways. If care is lacking, one hopes for good luck, and banks a greater net profit. If one takes care, there is less money in the bag.
Remember the catch phrase, "With service to London, Paris, and Johannesburg."
It is a service industry. Such a concept is open to interpretation in its pursuit.
When BA038 crumpled, there was mystery surrounding the problem. Prior to a found cause, United discovered a paper problem with fire bottle 5 in the hold of some of their 777 fleet. They ordered an immediate inspection (of all 88 aircraft) including cancellation of several revenue flights. The inspection was mundane, and turned out to be deferrable.
There are other examples with other airlines, but a pattern of care develops, and some people notice....
Remember the catch phrase, "With service to London, Paris, and Johannesburg."
It is a service industry. Such a concept is open to interpretation in its pursuit.
When BA038 crumpled, there was mystery surrounding the problem. Prior to a found cause, United discovered a paper problem with fire bottle 5 in the hold of some of their 777 fleet. They ordered an immediate inspection (of all 88 aircraft) including cancellation of several revenue flights. The inspection was mundane, and turned out to be deferrable.
There are other examples with other airlines, but a pattern of care develops, and some people notice....