A Sukhoi superjet 100 is missing
Thanks grizzled. 
It’s worth the effort as I only fly as pax now!
fullforward, “… is completely justifiable by the perpetrator …” au contraire. Exploration of ‘why’ should not seek to justify a particular view, only to provide understanding. Judgement should be considered elsewhere, and perhaps similar to Dekker’s views on just culture, it does not depend on where the line is drawn, but on who draws it.
If an accident investigation seeks justification then it risks the blindness of blame, whereas seeking understanding for the crew’s actions might enhance wisdom – or at least some safety learning.
Many apparent failings in awareness might be identified as normal human weaknesses; mental map slip, lack of emphasis on terrain (briefing), distraction, etc, but the dismissal of the TAWS warning is more disturbing.
The effectiveness of human factors training (CRM) will be limited by human variability in a given situation, thus perhaps we need to protect humans from themselves. Automatic / FD guidance demanding a pull-up after a TAWS warning; this should add further emphasis (cf Airbus studies)?
It’s worth the effort as I only fly as pax now!fullforward, “… is completely justifiable by the perpetrator …” au contraire. Exploration of ‘why’ should not seek to justify a particular view, only to provide understanding. Judgement should be considered elsewhere, and perhaps similar to Dekker’s views on just culture, it does not depend on where the line is drawn, but on who draws it.
If an accident investigation seeks justification then it risks the blindness of blame, whereas seeking understanding for the crew’s actions might enhance wisdom – or at least some safety learning.
Many apparent failings in awareness might be identified as normal human weaknesses; mental map slip, lack of emphasis on terrain (briefing), distraction, etc, but the dismissal of the TAWS warning is more disturbing.
The effectiveness of human factors training (CRM) will be limited by human variability in a given situation, thus perhaps we need to protect humans from themselves. Automatic / FD guidance demanding a pull-up after a TAWS warning; this should add further emphasis (cf Airbus studies)?
Last edited by PEI_3721; 21st Jun 2012 at 13:20.
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I´m seeing none with ATC what so ever.
There are many other “whys” in this (and every) case. (Including, for instance, several related to ATC).
For example - Russian newspapers informed that after clearance to descent pilot get the clearance to the right turn, just against the mountains. If true, it could be a contributing factor. Aspecialy in case of Russian pilots. They are used that ATC have much more responsibility.
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I cannot understand the attitude of the many otherwise intelligent people, who are posting sharp responses to fullforward's, perhaps harsh, but accurate conclusions.
The pax of the Sukhoi expected that the PIC was sufficiently highly qualified and competent, to ensure that he could operate a flight from commencement to conclusion, without killing them all.
He wasn't, and he did.
What part of "situational awareness" (as applied to aviation) don't these people (who are effectively apologists for Capt. Yablontsev) understand??
The pax of the Sukhoi expected that the PIC was sufficiently highly qualified and competent, to ensure that he could operate a flight from commencement to conclusion, without killing them all.
He wasn't, and he did.
What part of "situational awareness" (as applied to aviation) don't these people (who are effectively apologists for Capt. Yablontsev) understand??
Last edited by onetrack; 25th Jun 2012 at 02:57. Reason: sp. & punctuation
one track - # 606, “The pax of the Sukhoi expected that the PIC was sufficiently highly qualified and competent, to ensure that he could operate a flight from commencement to conclusion, without killing them all. He wasn't, and he did.”
Your conclusions are reasoned with knowledge of the outcome; thus if there was no accident and the flight landed safely, as did the previous one, the inference is that the PIC was qualified and proficient. So what changed between flights?
Your weak understanding of attitude is perhaps a reflection that other people are prepared to consider different situational viewpoints and alternative theories of human behaviour.
A broad spectrum of industry now recognises these alternatives as a means to progress safety, and whilst they are not a complete answer, or even provable theories, they do generate opportunity to think about issues and perhaps reflect on how some aspects might apply to themselves or be applied in their operations.
Thoughts on situational awareness:-
Critical Thinking
Gaining and Maintaining Situation Awareness
Making Better Decisions
Your conclusions are reasoned with knowledge of the outcome; thus if there was no accident and the flight landed safely, as did the previous one, the inference is that the PIC was qualified and proficient. So what changed between flights?
Your weak understanding of attitude is perhaps a reflection that other people are prepared to consider different situational viewpoints and alternative theories of human behaviour.
