AF 447 report out

[TampaSLF]

OK465

Good point on the pilots who don't grasp flight as well as some of the SLF, much less the engineers. Would have been scary in that 330 having a hunch what was happening.

The CVR transcript left me dumbfounded at some statements, but the "I have had the stick back the whole time" by PF was something I thought no pilot could be capable of uttering after bleeding 5 miles of altitude.
Sadness.

[Organfreak]

Dear Sassy--

Organfreak,
First, your name reminds me of those body eating, face munching freaks in the US right now but I'm sure you concentrate more on blood supply vs skin and tissue since you're an organ freak LOL. j/k

I'm a jazz organ player (Hammond B-3), repair man, and, if I may say so, world-renowned teacher of such. 'Organfreak' is a handle given to me years ago by a radio DJ - that I'm now stuck with.

If you have indeed read every. single. post. on the tech forums, you must be what, 99 years old now ?

Ha ha, why you, I oughta...I'm only 62 but I lave lots of free time, being retired from a career as a pro stage lighting designer. (Burnout case.)

NOW: As to SLFinAZ:

To place blame anywhere but on the pilots is fundamentally wrong. This is not an "AB" issue it's a question of basic airmanship. The PF took a perfectly functional airframe with a known manageable issue and fubar'd it so badly it was probably unrecoverable by the time the captain returned.

I'm sorry sir/madame, but I can seldom remember being so annoyed by any dumbass post in these forums. I can only assume that your breath-takingly simplistic opinion is not based on reading the threads very thoroughly, and/or, not reading the report. It must be really easy for you, living in such a black-and-white world.

I may apologize sometime later, or not.

[Joetom]

I have ready many posts on this event.

I will mention a few points of interest, just my pick up though.

1. The crew wanted to get to France.

2. The crew did not want to crash

3. The crew failed to avoid the crash.

4. It took a long long long time to decide to get the recorders.

5. Plenty of previous problems with those pitot probes.

6. Airlines like autopilot on for most flight time.

7. Pilots get little hand flying time in this event zone.

8. So many experts after the event.

9. Shame experts are not more pro-active before event/events.

10. Pilot training/awareness increased after this event, why needed ?

F.T.M.

It's like so many things in life, just Follow The Money, save time/money/fuel and increase profits period.

[SassyPilotsWife]

LOL if a SLF is worried about flying with a pilot based on ANYTHING posted on Pprune, they should take a Xanax before their next flight.

Puhhlease..OK and SLFinAZ don't try to exaggerate your knowledge when it has been taught to you in the hangar vs real flight time and emergency situation. Big difference between techs, ground crew etc. who when in bad weather get the luxury of a flashing blue light even get to leave the apron and/or hangar and are offered the luxury of safety, than the pilots who are experiencing a catastrophic situation in the middle of it.

Tampa.. you are correct. However, the main point of this thread (perhaps you haven't been reading, is about the pilot who knows how to fly and who knows how to operate a computer. Big difference.) See Colgan Air Crash.. If you're still dumbfounded, please.. take the time to read all of this thread. And..

" what if technology is now overbearing what the human mind can do and tolerate? "

[jcjeant]

Competences

That been said hundreds of times in this forum and also in the successive reports of the BEA
The accident took place in three phases
Phase 1
Loss of speed indication (trigger for everything that follows)
Phase 2
Pilot in manual controls and the next minute (major phase that causes phase 3)
Phase 3
Inevitable consequence of phase 2
Phase 2 is the largest in the course of the accident
The BEA report makes recommendations
When examined well .. some seem to be inspired by the fact that the pilots did not show a skill required for this type of event (in Phase 2)
It should not .. recommendations that are based on events of a incompetence .. and whose purpose would be to replace the pilot with even more automation of all kinds
This would still reduce the required skills .. and so have an adverse effect to the safety of flights

[Joetom]

7. Pilots get little hand flying time in this event zone.

care to elaborate ?
.

Pilots tend to hand fly take off and landings, little in climb/decent and even less in cruise.

Just follow the monie.

To have all crews well trained to cope with events that these crew found on the sad flight was not worth it, history shows this.

I would guess on another day/night with the same operating crew, the result may/could of been better.

[SLFinAZ]

If your annoyed with my post...

I sincerely hope your not sitting in the left hand seat of anything bigger then a 152. The issues here are absolutely that simplistic. The type specific issues were well documented and current. For a professional pilot to totally ignore not only training and procedure but common sense is beyond explanation. There are no complex holes in the swiss cheese here...simply a known malfunction with a safe, tested procedure that should be second nature to a commercial pilot... stabilize attitude and thrust appropriately and fly the plane while the PM sorts the issues out over time.

