Melbourne Tailstrike final report
Controversial, moi?
The aircraft scrapped the tail skid so bad that it warranted a write off as the frame 80 etc was so badly damaged beyond economical repair.
To maintain a clean image of Emirate no fatal record, the aircraft was extensively and costly repaired to a airworthy condition.
To maintain a clean image of Emirate no fatal record, the aircraft was extensively and costly repaired to a airworthy condition.
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To all those who persist in "blaming" the individuals, with an air of "anyone with that experience would surely notice..." or "not do that" 
A relatively quick read of the report will reveal that this type of accident (and similar incidents) is far from rare, and affects numerous experienced pilots.
Yes - it is surprising that such things are not noticed, but the facts are clear - they are missed, and without analysing and putting in place steps to try and prevent them, they will continue to do so.
Only comment would be it was back in service ~8 months after the event - given the time to analyse / investigate aircraft, plan what to do, ferry to Toulouse, repair and back in service, it does not seem a massive task?
A relatively quick read of the report will reveal that this type of accident (and similar incidents) is far from rare, and affects numerous experienced pilots.
Yes - it is surprising that such things are not noticed, but the facts are clear - they are missed, and without analysing and putting in place steps to try and prevent them, they will continue to do so.
The aircraft scrapped the tail skid so bad that it warranted a write off as the frame 80 etc was so badly damaged beyond economical repair.
To maintain a clean image of Emirate no fatal record, the aircraft was extensively and costly repaired to a airworthy condition.
To maintain a clean image of Emirate no fatal record, the aircraft was extensively and costly repaired to a airworthy condition.
Appologise, my understanding over the sequence of events was faulty.
The reason TOGA was not selected before the first rotation was that at that point the crew did not realize there was a problem.
The reason TOGA was not selected before the first rotation was that at that point the crew did not realize there was a problem.
Last edited by Wizofoz; 18th Dec 2011 at 11:09.
THIS however:-
Has more errors per word than just about any post in History.
There were four crew, not three, the erroneous figures had nothing to do with 300 vs 500, and how the hell does writing off the aircraft effect the number of fatalities (which was zero)?
Could you please supply the cost/benefit analysis you must have access to to make this claim?
There were 3 crew members in the cockpit still overlooking that the weight and balance input was wrongly not for 500 series but for a 300 series and hence reduce the take-off weight performance.
The aircraft scrapped the tail skid so bad that it warranted a write off as the frame 80 etc was so badly damaged beyond economical repair.
To maintain a clean image of Emirate no fatal record, the aircraft was extensively and costly repaired to a airworthy condition.
The aircraft scrapped the tail skid so bad that it warranted a write off as the frame 80 etc was so badly damaged beyond economical repair.
To maintain a clean image of Emirate no fatal record, the aircraft was extensively and costly repaired to a airworthy condition.
There were four crew, not three, the erroneous figures had nothing to do with 300 vs 500, and how the hell does writing off the aircraft effect the number of fatalities (which was zero)?
Could you please supply the cost/benefit analysis you must have access to to make this claim?
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2 cents
It would, but it would be a huge political loss to Airbus. Airbus has many good ideas and innovations, but they got the whole control feedback issue deadly wrong, and it has caused many accidents - who knows how many incidents.
There are good indications on the fd when more than one pilot is trying to operate the controls at a time, I don't think this issue was even a slight factor to this accident, been in the bus 13 years.
TAM was not related to flight control feedback.
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Instead of crying out loud against Airbus' automation philosophy I rather would demand an accelleration alarm, giving clues to an aircrew when an aircraft is not getting speed fast enough. This is missing in Airbus and Boeings alike, only seeing it rarely on top-end business jets - where there is never lack of accelleration anyway.
It would be dead simply to imply such an acceleration alarm, be it based on FMGES performance data base or with the RIPS or ROPS or other systems.
It would be dead simply to imply such an acceleration alarm, be it based on FMGES performance data base or with the RIPS or ROPS or other systems.
