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Airbus takes pilots back to basics with the A350

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Airbus takes pilots back to basics with the A350

Old 10th Oct 2012, 04:59
  #201 (permalink)  
 
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Gretchenfrage, Bubbers44 and 737jock

You are entitled to YOUR opinions, as Dozy has said, but to make the comments that you are doing, that you are the only ones that are correct and nobody is listening is falling into your own trap.

The major problem as I see it is that the regulators have allowed low time pilots into the RHS of airliners and in some cases they are falling short. We should NOT have to teach someone how to fly, in an airliner, that should be done elsewhere. The course on an Airbus or Boeing should be a CONVERSION and that is what the manufacturers have designed.

A lot of the arguments you put forward seem to be because your company is putting partially trained pilots on the line or an unwillingness (harping back to we did not do that on a Boeing etc) to really learn your aircraft, i.e. Airbus. You have to use all the cues to assist and that does mean looking around the cockpit sometimes, hard work but possible. Tactile feedback is all well and good but if you only believe your senses then you can be in great trouble as well. The examples put forward by Dozy, Birgen Air etc demonstrate that interconnected controls do not necessarily save the day,, but you do not want to accept that as it goes against your argument.

In previous lives, I have lots of times said "follow me through" as that was sometimes the best way to teach / demonstrate , but that was in a trainer NOT an airliner.
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Old 10th Oct 2012, 05:44
  #202 (permalink)  
 
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Iceman, your approach is soothing.

Let me try to clinically analyse what I have stated:

1. I never pretended that inteconnected controls or tactile feedback eliminated accidents. Thus by counter arguing with i.e. the Birgenair accident is a lost argument.

2. What I have said, is that there is no known accident where such controls contributed to an accident.
The example of the poor Algerian female copilot not being able to counteract the suicidal strength of her male captain on connected controls is silly. With physical strenght you can act in various ways, with the crash ax or with cutters. That has nothing to do with controls. The captain could have shot down the copilot by pressing the red knob in an Airbus for 45 seconds and had the same result. Interconnected and feedback controls are standard on all aircraft with mandatory two pilots, apart from Airbus. And Airbus had some issues that lead inspectors and accident analysts to question the logic. This has never happened on other systems.
Being a razor-sharp analyst, this fact alone should raise serious questions.

3. Considering point 2 there is no reason to abolish such controls. What could possibly get worse, if the Airbus sidesticks would duplicate the others inputs? Apart from a pretended increase in aircraft weight …. -> Nothing.
That is one of my strongest arguments.
What could possibly get better? The controversy would cease! The investigators could tick-off a box to investigate. The Airbus freaks who do not need feeback could simply take their hand away from the stick and would be back to sqare one. Airbus could even provide a “feedback-off-switch” for certain Airbus astronauts. However the other pilots could simply leave their hand on the sick and be more comfortable when a 200 hour MCC hero on his right does his first crosswind approach. That is also a very strong argument.

No one loses!! If someone's pride is hurt, then it was damned wrong pride.

The increased weight argument has long been proven a hoax. The two or three kilos do not count.
On the 30X a return to feedback would be greatly welcomed, because it would show that engineers can learn from misconcepts, from critics and from accidents.
Even if it’s a small misconcept, even if the critics are in a minority and even if their concept was only very marginally part of an accident.
The small steps to enhance safety contribute just as much as the big ones.
Ignoring small steps contribute to accidents just as much as ignoring big ones.
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Old 10th Oct 2012, 07:06
  #203 (permalink)  
 
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because it would show that engineers can learn from misconcepts, from critics and from accidents.

Just as Boeing did with self stowing spoilers after Cali. Oh wait there.....

I have flown both the Boeing and Airbus FBW aircraft. I have equal total time on conventional control yoke and Bus side stick. I tend to look out the window, or when that view is not appropriate the PFD, and when I see something not looking right, I "suggest", "direct" and then "take over". I don't rely on where I feel the flight controls to be positioned. Has anyone received training on how to interpret the control positioning of the controls by the other crew member? If it was so important, and a life saver as stated here, don't you think the manufacturer/TRO would teach how to do it?

