UA497 Smoke, Emergency Landing and Evacuation
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Airbus loses instruments
United Airlines, the FAA and NTSB are looking into an incident Monday in which a United Airlines Airbus A320 departed New Orleans and immediately declared an emergency due to smoke in the cockpit. As the situation progressed, the crew reported that it lost all power to its flight instrument, although the comm radios continued to function. The flight was en route from New Orleans to San Francisco when the incident occurred. The pilot told controllers: "Flight 497 we need to vector back to the airport. We have a smoke issue with the airplane." Shortly thereafter, the crew declared an emergency and landed at New Orleans, possibly with impaired braking and steering, since the aircraft exited the runway and got its nosewheel buried in mud. The emergency slides were deployed and all 105 passengers and crew exited safely.
It's not clear if smoke in the cockpit was so dense that the crew couldn't seen to navigate visually or if they were just too far from the airport to navigate back without vectors. The pilot told ATC that he had lost all instruments. Controllers got the airplane back on a heading toward New Orleans' Louis Armstrong Airport and cleared it to land. Most of the passengers were placed on later flights and arrived in San Francisco Monday afternoon.
It's not clear if smoke in the cockpit was so dense that the crew couldn't seen to navigate visually or if they were just too far from the airport to navigate back without vectors. The pilot told ATC that he had lost all instruments. Controllers got the airplane back on a heading toward New Orleans' Louis Armstrong Airport and cleared it to land. Most of the passengers were placed on later flights and arrived in San Francisco Monday afternoon.
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pax in the loop?
A feature of United is that pax can listen to cockpit communications on one of the IFES channels. Wonder whether this was on...?
Or is there a SOP to switch it off in non-routine situations?
Or is there a SOP to switch it off in non-routine situations?
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On airplanes with opening side windows in the cockpit (e.g. 737--not sure about a320), is it an option to open one or both of those windows when at low altitude to help vacate the smoke?
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Channel 9 is at the discretion of the flight crew. Al Haynes turned it off after reporting engine failure, but before the hydraulic failure became apparent.
In this case, it's pretty irrelevant, since we don't have any passenger reports about the "smoke issue" from the cockpit; from what's been reported so far, the first sign of trouble in the cabin was the cabin PA about in-flight meals for sale going dead in mid-shill.
If the cabin PA went dead, so did the IFEN, and thus, so did channel 9.
So, sure, someone could have heard something, but not much.
The folks at Louis Armstrong demonstrably did a fine job, managing an escalating condition and providing maximum service and coordination (while keeping the field open), and all the signs currently point to a great job by the flight crew as well.
(shuts up)
In this case, it's pretty irrelevant, since we don't have any passenger reports about the "smoke issue" from the cockpit; from what's been reported so far, the first sign of trouble in the cabin was the cabin PA about in-flight meals for sale going dead in mid-shill.
If the cabin PA went dead, so did the IFEN, and thus, so did channel 9.
So, sure, someone could have heard something, but not much.
The folks at Louis Armstrong demonstrably did a fine job, managing an escalating condition and providing maximum service and coordination (while keeping the field open), and all the signs currently point to a great job by the flight crew as well.
(shuts up)
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K 9: You can open the side windows of the 320 series aircraft at up to a IAS of 200kts. In fact, it is part of the smoke removal QRH procedure to open the windows and the cockpit door to get the smoke out after you have depresurized the aircraft.
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OK, I stand corrected, on the A320 there is limited mechanical back up, primarily to give some degree of control whilst fault finding a complete electrical failure. Not sure how successful an attempted landing in mech mode would be though.
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...the lenses on the O2 masks have a protective plastic film over them...
Unfortunately the strips are often missing from the masks because, I assume, pilots and mechanics think that they are for shipping purposes.
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Good to know. It's an obscure bit of info but worthwhile to know.
They should be a bit more obvious though with red stripes or something because I can tell you they are often not noticed (most cases) and left in place with subsequent complaints about poor vision through the mask.
They should be a bit more obvious though with red stripes or something because I can tell you they are often not noticed (most cases) and left in place with subsequent complaints about poor vision through the mask.
