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Airbus takes pilots back to basics with the A350

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Airbus takes pilots back to basics with the A350

Old 13th Oct 2012, 21:23
  #221 (permalink)  
 
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HazelNuts39

Hmm.

"That is not correct. The sidestick which was predominantly nose-up until 02:10:24 was predominantly nose-down between 02:10:26 and 02:10:40"

Yet the a/c continued up and up, the flight path was smooth as was trend, Vs.

No? I can appreciate your reference to the traces. If only PF and his MP could have seen the merged lines on that swell graph.

Instead, the PF had the stick until way past too late.

All the way UP. When the a/c went 1.65 G, that is me clocking the RHS with my right hand, and taking control with my left.

Point is, PF got the benefit of the doubt from rhe outset, right to "TireX3"

Originally Posted by BEA Final Report 2.1.2.4 and 2.1.2.5

"The PNF’s intervention prompted the PF to apply inputs that reduced the pitch attitude, which had exceeded 10 degrees. Although the PF agreed that the objective should be to lose altitude, his inputs maintained the aeroplane on an ascending flight path."

Hind sight, as pretty as it was useless.

Airbus can take pilots back to basics all day long, that won't fix what 447 LHS faced. He had no damning evidence to take back control from the flying pilot.

His less than explicit trust in the panel,

The PNF detected the climb based on observation and reasoning (“according to all three you’re climbing”), which indicates the beginning of a loss of confidence in the instrument readings. In particular, he asked the PF to stabilise, to pay attention to the airspeed and to descend.

and the short conversations he did have with PF were not enough, in the absence of "But I am pulling up. All this while..."

Which came too late by 3.5 minutes. Left hand seat sees the RHS sidestick, Or feels it pushing his left hand backwards, he takes control, and the planet keeps 228 souls on board...

QED?

Last edited by Lyman; 13th Oct 2012 at 21:43.
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Old 13th Oct 2012, 22:02
  #222 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by Lyman
If only PF and his MP could have seen the merged lines on that swell graph.
It's a mystery to me what you mean by "the merged lines on that swell graph." The DFDR recorded pitch attitude and vertical speed that were presented to the pilots: The PNF detected the climb based on observation and reasoning ...
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Old 13th Oct 2012, 23:38
  #223 (permalink)  
 
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HazelNuts39

Because it is clear there was no agreement on the attitude, for whatever either one was doing. if the "swell graph" was displayed for both pilots, both pilots have bankable data, and the confusion is solved...

To me this is simple. PF did not understand what was going on with the aircraft, and the PNF knew he was confused, or would not have directed him as he did.
The PNF was basing his get on "The Three", which BEA conclude caused him confusion, in the form of 'Loss of Faith' in the Panel....

All during the climb to STALL, and there was nothing but climb, both were confused...Whatever the source of confusion, the flight path was salvageable until loss of propulsive and Lift ceilings.

If the PNF was content to allow PF to continue the climb, he could have used a clue that presented him with the reason, which he suspected, but could not conclude....the pull on the stick on the right...

Give him that knowledge, in the form of connected and inter visible Sticks, and there is no crash...
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Old 13th Oct 2012, 23:52
  #224 (permalink)  
 
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Lyman
What does the PNF do when he is told the controls are pushed for ND, but are not? He sees the instruments, no change, still climbing
HazelNuts39
That is not correct. The pitch attitude reduced from 12° to 6°, and the rate of climb reduced from 7000 fpm to 1100 fpm
So Lyman is correct ... the plane still climbing instead of descending (the PNF request)

Last edited by jcjeant; 13th Oct 2012 at 23:53.
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Old 14th Oct 2012, 00:05
  #225 (permalink)  
 
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This is not at all complex. Forty nine seconds from a/p disconnect to STALL. No descent, none, not untill STALL... And even then NoseUp. The PF knew where his stick was, PNF did not.

This airframe was functionally single pilot, even after Captain entered. And the reason? Stick Inaccessibility, both visual and tactile, to anyone but the pilot flying. this critical information was not available, BY DESIGN.