In the good old day we were taught a thing called airmanship. Some called it common sense. This became too hard for the sausage machine training institutions to quantify, so was replaced with more rigorous SOPs. Pilots can now talk the talk, but have no idea what it means. Inexperienced pilots will be a threat to an aircraft with or without interconnected controls. The Air France A330 and the Ethiopian 737 , Flash 737 prove this.

To bring stick and rudder skills back into focus during training is a great idea. Long may it continue.
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Old 10th Oct 2012, 11:48
  #204 (permalink)  
 
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Has anyone received training on how to interpret the control positioning of the controls by the other crew member?
Yes, by my first flight instructor on the J3!!

Just as Boeing did with self stowing spoilers after Cali. Oh wait there.....
You name it! I stated in a contribution on this thread that I remain critical of any equipment I fly, and with the Boeing it is exactly that, I repeatedly asked for a change on the spoiler thing.
Funny how everyone agrees on that, A + B + AB drivers, but the moment someone steps on a weakness of a mighty Bus, he's considered a dinosaur and shot down.
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Old 10th Oct 2012, 12:34
  #205 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by donpizmeov
Has anyone received training on how to interpret the control positioning of the controls by the other crew member?
Is it a serious question ?
Have you received training on how to interpret the wheel steering positioning on your car when your son is the driver ?

It is nice to see now guys coming up and testify through their own experience how the Airbus sidestisk philosophy deprives a crew from very valuable information.

Keep coming up.
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Old 10th Oct 2012, 14:07
  #206 (permalink)  
 
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Has anyone received training on how to interpret the control positioning of the controls by the other crew member?
To bring stick and rudder skills back into focus during training is a great idea. Long may it continue.
Amazing that these two sentences come from the same person.

How do u know how much input you need to make to get the desired effect?
Every pilot is trained to interpret input and outcome... If you know what the input needs to be, you can compare that to the actual input.

Seriously this place is flooded by wannabee's who haven't got a clue.

Last edited by 737Jock; 10th Oct 2012 at 14:08.
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Old 10th Oct 2012, 14:49
  #207 (permalink)  
 
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And yet Airbus have the audacity to inform that TRIM, on their a/c, is used to "reduce forces on the controls"

"Disconnect"?

Any control surface that is deflecting, (destabilizing), is creating a bias in the trend in that direction. If TRIM and elevator are deflecting to produce Nose up, the bias is against the correction, by definition.

If the pilot is not aware if this via his stck/yoke, he can become disoriented relative to his inputs. There remain kinesthetic cues. One's seat informs one of the motion of the airframe, and needed inputs to stabilize the flightpath.

These kinesthetics can not be easily ignored, and until the pilots sit in gimballed and persistent 1G chairs, the passivity of the Airbus SS is potentially lethal.

I promise you, this played a major role in the 447 crash.

Last edited by Lyman; 10th Oct 2012 at 15:08.
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Old 10th Oct 2012, 18:36
  #208 (permalink)  
 
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Kinesthetics Lyman? – “The ability to feel movements of the limbs and body.”
Controls destabilising? In aerodynamics, stability and control are interconnected, but AFAIR controls do not change the basic stability of an aircraft.

Trim can be used to reduce control surface/system load. An example might be to reduce elevator hinge-moment by moving the tailplane allowing a compatible movement of the elevator.
Conventional ‘pilot’ trim forces are those felt via the control input. A residual force can be a measure of speed error from the trim datum; this is an additional cue of speed change/error.

In FBW aircraft with envelope protections – alpha/speed limits, then not having this trim force cue incurs few if any additional risks when considered against the advantages of control load alleviation or reduced trim drag (tailplane autotrim follow-up) and a stable baseline parameter – maintaining flightpath or attitude according to design.
There are greater risks when the envelope protections are degraded (cf AF447), thus additional alerts to speed change/errors may be required – stall warning/shaker.

The manual flight control loop involves input to achieve the desired target value (attitude control), sensing the achieved value (real world / ADI), and a comparison with the target. Any difference between input and achieved values is the basis for correction.
Whilst learned flying skills will enable appropriate input values for given situations / targets, (stick position/displacement feel force) there is no need to look at the input and certainly no need to look at the other pilots input. Dual controls have value in training situations, but side stick aircraft appear to have managed without connected controls, as do all single seat aircraft.
The aircraft response should be assessed from the result of the control input, the output not the input. Thus neither cross connected controls are essential nor is their absence necessarily hazardous. These aircraft are just different and need to be considered in that light and not from a unique viewpoint.