A broad spectrum of industry now recognises these alternatives as a means to progress safety, and whilst they are not a complete answer, or even provable theories, they do generate opportunity to think about issues and perhaps reflect on how some aspects might apply to themselves or be applied in their operations.
Thoughts on situational awareness:-
Critical Thinking
Gaining and Maintaining Situation Awareness
Making Better Decisions
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Your conclusions are reasoned with knowledge of the outcome; thus if there was no accident and the flight landed safely, as did the previous one, the inference is that the PIC was qualified and proficient. So what changed between flights?
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Even the qualified and proficient screw up, sometimes! The accident (factory test-) pilot must have been world-class in terms of mastery of his particular aircraft. It seems he just got it a bit wrong in putting said aircraft on the wrong flight path, towards a towering obstruction he obviously knew was elsewhere. Could we sum that up as 'Jeder macht ein bisschen Dummheit'? (Everyone screws up sometimes.)
It reads, so far, like 'Duck under the clouds, give the peeps a nice ride to a remote location... Sorted!' Who among us has not done something similar?
The pilot obviously thought he knew exactly what he was doing, showing a very high level of self-confidence/low level of self-doubt; that's a typical mind-set for a test pilot with the 'Right Stuff.' Someone closer to a mere mortal might not have made the same mistake, I think. I bet when we get the final report we will see how nearly he got it right, only just managing to hit the high terrain.
It reads, so far, like 'Duck under the clouds, give the peeps a nice ride to a remote location... Sorted!' Who among us has not done something similar?
The pilot obviously thought he knew exactly what he was doing, showing a very high level of self-confidence/low level of self-doubt; that's a typical mind-set for a test pilot with the 'Right Stuff.' Someone closer to a mere mortal might not have made the same mistake, I think. I bet when we get the final report we will see how nearly he got it right, only just managing to hit the high terrain.
Last edited by chuks; 26th Jun 2012 at 09:59.
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Chuck
Give us a break!
Are you a professional pilot? A "bit wrong"??? C'mon man, what you've been smoking/drinking?
I can't recall about any decent professional that took that kind of chances.
You put a typical case of criminal negligence like something casual.
This jerk ignored 11 times the "terrain" warning. Do you see any reason that could justify zooming at high speed, low altitude, well below MSA, close to mountains on unfamiliar area?
Enough of so much useless bs here!
I bet you posted this thrash just for fun, mate!
Are you a professional pilot? A "bit wrong"??? C'mon man, what you've been smoking/drinking?
I can't recall about any decent professional that took that kind of chances.
You put a typical case of criminal negligence like something casual.
This jerk ignored 11 times the "terrain" warning. Do you see any reason that could justify zooming at high speed, low altitude, well below MSA, close to mountains on unfamiliar area?
Enough of so much useless bs here!
I bet you posted this thrash just for fun, mate!
Last edited by fullforward; 26th Jun 2012 at 10:46.
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low level of self-doubt; that's a typical mind-set for a test pilot
I do - one was a flight instructor of mine - and I tell you that this statement is rubbish.
Maybe that individual was self-minded / over-confident. Maybe he wasn't. Maybe he had this as a general attitude or maybe just the last 10 seconds in his life. But that is by far no typical personality for test pilots as such. Just the opposite is true: No major aircraft developer on earth would knowingly employ any air cowboy to mess around with prototype gadgets worth years of development and billions of dollars.
Air cowboy = likely to be unemployed soon. Very simple.
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Since you ask...
Yeah, I do know a couple of test pilots! One had been asked by a potential customer to show us what an aborted take-off looked like, stopping from V1. As we were all walking out for our jolly I asked what was on offer, when I was told, 'We're going to see a V1 cut.' I took that for a joke, of course; it's the kind of thing you do in the sim, for obvious reasons. Not least, you can break stuff!
We lined up, Mr Right Stuff gave it the berries, we got to V1 (something north of 100 kts) and then we did indeed come to a complete stop! Just at the last there was a little bit of graunching and vibrating there, but then, almost immediately, we went again, from about 1/3 down the runway. After take-off one could see four bright red bars on the EFIS screen display for the brake temperatures, when we spent a goodly while with the gear down.
Upon landing there came a 'Pop!' from somewhere underneath just as we touched down, as if a tire had blown. Hmm....
