Article: NTSB: Emirates 777 continued flight after loud bang, messages
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golfyankeesierra:
Apologies to the majority who don't deserve the 'arrogant' paint-brush. I probably should have specifically acknowledged that my comment was intended to describe a small minority.
But I hold to my view that those few are not my favorite drivers because 'arrogance' and 'cooperative decisions' are sometimes tragically at odds, as anyone with a keen memory of accidents will be hard-pressed to deny.
In my own defense, although I've never flown anything bigger than a twin Commander, I've been a obsessed fan of flying machines since a relative who ran an FBO gave me a ride in a Navion, probably some 60 years ago. Since then I've had ample opportunity to see things from your side, minus the pilot in the other seat, spare engines, FBW electronics, or a friendly dispatcher or maintence tech on the line. And I am, probably insignificant to the discussion, a physicist and 'rocket scientist', by virtue of work on Apollo.
And, btw, I did develop an enormous respect for the many in your profession who contributed such vast amounts of knowledge to the AF447 threads - the likes of PJ2 and dozens of others far outshine the few at the other end of the scale.
Anyway, we are not an arrogant bunch of cowboys.
We use our experience, airmanship and good judgement to make cooperative decisions in situations like this.
We use our experience, airmanship and good judgement to make cooperative decisions in situations like this.
But I hold to my view that those few are not my favorite drivers because 'arrogance' and 'cooperative decisions' are sometimes tragically at odds, as anyone with a keen memory of accidents will be hard-pressed to deny.
In my own defense, although I've never flown anything bigger than a twin Commander, I've been a obsessed fan of flying machines since a relative who ran an FBO gave me a ride in a Navion, probably some 60 years ago. Since then I've had ample opportunity to see things from your side, minus the pilot in the other seat, spare engines, FBW electronics, or a friendly dispatcher or maintence tech on the line. And I am, probably insignificant to the discussion, a physicist and 'rocket scientist', by virtue of work on Apollo.
And, btw, I did develop an enormous respect for the many in your profession who contributed such vast amounts of knowledge to the AF447 threads - the likes of PJ2 and dozens of others far outshine the few at the other end of the scale.
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Reality check from an SLF
During my training on the 777, it was stressed that we should not try to outguess the systems - and definitely not act upon any status message. Status messages are just that, STATUS messages, which, translated for those who need translation, means "a syatem (or systems) is (or are) not operating at 100%, but we, the men who designed this aircraft, after many hours of careful consideration and with many, many hours of deliberation - and much, much more information than you, the operating crew (and the Monday morning quarterbacks) can ever hope to have available to you - have come to the conclusion that those systems haven't degraded to the point where crew action is necessary"
Sorry, but I can't let this pass. I have to agree with sax_r54's comments about what I would expect an aircrew to do in the circumstances as reported, i.e. *loud* bang, followed later by STATUS messages.
I would agree that if you JUST had some status messages you would be "alert but not alarmed". However, the loud bang makes a world of difference. I think it's a little cute to take the two in isolation. I'm a graduate electrical engineer, and if a comparable situation occurred in my line of work I wouldn't hesitate to shut down plant/stop production/whatever until the cause of the noise had been established.
Like sax_r54 I'm pretty disappointed at the apparent attitude of some posters on this forum, who seem to be saying that it's OK to ignore a loud bang AND some subsequent status messages. Here's another SLF who doesn't like that attitude.
If the circumstances were indeed different in this particular case then that's another matter, but my comments on the event as reported here stand.
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status
From Boeing FCOM (744, not 777):
They are nice to know but have NOTHING to do with inflight failures and have NO effect on decision making.
FYI The concept of Status message (AFAIK) was introduced with the B747-400.
As I said before the status messages aren't even displayed to the pilots (directly).
There is only a blue Cue indicating the presence after which the STS info can be called up.
With the introduction of the B744 the cue could be displayed right after take-off, causing some inadvertent inflight returns because the old school classic 747 pilots thought they were actual failures (like several posters here).
Boeing responded with inhibiting the STS cue until 30 minutes after T/O.
Still don't get it?
