Go Back  PPRuNe Forums > Flight Deck Forums > Rumours & News
Reload this Page >

Airbus takes pilots back to basics with the A350

Rumours & News Reporting Points that may affect our jobs or lives as professional pilots. Also, items that may be of interest to professional pilots.

Airbus takes pilots back to basics with the A350

Old 9th Oct 2012, 22:22
  #181 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Jul 2002
Location: UK
Posts: 3,182
Originally Posted by 737Jock View Post
Yes better then the ARB's test pilot. Again those pilots were working within a set design frame. They did not have absolute say on the cockpit design and controls.
I have it on good authority that they did. No aspect of the design could be signed off without their say-so.

Additionally there were technical constraints that will likely have prevented a system of interconnected driven FBW, flight enveloppe protection etc...
There was a complexity issue, certainly - but the other aspects of the design made up for it, and - if the safety record of the types are anything to go by - were very successful in doing so.

Because landing the aircraft has everything to do with getting close to the ground. Is that a surprise to you?
No.


The biggest change in pitch happens during takeoff and landing, which happens to be close to the ground where time is no luxury. The timing and rate of pitch change is very important which is all directly related to the input on the sidestick.
And the sidestick design appears to have coped admirably, given the utter lack of accidents during flare phase.

In addition the judgement of when to flare and how much to flare is completely based on outside visual cues. Not instruments!
I know. Again - what does this have to do with linked PFCs?

Apropos of nothing - during the great AF447 debate a friend of mine generously arranged for me to sit in during a Level-D A320 sim session during which I was allowed to take control during the sequence, and once done was given a chance to try taking off and landing. I landed the thing on the second attempt purely based on the verbal briefing performed by the on-duty TRE, this despite the fact I hadn't sat in a flight deck since I last climbed out of an RAF Chippy in 1993.

You seem to be very bad in combining various items together. I'm not saying cadet programs did not exist, but they made more hours flightschool, they spent longer in linetraining, they flew less sectors, there was less time pressure, there were less cadets coming through, experience was much more diverse etc etc etc.
The world of aviation has changed dramatically compared to the 80's, especially with the rise of lowcost aviation.
And yet the number of accidents and incidents continues to decrease...

And you are assuming that connected controls are worse, which is neither backed up by any evidence.
That's a misrepresentation. I am merely asserting that based on the evidence, neither setup is any better or worse than the other from a safety standpoint.

My suggestion is to design a new FBW system that combines the good aspects of both systems together.
No, your suggestion is "do what Boeing do, but with a stick" - which is not the same.

But if you ask the moderators to organise a poll on what pilots prefer regarding interconnected sidesticks vs segregated control sidestick we can get some evidence.
Online polls aren't worth the paper they're printed on...

Personally I don't know a single pilot in my airline who would prefer the current system with "instinctive" disconnect pushbutton over a system where the sidestick would move. And yes this is a discussion item in simulator excercises and training chats.
Alas, data is not the plural of anecdote.

Look - I don't want to keep arguing like this - you're welcome to your opinion, which I respect, and I'm sure it is shared. However, extrapolating that opinion and presenting it as objective fact is disingenuous.
DozyWannabe is offline  
Old 9th Oct 2012, 22:46
  #182 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Jan 2008
Location: ...
Posts: 3,789
I am only going to respond to this, as the rest is just plain unfounded bullshit.

Some landing incidents on airbus aircraft:
http://www.skybrary.aero/bookshelf/books/896.pdf

During the landing, the co-pilot was unaware of pushing the sidestick fully forward, having intended only to release the backpressure he had been applying. He had no issues with landing the aircraft before the 30 June, and none have been detected since the incident flight. As such, it is considered that the forward sidestick inputs may have been a subconscious reaction to the firm landing event of 30 June, where his commander took over. The co-pilotís landing technique appears to have altered following that landing. The Flight Data Monitoring (FDM) software in use by the operator tracked this change, but the information was not reviewed until after the heavy landing with G-MARA. During a CAA audit of the operator, in February 2008, an observation was raised that the current establishment assigned to FDM oversight appeared inadequate. In response, the operator was in the process of increasing staffing numbers at the time of the accident.
Heavier than desired landings occur throughout the industry, for a range of reasons, and damage occasionally results. The critical requirement is that the aircraft is not then dispatched without this damage being identified and rectified.
Would this pushing on the stick have gone unnoticed if the captain could have felt the inputs made by the FO? Could it have been saved?

