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Airbus takes pilots back to basics with the A350

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Airbus takes pilots back to basics with the A350

Old 20th Oct 2012, 13:56
  #281 (permalink)  
 
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In my 22 years of flying Boeings and Airbuses. "What the F#@*' moments:
Boeing=0
Airbus=Lost count.
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Old 20th Oct 2012, 14:09
  #282 (permalink)  
 
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studi

without research I can recall the AB330 test crash, Perpignan, Habsheim, AF447, Strasbourg, Islamabad, etc. etc.

.... and for Boeing FBW no fatalities, only one hull loss.

remember, we compare FBW aircraft. Now if you come up with numbers, what was the initial argument? Ah yes, Airbus FBW versus more traditional layouts. Now the latter have a lot more numbers, do we agree? So how does a comparison work there? Yes, by percentage. So lets take percentage of Airbus FBW and fatalities and put this into perspective of Boeing FBW and fatalities.
You'll end up with exactly what I said: The Boeing looks way safer.

Thus my statement: There is a lesson to be learned and it just might be that the philosophy in design is safer .....
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Old 20th Oct 2012, 14:15
  #283 (permalink)  
 
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Which Scenario is better?

At a short time after the AP has disconected , the PF pulls back the stick/yoke but the plane has not yet responded:
Scenario 1. The PNF is unaware that the PF has pulled back the stick.
Scenario 2. The PNF feels the PF has pulled back the yoke.

At a short time after the PF has pulled back the stick/yoke and the plane starts to climb:
Scenario 1. The PNF wonders why the plane is climbing so he scans his instruments to work out why.
Scenario 2. The PNF knows why the plane is climbing because he felt the PF pulll back the yoke.
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Old 20th Oct 2012, 15:11
  #284 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by DozyWannabe View Post
The 'za?

Northwest 6231, West Caribbean 708 and Birgenair 301 are all accidents involving aircraft with traditional controls where the non-handling crew had connected PFCs displaying exactly what the handling pilot was doing and yet the non-handling crew did nothing to correct the situation. The idea that connected controls make the difference is therefore not supported by the evidence and smacks of wishful thinking on the part of those who have already decided that the Airbus flight deck design is unsafe because of the lack of said connection.

The advent of the A320 and its FBW implementation is not - and never was - part of a move to sideline and de-skill the job of the line pilot. The opprobrium directed at the A320 and her sisters is and has has always been entirely misdirected.
Your logic is very peculiar. For one you seem satisfied with and repeat frequently throughout this thread that Airbus has been able to maintain the status quot with regards to accident rates.

This is akin to BMW or Audi coming forth and proudly claiming that the 2013 7 series or A8 are on par safety-wise with the E3 Saloon or Quattro Series. Notwithstanding that these are vehicles separated by 40 years of technological improvement. Mind boggling.

The question that should be asked and answered is why Airbus has not been able to substantially improve the safety record. The SS unlinked system should be blowing Boeing out of the water safety-wise. Instead, it is merely keeping up. The age old saying "if you're standing still, you're going backwards" applies.

Secondly, comparing incidents across completely different aircraft types can be difficult. The question that I would like to have answered is: If AF had been operating a 777 that night, would both the cruise captain and the captain have allowed the F/O to pull the yoke into his stomach for over a minute, stick shakers rattling away?
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Old 20th Oct 2012, 15:27
  #285 (permalink)  
 
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The answer will be that a/c configured conventionally have crashed also.

Which is an utterly ridiculous position. Logic lives not in the minds of partisans.

447 crew could have reacted exactly as did the Colganair crew. Since the posibility exists, it is likely, no? Perhaps, certain? bobs yer uncle.

Last edited by Lyman; 20th Oct 2012 at 15:31.
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Old 20th Oct 2012, 16:01
  #286 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by root View Post
The SS unlinked system should be blowing Boeing out of the water safety-wise. Instead, it is merely keeping up.
Why? It wasn't designed to be an across-the-board improvement safety-wise, it was simply a different approach using late 20th century state-of-the-art technology rather than mid-20th century.

If AF had been operating a 777 that night, would both the cruise captain and the captain have allowed the F/O to pull the yoke into his stomach for over a minute, stick shakers rattling away?
Given that that's exactly what happened with NWA6231 and Birgenair 301, it has to be considered a possibility.
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Old 20th Oct 2012, 16:16
  #287 (permalink)  
 
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@Dozy

Again, again and again:

You compare conventional aircraft with the Airbus with FBW and modern protections! (NWA6231 and Birgenair 301)

Try comparing it once and for all with the other FBW system by Boeing!