Status Messages

Status messages indicate equipment faults requiring MEL reference for dispatch.

Status messages indicate equipment faults requiring MEL reference for dispatch.
FYI The concept of Status message (AFAIK) was introduced with the B747-400.
As I said before the status messages aren't even displayed to the pilots (directly).
There is only a blue Cue indicating the presence after which the STS info can be called up.
With the introduction of the B744 the cue could be displayed right after take-off, causing some inadvertent inflight returns because the old school classic 747 pilots thought they were actual failures (like several posters here).
Boeing responded with inhibiting the STS cue until 30 minutes after T/O.
Still don't get it?
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Maybe the cyclical nature of this thread should now be locked by the MOD's, in deference to the more important news items on the rest of the Forum. To sqwk7777 and 629bus I stand behind your views and hope that on any given roll of the dice, that you would be the pilots at the sharp end, using superior judgement in order to avoid having to demonstrate your superior skill. All other times our trust will be in the hands of fault tolerance, triple-redundancy and prayer.
opinions, opinions opinions
anonymous posters from all walks of life interested in aviation.
commenting on news.
Nothing unexpected about that except the name of this forum doesn't match the overall quality of the message to the reader.
What we need is a sticky thread to capture the discussion messages to these news clips
What Would You Have Done ..... if
anonymous posters from all walks of life interested in aviation.
commenting on news.
Nothing unexpected about that except the name of this forum doesn't match the overall quality of the message to the reader.
What we need is a sticky thread to capture the discussion messages to these news clips
What Would You Have Done ..... if
They are nice to know but have NOTHING to do with inflight failures and have NO effect on decision making.
FYI The concept of Status message (AFAIK) was introduced with the B747-400.
As I said before the status messages aren't even displayed to the pilots (directly).
There is only a blue Cue indicating the presence after which the STS info can be called up.
With the introduction of the B744 the cue could be displayed right after take-off, causing some inadvertent inflight returns because the old school classic 747 pilots thought they were actual failures (like several posters here).
Boeing responded with inhibiting the STS cue until 30 minutes after T/O.
Still don't get it?
FYI The concept of Status message (AFAIK) was introduced with the B747-400.
As I said before the status messages aren't even displayed to the pilots (directly).
There is only a blue Cue indicating the presence after which the STS info can be called up.
With the introduction of the B744 the cue could be displayed right after take-off, causing some inadvertent inflight returns because the old school classic 747 pilots thought they were actual failures (like several posters here).
Boeing responded with inhibiting the STS cue until 30 minutes after T/O.
Still don't get it?
Thrust asymmetry? Overheat and Fire sensor problems? All after a loud bang? That sounds like a big deal.
I defer to those that understand these things properly but I understand the confusion.
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They are nice to know but have NOTHING to do with inflight failures and have NO effect on decision making.
When you add the audible 'bang' into the picture, the situation seem pretty clearer still!
The decision to continue is what they chose. On the face of it, it I does seem a very strange decision. What they took into consideration is unknown by all of us and one can only assume they made the correct decision at the time and under the circumstances. However, that does not detract from the obvious gravity of the situation.
As one poster put it with sat phones and data link the crew have access to a lot of information on which to base a decision. I doubt the crew would have continued if they thought that they had a crippled aircraft.
I do have to question though some of the assertions that just because its a STATUS msge then all is well. The 777 QRH is a very thin document compared to a lot of other Boeing QRHs. Thats due to most abnormals consisting of STATUS msges that don'e require any crew action. My understanding of the reason for this is that Boeing tried to make the 777 that automated even with non-normals that no crew action was required. As an example of this the 777 did not have an unreliable airspeed checklist because the FT-ADIRU was considered so good that in the event of a single failure of an accelerometer or gyro then the "box" would take care of the problem without the crew having to do any switching. After the MAS 777 incident in 2005, Boeing have now put an Unreliable Airspeed checklist into the 777 QRH.