Because Lyman says so? No, read the report.
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Old 14th Oct 2012, 00:22
  #226 (permalink)  
 
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[QUOTAF447 would never have happened if PNF or the Capt, could have seen the control input.E][/QUOTE]

Rubbish.
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Old 14th Oct 2012, 00:44
  #227 (permalink)  
 
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mini

mini.....Rubbish.

I'll want some kind of explanation, then.....

Last edited by Lyman; 14th Oct 2012 at 00:46.
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Old 14th Oct 2012, 03:37
  #228 (permalink)  
 
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My opinion will be always that the PNF was very disturbed after asking the PF to lower the plane
Indeed ... as PF replied OK .. he believes that the PF gives order to descend (push stick forward) but notes on the instruments that the plane continues to climb
What must he think at that time about the instruments?
Do he thinks that the airplane suddenly became uncontrollable ?
And later what must be the PNF astonishment when the PF answer to the captain "that he pull on the stick from a while" !
His blood must definitely frozen in his veins .. realizing all this time lost and little still ...
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Old 14th Oct 2012, 05:36
  #229 (permalink)  
 
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jcjeant

Everything to which you refer is in the BEA product of investigation, yet some have said rubbish....they sound like an old bear.

But of course the pilot pulls non stop. Since the other one and Captain cannot see it, he rejects it as impossible. And for want of this piece of information, "We are going to crash, this cannot be happening..." Rubbish? In their own words they say to us, 'impossible....' Some here still cling to impossible. But it must be accepted, and move on....

The truth may hurt, but it is the truth....

Last edited by Lyman; 14th Oct 2012 at 05:44.
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Old 14th Oct 2012, 06:03
  #230 (permalink)  
 
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I have 4000hrs in Boeings and 3000 now on the A330.

I like the A330 to handle.

BUT I have far less sense of what the airplanes doing than I had in the Boeing, especially when PNF.

The rest of this debate is crap. The fact is the crew are less pilots, and more systems operators on the Airbus.

I'll leave you to the merits of each, as I have to go fly my Airbus now.
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Old 14th Oct 2012, 06:54
  #231 (permalink)  
 
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As a systems operator, shouldn't more information be available, not less? Certainly as to the hardware's relationship to its fluid environment?

Problem #1 Zero tactile feedback, flying pilot must rely on instruments alone to negotiate the a/c attitude.

Problem #2 Zero awareness of control system status by back up pilot, due isolated back up controller, and unavailable visual cues.

(BUT I have far less sense of what the airplanes doing than I had in the Boeing, especially when PNF.) ....quote/unquote

Hi HazelNuts39 i understand completely your pov. It is all there in the traces, and makes for a very clear report of the data, so we can get a handle on what happened. My pov is simply that given the available data at the time, and the obstacles encountered, we simply cannot use the record to determine the actions of the pilots, in regards to their decision making.

We can "should" on them forever, the reality is there were things they could not surmount. I am starting with crap CRM, and nonexistent awareness of inputs, all pilots. For it is clear that PF was not aware of the results, and his mates were unaware of his inputs.

That is two separate issues, and if the first one is solved in time, no crash. But it is the most difficult to suss, his actions make little sense.

The second issue is the complete lack of knowledge of the pilot's commands.

This is the back up solution that had no chance of success.

One can say, "that's just the way it is".... Or "other aircraft crash too"..

Or, one can say, "can we improve this, so that we eliminate the obstacle to recovery of the flight path in the future"?

From "rubbish" to "can we have driven and connected sticks?" it is a continuum.

Designers work hard to anticipate and model for things that may never happen.

But when something happens that was predicted, and undesigned for, the industry cannot simply say: "other aircraft have crashed also"

Can they?

Last edited by Lyman; 14th Oct 2012 at 16:49.
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Old 14th Oct 2012, 13:17
  #232 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by aguadalte
David, will I get interconnected side sticks and SS feed-back on the future A30X? And what about moving auto-throttles? (That's what "intuitive" flight is all about...the rest is "gadget technology").
Agree on that.

