Crash-Cork Airport

[neilki]

Beta on the Metro

There's a trigger that pulls a guard up from the quadrant. it's not unlike selecting Reverse in a 'jet'
The metal on the quadrant is fairly soft and does wear some, making the selection of beta less 'impossible' with aircraft age. Under duress it's certainly feasible the Captain (per the report) inadvertently selected a little Beta.
I read the report. It's very sad indeed..

[Big Pistons Forever]

The bottom line is this accident was not caused by differential power, it was caused by the crew electing to continue to repeatedly fly an approach when the the conditions were not suitable and critically to fly below approach minimums without the required visual references.

There were many contributing factors here but IMO the lesson to be learned for those pilots doing the hard flying in crappy little T-Props for Sh*yte operators is; "you have to keep your safety margins intact". You will likely face almost irresistible pressure to cut corners, but it is up to you to resist those pressures. This accident is, sadly, one more in a long, long list of avoidable tragedies.

The smartest move I ever made in my whole flying career was to walk away from a terrible operator. Not too long after I left they were shut down by the authorities after a fatal crash of a Metro in bad weather.........

[justanotherflyer]

@perceval

hangar6 : some of Manx2 and subsequently CityWings flights have been operated by Van Air Europe's Let 410s for many years now . VAA is a safe and well regulated company which has never had an accident or serious incident . The Czech Authorities are doing their job and the Van Air pilots are always well trained and competent . Your slur towards ' an operator from Czech republic' is uninformed and totally biaised . Coming from Ireland , you should think about looking in your own backyard before making bizarre assumption about others ....

It's a pity that the useful observations in the first half of your post are diminished by your making exactly the same kind of slur you bemoan in hangar6's contribution!

[Piltdown Man]

If nothing else, this unpleasant incident shows that Europe, and by that I include grasping little islands and enclaves full of interbreds like IOM, Jersey, Lichtenstein, etc. has to have an update in corporate and criminal law. All directors and anyone controlling airlines should be personally liable to criminal prosecution. It should made impossible for anyone to escape from criminal prosecution by hiding behind a corporate persona. If that is not possible, you shouldn't be able to run an airline (or come to that, any form of transport or undertaking involving the public). Insults like sloping shoulders, a quick winding up and rapid corporate relaunch (so it looks like a mere name change) must become things of the past. If our little tax avoiding friends don't want to play, cut them off. They need us, we certainly don't need them.

[Lonewolf_50]

Why can't the EU, and various related organizations, have persons with your common sense on staff?

Well said, sir!

[BigDaddyBoxMeal]

From page 151:

49. Some of the operational responsibilities of the Operator as AOC holder including operational control were being inappropriately exercised by the Owner and Ticket Seller

There you have it. Manx2 were playing airline. The two Spanish companies were just a means to an end. Manx 2 knew exactly what was going on.

Just think how did a young British low hours pilot get recruited by a Spanish company? That just happen to operate in the UK? How did the Spanish operator (who allegedly had no contact with Manx 2) come to pick up night freight charters? How did they come to get sub-charters for other pax ops? The IOM based company is the common link here.

Tragic that people lives were lost. Including the poor guys up front. Infuriating that those behind it are soldiering on with a new brand and will not carry any of the responsibility, just blaming it on the crew, the Spanish, and a company in liquidation.

[Sunnyjohn]

What a tangled web. No wonder it took three years to produce the report.

The bottom line is this accident was not caused by differential power, it was caused by the crew electing to continue to repeatedly fly an approach when the the conditions were not suitable and critically to fly below approach minimums without the required visual references.

If you read the report thoroughly, you will find that it was indeed caused by differential power, due to a fault in the sensing system for the engine power which was not picked up during maintenance because the full test was not carried out. When the thrust levers were moved back past the gate, the fault produced a negative torque in one engine which caused the aircraft to bank sharply 40 degrees to the left. The PF then attempted to correct this by pushing the levers forward and then overcorrected to the right. You are correct in that the aircraft was far too low at the point and so the roll to the right caused the right wingtip to impact with the ground. However, the actual cause was the differential in power between the two engines.

[Bang Or West]

Sunnyjohn - you are wrong. The power/engines/torque issue was the last link in the error chain. Two "professionals" bust the approach ban 3 times, went below minima 3 times, and might have got away with it if they hadn't botched the last go-around. The accident was ultimately caused by the captain doing the work of two men, those two men being Laurel & Hardy.