Back on terra firma it turned out upon thorough inspection that the V1 cut had made quite a mess of the brakes; the 'Pop!' had been the left outboard main blowing from a locked-up brake. I was watching over the engineer's shoulder as he pulled the left outboard wheel assembly off, when all sorts of metal shards fell out, whatever was left of the pucks, I guess.
Anyway, if a safe take-off is calculated from the full length with normal brake temperatures, how much ability to stop does one have to stop from 2/3 of the available length with red-hot brakes, hmm? That seemed like a fairly obvious point to (non-test-pilot) me!
The machine spent a few days grounded while they flew replacement parts in, a period when it was supposed to be doing numerous demo flights. They finally fixed it, but they flew it out again with no further demos flown from our airport.
I agree that there must be many test pilots with the right stuff, people who are serious, methodical and totally professional. Here I was writing about something rather different, perhaps another one of those with the 'Right Stuff,' when, as it happens, I have met a few, yes, my genius being just the first one. I am sure my guy was 'a really hot stick,' but he certainly was not thinking things through on the ride I got, although I am sure he really was focused on giving the prime customer exactly what he had wanted to see. Different pilots assign different things different priorities, don't they? And that is often done on the basis of one's self-assessment of one's own abilities.
We lined up, Mr Right Stuff gave it the berries, we got to V1 (something north of 100 kts) and then we did indeed come to a complete stop! Just at the last there was a little bit of graunching and vibrating there, but then, almost immediately, we went again, from about 1/3 down the runway. After take-off one could see four bright red bars on the EFIS screen display for the brake temperatures, when we spent a goodly while with the gear down.
Upon landing there came a 'Pop!' from somewhere underneath just as we touched down, as if a tire had blown. Hmm....
Back on terra firma it turned out upon thorough inspection that the V1 cut had made quite a mess of the brakes; the 'Pop!' had been the left outboard main blowing from a locked-up brake. I was watching over the engineer's shoulder as he pulled the left outboard wheel assembly off, when all sorts of metal shards fell out, whatever was left of the pucks, I guess.
Anyway, if a safe take-off is calculated from the full length with normal brake temperatures, how much ability to stop does one have to stop from 2/3 of the available length with red-hot brakes, hmm? That seemed like a fairly obvious point to (non-test-pilot) me!
The machine spent a few days grounded while they flew replacement parts in, a period when it was supposed to be doing numerous demo flights. They finally fixed it, but they flew it out again with no further demos flown from our airport.
I agree that there must be many test pilots with the right stuff, people who are serious, methodical and totally professional. Here I was writing about something rather different, perhaps another one of those with the 'Right Stuff,' when, as it happens, I have met a few, yes, my genius being just the first one. I am sure my guy was 'a really hot stick,' but he certainly was not thinking things through on the ride I got, although I am sure he really was focused on giving the prime customer exactly what he had wanted to see. Different pilots assign different things different priorities, don't they? And that is often done on the basis of one's self-assessment of one's own abilities.
Last edited by chuks; 26th Jun 2012 at 15:50.
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DOVE
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Since you ask...
Chuck!
Would you say the same things you wrote on your post 613, if connected to a lie detector?
If you say that, you should be very grateful to the Good Lord Who has protected you from your suicidal instinct.
If anyone had ever proposed to board his plane (and not a simulator, mind you) when he was about to perform a Take Off abort at V1, I would have said that I had to go to accommodate a relative coming from very far. And if, one, whomsoever: Chuck Yeager, Alan Shepard, Yuri Gagarin, after a HIGH ENERGY ABORTED TAKE OFF, had indicated its intention to Take Off immediately, and with a third of runway behind I had also vividly expressed my intention to go down, even on the runway, to admire him doing such a maneuver.
Would you say the same things you wrote on your post 613, if connected to a lie detector?
If you say that, you should be very grateful to the Good Lord Who has protected you from your suicidal instinct.
If anyone had ever proposed to board his plane (and not a simulator, mind you) when he was about to perform a Take Off abort at V1, I would have said that I had to go to accommodate a relative coming from very far. And if, one, whomsoever: Chuck Yeager, Alan Shepard, Yuri Gagarin, after a HIGH ENERGY ABORTED TAKE OFF, had indicated its intention to Take Off immediately, and with a third of runway behind I had also vividly expressed my intention to go down, even on the runway, to admire him doing such a maneuver.
Strewth folks - it's a bit of a worry for us mere pax that so called professional pilots (test or otherwise) carrying hundreds of passengers can decide to go rogue and kill people cause they want to do some fancy flying tricks.