http://www.aaib.gov.uk/cms_resources...pdf_032602.pdf
The co-pilot commenced the flare at 50 feet agl and retarded the thrust levers at 30 feet agl, but it became apparent that the aircraft was descending more rapidly than normal. He maintained back pressure on his sidestick but, in an attempt to cushion the landing, the commander also applied back pressure to his sidestick. When making his control input the commander did not press his sidestick priority takeover pushbutton. The aircraft made a firm touchdown on its main wheels and bounced once before touching down again. As the aircraft slowed on the runway, the pilots were informed by ATC that the aircraft had scraped its tail on the runway.
Yep helping the first officer during the landing was no problem... Thats sarcasm...
And this was not a normal captain either because:
The co-pilot had been flying the A319 and A320 with the company for approximately five months. His previous commercial flying experience was exclusively on the Jetstream 31 and he had a total flying experience of 840 hours. He was undergoing a protracted period of line training on the Airbus A319 and A320 due to his relative inexperience. On this occasion he had been rostered to fly on four consecutive days with the commander, a line-training captain.
And then the AAIB also mentions this:
Use of the takeover pushbutton is not instinctive and previous accidents investigated by the AAIB have revealed instances involving Airbus fly-by-wire aircraft types where non-handling pilots have failed to use the button when making control inputs to correct those of the handling pilot. The Civil Aviation Authority also has other evidence where failure to use the takeover button has caused additional aircraft control problems.
The Airbus fly-by-wire aircraft types are unique in commercial aviation in that it is not possible for one pilot to feel what the other pilot is doing with his or her sidestick. In brief, there is no force or position feedback from one sidestick to the other and in the air, there is no stick position information on the flight instrument displays. Consequently there is no practical method of 'assisting' the handling pilot by making a control input on the other sidestick, particularly if the handling pilot is also moving his or her sidestick at the time. The result of two sidestick inputs is a blend of both and, since the aircraft's reaction is inconsistent with its normal 'manoeuvre demand' response, the resultant response cues may seem abnormal for both pilots which in turn, can provoke more extreme sidestick inputs.

No, your suggestion is "do what Boeing do, but with a stick" - which is not the same.
So on boeings it is possible to lock out one of the yokes? Which I am suggesting for the new system.

Last edited by 737Jock; 9th Oct 2012 at 22:47.
737Jock is offline  
Old 9th Oct 2012, 22:50
  #183 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Jan 2008
Location: ...
Posts: 3,789
More landing incidents, various incidents listed here:

Accident of an Iberian Airbus A320 in Bilbao

http://www.skybrary.aero/bookshelf/books/807.pdf

Last edited by 737Jock; 9th Oct 2012 at 22:59.
737Jock is offline  
Old 9th Oct 2012, 22:57
  #184 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Jul 2002
Location: UK
Posts: 3,182
See Birgenair 301, ColganAir 3407 and Northwest 6231. The yoke was clearly displaying to the PNF what the PF was doing wrong and yet this was *not picked up*. See also Turkish 1951 where *3* flight crew failed to notice the moving thrust levers.

This argument is pointless because the evidence clearly suggests that in real terms, linked controls do not make a difference. By which I mean that for every incident you can post regarding the A320 and her sisters, I'm sure I can find an equivalent involving a type with linked controls.

Last edited by DozyWannabe; 9th Oct 2012 at 23:03.
DozyWannabe is offline  
Old 9th Oct 2012, 23:04
  #185 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Aug 2009
Location: Germany
Age: 63
Posts: 1,809
You're a Captain, not an instructor.
I disagree with this
The "Captain" is the experienced man .. and it's also his duty to correct or to make benefit his co-pilot from his experience
At least .. it was like this in my profession
Never forget that we learn every day

All men learn in one of three ways:
1. Some learn by being told.
2. Some learn by being shown.
3. Then there are those that learn by experience. They just have to urinate on the electric fence.