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NTSB Press Release
How does a procedure for a (potentially invalid) Avionics Smoke warning end up with deployment of the RAT plus killing the CVR + FDR?
NTSB Advisory
National Transportation Safety Board
Washington, DC 20594
April 7, 2011
FIRST UPDATE ON NTSB INVESTIGATION INTO UNITED AIRLINES RUNWAY EXCURSION INCIDENT IN NEW ORLEANS
The National Transportation Safety Board continues to make progress in its investigation of United Airlines flight 497, which returned to the airport on April 4, 2011, in New Orleans, shortly after take-off due to automated warnings of smoke in the equipment bay. The airplane's nose wheel exited the side of runway 19 upon completing the landing roll and an emergency evacuation was conducted.
The NTSB team, comprised of 3 NTSB investigators and representatives from the designated parties and advisors, arrived on scene April 4 to document and examine the aircraft and retrieve the data and voice recorders. Two other NTSB investigators, specializing in operational factors and maintenance factors, traveled to various locations to review pertinent documentation and records and conduct interviews.
After documenting the condition of the equipment in the electronics bay, investigators applied limited electrical power to various systems on the airplane. At this time, the preliminary examination has not revealed any signs of burning, indications of smoke or other anomalous system findings.
The NTSB operations group completed interviews of the flight crew yesterday. The crew indicated that, at about 4000 feet, the airplane's electronic centralized aircraft monitoring (ECAM) system provided an autothrottle-related message, then an avionics smoke warning message, accompanied by instructions to land. Despite receiving this message, neither crew member recalled smelling smoke or fumes during the flight.
The captain indicated that he used the electronic checklist for the avionics system smoke warning indication, which included shutting down some of the airplane's electrical system. The crew reported that the first officer's display screens went blank, the ECAM messages disappeared, the cockpit to cabin intercom stopped functioning, and the air-driven emergency generator deployed. The captain said that he took control of the airplane at this point and managed the radios while the first officer opened the cockpit door to advise the flight attendants of the emergency and their return to New Orleans airport.
The crew also noted to investigators that they requested runway 10 for landing, but were told the runway was not available due to the presence of construction vehicles. The captain said that he was able to use the airspeed, altimeter, and attitude information on his primary flight display during the return to the airport, and that he ordered an evacuation after landing.
As previously reported, the airplane's forward right slide did not properly inflate during the emergency evacuation. After examining the evacuation slides, investigators found that the aspirator for the forward right-hand slide was partially blocked. The aspirator component is the mechanism for inflating the slide during an emergency evacuation. Investigators have retained the slide for further evaluation.
Preliminary reports provided to investigators suggest that the flight attendants did not smell or see smoke in the cabin, but observed the cabin lights turn off and the intercom system cease to function during the flight. Interviews of the cabin crew will be conducted after the investigators complete their on-scene work to more thoroughly document the cabin crew's observations and communications throughout the flight and emergency evacuation.
The cockpit voice recorder (CVR) and flight data recorder (FDR) arrived at NTSB headquarters in Washington, D.C. on April 5 and were successfully downloaded. The CVR is of good quality and captured approximately 7 minutes and 30 seconds of the incident flight. The FDR contained in excess of 25 hours of data and captured approximately 18 minutes of data relevant to the incident flight. Both the CVR and FDR stopped recording data prior to landing.
Investigators will remain on scene to complete their evaluation of the airplane and documentation of other factors in the incident.
National Transportation Safety Board
Washington, DC 20594
April 7, 2011
FIRST UPDATE ON NTSB INVESTIGATION INTO UNITED AIRLINES RUNWAY EXCURSION INCIDENT IN NEW ORLEANS
The National Transportation Safety Board continues to make progress in its investigation of United Airlines flight 497, which returned to the airport on April 4, 2011, in New Orleans, shortly after take-off due to automated warnings of smoke in the equipment bay. The airplane's nose wheel exited the side of runway 19 upon completing the landing roll and an emergency evacuation was conducted.