This isn't something you want to appear on a thread nor is it something some of you should be trying to find a way to justify.
This isn't something you want to appear on a thread nor is it something some of you should be trying to find a way to justify.
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Yes.
I had just landed my own aircraft, taxied in and shut down, when I saw everyone else walking out for this demo flight, so that I just fell into line. I asked one of our own Training Captains what we were going to see, when he told me about the V1 demo. I said something like, 'You must be kidding!' when he just grinned at me. I took that to mean that, yes, he was joking. Then, sat there on the numbers, Mr Right Stuff came on the PA to say something like 'Ve are now goink to attempt (!) an aborted take-off wiz simulated engine failure at V1.' So it turned out that my friend had grinned to say that no, he was not joking!
That was merely stupid, but when we came to that graunching halt and then, in the next second, the engines spooled up again, and off we went, well.... If we had had a real engine failure at V1 minus ten, say, I suppose R & N would have had a real accident to discuss. As it was, the whole kerfuffle came to a reasonably happy end, when I was about the only one bitching and whining about what went on there. Everyone else just wanted to be bezzers with Mr Right Stuff, I guess.
It might be that there's often an assumption that 'This guy is a TEST PILOT! He must be some sort of winged god!' that sometimes leads to disappointment. In the case I am writing about, well, I have never done a real V1 cut in my entire career, where Mr Right Stuff probably had done hundreds, and he almost got that one right.
That was merely stupid, but when we came to that graunching halt and then, in the next second, the engines spooled up again, and off we went, well.... If we had had a real engine failure at V1 minus ten, say, I suppose R & N would have had a real accident to discuss. As it was, the whole kerfuffle came to a reasonably happy end, when I was about the only one bitching and whining about what went on there. Everyone else just wanted to be bezzers with Mr Right Stuff, I guess.
It might be that there's often an assumption that 'This guy is a TEST PILOT! He must be some sort of winged god!' that sometimes leads to disappointment. In the case I am writing about, well, I have never done a real V1 cut in my entire career, where Mr Right Stuff probably had done hundreds, and he almost got that one right.
Psychophysiological entity
Depends on the era you're in. We liked training on the real aircraft. Surely, the issue of a real V1 cut is how much concrete you have available? And I suppose an acute awareness of real mechanical issues.
And yes, many's the time I've been whisked into the air again without backtracking.
The man from the manufactures used to turn up - never a sign of a co-pilot - and the flying was just plain bewildering. Our to-be cheif training captain asked if the fire handles could be re-set in flight, and yer man just pulled one, re-set it, and pulled it again . . . several times. I looked in dismay at the engine temperatures and wondered what the long term effect on the blades might be. I was waaaaaaaay to junior to make comment.
All stalls were done to the push, and with the mental imagery of Mike Lithgow's flight still clear in our minds.
Simulators are very useful tools, but when I moved to the left, I would hate to have found myself there with nothing but simulation to found my abilities on.
And yes, many's the time I've been whisked into the air again without backtracking.
The man from the manufactures used to turn up - never a sign of a co-pilot - and the flying was just plain bewildering. Our to-be cheif training captain asked if the fire handles could be re-set in flight, and yer man just pulled one, re-set it, and pulled it again . . . several times. I looked in dismay at the engine temperatures and wondered what the long term effect on the blades might be. I was waaaaaaaay to junior to make comment.
All stalls were done to the push, and with the mental imagery of Mike Lithgow's flight still clear in our minds.
Simulators are very useful tools, but when I moved to the left, I would hate to have found myself there with nothing but simulation to found my abilities on.
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Part of the problem, perhaps?
Oh, I had my DC-3 checkout from one of the old school, who told me he wanted to see a full-breaking stall, none of this namby-pamby 'release of back pressure at the first burble.' Well, next thing you knew, there we were, nothing on the clock but the maker's name, headed earthwards at an angle of bank approximating 90º! No stall breaker strips on the Greasy Three, are there? Never mind, never mind... nowadays we do that sort of thing in the sim, don't we?
My point here, I suppose, is that sometimes even test pilots get carried away trying to sell airplanes, when they think showing how it can be turned inside-out is cool and sexy. Any fule can figure out, given a moment of quiet thought, that it must be deeply optimistic to do an abort and then go again from less than the full length with red-hot brakes. Or perhaps, to do some sort of cloud-break with the TAWS shouting at you, what seems to have happened here... could that not have been foreseen as likely to have ended in tears?
