4 Ryanair aircraft declare fuel emergency at same time
Per Ardua ad Astraeus
Join Date: Mar 2000
Location: UK
Posts: 18,579
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Come on, the actual precise amount of fuel to the nearest kg is unimportant. The crux of the matter is how/when they diverted and ATC issues. The fact that they EXPECTED to be below Final Reserve is all that matters. Getting involved in gauge errors, dripsticking, etc etc is irrelevant.
Per Ardua ad Astraeus
Join Date: Mar 2000
Location: UK
Posts: 18,579
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Surely the safest procedure would call for crews to upload 2.5% more than the plog fuel to allow for gauging errors
Gauge errors have NEVER been taken into account in my time, nor are they related to "the plog fuel" in any way, shape or form. In any case, an over-read will almost certainly stay an over-read all the way down (and vice-versa) and you would never know unless you drip, and that is inaccurate in itself. Never known a pilot drip the wings before diverting.
Assuming the final figure was from the tech log then not 1 RY a/c went below gauged F Reserve, if that matters..
Join Date: Dec 1999
Location: UK
Posts: 0
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Boac
Actually from the IAA report two of them called Mayday after requesting diversions and being given or hearing long delays enroute to VLC. Given Spanish ATC's general attitude to Ryanair and with the workload the controllers found themselves under the Commanders had little choice but to declare an emergency , otherwise they may have been treated with little priority until they found themselves in an even tighter corner.
The holding point RESBI to the South West of the field , the opposite side to the diversion airfield has a big part to play, without an FMC to punch it in to, I could not even find it at all on the charts - considering I was in a quiet room with no distraction.Not easy for the crews *given the weather and spanish ATC. *Most would have started getting nervous ,or at least up to full concentration ,in such circumstances , including me. (An experienced pilot and Tre)*
The ' burn them' witch hunt mentality displayed by some on this thread and lack of empathy is really sad to see, and not justified in my experience .*
Actually from the IAA report two of them called Mayday after requesting diversions and being given or hearing long delays enroute to VLC. Given Spanish ATC's general attitude to Ryanair and with the workload the controllers found themselves under the Commanders had little choice but to declare an emergency , otherwise they may have been treated with little priority until they found themselves in an even tighter corner.
The holding point RESBI to the South West of the field , the opposite side to the diversion airfield has a big part to play, without an FMC to punch it in to, I could not even find it at all on the charts - considering I was in a quiet room with no distraction.Not easy for the crews *given the weather and spanish ATC. *Most would have started getting nervous ,or at least up to full concentration ,in such circumstances , including me. (An experienced pilot and Tre)*
The ' burn them' witch hunt mentality displayed by some on this thread and lack of empathy is really sad to see, and not justified in my experience .*
Per Ardua ad Astraeus
Join Date: Mar 2000
Location: UK
Posts: 18,579
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Originally Posted by SW
Boac
Actually from the IAA report two of them called Mayday after requesting diversions and being given or hearing long delays enroute to VLC. Given Spanish ATC's general attitude to Ryanair and with the workload the controllers found themselves under the Commanders had little choice but to declare an emergency , otherwise they may have been treated with little priority until they found themselves in an even tighter corner.
Actually from the IAA report two of them called Mayday after requesting diversions and being given or hearing long delays enroute to VLC. Given Spanish ATC's general attitude to Ryanair and with the workload the controllers found themselves under the Commanders had little choice but to declare an emergency , otherwise they may have been treated with little priority until they found themselves in an even tighter corner.
Join Date: Dec 1999
Location: UK
Posts: 0
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
In post #488 you said they expectedto be below FR fuel. This was afterthey decided to divert and as a result of poor ATC.
I was just highlighting this point, I in no way include you in the 'Witch Hunters'.
Sorry if you thought I did.
I was just highlighting this point, I in no way include you in the 'Witch Hunters'.
Sorry if you thought I did.
Per Ardua ad Astraeus
Join Date: Mar 2000
Location: UK
Posts: 18,579
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Sorry I didn't make myself clear, the approx 400kg error I refer to is based on a full load including the centre tank
In any case, you need to look up NG fuel tank capacity, I think. Your figure should be over 520kg, not 400.
Per Ardua ad Astraeus
Join Date: Mar 2000
Location: UK
Posts: 18,579
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Yup - 522'ish if ALL 3 tanks over-read to max limits (unlikely?). Remember, though, that when you get to buttock-clenching time, it is only wing tank error we are (bizarrely) looking at. If I had ever got near F Reserve in civilian life it would be accel/decel/pitch/fuel starvation that would focus my mind, not 195kg.
) looking at. If I had ever got near F Reserve in civilian life it would be accel/decel/pitch/fuel starvation that would focus my mind, not 195kg.