Last edited by jcjeant; 9th Oct 2012 at 23:06.
jcjeant is offline  
Old 9th Oct 2012, 23:04
  #186 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Jan 2008
Location: ...
Posts: 3,789
Birgenair 301 is NOT a landing accident
Colganair 3407 is NOT a landing accident, fatigue was the major contributing factor in this. Wonder how things go unnoticed.
Northwest 6231 is NOT a landing accident

Turkish 1951 is the only accident on approach but still not landing.
See also Turkish 1951 where *3* flight crew failed to notice the moving thrust levers.
In fact they missed that the thrust levers were NOT moving. They had closed I believe in LVL change, and due to the RA failure the Autothrottle had gone straight to RETARD mode. So the thrust levers closed in the high energy approach and never moved away from that closed position.
Anyway for me that accident is complete pilot error. Despite the RA failure and the distracting shortcut.

So after I'm talking for the last 3 hours about the landing on an airbus you come up with stalls!

But lets put an airbus low level accident into the mix, that gives some thought on the flightcontrol logic switching between normal and direct law and obviously stalling the aircraft:
http://www.bea.aero/docspa/2008/d-la...a081127.en.pdf

Last edited by 737Jock; 9th Oct 2012 at 23:19.
737Jock is offline  
Old 9th Oct 2012, 23:20
  #187 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Jul 2002
Location: UK
Posts: 3,182
I was not aware that only landing incidents counted.

Whatever that particular AAIB report says, I think it unlikely that a situation should arise on the line whereby the handling pilot requires "assisting". If the PNF feels that the PF is not in control of the situation, the procedure (post-MDA) is "I have control", followed by a go-around (@jcj - the Captain may be the experienced man, but he (or she) is still required to follow procedure).

Even with connected controls, on a line flight the PNF (even a senior PNF) should not have hands on PFC without simultaneously calling for control. Shadowing inputs is all very well during training, but on the line risking an instinctive opposite input on the part of the PF is just as dangerous as an Airbus Dual Input scenario during flare!

Originally Posted by 737Jock View Post
But lets put an airbus low level accident into the mix, that gives some thought on the flightcontrol logic switching between normal and direct law and obviously stalling the aircraft:
http://www.bea.aero/docspa/2008/d-la...a081127.en.pdf
Well yes - the sensors were damaged due to poor maintenance procedures. The crew of Aeroperu 603 were similarly unlucky.

Last edited by DozyWannabe; 9th Oct 2012 at 23:23.
DozyWannabe is offline  
Old 9th Oct 2012, 23:31
  #188 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Aug 2009
Location: Germany
Age: 63
Posts: 1,809
(@jcj - the Captain may be the experienced man, but he (or she) is still required to follow procedure).
There is a procedure that prohibits this ? :
The "Captain" is the experienced man .. and it's also his duty to correct or to make benefit his co-pilot from his experience
Or I don't understand what mean your word "procedure"
I think if a captain tell "this is my aircraft" or "I have the control" he make benefit his copilot from his experience ...

Last edited by jcjeant; 9th Oct 2012 at 23:34.
jcjeant is offline  
Old 9th Oct 2012, 23:34
  #189 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Jul 2002
Location: UK
Posts: 3,182
@jcj:

It means that if the Captain wants to take control, he or she must call "I have control" (or equivalent) and take over. Forcing corrections without proper notification is a safety risk.
DozyWannabe is offline  
Old 9th Oct 2012, 23:38
  #190 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Aug 2009
Location: Germany
Age: 63
Posts: 1,809
he or she must call "I have control" (or equivalent) and take over. Forcing corrections without proper notification is a safety risk.
I have long understood this
In certain situations the time to say (or think to say) these words is not even available
Act .. survive ... and after laughing

Last edited by jcjeant; 9th Oct 2012 at 23:38.
jcjeant is offline  
Old 9th Oct 2012, 23:43
  #191 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Jan 2008
Location: ...
Posts: 3,789
Ah so now you are the authority on what is safe and unsafe to do. Your arrogance as non-pilot knows no boundaries.
Please note that some of these landing incidents/accidents were with trainers!

When I am reffering to interconnected controls regarding the landing phase, yes I kind of expect the arguments that I am countered with take this into account.

And in any case in none of the accidents you mentioned were the interconnected flight controls a factor to the incident.
In the examples I gave the non-instinctive nature of the disconnect pushbutton, and the algabraically adding of control inputs were factors. Also not being able to feel through with the landing is mentioned in the reports. All these things are inherrent to the airbus design.

Everytime you are faced with arguments you retreat behind some new fictitious argument. You lose the argument and subsequently you start a debate on what the captain is or is not allowed to do. I have news for you, in the interest of safety the captain can do as he pleases.