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Instead of crying out loud against Airbus' automation philosophy I rather would demand an accelleration alarm, giving clues to an aircrew when an aircraft is not getting speed fast enough
There are way too many systems shanihaniganging between me, the aircraft and basic airmanship anyway.
It is somewhat inherent to the Airbus fraction that after each incident, especially those involving an Airbus, they are demanding even more automation and protections to help the already implemented automation, just a much as the involved pilots.
To me, Jazz hands has got it dead right:
Contained in the report is the FAA's response to the idea of developing a take-off monitoring system designed to prevent similar accidents:
It has "found the idea of these systems, with all of their inherent complexity to be more problematical than reliance on adequate airmanship".
It has "found the idea of these systems, with all of their inherent complexity to be more problematical than reliance on adequate airmanship".
Sure enough it is not the principal factor leading to the MEL incident. However the MFF concept with models with such a variety in performance, number of engines, fuel tanks, system and checklist variations simply increases the risk of a stuff up. The statements of the pilots concerning the acceleration feel is quite symptomatic.
The MFF concept is very integrated in the Airbus philosophy, therefore my criticism.
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This thread is probably started by some one having a grudge against Emirates to re-open the deep wound just about to be forgotten.
It is more than 2 year old history and any legal documents would be buried deep into the sand dunes.(2 years max safe keeping).
The rumor came from the epic-centre of the volcano in Dubai.
2 operational crews, 1 observer in cockpit.
Strangely, airmech had a better infor/rumor than the pprune here with rumors more than facts. That was 2 years ago.
Needed a longer runway? - Aircraft Engineers Bulletin Board
May be the engineer (airmech) is more down to earth (ground engineer) than the crews dreaming (flying) in the sky.
It is more than 2 year old history and any legal documents would be buried deep into the sand dunes.(2 years max safe keeping).
The rumor came from the epic-centre of the volcano in Dubai.
2 operational crews, 1 observer in cockpit.
Strangely, airmech had a better infor/rumor than the pprune here with rumors more than facts. That was 2 years ago.
Needed a longer runway? - Aircraft Engineers Bulletin Board
May be the engineer (airmech) is more down to earth (ground engineer) than the crews dreaming (flying) in the sky.
It would be dead simply to imply such an acceleration alarm, be it based on FMGES performance data base or with the RIPS or ROPS or other systems.
The best SOP I've seen to prevent such gross errors is an independent check by two or more crew members, where both do the calculation independently. In addition to comparing their computed results, the crew also must compare the calculated TOW with the one on the operational flight plan. Discrepancies must be investigated and resolved prior to takeoff.
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This statement could be enlarged to the whole Airbus design.
Sure enough it is not the principal factor leading to the MEL incident. However the MFF concept with models with such a variety in performance, number of engines, fuel tanks, system and checklist variations simply increases the risk of a stuff up. The statements of the pilots concerning the acceleration feel is quite symptomatic.
Sure enough it is not the principal factor leading to the MEL incident. However the MFF concept with models with such a variety in performance, number of engines, fuel tanks, system and checklist variations simply increases the risk of a stuff up. The statements of the pilots concerning the acceleration feel is quite symptomatic.
Then there's the 757/767 rating and 737 variants.
Before I get flamed, I'll acknowledge the general systems commonality, but I don't believe that's an issue in this or similar incidents.
Captain flew 98.9 hrs in last 30 days.....wow
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Captain flew 98.9 hrs in last 30 days.....wow
Being SLF, I may be asking a stupid question, but what about a system that measures the position of the landing gear oleos and sounds an alarm if there's a significant discrepancy from the weight entered by the crew?
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Acceleration?
It appears here that the problem is using a derived figure to calculate thrust based on aircraft mass and runway length.
Surely it's easier to enter known figures - runway length and local windspeed and direction - and let the thrust control system manage the accelleration to achieve a takeoff in the available runway?
This will handle all sorts of situations, such as mistaken TOW as well as factors such as rainfall.
Surely it's easier to enter known figures - runway length and local windspeed and direction - and let the thrust control system manage the accelleration to achieve a takeoff in the available runway?
This will handle all sorts of situations, such as mistaken TOW as well as factors such as rainfall.