Also have some concerns on the "much more open A350 flight deck, brighter, more larger windows, huge vision" video 2:00
Too much outside lighting is the enemy we try to protect from, tiring for the eyes, unable to properly look at the screens we rely so much on.

Larger windows, yes, but only if we're able to dim them ... ?
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Old 14th Oct 2012, 17:43
  #233 (permalink)  
 
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I'm a little surprised at the revelation. When I went through Airbus training in the mid-2000s, the first session was flown in direct law to show me that it flew "like an airplane." I commented to the Airbus instructor and he said some early airline instructors had tried to concentrate on the bells and whistles, not on the airplane.

My impression was that they were doing a better job than what I was used to.
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Old 14th Oct 2012, 18:29
  #234 (permalink)  
 
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"I commented to the Airbus instructor and he said some early airline instructors had tried to concentrate on the bells and whistles, not on the airplane."

It strikes me that is entirely appropriate; it is not the duty of the manufacturer or the airline to teach ab initio, only to familiarize the transitioning pilot with the platform.

If the airbus needs to be demonstrated as complying with basic aero, then the certification is in need of address.

The system is and was oversold, and undersupported.

Airbus, at least their marketing, are in the weeds. There are some design flaws that are being disguised as shortcomings of pilot training, it is a condescending subterfuge, imo.
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Old 14th Oct 2012, 19:50
  #235 (permalink)  
 
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CONF iture
Also have some concerns on the "much more open A350 flight deck, brighter, more larger windows, huge vision" video 2:00
Too much outside lighting is the enemy we try to protect from, tiring for the eyes, unable to properly look at the screens we rely so much on.
That's because they think we're there for the sightseeing...
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Old 14th Oct 2012, 21:52
  #236 (permalink)  
 
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Well, a week ago I'd put some of the things written in this thread into "you just can't make this stuff up". Once again, I was proven wrong.

I have repeatedly warned about the hilarious theories that are inevitably put forward when someone without the basic grasp of the theory of flight tries to go into details of sophisticated flight control system. Now we have moved a couple of notches up with debaters unable to understand simple general terms such as "feedback".

Originally Posted by 737Jock
Whatever Clandestino... Thank god you know it better than the dictionary.
Nope. I know it as well as dictionary and most of the world. No better, no worse.

Originally Posted by 737Jock
If I put my hand on moving thrust levers, I am getting tactile feedback on what the autothrottle is doing.
If I put my hand on a yoke/stick that moves, I am getting tactile feedback om what the autopilot/my colleague is doing.
This can under no circumstances be called feedback. Any feedback involves return information. There is no any return in your examples as you are not the originator!

Control feedback that was so much discussed with so many misconceptions here involves feeling of the resistance of the flight controls as yoke or stick is moved. As the aeroplanes grew bigger and were operated across the wider speed range, having aerodynamically balanced manually operated flight controls become impractical so we switched to power (that is hydraulic) operated controls. There is no any feedback in them as yoke doesn't move the controls any more but a block of hydraulic valves and 3000psi actuators don't care much if aeroplane is standing still or flying around at 400KEAS, they will move the controls anyway. So in order to prevent pilots from whamming their yokes and overstressing the airframes at high speeds, synthetic pitch feel or artificial feedback had to be introduced that simulates for the pilot the feeling of aeroplane as if it had classic C-172 like controls.

There is no control feedback on most of todays airliners, last one I've flown with it was ATR-42. What feels like it is just synthetic pitch feel, which is heavily dependent on the proper working of air data computers. Objection that synthetic pitch feel feels like classic controls so all the discussion about it is purely academic is valid up to (very low) point. If one berates Airbus for not having feedback while Boeing does, this point has been passed.

Originally Posted by Gretchenfrage
Airbus is wasting their money.
Not in the real world.