[Sunnyjohn]

might have got away with it if they hadn't botched the last go-around.

True - but they would have got away with it if, when the PF pushed the throttles past the gate and then pushed them forward again, the aircraft would have climbed for the go-around instead of banking to the left. The reason it didn't was because of the differential power fault (sorry to keep banging on, but read the report thoroughly). The crew were indeed tired because they left late because they were fixing seats - a job they were not trained to do and which should have been done by the night crew who had flown the Royal Mail charter on the previous flight. They were not trained because the company who employed them did not train them. And so it goes on. The ultimate fault lies, I'm afraid, with the EU legislation which allowed, and still allows, this sort of tangled web to happen.

[Bang Or West]

Sunnyjohn - again you are incorrect. The crew were tired because, as reported on pages 113 and 115 of the report, they had both reported for duty with 1 hour 10 minutes less than the minimum legal rest following their previous duties. That has got stuff all to do with putting seats back into the plane, and rather more to do with the sort of disregard for rules which might, for example, lead to a belief that "the approach ban doesn't apply to us" or "these minima figures don't apply to us".

[BARKINGMAD]

All praise to AAIU for this report, it will have taken awesome resources and patient slogging to produce a damning indictment on those at the very top of the avation food chain, both corporate and regulatory.

Some in EASA and elsewhere should be seen in the dock under criminal charges for their negligence and compliance with the wishes of Big Corp & LittleCorp.

What a shame that some of our number refer to the horribly inexperienced crew as a pair of comedians in these pages.

Would you say the same to their grieving relatives face to face? I seriously doubt it, but if you did, I trust their understanable reaction might teach you a lesson. Typical thoughtless reaction to heap all the blame and opprobrium on the deceased flight crew whilst sparing the real villains some of the anger which should be directed at a higher level. Whoever you are, you should go far in the psychotic environment of corporate management!!

Incoming............................................!!!

[Big Pistons Forever]

Was the whole operation a total Shyt*e show.... Absolutely.
Should the little weasels in management face criminal sanctions...Yes if there was any justice

But

Nobody held a gun to the heads of the crew. The deliberately chose to put themselves and their passengers in a situation that was illegal and unsafe. This deliberate erosion of safety margins then made them fatally vulnerable to any malfunction, like the mis-rigged engine controls.

Pilots reading the report have a choice. They can say "other people" were responsible not the pilots, or they can use this as a wake up call on the fact that ultimately it is a pilots responsibility to resist the kinds of egregious work place pressures that reduce safety and vow not to make this kind of mistake. Learn from the accidents or be doomed to repeat them.....

[RatherBeFlying]

Nobody held a gun to the heads of the crew. The deliberately chose to put themselves and their passengers in a situation that was illegal and unsafe. This deliberate erosion of safety margins then made them fatally vulnerable to any malfunction, like the mis-rigged engine controls.

Pilots reading the report have a choice. They can say "other people" were responsible not the pilots, or they can use this as a wake up call on the fact that ultimately it is a pilots responsibility to resist the kinds of egregious work place pressures that reduce safety and vow not to make this kind of mistake. Learn from the accidents or be doomed to repeat them.....

Operators can always find junior pilots desperate for any flying job. The CAAs nevercome down on operators where the culture encourages busting limits.

The dirty secret is that you can get away with busting limits -- quite a bit of the time. But the odds do catch up with folks from time to time.

[deefer dog]

If you read the report thoroughly, you will find that it was indeed caused by differential power, due to a fault in the sensing system for the engine power which was not picked up during maintenance because the full test was not carried out. When the thrust levers were moved back past the gate, the fault produced a negative torque in one engine which caused the aircraft to bank sharply 40 degrees to the left. The PF then attempted to correct this by pushing the levers forward and then overcorrected to the right. You are correct in that the aircraft was far too low at the point and so the roll to the right caused the right wingtip to impact with the ground. However, the actual cause was the differential in power between the two engines.

Sunnyjohn, you must have read a different accident report. The differential power issue had been with that aircraft for some time, and certainly had been experienced and handled by the crew in the two preceding go-arounds. By all means it may have been a factor that contributed to the eventual cause, as was the wierd "combined" effort of flying the aircraft (PF on the yoke, and PNF on the power levers) and the mis-hadling that led to negative torque being commanded to the left engine, but the main cause of the crash was busting the approach minimums.