I do have to question though some of the assertions that just because its a STATUS msge then all is well. The 777 QRH is a very thin document compared to a lot of other Boeing QRHs. Thats due to most abnormals consisting of STATUS msges that don'e require any crew action. My understanding of the reason for this is that Boeing tried to make the 777 that automated even with non-normals that no crew action was required. As an example of this the 777 did not have an unreliable airspeed checklist because the FT-ADIRU was considered so good that in the event of a single failure of an accelerometer or gyro then the "box" would take care of the problem without the crew having to do any switching. After the MAS 777 incident in 2005, Boeing have now put an Unreliable Airspeed checklist into the 777 QRH.
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Witness amazing powers of deduction...
First, not a T7, just a B744. A lot of similarities though..
It is easy to "second guess" or Armchair Quarterback the decisions of others. Comfy in the confines of our snug room, out of the stress of being in the "pointy end". So, although I wasn't there. I am going to subject you to my thoughts on the matter ( lucky you ).
First, as was pointed out ( often ), the crew does not act on Status messages, as per Boeing. Only Warnings or Cautions ( and maybe non < carroted advisories ). I understand Boeings logic, and the necessity of delaying even their presence on the lower EICAS screen. However, they are there. They are information, a tool to be used by the crew in understanding the state of the aircraft. I mean, if we were not meant to view them, wouldn't Boeing, in their infinate wisdom, not even display them until after we were to land?. A single Status message is of limited concern, nesessating only the time it takes me to enter it into the MX log. Multiple messages, all concerning a "system", are another story. Common sense would tell me that something is wrong with the system. In this case the system is the engine. This information, comming on the heels of a loud "Bang" would further inspire me to conclude that all is not well with the engine. Aren't we ( as fellow PIC's ), obligated to use our system knowledge?. There are times when the checklist says, "land at the nearest suitable airport". But, do we really need to wait for a catastrophic event, and the cascading EICAS warnings to take the "safest" course of action?.
There are instances of having multiple deferred items ( all legally deferred ), where the PIC has the right to refuse to take the aircraft, if he feels that the combined effects of those multiple deferred items pose a safety hazard. Again, it's judgement. We have an obligation to ensure the safety of the flight, regardless of the financial of operational implications.
Years ago, I had an ADC fail. The jet didn't know the ADC failed ( no EICAS ), but it sure poured out a lot of EICAS messages related to the outputs of the erroneous ADC. We had to use out system knowledge, or our "common sense" to deduce the cause of our erroneous messages. My point is, although Boeing designed a great airplane, the notification system in place ( EICAS ), can't be relied on to tell the whole story. Sure, act on the EICAS according to your AFM. But, do you believe you will get accurate EICAS messages ( or in this case ANY EICAS massages ) when catastrophic events destroy wires, sensors, or when pieces go missing?.
So, as a commander ( and semi-professional armchair quaterback ), deducing that all is not well with one of my two engines, and being responsible for the lives of all on board, would take the safest course of action by putting the plane back on the ground.
Wait, there's more.....
As far as "calling" the Company is concerned. I've had instances where those on the other end didn't know ****. You may even say there were times we were led down the wrong path. There is often a different set of priorities exhibited by those on the other end. Coersion is not beyond them. So, when safety is concerned, I have learned to make my decision, then call the company to tell them what MY decision is. Of course, operational issues are a different matter.
I've witnessed enough on PPRUNE to know there will be those that disagree with a lot of what I said, yet, I have the utmost confidence that all will be perfect gentlemen in their responces and will not stoop to criticism or remarks that will hurt my feelings.
It is easy to "second guess" or Armchair Quarterback the decisions of others. Comfy in the confines of our snug room, out of the stress of being in the "pointy end". So, although I wasn't there. I am going to subject you to my thoughts on the matter ( lucky you ).