BTW on airbus BOTH pilots MUST have their hands on the PFC during critical phases of flight. Hands and feet. And the PF has the thrust levers in addition to that!

And as said by the AAIB the disconnect pushbutton is not instinctive at all, and on airbus calling I have control is associated with that pushbutton. And to make that call the pilots needs situational awareness. A driven sidestick will enhance the captains situational awareness as he will be better able to judge what the FO is doing.

Last edited by 737Jock; 9th Oct 2012 at 23:49.
737Jock is offline  
Old 9th Oct 2012, 23:43
  #192 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Jul 2002
Location: UK
Posts: 3,182
Be that as it may, if the call is not made there is a safety risk regardless of whether the controls are connected or not.

@737Jock - I'm an undisputed authority on nothing. And so are you.

"Instinct" is subjective, and theoretically speaking an instinctive input on a connected PFC is just as risky as the same action on a non-connected PFC.

While I'm fairly brazen in stating that I don't believe your opinion is correct, that does not mean that I am asserting the opposite of your opinion is correct. I'm simply stating that the argument (and evidence) you are presenting is subjective. It doesn't matter how many accidents or incidents we throw at each other, the fact is that taken as a whole the safety record suggests that there is no significant issue with either approach.

Hands on PFC is not the same as shadowing the opposite seat input, it's simply preparation for an abnormal event.

Interconnected controls were not a factor in the accidents, but they did not make the situation any better by way of being present.

These arguments are not fictitious, they are entirely based on the evidence at hand.

Last edited by DozyWannabe; 9th Oct 2012 at 23:56.
DozyWannabe is offline  
Old 9th Oct 2012, 23:48
  #193 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Jan 2008
Location: ...
Posts: 3,789
You are not an authority at all... You are not even a pilot.

When I speak about instinctive, I am quoting the AAIB. That is the Air Accidents Investigation Branch. Which happens to be a very authorative agency. As quoted earlier they say the following about airbus FBW:

Use of the takeover pushbutton is not instinctive and previous accidents investigated by the AAIB have revealed instances involving Airbus fly-by-wire aircraft types where non-handling pilots have failed to use the button when making control inputs to correct those of the handling pilot. The Civil Aviation Authority also has other evidence where failure to use the takeover button has caused additional aircraft control problems.
The Airbus fly-by-wire aircraft types are unique in commercial aviation in that it is not possible for one pilot to feel what the other pilot is doing with his or her sidestick. In brief, there is no force or position feedback from one sidestick to the other and in the air, there is no stick position information on the flight instrument displays. Consequently there is no practical method of 'assisting' the handling pilot by making a control input on the other sidestick, particularly if the handling pilot is also moving his or her sidestick at the time. The result of two sidestick inputs is a blend of both and, since the aircraft's reaction is inconsistent with its normal 'manoeuvre demand' response, the resultant response cues may seem abnormal for both pilots which in turn, can provoke more extreme sidestick inputs.
All this is THE problem which conventional interconnected aircraft do not suffer from. Its a design feature of the aircraft. But both the AAIB and the CAA have information that this design is a contributing factor on some incidents/accidents.

So when I talk about instinct, I am talking about pushing this button which according to the AAIB is NOT instinctive.

Hands on PFC is not the same as shadowing the opposite seat input, it's simply preparation for an abnormal event.
Define abnormal.
IMHO shadowing controls does not increase the risk over covering the controls. For example In both cases turbulence can cause extra input on the PFC.

Interconnected controls were not a factor in the accidents, but they did not make the situation any better by way of being present.
This is a circle argument. Just because it didn't improve the situation in these accidents does not mean that it doesn't/ did not help in other situations.
The only conclusion you can make is that the controls did not contribute to the outcome.

In the reports I mentioned, the controls and design DID affect the outcome in a negative way.

Last edited by 737Jock; 10th Oct 2012 at 00:34.
737Jock is offline  
Old 10th Oct 2012, 00:33
  #194 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Jul 2002
Location: UK
Posts: 3,182
Just as evidence exists that interconnected PFCs are or were a factor in other accidents, or made no difference in accidents where advocates of an interconnected design insist that they would!

If you feel my lack of an ATPL renders my input moot, then feel free to ignore me.

The fact remains that when correct, "instinct" is all well and good. But "instinct" is also considered the reason why, without proper training, most pilots will immediately pull back on the PFC when startled by a warning.