Once we read and understand the crash report we may well be reminded of something some of us tend to forget, that we are only as good as our last flight! I certainly have found myself in situations where I really needed to have remembered that before I got myself into said situation! I may have done something just as stupid (with much less raw flying ability) than this unfortunate crash pilot, when it was just dumb luck, blind fate or whatever that spared me to learn from my own mistake. Now we need to learn from his, yes?
My point here, I suppose, is that sometimes even test pilots get carried away trying to sell airplanes, when they think showing how it can be turned inside-out is cool and sexy. Any fule can figure out, given a moment of quiet thought, that it must be deeply optimistic to do an abort and then go again from less than the full length with red-hot brakes. Or perhaps, to do some sort of cloud-break with the TAWS shouting at you, what seems to have happened here... could that not have been foreseen as likely to have ended in tears?
Once we read and understand the crash report we may well be reminded of something some of us tend to forget, that we are only as good as our last flight! I certainly have found myself in situations where I really needed to have remembered that before I got myself into said situation! I may have done something just as stupid (with much less raw flying ability) than this unfortunate crash pilot, when it was just dumb luck, blind fate or whatever that spared me to learn from my own mistake. Now we need to learn from his, yes?
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The simple conclusion with regard to the Sukhoi crash, is that there was a serious lapse of aviating and navigating professionalism. There is little indication at this point, of mechanical failure being a major factor.
The snippets of information slowly being gathered - such as no pax manifest being drawn up - show a culture of "joyriding" and casualness associated with the entire flight.
I'll wager that the final report produces a record of casualness towards the flight plan on the part of the Captain and the co-pilot.
Perhaps there was no complete and utter recklessness, as fullforward is stating - but it's totally obvious that after setting a descending flight path, the Captain and crew were either unaware of the precise position of the mountain, as regards their intended path - or perhaps, because of lax cockpit drill, visitors to the cockpit distracted the Captain and co-pilot from giving their full attention to navigation, at a time when they needed 110% attention to navigation.
There is a subtle increase in complacency and a corresponding lowering of professionalism in many skilled people as they age, and as their experience, and "hours in the seat" increases.
It's a not-uncommon factor to find that many people involved in disasters involving fatalities, and serious crashes involving major injury, have good skills that should otherwise have ensured that they did not come to grief.
The old adage that "complacency breeds contempt" is an adage that is well-founded. Casualness and complacency are extremely subtle human factors that just creep up on you, when you continue to do the same complex job continuously.
I am often dumbfounded at how otherwise highly skilled, and supposedly highly professional people, with extensive experience, initiate disasters - that have as their root cause, simple acts of negligence, casualness, and complacency, that led to the disaster.
We, as humans, tend to develop habits over a long period of time, that degrade the intense professional skills levels required, when complex machines are being operated.
We have to continually guard against those habits degenerating into habits of complacency that take us into areas of extreme danger.
The snippets of information slowly being gathered - such as no pax manifest being drawn up - show a culture of "joyriding" and casualness associated with the entire flight.
I'll wager that the final report produces a record of casualness towards the flight plan on the part of the Captain and the co-pilot.
Perhaps there was no complete and utter recklessness, as fullforward is stating - but it's totally obvious that after setting a descending flight path, the Captain and crew were either unaware of the precise position of the mountain, as regards their intended path - or perhaps, because of lax cockpit drill, visitors to the cockpit distracted the Captain and co-pilot from giving their full attention to navigation, at a time when they needed 110% attention to navigation.
There is a subtle increase in complacency and a corresponding lowering of professionalism in many skilled people as they age, and as their experience, and "hours in the seat" increases.
It's a not-uncommon factor to find that many people involved in disasters involving fatalities, and serious crashes involving major injury, have good skills that should otherwise have ensured that they did not come to grief.
The old adage that "complacency breeds contempt" is an adage that is well-founded. Casualness and complacency are extremely subtle human factors that just creep up on you, when you continue to do the same complex job continuously.
I am often dumbfounded at how otherwise highly skilled, and supposedly highly professional people, with extensive experience, initiate disasters - that have as their root cause, simple acts of negligence, casualness, and complacency, that led to the disaster.
We, as humans, tend to develop habits over a long period of time, that degrade the intense professional skills levels required, when complex machines are being operated.
We have to continually guard against those habits degenerating into habits of complacency that take us into areas of extreme danger.