Exactly what dozens off other crews did with exactly the same issue.

[sevenstrokeroll]

30 years ago I first hand flew a jet (sabreliner). On one trip, we went to max alt, FL450. Hand flew. IT WAS HARD TO DO. One had to dampen out the controls to very, very small movements.

I made it my business to learn to hand fly at max altitude any subsequent plane I ever flew. You NEVER know when YOU have to fly.

Later on in my career, I noticed no one took advanatge of getting the feel of a plane at altitude when I offered it to them.

and when the autopilot quit on them, they had their hands full.

and the planes I flew weren't fancy computerized planes like the AB.

SO, it is really time to learn to fly a plane in all regiemes of flight

[svhar]

Let's wait for BOAC's final analysis. He knows it all.

[bubbers44]

I flew the same way and handflew when it wasn't required because I wanted tol.

[Dengue_Dude]

Without reading every post, has anyone mentioned the IN/GPS groundspeed readout thats usually on constant display in each MFD?

With serviceable attitude indicators and GS you could hazard a guess at whether you were stalled or not.

[mm43]

Dengue Dude;

This post to the AF447 - wreckage found thread will confirm what you are asking.

However, these guys had problems with their scan, and in not believing what they were seeing on the PDF, then what chance of that on the MFD?

[Capn Bloggs]

Originally Posted by Acer231

BASIC AIRMANSHIP would have probably saved the day (night).

Interesting concept, Airmanship. But what exactly is it, and how do you get it? When the answer is known/worked out, you will understand why the pilots of AF447 were not up to the task.

[fitliker]

Was their weather avoidance equipment in good working order ?
This is the second CB related accident for this operator .The Pilots took a servicable aircraft into wx that was beyond the capability of the aircraft.
Maybe the Radar systems of these aircraft needs to be looked at as well as no sane pilot in a civilian aircraft would willingly and knowingly fly into a CB with tops of 0ver fifty thousand feet.
As the USAF training video used to say "There is no reason to take ANY aircraft into a CB"
There are many causes to most accidents,hopefully someone will be asking about this companies weather avoidance strategies.And whether their radar was working and if the pilots willingly and knowingly attempted to take an aircraft into an enviroment beyond the aircrafts abilities.

[Capn Bloggs]

There is no evidence to support the hypothesis that they flew into a CB. Certainly, the turbulence that was registered on the FDR showed they didn't!

[GliderGuy88]

Hi all, long time lurker, first time poster here. I find this thread very intriguing. What I find most intriguing of all is that some contributors feel that it is neccessary to apportion blame in a disproportionate manner.

Quote:
"To place blame anywhere but on the pilots is fundamentally wrong".

To place blame squarely on the shoulders of the pilots is also fundamentally wrong. All accidents, be they industrial, aviation or even road traffic accidents; rarely, if ever, have a single outright cause. There are almost always several causal factors involved. Said causal factors are already being explored so I will not delve into them in detail here.

Yes, the pitot issues were known and documented. Yes, pilots are trained to deal with unreliable airspeed readings, but past incidents have shown that when pilots are faced with unreliable instrument readings combined with constant, paradoxical, and conflicting warnings, overwhelming confusion can ensue. It can happen to any pilot, no matter how well trained or proficient they may be.

As a glider pilot, I only fly VFR. I have been exposed to unreliable/no airspeed readings as part of my training syllabus, and it is a very trying experience, even with outside visual references and no alarms to divert your attention. The point I wish to make is that I cannot even begin to imagine what it would be like to be faced with the situation that the pilots of AF447 experienced that night. Thus I cannot pass judgement on the actions of the crew, and neither can anyone who has not experienced a similar mind boggling, overwhelming scenario.

In addition, I feel that the blame/punishnent culture that is seemingly so prevalent these days (in all walks of life) does absolutely nothing to further the cause of improving aviation safety. If anything, it acts as a monumental hindrance, in such a culture people are less likely to come forward and admit to errors or shortcomings. As a result, such issues remain unknown and thus cannot be rectified, and will likely resurface in future with potentially disastrous consequences....

The aviation community needs to study this tragedy in depth, and learn from it, rather than waste precious time on the narrow minded, counter productive pursuit of worrying about who is to blame.

[qquantum]

AF-447 Accident

SLFinAZ – you sound like the NTSB.