The AAIB is, as usual, inclined to be qualified in what it is saying. It is interesting that this report considers a design that makes up almost half the global fleet in the West "unique" in its behaviour. Note also the use of qualifying terms such as "may".

Aircraft with interconnected controls may not suffer from the problem described, but they suffer from other potential pitfalls resulting from that design.

No matter how you present that information, it does not constitute evidence that interconnected is the superior method.

Given that you have previously stated your opinion that the Airbus design is "Flying for dummies", and (incorrectly) stated that under manual control, autotrim will maintain altitude when thrust is increased (autotrim maintains flightpath - not specific altitude) - I can't help but think you've already made up your mind on the subject and nothing will change that.

Last edited by DozyWannabe; 10th Oct 2012 at 00:41.
DozyWannabe is offline  
Old 10th Oct 2012, 00:42
  #195 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Jan 2008
Location: ...
Posts: 3,789
Turning turning turning...

Just as evidence exists that interconnected PFCs are or were a factor in other accidents, or made no difference in accidents where advocates of an interconnected design insist that they would!
In english please?

The fact remains that when correct, "instinct" is all well and good. But "instinct" is also considered the reason why, without proper training, most pilots will immediately pull back on the PFC when startled by a warning.
The problem is that the airbus design does not cater for instinctive inputs. When a pilot reacts instinctive in an airbus things go wrong due to the algabraic adding of inputs. To prevent this the pilot must push a button, but this is NOT instinctive. The instinct in itself however is correct, its the design that falls short.

The airbus design is unique... The type... Nothing is said about the amount of aircraft.

Aircraft with interconnected controls may not suffer from the problem described, but they suffer from other potential pitfalls resulting from that design.
Potential pitfalls that can be eliminated by combining the 2 current methods.

Last edited by 737Jock; 10th Oct 2012 at 00:44.
737Jock is offline  
Old 10th Oct 2012, 00:52
  #196 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Jul 2002
Location: UK
Posts: 3,182
Originally Posted by 737Jock View Post
In english please?
EgyptAir 990 - interconnection led to loss of control due to the peculiarities of the electro-mechanical implementation on the 767. The Birgenair, Northwest and Colgan accidents where an out-of-position PFC was not noted by the non-handling pilot.

The problem is that the airbus design does not cater for instinctive inputs. When a pilot reacts instinctive in an airbus things go wrong due to the algabraic adding of inputs. To prevent this the pilot must push a button, but this is NOT instinctive.
The Q400 is not an Airbus design, but the instinctive "pull-up" response was not catered for in the case of Colgan 3407. In terms of line flying, training and procedure are supposed to overrule instinct.

In the incidents you draw attention to (as well as those I draw attention to), correct procedure was not followed. This is not caused by design, it is caused by mishandling on the part of the crew.

The airbus design is unique... The type... Nothing is said about the amount of aircraft.
As I said, it's a stretch to consider a design that constitutes half the market "unique". In any case, the point is that there's no evidence to suggest the design is any worse than the more traditional approach in an objective sense, unless you can prove different!

Potential pitfalls that can be eliminated by combining the 2 current methods.
Not in every case, and probably not even in a majority of cases.
DozyWannabe is offline  
Old 10th Oct 2012, 02:34
  #197 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Aug 2005
Location: fl
Posts: 2,561
It seems the seasoned pilots here want interconnected controls so they know what the autopilot or PF is doing, the non pilots think it is unnecessary because you can just look at the instruments and see what he did.

After 23,000 hrs and no incidents I give a lot of credit to interconnected controls and being able to stop an incident from happening when it it is obviously going to be one instantly, not waiting to see what the instruments read.

A few pilots here know this is true. The non pilots don't understand what we deal with when flying with a new inexperienced pilot in an airplane he isn't comfortable in. We are responsible for his short comings so can't let him cause an incident.

Airbus took this away from their pilots. Boeing did not. Airbus says anybody can fly their airplane with minimum experience. I don't think you will find one experienced pilot on PPRuNe that will agree with them.

The stall from 38,000 ft to the Atlantic Ocean with the stick held full back all the way says a lot about how anybody can fly it with little experience.