But we all know why you don't.

Furthermore root is correct.
With a T7, the AF447 accident would not have been possible the way it originated.

First: You simply cannot hold the yoke back for so long in a T7! It is too hard, your strength fades out and the other guy will be startled by the shaking yoke in his stomach and your choking in agony.

Second: The trim cannot be full aft. Once the red stripe attained, the trim is inhibited. So forces stay in a nose down manner once you release the yoke.

That to me is compelling enough.

But continue comparing apples with pears, it simply doesn't stick.
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Old 20th Oct 2012, 16:40
  #288 (permalink)  
 
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If you think the T7 system can't be defeated, there's a bridge I'd like to sell you.
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Old 20th Oct 2012, 16:52
  #289 (permalink)  
 
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Thus far, the T7 has prevailed. AB not so much.
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Old 20th Oct 2012, 17:05
  #290 (permalink)  
 
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Prevailed how? There aren't enough accidents to either widebody type to make a statistically valid comparison.

[And I'm not a partisan, I'm strictly neutral - I just challenge assertions that aren't based in fact!]

Last edited by DozyWannabe; 20th Oct 2012 at 17:07.
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Old 20th Oct 2012, 17:25
  #291 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by DozyWannabe View Post
Why? It wasn't designed to be an across-the-board improvement safety-wise, it was simply a different approach using late 20th century state-of-the-art technology rather than mid-20th century.

Given that that's exactly what happened with NWA6231 and Birgenair 301, it has to be considered a possibility.
If there's no measurable safety improvement to a new system and aside from that the new system creates new problems as demonstrated by AF it is only fair to conclude the new system is inferior. Again, how do you justify possibly exposing crews to new threats by implementing a system that, by your own declaration, does not provide substantial improvements over the system it is replacing?

Furthermore, your references to accidents on linked controls aircraft tie into my previous question. Those crews did not react the way they should have because they misunderstood the condition their airplane were in. They were so overloaded they did not recognize a stick shaker, a universal stall indication system implemented on airliners for over half a century, for what it was. These crews lost the basics. This is not about analyzing the PFD. This is about the most basic of muscle memories failing them in their hour of need. These crews were beyond saving on any aircraft.

But what if the cruise captain would have remembered what that vibrating pole between his legs meant on that A330, if only it had been there?
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Old 20th Oct 2012, 17:42
  #292 (permalink)  
 
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"Prevailed how? There aren't enough accidents to either widebody type to make a statistically valid comparison."

First, may there be by the grace of God, no more Accidents on any type.

Secondly, your argument is meaningless. No fatals is the goal, thus far, the 777 has a perfect record.

Third, statistics are for insurance actuaries and accountants. Real people keep "score". Fair? Does it matter?

If your audience is bean counters, and risk managers, you have a case.

But it takes a jaundiced view to ignore the results. ......RIP

Last edited by Lyman; 20th Oct 2012 at 17:43.
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Old 20th Oct 2012, 17:52
  #293 (permalink)  
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Originally Posted by root View Post
Those crews did not react the way they should have because they misunderstood the condition their airplane were in. They were so overloaded they did not recognize a stick shaker, a universal stall indication system implemented on airliners for over half a century, for what it was. These crews lost the basics. This is not about analyzing the PFD. This is about the most basic of muscle memories failing them in their hour of need. These crews were beyond saving on any aircraft.
Replace stick shaker with stall warning & buffet, and you have a rather accurate description of AF447.
 
Old 20th Oct 2012, 17:57
  #294 (permalink)  
 
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I think that is an additional way to frame the problem. However, the 330 is still missing the equipment, and replacement value is the argument. Obviously, there are those who believe the yoke and its vibration would make a difference. Some do not believe it would.

I suppose that makes it a popularity thing..
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Old 20th Oct 2012, 18:09
  #295 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by root View Post
If there's no measurable safety improvement to a new system and aside from that the new system creates new problems as demonstrated by AF it is only fair to conclude the new system is inferior. Again, how do you justify possibly exposing crews to new threats by implementing a system that, by your own declaration, does not provide substantial improvements over the system it is replacing?
You're misrepresenting what I said. The design solves some problems with the nature of interconnection (which have been gone into in some detail over on the Tech Log thread and I'm not going to repeat them here) - as with any design change new issues are created, but overall there's no evidence to suggest one system is superior or inferior to the other in that regard. The *big* advantage to the system is in ease of conversion between the entire Airbus range from the A320 up to the A380. That was the primary design goal from right back in 1982 and it's been successful - it's a significant part of the reason why Airbus went from where it was in the mid-80s to going toe-to-toe with Boeing by the late '90s.