Originally Posted by gretchenfrage
Tactile feedback is anything coming back in a sensory mode through feel.
It has nothing to do with physically moving anything.
It is using a sensory input to a human being other than visual or aural.
No it is not. Your definition lacks the essential part of the feedback: return information.

Originally Posted by Gretchenfrage
You should get more human interaction on all levels, especially with a partner, maybe you will get it one day ......
Why are you resorting to personal attacks? Quite a nice discussion we are having here, eh?

Originally Posted by bubbers44
I had an FO, ex B52, who always said he had moderate turbulence on short final for the last several hundred feet of his flights with me. I could feel his PIO's on my yoke but said nothing. Once even the tower commented on our unstable approach. I call this tactile feedback in a Boeing 757.
Originator is your alleged FO, receiver is you, where is the return of information? Sorry, this isn't feedback either.

Originally Posted by bubbers44
I also wouldn't want to be without the tactile feedback Boeing gives.
Which one? 247 certainly, 737NG certainly not.

Originally Posted by Gretchenfrage
Plus the feature to override pitch/bank limit prot with increased force, when necessary.
(To enable the LHR stunt)
In which LHR stunt were 67° bank or -15/+30 pitch exceeded?

Originally Posted by Retired F4
That´s the point. A stick release would have changed nothing, as the trajectory would have been maintained by the C* law. We discussed that to the end already.
Well, thank you again for pointing it out.


Originally Posted by Retired F4
And your conclusion, that the reduction in pitch was caused due to the SS nosedown inputs lacks the necessary proof. See the page 6 of the Annex 3 linked below:
This would be true if the elevator was the only thing keeping the nose up. Underslung engines at high power and low speed helped immensely, too. One average reduction in pitch (that is center of the bobbing) is consistent with reducing the power, two with elevators moving from their stops, consistent with stick movement.
Originally Posted by retired F4
The conclusion that a "release of SS caused a plunge" can´t be derived from the available information, and that´s most probably the reason that BEA didn´t state something like that. They actually saw a lost case early in the event.
So you are making a case around my one imprecision that I thanked you for refuting. Be my guest. As for BEA seeing the lost case, it is obvious that CM2 chased the aeroplane into stall and maintained her there so there was no chance he would perform the difficult recovery.

Originally Posted by retired F4
All those factors interact together and produce a near random output, therefore, the conclusion of Clandestino imho is far fetched.
Why? Just because Clandestino made it? Dear Retired F4, if it is so random, how come you are making such a bold analysis in this post?

Because we both and the aeronautical world know that it isn't completely random. There are uncertainties and tolerances but we are sure that there is no magic island of low lift to drag somewhere beyond the critical alpha and that stalled (and unrecovered) airliner quickly succumbs to gravity.

We have also repeatedly seen PPRuNers twisting the facts to suit their theory and then accusing others of doing it. Yawn.

Originally Posted by 737jock
There have been plenty of hard landing incidents that could have been prevented by interconnected sidesticks.
There are plenty of hard landings that were not. If you are really interested in prevention of hard landings and not into some politicking based on unsubstiated opinions being passed as fact, read this. Pages from 17 onwards shatter the myth of hard landings being caused by airbus flight control architecture (except that infamous Bilbao case, included here and neatly explained) or that interconnected yokes will prevent it.

Originally Posted by 737jock
There are various reasons why 2 pilots can be on the controls during normal line operations, not just manual reversion.
Which would they be?

Originally Posted by Lyman
"But I HAVE been pulling back, all the while".... no shit. And people defend this architecture?
So unprotected Airbus stalls if pulled hard. As does anything else. Why are some PPRuNers so shocked with basic aerodynamics?

Originally Posted by Lyman
Bonin did not have a clue what his controls were doing to the airplane.
Correct. It was CM2 that had no idea. No indication that ample indications were not available that would help someone more self-possessed to realize what he was doing to aeroplane.