We need real pilots in our aircraft that can fly no matter what automation fails or we will have repeats of this.
bubbers44 is offline  
Old 10th Oct 2012, 03:01
  #198 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Aug 2005
Location: fl
Posts: 2,561
By the way there is no instinct to pull up if an abrupt situation occurs. Any experienced pilot will only maneuver as required. Also the Buffalo crash was not an instinctive panic pull up, he had gone through a course in plane tail stall where the horizontal stabilizer ices up and stalls pitching the nose down requiring a nose up elevator to recover. Unfortunately that was not their problem that night.
bubbers44 is offline  
Old 10th Oct 2012, 04:14
  #199 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: May 2005
Location: middle of nowhere
Posts: 348
You will never be able to reason with the likes of Dozy et al.

You can bring up as many investigations or reports about the Airbus controls as you want stating that the absence of tactile feedback is taking away an important interaction between aircraft and pilot, thus being detrimental to safety. In this case resistance is futile.

They are either part of the team that simply has to defend the system or lose money or credentials.

Or they are comparable to followers of sects or extreme religions. Even if all indicators show them on the wrong path, they continue to the bitter end, because it is written in some pamphlet by some guru.

Neither of both retains the capability to question the system. People who do it, be they the most competent or not, have to be shouted down, because they have become a threat to everything they are or believe in. No more debate, just argue them down, even if the arguments are painfully and obviously misconstrued. This seems fashion today, just look at the presidential race....

I love a good debate, I can live with an outcome that is not to my liking, that was the situation as long as I flew Airbus and I remained professional. It did not take away my capability to criticise, as I do now on the new equipment. What bugs me is the hollowness of some people here in their not being capable of even grasping what the counterpart in an argument is trying to say.
It's the "I must be right or I lose my self belief, therefore he must irrevocably be wrong, irrespective of the arguments" approach.

As I said, resistance is futile, as it seems that such beliefs are somewhat sustained by the industry and the regulators, at least very thinly contested.
I thus have to rest my case.

Last edited by Gretchenfrage; 10th Oct 2012 at 04:16.
Gretchenfrage is offline  
Old 10th Oct 2012, 04:47
  #200 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Mar 2010
Location: South Korea
Age: 59
Posts: 119
Sometimes there can be more than one right way of doing the same thing. Each method may have subtle differences that make it slightly better in some situations and slightly worse in others. You can argue which method is slightly better based on statistics which is pretty black and white. It is easier for the non professional to argue based on statistics. However there are many circumstances where we are not fortunate enough to have such evidence. The theory of a nuclear deterrent is anobvious example of this. We have no statistical evidence about blowing up the world. In these situations we must consider the opinions of professionals. A professional being someone with considerable theoretical knowledge, hands on practical experience and success in his particular endeavour. Native intelligence also enters in. It requires the different parties sit down and talk nicely together, respect the others' viewpoint and through reason come to a conclusion. As we know this can be difficult to achieve and the result may not be so conclusive and is more open to argument but in some circumstances it isthe only way to come to a decision because there is no scientific evidence. However in making these decisions I think it is wise to take notice of the professionals. People who are not so experienced are more likely to alter importanceís. They make things important that are really not so important or brush aside things that are actually important. Also some people may have an inferiority complex, they feel inside that they are inferior and they have an underlying fear of being wrong so they have an obsession to be right and push their perhaps flawed view point. This person can make rational arguments very difficult and the outcome will be flawed because the decision based on emotion rather than rational thinking.

For me I enjoy reading the intelligent arguments and viewpoints of these professionals. We have many people here who are obviously aviation professionals that share their differing opinions in these threads with the knowledge that these are public forums . Because they are professionals I think their opinions generally hold more value. In the end you must evaluate all the knowledge you have obtained including your life time of learning and make your own decision on what is right for you but we must also respect other peoples decisions and understand that they are human with a life time of different experiences which makes them come to a different conclusion. There are many things I have learned from these professionals which have helped me considerably in my own profession. It concerns me that non professionals who are somewhat obnoxious and disrespectful of the opinions of others will drive away the professionals and we will no longer have this wealth of information that we can casually ingest while relaxing in at home.
Cool Guys is offline  

Thread Tools
Search this Thread

Contact Us - Archive - Advertising - Cookie Policy - Privacy Statement - Terms of Service - Do Not Sell My Personal Information

Copyright © 2018 MH Sub I, LLC dba Internet Brands. All rights reserved. Use of this site indicates your consent to the Terms of Use.