“… if you judge a fish by its ability to climb a tree, it will live its whole life believing that it is stupid.” – Einstein.

As with fish, the primary problem of aircraft control is being aware of the situation and what action is required in that situation.

Last edited by alf5071h; 10th Oct 2012 at 18:39. Reason: typo
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Old 10th Oct 2012, 18:57
  #209 (permalink)  
 
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I do not address interconnected manual control device, what I address is the passivity of the stick itself, each one, no matter the pilot in control.

Yes, TRIM reduces drag, it is not meant to reduce arm fatigue that results from actually deflecting the elevators, that span a five story building's height.

My point is that the flying pilot can lose awareness of his position in space, and whether that is important or not is debatable. He can also lose the relationship his control movements are eliciting in the airframe. Should he know These? That is the discusson. From this recent accident, it is clear the pilot is unaware of his attitude, and also his increasing altitude. "You Go UP, so go Down". That is a quote from the Monitoring pilot, suggesting they both knew that SA was lost, and instead of assuming command, for some reason the PNF allowed the PF to continue in his confusion.

My young son excels at video games, he has conquered the stick. I take him up in the C172, he is all over the sky, he has no relationship with the aircraft v/v the Controls, for in this case, the controls respond directly, and communicate to his skilled but ignorant dexterity what the a/c is doing.

If he had the video game joy stick, he gives Yeager a run for the money.

The Airbus has controls in manual flight that respond as the Cessna's do, but only when there is an emergency.

From at least a standpoint of safety, should the Airbus not be flown manually most of the time, and rely on automatics in emergencies?

Because is it not instructive that when an emergency occurs, we want to have our best game to hand?

Aircraft maneuver in three dimensional space, a video game is in two dimensions. You do not see the problem?

A screen is a LIE, it has no depth, of position, or vector.
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Old 10th Oct 2012, 21:00
  #210 (permalink)  
 
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You really don't need a moving control yoke to tell you the fella next to you is stuffing up. Its that easy. If you see 15 degrees nose up at FL350 and need a control yoke felt pulled into your belly to know something is wrong, I would suggest you are in the wrong job.

Pilots complained that the hydraulically powered flight control surface deprived them the feel on the machine, and was therefore dangerous. Regulators tested them and thought they were ok. Pilots are trained to understand how they work and they become industry standard.

Pilots and Navigators complained that Inertial navigation systems were not as safe as a navigator. Regulators tested them and thought them ok. Pilots are trained to understand how they work and they become industry standard.

Pilots and flight engineers complained that a black box would never truly be as safe as a human for monitoring systems. Regulators tested them and thought them ok. Pilots are trained on how they work, and they become industry standard.

Side stick don't move....

Wow a post with no name calling. Who would have guessed that would happen on this thread.
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Old 10th Oct 2012, 23:33
  #211 (permalink)  
 
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Don,
You should have wrote:

Pilots complained that the hydraulically powered flight control surface deprived them the feel on the machine, and was therefore dangerous. Regulators decided to had artificial feeling and tested them and thought they were ok. Pilots are trained to understand how they work and they become industry standard.

Yes...Side stick don't move....and don't have artificial feeling...

Yes...sorry for calling your name...

Last edited by aguadalte; 10th Oct 2012 at 23:35.
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Old 11th Oct 2012, 00:21
  #212 (permalink)  
 
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I hope a few of us will reread the BEA report, 447. From the beginning, the aircraft maneuvered as told, but by pilots who did not know what they were telling it... After many seconds, both siad "we have lost control".

But they had not, they only believed they were unable to control the airplane...they had in their minds that the stick was not doing what they input. how else can you explain their disconnect with the a/c? Their sequencing after the zoom gave them no joy, the instruments were no help, etc.

The coup de grace came when Captain asked Bonin to climb. They were moments from impact, but the Captain suggested a climb. So when bonin answered "I have been pulling..." do we not see? It was not the attitude they feared, for there was no concurrence on that assessment. It was their utter lack of confidence in the link between the instruments and the SIDESTICK.