First, as was pointed out ( often ), the crew does not act on Status messages, as per Boeing. Only Warnings or Cautions ( and maybe non < carroted advisories ). I understand Boeings logic, and the necessity of delaying even their presence on the lower EICAS screen. However, they are there. They are information, a tool to be used by the crew in understanding the state of the aircraft. I mean, if we were not meant to view them, wouldn't Boeing, in their infinate wisdom, not even display them until after we were to land?. A single Status message is of limited concern, nesessating only the time it takes me to enter it into the MX log. Multiple messages, all concerning a "system", are another story. Common sense would tell me that something is wrong with the system. In this case the system is the engine. This information, comming on the heels of a loud "Bang" would further inspire me to conclude that all is not well with the engine. Aren't we ( as fellow PIC's ), obligated to use our system knowledge?. There are times when the checklist says, "land at the nearest suitable airport". But, do we really need to wait for a catastrophic event, and the cascading EICAS warnings to take the "safest" course of action?.
There are instances of having multiple deferred items ( all legally deferred ), where the PIC has the right to refuse to take the aircraft, if he feels that the combined effects of those multiple deferred items pose a safety hazard. Again, it's judgement. We have an obligation to ensure the safety of the flight, regardless of the financial of operational implications.
Years ago, I had an ADC fail. The jet didn't know the ADC failed ( no EICAS ), but it sure poured out a lot of EICAS messages related to the outputs of the erroneous ADC. We had to use out system knowledge, or our "common sense" to deduce the cause of our erroneous messages. My point is, although Boeing designed a great airplane, the notification system in place ( EICAS ), can't be relied on to tell the whole story. Sure, act on the EICAS according to your AFM. But, do you believe you will get accurate EICAS messages ( or in this case ANY EICAS massages ) when catastrophic events destroy wires, sensors, or when pieces go missing?.
So, as a commander ( and semi-professional armchair quaterback ), deducing that all is not well with one of my two engines, and being responsible for the lives of all on board, would take the safest course of action by putting the plane back on the ground.
Wait, there's more.....
As far as "calling" the Company is concerned. I've had instances where those on the other end didn't know ****. You may even say there were times we were led down the wrong path. There is often a different set of priorities exhibited by those on the other end. Coersion is not beyond them. So, when safety is concerned, I have learned to make my decision, then call the company to tell them what MY decision is. Of course, operational issues are a different matter.
I've witnessed enough on PPRUNE to know there will be those that disagree with a lot of what I said, yet, I have the utmost confidence that all will be perfect gentlemen in their responces and will not stoop to criticism or remarks that will hurt my feelings.
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@FirstStep.
Yours is an analysis that I can comprehend. Ultimately an investigation will be the final arbiter of the known facts. One fact that does seem clear at this stage, is that neither EICAS, the real time engine monitoring back at base nor the pilots, were aware of the large section of fan duct and thrust reverser that was missing. It would be interesting to hear the thoughts of the EK pilots, juxtaposed between what they understood whilst in the air and what they finally saw when positioned on the ramp.
Yours is an analysis that I can comprehend. Ultimately an investigation will be the final arbiter of the known facts. One fact that does seem clear at this stage, is that neither EICAS, the real time engine monitoring back at base nor the pilots, were aware of the large section of fan duct and thrust reverser that was missing. It would be interesting to hear the thoughts of the EK pilots, juxtaposed between what they understood whilst in the air and what they finally saw when positioned on the ramp.
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Known ,extremely infrequent occurrence with RR engine.
Problem with the T/R inner wall lining due long term exposure to elevated temperatures.
Typically occurs during takeoff or shortly after rotation. Loud bang or jolt and EICAS messages + increased fuel flow on affected engine.
Service bulletins 777-78-0071 and 777-75A0002 deals.
Release of parts of engine primary nozzle,aft cowl and portions of the inner wall can lead to minor airplane damage to tires,stab,flaperons,wing control surfaces and wing lower surface.
Continued flight after the T/R failure increases the risk of continued parts liberation from the affected engine....Flight crews should be aware of fuel management given the potential increased fuel consumption resulting from the T/R failure. Thrust reverser should not be selected on subsequent landing if damage is suspected.
A turnback would be understandable, given the prudent nature of most crews, but it is a crew decision, taken in conjunction with maintenance control.
Problem with the T/R inner wall lining due long term exposure to elevated temperatures.
Typically occurs during takeoff or shortly after rotation. Loud bang or jolt and EICAS messages + increased fuel flow on affected engine.