Originally Posted by Lyman
What are we missing?
Some of us discussing here are missing the basic knowledge of how aeroplane flies and how airliner crew functions (or at least how it ought to), however, I must stress that airing completely hare-brained theories is absolutely against no RoE here, as long as it is made in courteous manner.

Originally Posted by 737jock
Clearly the current airbus FBW logic has an impact on Situational Awareness. And the biggest impact on safety is Situational Awareness. Period.
Are you concerned enough to make your viewpoint available to EASA or at least your airline's safety department? They don't read PPRuNe.

Originally Posted by 737Jock
There is lots and lots more scientific background on how people process information. There is about 20 years of incident and accident data.
Is there anything supporting the notion that Airbus FBW is step backward from "traditional" controls except laments on anonymous forums and in sensationalist media?

Originally Posted by 737jock
So to be able to feel the input enables the pilot monitoring to look outside for visual cues and judge if the input is sufficient.
Airbus pilots a) feel the input b) make thousands of flights daily that end up in successful flare and landing c) provided your notions are true, deserve better pay for deploying higher skills than their Boeing counterparts to safely land the more difficult aeroplane.

Originally Posted by 737Jock
Any hard landing incident or even a long landing/ soft bounce you will never hear about seems to be of no value to you.
Well, I guess I'll just repost the link: FSF digest Aug 2004: Avoiding the hard landings.

Originally Posted by 737Jock
Maybe that LH airbus should not have started the approach because of crosswind limits, but that doesn't mean that the control system did not have any impact on the incident.
Operating outside limits invalidates CofA but then pilots know that. How about using wrong roll input while decrabbing in over-limit crosswind and bending wingtip fence as result? Scandalous!

Originally Posted by 737Jock
Some landing incidents on airbus aircraft:
Some landing incidents on Airbus, Lockheed, Boeing, Embraer &tc. Page 17 onward.

Originally Posted by Gretchenfrage
The controversy would cease!
There is not much controversy outside PPRuNe.

Originally Posted by donpizmeov
I don't rely on where I feel the flight controls to be positioned.
Which is, incidentally, the correct way on any aeroplane except basic trainers.

Originally Posted by donpizmeov
Pilots can now talk the talk, but have no idea what it means.
Which is far, far greater problem than control design.

Originally Posted by Gretchenfrage
Yes, by my first flight instructor on the J3!!
It is important to be able to tell the difference between Airbus and Cub.

Originally Posted by CONFiture
Is it a serious question ?
Of course it is. Maybe even too serious for this debate as the answer is: "No".

Originally Posted by CONFiture
It is nice to see now guys coming up and testify through their own experience how the Airbus sidestisk philosophy deprives a crew from very valuable information.
Red warning at the bottom of this page takes away a lot of nicety from it, eh?

Originally Posted by 737Jock
How do u know how much input you need to make to get the desired effect?
Feedback from aeroplane. Observed on instruments or by looking out the window in flare. Of course, I'm the lucky b'stard that can do both things at the same time.

Originally Posted by 737Jock
Seriously this place is flooded by wannabee's who haven't got a clue.
I would be extremely concerned if it were otherwise.

Originally Posted by Lyman
Yes, TRIM reduces drag, it is not meant to reduce arm fatigue that results from actually deflecting the elevators, that span a five story building's height.
Trim relieves force on the stick, elevators so large are hydraulically powered. I am tempted to say that now I've read it all but I am pretty sure proving me wrong would be just matter of minutes.

Originally Posted by Lyman
From this recent accident, it is clear the pilot is unaware of his attitude, and also his increasing altitude
Not any pilot. Two very specific pilots.

Originally Posted by Lyman
A screen is a LIE, it has no depth, of position, or vector.
Which seemingly doesn't prevent thousands of flight every day in EFIS aeroplanes from being performed successfully.

Originally Posted by shy talk
Maybe someone would care to explain the BENEFIT of having un-linked controls?
Personally, I found posts by people with noth much clue about aviation in general and Airbus FBW in particular, about how it is bad or outright dangerous pretty entertaining and that's benefit enough for me.