This STARTED ten seconds after a/p off, and at no time after did anyone know what to do with controls. Assumptions were made, but they experienced no affirmations from the airframe. It was not even the lack of visibility of stick, for that is not standard to solve the dilemma. BEA (wants) tells us that it was alll bonin's fault for constant pull, but that means eliminate all experimentation on his part. Even after the long pull, they respond to GPWS "PULLPULLPULL"

Stick and Rudder solutions for a crew in trouble on a BUS? To laugh out loud....
Yet it is Direct Law that is given to them when all they know is "Bump Stick, and mayonnaise..." Arse about.
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Old 11th Oct 2012, 00:44
  #213 (permalink)  
 
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Practice for ultimate single pilot crew?

I would suggest that the above is taken seriously by those who think it a benefit.

Did you miss Learmount and his disclaimer "we are not suggesting fewer crew"?

Last edited by Lyman; 11th Oct 2012 at 01:15.
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Old 11th Oct 2012, 02:51
  #214 (permalink)  
 
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Perhaps someone will soon explain the BENEFIT of unlinked controls?
I have asked this question many times, and looked for answers all over reports and investigations, but there are none.

The best proof for no serious and valuable answer to this question is, that with any criticising unlinked/dead controls, you get only one response, and always the same one: "Link controlled aircraft crash as well".

What a stupid answer!

Or you get the 'statistics bombshell', like how much safety has improved since Airbii took the air. Sort of "now that we gave you Airbus, we can stop improving design, this is the peak, we just have to improve the human operating it".
Funnily enough the same statistics show the (almost) sole competitor in FBW aircraft (with linked controls) has no fatalities up to today, whereas the Airbus has quite a few. But then suddenly statistics mean nothing no more .....

We will never get an answer as to any benefit for unlinked/dead controls.
I pretend because there are none.

However no one can ever say: "Why did nobody point at this?"

Last edited by Gretchenfrage; 11th Oct 2012 at 02:52.
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Old 11th Oct 2012, 03:09
  #215 (permalink)  
 
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The coup de grace came when Captain asked Bonin to climb. They were
moments from impact, but the Captain suggested a climb. So when bonin answered "I have been pulling..." do we not see?
Indeed .. I ( we ? ) must admit that this dialogue is quite disturbing .. the trick is to explain why he rather be ....
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Old 12th Oct 2012, 13:28
  #216 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by alf5071h
The manual flight control loop involves input to achieve the desired target value (attitude control), sensing the achieved value (real world / ADI), and a comparison with the target. Any difference between input and achieved values is the basis for correction.
This is how a PF analyses but why depriving a Pilot Monitoring from such analysis as he cannot know anything about the inputs made by the PF on the Airbus ?

Whilst learned flying skills will enable appropriate input values for given situations / targets, (stick position/displacement feel force) there is no need to look at the input and certainly no need to look at the other pilots input. Dual controls have value in training situations, but side stick aircraft appear to have managed without connected controls, as do all single seat aircraft.
But what is a pilot if not an eternal student ...
And an Airbus is just NOT a single seat aircraft.

The aircraft response should be assessed from the result of the control input, the output not the input. Thus neither cross connected controls are essential nor is their absence necessarily hazardous. These aircraft are just different and need to be considered in that light and not from a unique viewpoint.
As being different, the Airbus manuals should clearly stipulates :
Be aware that our sidestick concept does not allow a PNF the same level of monitoring of PF’s inputs than on an airplane with more conventional flight control commands.

For the very VERY first time, the BEA dared a very shy comment in that direction on P174 of the AF447 Final Report :
It is worth noting that the inputs applied to a sidestick by one pilot cannot be observed easily by the other one.
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Old 12th Oct 2012, 13:57
  #217 (permalink)  
 
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"It is worth noting that the inputs applied to a sidestick by one pilot cannot be observed easily by the other one."

In the beginning, the PF acknowledged he was high, and would descend. He did no such thing.

What does the PNF do when he is told the controls are pushed for ND, but are not? He sees the instruments, no change, still climbing. So he must think, "he has input ND, we still climb, the aircraft is not answering..."

Now we have the handling pilot who has given bad information to his partner, and the PNF mistrusts the a/c, which leads to, "we have tried everything, what do we do?"

This is how confusion can lead to disaster.... the handling pilot has led his partner into loss of SA...neither pilot knows what is occurring.