The NTSB team, comprised of 3 NTSB investigators and representatives from the designated parties and advisors, arrived on scene April 4 to document and examine the aircraft and retrieve the data and voice recorders. Two other NTSB investigators, specializing in operational factors and maintenance factors, traveled to various locations to review pertinent documentation and records and conduct interviews.
After documenting the condition of the equipment in the electronics bay, investigators applied limited electrical power to various systems on the airplane. At this time, the preliminary examination has not revealed any signs of burning, indications of smoke or other anomalous system findings.
The NTSB operations group completed interviews of the flight crew yesterday. The crew indicated that, at about 4000 feet, the airplane's electronic centralized aircraft monitoring (ECAM) system provided an autothrottle-related message, then an avionics smoke warning message, accompanied by instructions to land. Despite receiving this message, neither crew member recalled smelling smoke or fumes during the flight.
The captain indicated that he used the electronic checklist for the avionics system smoke warning indication, which included shutting down some of the airplane's electrical system. The crew reported that the first officer's display screens went blank, the ECAM messages disappeared, the cockpit to cabin intercom stopped functioning, and the air-driven emergency generator deployed. The captain said that he took control of the airplane at this point and managed the radios while the first officer opened the cockpit door to advise the flight attendants of the emergency and their return to New Orleans airport.
The crew also noted to investigators that they requested runway 10 for landing, but were told the runway was not available due to the presence of construction vehicles. The captain said that he was able to use the airspeed, altimeter, and attitude information on his primary flight display during the return to the airport, and that he ordered an evacuation after landing.
As previously reported, the airplane's forward right slide did not properly inflate during the emergency evacuation. After examining the evacuation slides, investigators found that the aspirator for the forward right-hand slide was partially blocked. The aspirator component is the mechanism for inflating the slide during an emergency evacuation. Investigators have retained the slide for further evaluation.
Preliminary reports provided to investigators suggest that the flight attendants did not smell or see smoke in the cabin, but observed the cabin lights turn off and the intercom system cease to function during the flight. Interviews of the cabin crew will be conducted after the investigators complete their on-scene work to more thoroughly document the cabin crew's observations and communications throughout the flight and emergency evacuation.
The cockpit voice recorder (CVR) and flight data recorder (FDR) arrived at NTSB headquarters in Washington, D.C. on April 5 and were successfully downloaded. The CVR is of good quality and captured approximately 7 minutes and 30 seconds of the incident flight. The FDR contained in excess of 25 hours of data and captured approximately 18 minutes of data relevant to the incident flight. Both the CVR and FDR stopped recording data prior to landing.
Investigators will remain on scene to complete their evaluation of the airplane and documentation of other factors in the incident.
How does a procedure for a (potentially invalid) Avionics Smoke warning end up with deployment of the RAT plus killing the CVR + FDR?
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@press release
..probably it was just a blocked filter in the avionic ventilation system, which generates the ECAM warning. happens quite often, especially if you use "cheap" filters.nothing to worry about
The checklist says IF SMOKE EXISTS
...the pilots didn't observe any smoke....so why did they continue with the procedure...unnecessary....pilots fault...no heroes then
..probably it was just a blocked filter in the avionic ventilation system, which generates the ECAM warning. happens quite often, especially if you use "cheap" filters.nothing to worry about
The checklist says IF SMOKE EXISTS
neither crew member recalled smelling smoke or fumes during the flight.
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Airbus A321:
I know nothing about the line of Airbus types. But, every airplane type I flew (including two with RATs) had an electrical fire/smoke checklist that did not shut off power to all busses at the same time. Thus, if followed properly the RAT would not deploy.
And, as you say if no smoke exists at any time, seems like they should have had normal electrical for approach and landing unless there were some kind of major buss fault. (?)
The checklist says IF SMOKE EXISTS
...neither crew member recalled smelling smoke or fumes during the flight.
And, as you say if no smoke exists at any time, seems like they should have had normal electrical for approach and landing unless there were some kind of major buss fault. (?)