As expected, the BEA Report is comprised of carefully crafted smoke — placing blame on the pilots of course — and distraction from the real issues of airplane design and regulator oversight failure that truly were the causes of the accident:

Pressure and Confusion
A review of the CVR transcript (Final Report, Appendix 1) plainly indicates the confusion in the cockpit that resulted from the total loss of airspeed indication, which occurred at a time when they were attempting to avoid the worst of the weather (icing, lightning, and severe turbulence).

In the darkness, in addition to the pressure of weather avoidance, the following compounded pilot confusion:
1. The loss of airspeed information caused a change in the FCS mode at 2h10min06; the fact was indeed mentioned [thanks InfrequentFlyer] at 2h10min22.1, but its import with respect to 2. (below) was lost in the confusion that followed.
2. The FCS Mode change resulted in loss of the envelope speed and angle of attack (AOA) limits — no stall protection — no overspeed protection — no bank angle/pitch angle protection — again the pilots seemed not to notice, as they did not discuss it;
3. The inexperienced FO, who was flying, made a radical pitch control input (full aft stick), which was not noticed by the more experienced FO, as he could not see the opposite control stick in the darkened cockpit (the A330 has independent control sticks, and so the normal means by which one pilot will instantly know what the other pilot is doing with his control stick – by the position of his own stick – was not available);
4. This drastic control input caused the trimmable horizontal stabilizer (THS) to automatically apply full nose‐up trim — a condition that while dangerous, in that it seriously compromised any attempt at recovery, was not detected by the pilots, as they made no mention of it;
5. Examination of the Flight Data Recorder (FDR) data, (Final Report, Appendix 3) indicates that, incredibly, the stall warning ceased (as designed) while the airplane was still in a deeply stalled condition, then reappeared when recovery action was attempted, adding even more confusion to the situation.
From the above it is readily apparent that the pilots were unable to fully recognize and understand the danger of the aircraft configuration and the continued existence and extent of the stall condition — in other words, the aircraft state was not presented to them in a way that would enable them to take proper recovery action.

Conditions of high altitude stall and reversion to Alternate Mode have been very rarely encountered in airline operations, leading to a degree of complacency with respect to knowledge and practice of operation in the Alternate Mode of the FCS, and an unjustified feeling of trust that the airplane “will take care of the situation”. The following flaws in the design of the A‐330 FCS fatally betrayed this trust:

Design Flaws
1. Failure of the FCS to remain in the Normal mode (with envelope protection) resulting from the loss of a single parameter (pitot‐static airspeed). While failure to design for this event may have been excusable during the initial design phase, the simultaneous loss of all pitot‐static systems had occurred in normal airline operations a number of times, and should have provided the impetus for a review of the design — or at least a warning to airline crews of the possibility of such an occurrence, along with appropriate remedial training for such an encounter. On AF‐447, the temporary loss of pitot‐static information caused the FCS to revert to Alternate mode – without envelope protection, at a time when the pilot most needed it – with no indication of airspeed.
If the design had incorporated synthesized speed – from GPS, IRS – which would be accurate enough – the pilot would not have been placed into such dire straits, and with appropriate cautions, would have been able to contend with the problem (in the Normal FCS mode); needless to say, the presentation of angle of attack (AOA) information (now planned for inclusion on Airbus airplanes) would have eased the burden on the pilot.

2. The design of the primary flight control controller such that it is possible for a pilot to make a sustained incorrect or dangerous input, without the awareness of the other crewmember(s).
On AF‐447, the junior co‐pilot’s instinctive reaction to the confusing situation, of pulling the control stick to the maximum nose‐up position, was not detected (in the darkness of the cockpit) by the other two crewmembers until he verbally brought it to their attention at an altitude which was too low to enable a recovery, due to low energy and excessive descent rate.

It can be readily appreciated that an FCS control design in which both controllers move in unison at all times (as in Boeing, MacDonnell Douglas, and most other airplanes) would have enabled instant detection (tactile) by the senior pilot (along with the probability of a sharp rebuke) and subsequent recovery of the airplane. Note that when the original airliner sidestick controller was first designed, some twenty or more years ago, it was not technically feasible to design a parallel (active) sidestick controller, as a mechanical solution would pose major problems of friction and hysteresis; now, however, the required technology has been available for several years, and because tactile communication between pilots is of such vital importance, parallel control should become mandatory on all future sidestick designs.