Furthermore, your references to accidents on linked controls aircraft tie into my previous question. Those crews did not react the way they should have because they misunderstood the condition their airplane were in. ... This is not about analyzing the PFD. This is about the most basic of muscle memories failing them in their hour of need. These crews were beyond saving on any aircraft.
And who's to say AF447's crew would have been any different in that regard? You're being very selective in your assertion, which seems to be that if a crew missed cues in a "conventional" system it must be incompetence on their part, but if they missed the cues (of which there were many) in a FBW Airbus flight deck then it must be the PFC design that is to blame.

They were so overloaded they did not recognize a stick shaker, a universal stall indication system implemented on airliners for over half a century, for what it was.
As Clandestino has pointed out, stick shakers were not standard fit until airliners were developed that had difficult stall characteristics - the shaker was designed as a crude mechanical replacement for the pre-stall buffet absent from those designs. As it turns out, the A330 airframe design has a significant pre-stall buffet, so a shaker isn't really necessary.

But what if the cruise captain would have remembered what that vibrating pole between his legs meant on that A330, if only it had been there?
There was no "cruise captain", the F/O was designated as relief pilot - and seeing as he missed cues that his initial control inputs had climbed the aircraft to 38,000ft, misdiagnosed pre-stall buffet as overspeed, and failed to determine stall despite having all the cues available, I think it's fair to say that a shaker would have been unlikely to make the difference.

Lyman - the T7 has a hull-loss that would have been a fatal if the crew hadn't handled the situation as well as they did (I saw it when flying back into LHR from a work trip to NYC). Your "score" is based on an arbitrary measure that you picked to support your point.
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Old 20th Oct 2012, 19:14
  #296 (permalink)  
 
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Fuel starvation caused by powerplant issue is not relative to airframe. TRENT just about crashed a 380, is that Airbus' fault?

Bob and weave, as usual.
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Old 20th Oct 2012, 19:21
  #297 (permalink)  
 
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Cool

Hi,

Cool guy
At a short time after the PF has pulled back the stick/yoke and the plane starts to climb:
Scenario 1. The PNF wonders why the plane is climbing so he scans his instruments to work out why.
Scenario 2. The PNF knows why the plane is climbing because he felt the PF pulll back the yoke.
At a short time after the PF has pulled back the stick the plane start to climb and the PNF asked for stop to climb and PF agree
Scenario 1
The PNF know the plane continue to climb because he scan his instruments and don't understand why the plane continue to climb (the PF agreed to no more climb)
Scenario 2
The PNF know why the plane continue to climb as he understand that the PF don't followed his request because he felt the PF continue pull back the yoke and the instruments show the climb

What is the best scenario ?

Last edited by jcjeant; 20th Oct 2012 at 19:37.
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Old 20th Oct 2012, 20:16
  #298 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by Lyman View Post
Fuel starvation caused by powerplant issue is not relative to airframe. TRENT just about crashed a 380, is that Airbus' fault?
You never mentioned anything about causes, but in the same regard the pitot tubes at the centre of the AF447 event were an optional fit made by Thales.

Bob and weave, as usual.
No, just a bit of fact-checking - at least I'm consistent!

Bear in mind there are around 200 (approx 20%) more widebody FBW Airbuses on the line than there are 777s, so that's going to affect probability as well.
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Old 20th Oct 2012, 21:10
  #299 (permalink)  
 
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As far as I am concerned, if a subset of actual pilots believe that feedback would be a benefit, and the rest of the pilot community believe it would do no harm to have it (whether or not they believe they need it) then I don't see how non-pilots can argue with them. Perhaps there are commercial or practical design issues which in the event mean it is not provided, however it has to be acknowledged that something has been lost. As regards the absence for 447, we can argue this to our graves but I vote for life.
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Old 20th Oct 2012, 21:29
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What about the subset of pilots who think it's fine as it is (or the pilots who helped design it in the first place)?

Last edited by DozyWannabe; 20th Oct 2012 at 21:31.
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