"trust, but verify..." unless through passive and unobservable controls, verification is not possible...
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Old 12th Oct 2012, 15:17
  #218 (permalink)  
 
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Perhaps someone will soon explain the BENEFIT of unlinked controls?
I have asked this question many times, and looked for answers all over reports and investigations, but there are none.

The best proof for no serious and valuable answer to this question is, that with any criticising unlinked/dead controls, you get only one response, and always the same one: "Link controlled aircraft crash as well".

What a stupid answer!
Engineering simplicity and weight saving are the benefits.

The "stupid answer" is simply saying that there does not appear to be a safety downside to that engineering decision.

Though clearly the case is not closed.
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Old 12th Oct 2012, 15:43
  #219 (permalink)  
 
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"The "stupid answer" is simply saying that there does not appear to be a safety downside to that engineering decision."

It is not stupid, but it is sly...and misleading. One platform provides cues of controls position that are generated through instantaneous feel, PLUS a follw on instrument display, a twofer, a benefit.

The other platform, through reductive design, eliminates the instantaneous sensate cue, and leaves the instrument display to provide only the response of the airframe. The instrumentaion is not possessed of a fine resolution, and must be further interpreted as an approximation, or estimated trend.

Both aircraft are subject to accident. And incident. The argument is not relevant, for the design speaks its own story. More data, safer flight, especially the "cross check capability involved in the relationship of tactility to digital or "bar" display.

Imho.

Add. There is an argument that at some time that is appropriate, the sensate cues may be withdrawn without disadvantage, suggesting that felt controls, once mastered, and merged with a complete idea of displays only, are not necessary.

Except perhaps in an emergent situation, when a return to sensate controls may be advantageous. Train on Boeing fly the BUS, and do not forget manual mastery

donpizmeov "You really don't need a moving control yoke to tell you the fella next to you is stuffing up."

Absolutely not entirely incorrect. IOW "Not Wrong"... However, something's missing...

Last edited by Lyman; 13th Oct 2012 at 15:00.
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Old 13th Oct 2012, 21:05
  #220 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by Lyman
In the beginning, the PF acknowledged he was high, and would descend.
That is correct, that exchange occurred between 02:10:27 and 02:10:39

He did no such thing.
That is not correct. The sidestick which was predominantly nose-up until 02:10:24 was predominantly nose-down between 02:10:26 and 02:10:40

What does the PNF do when he is told the controls are pushed for ND, but are not? He sees the instruments, no change, still climbing.
That is not correct. The pitch attitude reduced from 12° to 6°, and the rate of climb reduced from 7000 fpm to 1100 fpm.

Originally Posted by BEA Final Report 2.1.2.4 and 2.1.2.5
Once the first actions in response to the perceived anomaly is executed (returning to manual piloting following AP disconnection) and the flight path stabilisation ensured, the philosophy of both the manufacturer and the operator is for the crew to look for additional information necessary to understand the problem and take action.

(...)

In theory, the identification of the situation is mainly up to the PNF and begins once the flight path is stabilised and/or secured. In the case under consideration, this identification began while the flight path may have appeared to have been controlled but was not stabilised.

(...)

Thus, having identified the loss of airspeed information, the PNF turned his attention to the ECAM, undoubtedly in an attempt to refine his diagnosis and to monitor any actions displayed. He started to read the messages, and consequently called out the loss of autothrust and the reconfiguration to alternate law.

(...)

After reading the ECAM messages, which provided no apparent assistance to the crew, the PNF’s attention was drawn for a period of twelve seconds to the PF’s control of the flight path.

(...)

The PNF detected the climb based on observation and reasoning (“according to all three you’re climbing”), which indicates the beginning of a loss of confidence in the instrument readings. In particular, he asked the PF to stabilise, to pay attention to the airspeed and to descend.

(...)

The PNF’s intervention prompted the PF to apply inputs that reduced the pitch attitude, which had exceeded 10 degrees. Although the PF agreed that the objective should be to lose altitude, his inputs maintained the aeroplane on an ascending flight path.

(...)

The PNF had noticed the need to stabilise the flight path, and the need for moderate aeroplane handling inputs. He probably considered that the reduction in pitch and the vertical acceleration sensed was a sufficient sign that the PF would correct the flight path to allow him to devote himself once again to identifying the failure.
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