3. The ability of the FCS to allow the Trimmable Horizontal Stabilizer (THS) to move to a configuration that renders the airplane essentially unrecoverable, without appropriate warning to the pilot.
On AF‐447, the THS moved to the full nose‐up trim position in response to the (incorrect) sustained nose‐up command by the junior FO on the control stick. No warning to the crew of this grossly abnormal stabilizer position was provided. Further, when AOA becomes greater than 30°, or Speed is less than 60kt, auto THS trim is turned off. The result was that the THS was set at full nose‐up trim at 32,000 feet (Final Report, Appendix 3, Page 6), and remained there until impact with the ocean. It can be reasoned therefore, that unless the pilot had detected and manually corrected the trim setting, the airplane could not have been recovered to normal flight with a power setting of other than minimal thrust.
In addition to AF447, a number of previous Airbus accidents have also been characterized by a movement of the THS to the full nose‐up position prior to a crash – Nagoya, Tao Yuan, Perpignan, etc. without the pilot being aware of the change in configuration. Manual trimming is only ever encountered by line pilots in the simulator, and then in a lesson in which a stabilizer mis‐trim is expected to occur. When asked how often they have used manual trim in normal operations, Airbus pilots reply “Never”.
There is a subset of THS settings associated with cruise flight; that the THS was allowed to move outside of this range without a strong warning to the pilot is a major flaw in the FCS design.

4. The FCS design which allows the primary stall‐warning sensor to be declared invalid (when it is still capable of providing a correct indication) based upon another parameter (speed), of questionable validity.
On AF‐447 the stall warning was turned off as a result of an airspeed error (invalid), even though the airplane was deeply stalled – giving the pilot the impression that the airplane was not in a stall. When the senior co‐pilot took control (although the junior FO did not relinquish it) and pushed forward on the stick in an attempt to recover, the stall warning again sounded – leading him to believe that his control input was not correct, thus causing him to release pressure on the stick to get rid of the stall warning. This design is absolutely inexcusable; there was no reason to believe that the AOA vanes became simultaneously unreliable, since matching IRS AOA was present on the FDR data.

In all, a "politically correct" report that omits analysis of significant factual information, and does not criticize either Airbus or the DGAC.

Member – ISASI

[lear60fellow]

There are hundreds of aviation accidents/incidents you may find on internet, but why on the Airbus is always to blame the crews? Looks like "Black Boxes" always get lost for a couple of weeks and then they come up with an extraordinary story to the public.

Is Airbus a state of the art piece of engineering? Yes it is, for the Engineers, but not for the pilots.

Are airlines pushing the limits hiring guys fresh from Flight school? Yes, they are, but also the engineers who design the aircrafts.

Something went wrong on that flight, I bet my they didn´t want to get killed, but crew inexperience + bad weather + technical problems is a molotov cocktail.

On the other hand all that computer design should be there to help the pilots not to distract them from basic airmanship, I have this problem with too many F/O, punching buttons is great but not on final 2 miles from airport, what I tell them? "Fly the ******* aircraft!!!!!!!"

Hand Flying: absolutely right, do it as much as you can, climbs and descend is a way to practice everyday.

[wiggy]

it is really time to learn to fly a plane in all regiemes of flight

(sic)

Agree, but of course hand flying above FL245 is now illegal in (?above) many parts of the world.

has anyone mentioned the IN/GPS groundspeed readout thats usually on constant display in each MFD?

It has, as has the idea of better:solid state/hot wire ASI's - but wouldn't it have been even better to have provided the crew a full time visual display of the AOA? AFAIK it's not particularly useful in some portions of a typical heavy's flight envelope but personally it's something I think should now be mandatory...(and it certainly woud be an improvement on the new simulator "fad" of training crews to add/subtract flight path angle from pitch attitude to derive an AOA).

[jcjeant]

About the choice of the Captain for the crew change (and designation of the PF)

It's some additional stances in the CVR transcript (appendix N°1) of the final report that was not in the interim report N°3
One is about some words of the captain and Bonin just before the entrance of the other copilot in the flight deck (those words were already in some leaks published in the press ... but at time they were not fully credible)

So we read in the transcript: (page 17)

1 h 56 min 16
er who’s doing the
landing, is it you? well
right he’s going to take
my place

1 h 56 min 20
You’re a PL, aren’t
you ?
change in
background noise
1 h 56 min 21 yeah

It is to remind that the crew who perform the flight Rio - Paris is the same that perfomed the flight Paris - Rio some days ago
Seem's to me that the question of the captain is legit
What seems odd to me is the time to ask ....
Is there no sense that the captain knows that consists of his crew and therefore he should have put this question before takeoff from Paris .. some days ago
Some pro can maybe answer ?