Service bulletins 777-78-0071 and 777-75A0002 deals.
Release of parts of engine primary nozzle,aft cowl and portions of the inner wall can lead to minor airplane damage to tires,stab,flaperons,wing control surfaces and wing lower surface.
Continued flight after the T/R failure increases the risk of continued parts liberation from the affected engine....Flight crews should be aware of fuel management given the potential increased fuel consumption resulting from the T/R failure. Thrust reverser should not be selected on subsequent landing if damage is suspected.
A turnback would be understandable, given the prudent nature of most crews, but it is a crew decision, taken in conjunction with maintenance control.
Last edited by Yaw String; 31st Dec 2012 at 13:01.
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First Step,
Well said.
What no one seems to have mentioned in the last seven pages is, were the crew confident that they would be able to achieve go-around thrust on the damaged engine. If I'd been in the same situation, given the same info then I would have been very unsure. If you can't get go around power then you have to treat the situation as single engine (even with the damaged engine running) and therefore on a twin engined aircraft land at the nearest suitable airport.
Well said.
What no one seems to have mentioned in the last seven pages is, were the crew confident that they would be able to achieve go-around thrust on the damaged engine. If I'd been in the same situation, given the same info then I would have been very unsure. If you can't get go around power then you have to treat the situation as single engine (even with the damaged engine running) and therefore on a twin engined aircraft land at the nearest suitable airport.
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Two issues here:
It happened on take off so the engine was at high thrust and it DIDN'T fail. No reason so far to assume it wouldn't provide high thrust.
A bang by itself doesn't mean a damaged engine. The Status messages that followed would have indicated that there may be a problem, but co-ordination with engineering, lack of pax reports, ground reports etc AND a NORMALLY functioning engine (parameters/thrust response) could reasonably be deduced by the crew as a continue decision.
Surely this thread has died a slow death by now
a load bang on take off
were the crew confident that they would be able to achieve go-around thrust on the damaged engine
Surely this thread has died a slow death by now
Thread Starter
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but ...
A bang by itself doesn't mean a damaged engine. The Status messages that followed would have indicated that there may be a problem, but co-ordination with engineering, lack of pax reports, ground reports etc AND a NORMALLY functioning engine (parameters/thrust response) could reasonably be deduced by the crew as a continue decision.
Look at the picture of the damaged engine, was it safe to continue?
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Engineering don't tell you it's safe to continue, they will tell you what the data they have says.
The engine may not run smoothly in 30 mins.. and the sun may not rise in the East.
Pilots don't have internal photos to look at in the air.
Landed safely after the crew made a decision.
GET OVER IT.
Now have the final say and then lets get on with our lives
The engine may not run smoothly in 30 mins.. and the sun may not rise in the East.
Pilots don't have internal photos to look at in the air.
unnecessary risk
GET OVER IT.
Now have the final say and then lets get on with our lives
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Well, I think there's a whole bunch of you who should offer... no, DEMAND that Emirates take you on as (obviously highly paid) consultants - the lot of you - to advise Emirates' obviously hapless, totally inexperienced crews on how they SHOULD operate their aircraft.
Then again, you could all probably save yourselves the journey to Dubai, as, from the posts I've read here, your collective advice would seem to be, in every case where everything isn't 101% hunky dory: "Land immediately!!!! Just... in... case."
Then again, you could all probably save yourselves the journey to Dubai, as, from the posts I've read here, your collective advice would seem to be, in every case where everything isn't 101% hunky dory: "Land immediately!!!! Just... in... case."
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Helen,
So you have a loud bang on take off, various engine related status messages and the local ATC unit report engine debris on the runway and your are happy you are going to achieve GA thrust. Amazing foresight.
So you have a loud bang on take off, various engine related status messages and the local ATC unit report engine debris on the runway and your are happy you are going to achieve GA thrust. Amazing foresight.
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Informed by DME station that items believed to be part or all of primary exhaust nozzle were recovered from within the airport perimeter. Investigation is ongoing, TR cowls not yet opened.
I have no doubt the crew would have responded differently if there was a report of debris shortly after T/O.
Amazing indeed!