I wonder how many of you out there have actually had to measure your fuel upload using the magnetic drop sticks provided in most aircraft tanks? I have.
In fact, my last company had a policy that if we had to use any of the drop sticks then we were to add 500 kgs to the fuel required.
They simply are not really any more accurate than the fuel gauges except when a fuel gauge is inop and despatch is permitted within the MEL.
Therefore, I think that it is a complete red herring to argue about how the IAA might have measured the final landing fuel.
Since we are nitpicking, you will note that I said landing fuel. That is where the planned fuel for the flight comes to an end. Nowhere does it mention the fuel required to taxi to the ramp which is where the final fuel would normally be calculated. (Taxi-out fuel is calculated but not taxi-in fuel).
One night JFK became flooded and everyone (including me) ended up at EWR. In those days EWR only had two customs gates so we all ended up parked on a disused runway waiting for a gate. I had Kuwait Airways on one side and a BA 747 on the other side. We were out there for 5 hours.
Now, I freely accept that this was an unusual event but at what point would the authorities (in this case, the FAA) have checked the final fuel contents on landing?
In fact, my last company had a policy that if we had to use any of the drop sticks then we were to add 500 kgs to the fuel required.
They simply are not really any more accurate than the fuel gauges except when a fuel gauge is inop and despatch is permitted within the MEL.
Therefore, I think that it is a complete red herring to argue about how the IAA might have measured the final landing fuel.
Since we are nitpicking, you will note that I said landing fuel. That is where the planned fuel for the flight comes to an end. Nowhere does it mention the fuel required to taxi to the ramp which is where the final fuel would normally be calculated. (Taxi-out fuel is calculated but not taxi-in fuel).
One night JFK became flooded and everyone (including me) ended up at EWR. In those days EWR only had two customs gates so we all ended up parked on a disused runway waiting for a gate. I had Kuwait Airways on one side and a BA 747 on the other side. We were out there for 5 hours.
Now, I freely accept that this was an unusual event but at what point would the authorities (in this case, the FAA) have checked the final fuel contents on landing?
Having studied the IAA report, my conclusion is that it is the planned destination-to-alternate profile which should be reviewed.
If your planning assumed a 150 mile diversion, climbing to FL310 and descending for a VFR approach - but you then found yourself stuck down at FL100 and being vectored around the ying-yang by ATCOs close to meltdown, then you're on a hiding to nothing.
Many years ago, 'no delay expected' at London Airport meant that no delays in excess of 20 min could be expected - a somewhat different thing. Some airlines didn't know this and reportedly found themselves on fumes on a few occasions....
So I think I would take a leaf out of Dan Winterland's book, if I was unfortunate enough to be flying aluminium people-tubes, particularly in Espanish airspace in iffy Wx. Add allowances for at least 50 nm destination-to-alternate distance, assume worst FL, ISA+15 and engine anti-icing required - the heck with gauge errors and nearest kilogram calcs, there'd be a prudent fuel quantity at the alternate to avoid the need to declare an emergency!
About a million years ago, following the problems faced by a colleague conducting a diversion, we were ordered to declare a Mayday in any similar event.... Though not on CAT aircraft, I hasten to add. But after my wingman had a severe engine surge on take-off, returned to the aerodrome and blacked the RW after destroying the barrier, I had to divert. One would feel rather daft declaring a Mayday when well over max. landing weight, so I didn't! There then followed a few glorious minutes of aerobatics, before I landed my trusty Hunter F(GA) Mk9 at the alternate. The moral of which is that there might be SOPs, whether you're flying a Hunter or an airliner, but the commander must make the ultimate decision based upon experience and sound airmanship.
If your planning assumed a 150 mile diversion, climbing to FL310 and descending for a VFR approach - but you then found yourself stuck down at FL100 and being vectored around the ying-yang by ATCOs close to meltdown, then you're on a hiding to nothing.
Many years ago, 'no delay expected' at London Airport meant that no delays in excess of 20 min could be expected - a somewhat different thing. Some airlines didn't know this and reportedly found themselves on fumes on a few occasions....
So I think I would take a leaf out of Dan Winterland's book, if I was unfortunate enough to be flying aluminium people-tubes, particularly in Espanish airspace in iffy Wx. Add allowances for at least 50 nm destination-to-alternate distance, assume worst FL, ISA+15 and engine anti-icing required - the heck with gauge errors and nearest kilogram calcs, there'd be a prudent fuel quantity at the alternate to avoid the need to declare an emergency!