Had been flying them for two years. Found them satisfactory. Earned my keep. Moved on. Wouldn't let the good T&C post pass me by if it involves flying them again or put up with bad T&C just to get back on Airbus.

Originally Posted by shy talk
Its utterly unconceivable that that a/c would have fallen as it did, with a pilot holding a yoke right back in his belly.
No need to imagine anything. Other yoked aeroplanes did just that.

Originally Posted by shy talk
It's as simple as that.
Might be simple but is false nevertheless.

Originally Posted by Lyman
.they had in their minds that the stick was not doing what they input.
Possibly, but they were wrong. Now if it ever gets proven (almost no chance), would those people slandering the Airbus FBW be proud of their feat, namely putting uncertainty and fear in the minds of Airbus pilots?

Originally Posted by CONFiture
This is how a PF analyses but why depriving a Pilot Monitoring from such analysis as he cannot know anything about the inputs made by the PF on the Airbus ?
Because outside PPRuNe not much relevance is attached to it.

Originally Posted by Lyman
"That is not correct. The sidestick which was predominantly nose-up until 02:10:24 was predominantly nose-down between 02:10:26 and 02:10:40"

Yet the a/c continued up and up, the flight path was smooth as was trend, Vs.
Pushing the stick on Airbus will reduce the pitch, it will not automatically make the aeroplane descend.

Originally Posted by Lyman
If only PF and his MP could have seen the merged lines on that swell graph.
If they paid attention to instruments or knew what they were supposed to do, there would be no report, thence no graph.
Originally Posted by AAIGUY
The fact is the crew are less pilots, and more systems operators on the Airbus.
Nope. It's your opinion. If you want it to be fact, please lend it some verifiable support.

Originally Posted by Lyman
flying pilot must rely on instruments alone to negotiate the a/c attitude.
That's how it is done in the real world. It tends to give predictable and safe results.

Originally Posted by Lyman
It strikes me that is entirely appropriate; it is not the duty of the manufacturer or the airline to teach ab initio, only to familiarize the transitioning pilot with the platform.
It strikes you so because you misunderstand what was written: starting type rating in direct law without FMGS is familiarization with the basic platform without any bells and whistles. Boy, it does fly nicely.

Originally Posted by Lyman
Airbus, at least their marketing, are in the weeds. There are some design flaws that are being disguised as shortcomings of pilot training, it is a condescending subterfuge, imo.
In the real world, outside of the PPRuNe, not true.
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Old 14th Oct 2012, 23:05
  #237 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by Gretchenfrage View Post
3. Considering point 2 there is no reason to abolish such controls. What could possibly get worse, if the Airbus sidesticks would duplicate the others inputs? Apart from a pretended increase in aircraft weight …. -> Nothing.
Something did.

The first (A300 test platform) Airbus to fly with sidesticks in fact did have interconnection.

The test pilots rejected that design, specifically the interconnection.

I wonder if you knew that ?
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Old 14th Oct 2012, 23:45
  #238 (permalink)  
 
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Why did they "reject" it? Because it felt "nosy", and they had the power to say, "scrap it"? It would be interesting to understand their reasoning. As test pilots, they were at the top of their game, and high in skill rating. Overconfidence? In themselves, and in the controls architecture?

What was the downside to connected sticks?
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Old 14th Oct 2012, 23:47
  #239 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by infrequentFlyer789
The first (A300 test platform) Airbus to fly with sidesticks in fact did have interconnection.

The test pilots rejected that design, specifically the interconnection.
Who was paying the test pilots? Assuming that "test" pilots are non biased, non partisan pilots is the same as assuming that management pilots are loyal to the line swine.
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Old 15th Oct 2012, 00:23
  #240 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by IF789
Something did.
The first (A300 test platform) Airbus to fly with sidesticks in fact did have interconnection.
The test pilots rejected that design, specifically the interconnection.
I wonder if you knew that ?
I don't know where you get that information from ?
But I'm curious now ...
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