Per Ardua ad Astraeus
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The captain said that he was able to use the airspeed, altimeter, and attitude information on his primary flight display during the return to the airport,
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In an Avionic Smoke situation there is the option of entering into Emergency Electrical Configuration with the press of just one button. It is designed to shed all electrics except what's necessary to fly the aircraft manually from the LHS. The FO will have lost his screens, maybe he confused losing his side with losing all instruments?
Not sure why the FDR and CVR stopped though - that obviously shouldn't happen.
Not sure why the FDR and CVR stopped though - that obviously shouldn't happen.
In an Avionic Smoke situation there is the option of entering into Emergency Electrical Configuration with the press of just one button. It is designed to shed all electrics except what's necessary to fly the aircraft manually from the LHS. The FO will have lost his screens, maybe he confused losing his side with losing all instruments?
I always felt that way about SR111 when they started shutting down engines.
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"lost all our instruments" may have simply been a way to express that things were getting progressively worse for them, action-induced or not. I personally don't see a need to get into specifics with ATC at that point.
The report did say this incident started with an A/T message or disconnect which by itself is not a big deal but followed by an ARINC smoke or avionics smoke message, this situation warranted a return in my opinion. Had this been a real avionics bay fire, it wouldn't have seemed prudent after the fact to have waited for my nostrils or eyes to detect particulates. As for actioning the elec fire/smoke items, that would obviously make this situation much more demanding.
Also, a PAR is perfectly prudent had they felt electronic navigation may have become unavailable at some later point.
All that being said, it's possible they did de-power the airplane as directed but the RAT deployed for reasons unknown (lazy relay perhaps?). Who knows at this point.
The report did say this incident started with an A/T message or disconnect which by itself is not a big deal but followed by an ARINC smoke or avionics smoke message, this situation warranted a return in my opinion. Had this been a real avionics bay fire, it wouldn't have seemed prudent after the fact to have waited for my nostrils or eyes to detect particulates. As for actioning the elec fire/smoke items, that would obviously make this situation much more demanding.
Also, a PAR is perfectly prudent had they felt electronic navigation may have become unavailable at some later point.
All that being said, it's possible they did de-power the airplane as directed but the RAT deployed for reasons unknown (lazy relay perhaps?). Who knows at this point.
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FIRESYSOK,
The Airbus A320 has a single smoke detector in the avionics bay. The pilot's nose being the second. If smoke not detected in flight deck by crew - don't action the checklist IMHO. It is one of the ECAM checklists that should not be actioned immediately but refer to QRH according to my airline.
Otherwise potentially you end up in a worse situation than necessary. Await the facts on this one though - not a pleasant experience I imagine.
The Airbus A320 has a single smoke detector in the avionics bay. The pilot's nose being the second. If smoke not detected in flight deck by crew - don't action the checklist IMHO. It is one of the ECAM checklists that should not be actioned immediately but refer to QRH according to my airline.
Otherwise potentially you end up in a worse situation than necessary. Await the facts on this one though - not a pleasant experience I imagine.
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I just don't get it...a warning light comes on saying there is smoke...but you don't smell anything?
I remember when they gave the first mercury astonauts a small hammer...the advice was if something didn't work...hit it.
are we to the point where warning lights have overcome common sense?
I had smoke, or what we thought was smoke in the DC9...I left the flight deck and went back to take a look...it didn't look like smoke..more like dirt/dust. We shut down the pack that supplied the cabin, used the other pack and flew the thing at lower altitude...arriving on time.
when on the ground, we had found a hose clamp sort of thing had fallen off sucking in some air from the tail compartment...a bit stinky. mx fixed it in about 10 minutes.
thing is boys, think.
I remember when they gave the first mercury astonauts a small hammer...the advice was if something didn't work...hit it.
are we to the point where warning lights have overcome common sense?
I had smoke, or what we thought was smoke in the DC9...I left the flight deck and went back to take a look...it didn't look like smoke..more like dirt/dust. We shut down the pack that supplied the cabin, used the other pack and flew the thing at lower altitude...arriving on time.
when on the ground, we had found a hose clamp sort of thing had fallen off sucking in some air from the tail compartment...a bit stinky. mx fixed it in about 10 minutes.
thing is boys, think.