About a million years ago, following the problems faced by a colleague conducting a diversion, we were ordered to declare a Mayday in any similar event.... Though not on CAT aircraft, I hasten to add. But after my wingman had a severe engine surge on take-off, returned to the aerodrome and blacked the RW after destroying the barrier, I had to divert. One would feel rather daft declaring a Mayday when well over max. landing weight, so I didn't! There then followed a few glorious minutes of aerobatics, before I landed my trusty Hunter F(GA) Mk9 at the alternate. The moral of which is that there might be SOPs, whether you're flying a Hunter or an airliner, but the commander must make the ultimate decision based upon experience and sound airmanship.
My experience of 5 years in Ryanair and a few diversions is that the alternate fuel was well padded in terms of track distance and levels etc and, of course the alternate fuel is also subject to 5% contingency.
Am not saying either way that this was the case for MAD-VLC but would be surprised if it wasn't similarly "padded".
Am not saying either way that this was the case for MAD-VLC but would be surprised if it wasn't similarly "padded".
Join Date: Apr 2002
Location: FUBAR
Posts: 3,348
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
We are getting a little bit nit-picking now discussing gauge error when we are only talking 1100kg or so, and I think it is safe to assume that no-one from the Spanish CAA works at that hour of the night. . . . therefore the arrival fuel was as noted by the crew. Aircraft would be refuelled well before any Spanish Civil Servant left bed, so lets leave it at that.
Safe to assume they landed "close"
to final reserve if they took the trouble to declare an emergency.
Well, happy to say that the crew that took me to Sevilla last week when I wanted to go to Malaga still managed to park it with a smidgin less than 1400kg after holding 40 min waiting for the CB to pass AGP.
I certainly had no complaints about their fuel choice or operational decisions
For sure the hysteria in the Spanish press probably resulted in a few clenched buttocks amongst the mainly Spanish pax acompanying me. Much scarier by far the 2& a half hour bus ride between flooded fields & rivers bursting their banks
Safe to assume they landed "close"
to final reserve if they took the trouble to declare an emergency.Well, happy to say that the crew that took me to Sevilla last week when I wanted to go to Malaga still managed to park it with a smidgin less than 1400kg after holding 40 min waiting for the CB to pass AGP.
I certainly had no complaints about their fuel choice or operational decisions
For sure the hysteria in the Spanish press probably resulted in a few clenched buttocks amongst the mainly Spanish pax acompanying me. Much scarier by far the 2& a half hour bus ride between flooded fields & rivers bursting their banks
Quote Mikehotel: ''Finally, Dan, is it not the case that the amount of extra fuel is almost irrelevant if that fuel is burned before the diversion commences? Had these aircraft diverted immediately after discontinuing their MAD approaches they would have had more fuel at VLC. So it comes down to airmanship backed up by guidance from up on high as to when to commence a diversion.''
Of course it is, and you answer your own question. Having the extra fuel gives you the luxury of more time to make that desision. Although I mentioned that generally the crews did a good job, I have to question the wisdom of waiting until you get to diversion fuel and then make the desision when everyone else is also diverting. In my experience, in these situatuions is best to be ahead of the queue!
Of course it is, and you answer your own question. Having the extra fuel gives you the luxury of more time to make that desision. Although I mentioned that generally the crews did a good job, I have to question the wisdom of waiting until you get to diversion fuel and then make the desision when everyone else is also diverting. In my experience, in these situatuions is best to be ahead of the queue!
Join Date: Aug 2009
Location: yorkshire
Posts: 4
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
leeds to stanstead fuel diversion
I caught a flight last tuesday from Leeds Bradford to Tenerife. We were told that "due to high winds and a low pressure cell over the uk" we had to stop at Stanstead for fuel. I have only ppl rotary experience but cannot think of any logical reason for this (other than Leeds would not upload fuel). Could it be due to the diversions in Spain, so we had to have additional fuel?
...and, of course the alternate fuel is also subject to 5% contingency.
peapodpea
As far as I know Leeds Bradford has a short runway subject to notoriously strong crosswinds and that would have limited the amount of fuel (or passengers) they could carry for what is a long flight. They presumably faced a choice of taking fewer passengers or stopping at STN to top up the fuel.
As far as I know Leeds Bradford has a short runway subject to notoriously strong crosswinds and that would have limited the amount of fuel (or passengers) they could carry for what is a long flight. They presumably faced a choice of taking fewer passengers or stopping at STN to top up the fuel.
Is that your company policy? My understanding is that mandatory 5% contingency only applies to trip fuel, not to fuel required for diversion to the planned alternate.
Diversion fuel always used to attract contingency but maybe there has been a change which I am not aware of - anyone care to comment?
I caught a flight last tuesday from Leeds Bradford to Tenerife. We were told that "due to high winds and a low pressure cell over the uk" we had to stop at Stanstead for fuel. I have only ppl rotary experience but cannot think of any logical reason for this (other than Leeds would not upload fuel). Could it be due to the diversions in Spain, so we had to have additional fuel?