[perceval]

@Justanotherflyer : Duly noted and acknowleged . I got carried away there ...Apologies .

[mad_jock]

That power difference is pretty much common to all types that use those engines.

In fact I can't think of a single aircraft I flown in the last 6 years that hasn't had a bit of a split in either torque acceleration response or lever split.

I think the last time I flew one that didn't was when two aircraft got imported from Japan in 2004. Don't worry it only lasted for a week and then they were back to normal. Its one of the reasons why they gave us a rudder and we know how to use it.

http://www.aaib.gov.uk/cms_resources...pdf_033317.pdf

Again a beta in the air accident.

I was always told that with these props that the big spring that drives the props to fine isn't strong enough to drive the props fine again against aerodynamic forces once in beta in the air so I am quite surprised they got any power back.

The dirty secret is that you can get away with busting limits

This is the problem. And one which is extremely hard to battle against once it becomes normal. And don't think that it just apply's to so called third world airlines and pilots. It is alive and kicking in the UK as well away from the big boys with there QDR's. Most have beaten the approach ban and landed in sub 550m off a CAT1 I think my lowest has been 250m RVR after being 600m RVR at 4 miles and 400m at 2 miles, all I can say is the CAT II lighting at Bristol is top notch. We only found out the RVR was 250m on touch down was when the tower told the aircraft behind. Once you get away with it once there is a tendency to do it again. And if its what you have seen throughout all your career you think its normal.

The UK is actually quite strong dealing with below RVR approaches there is set ATC RT which will be given and if you land anyway the **** hits the fan Most countries this is not the case and if you manage to land nothing more is said about it.

Of course busting DA there is no proof one way or the other on the ground and its perfectly legal to attempt an approach in VV000 550m RVR even though there isn't a chance in hell of getting in. I have always wondered why there hasn't been an approach ban for sub 100ft BKN or vv001 for cat 1 approaches. But if there isn't a robust ATC system from discouraging any attempt pilots will continue to try. To be honest if you had a look at the stats for different airports you might find its normal for local pilots to land in such conditions. And they have been doing so safely for years and years.

And also IOM would be a good place to start. I have diverted from there to Liverpool only to asked by ops why the hell didn't you get in. The Let410 front of us had and the Jetstream behind us even though the RVR had dropped another 100m an the VV gone from 200 down to 100 . We couldn't see Jack at 200ft not even a dim glow of the lights (it was at night) Top cover appeared from the CP and they got told in no uncertain terms to wind their necks in. But if your CP is the sort that he does that sort of thing your stuffed and its time to look for another job which your more than likely doing anyway working for that sort of company.

[NigelOnDraft]

Quote:
If you read the report thoroughly, you will find that it was indeed caused by differential power, due to a fault in the sensing system for the engine power which was not picked up during maintenance because the full test was not carried out. When the thrust levers were moved back past the gate, the fault produced a negative torque in one engine which caused the aircraft to bank sharply 40 degrees to the left. The PF then attempted to correct this by pushing the levers forward and then overcorrected to the right. You are correct in that the aircraft was far too low at the point and so the roll to the right caused the right wingtip to impact with the ground. However, the actual cause was the differential in power between the two engines.

Sunnyjohn, you must have read a different accident report. The differential power issue had been with that aircraft for some time, and certainly had been experienced and handled by the crew in the two preceding go-arounds. By all means it may have been a factor that contributed to the eventual cause, as was the wierd "combined" effort of flying the aircraft (PF on the yoke, and PNF on the power levers) and the mis-hadling that led to negative torque being commanded to the left engine, but the main cause of the crash was busting the approach minimums.

My reading of the report, albeit recollection, as is Sunnyjohn says.

The torque "difference" was not a significant factor in normal ops, and an indication based issue. The trouble was, with the (partial) beta selection, the reduction in torque PLUS the error led to a "negative" torque being "sensed", in turn leading that prop (only) to feather. This led to a much more significant asymmetric issue than the original issue, and led to the roll (as warned about by the manual). This led to an immediate left roll, almost certainly countered by the PF (P2) with right aileron. When the PNF (P1) applied full power, the asymmetry was removed, but the right aileron not = right roll as at impact.

[PAX_Britannica]

The - generally manageable, as more knowledgeable folk have pointed out - power differential, and the - presumably - inadvertent engagement of beta mode were just the last holes in the cheese.

They busted minima three times, in spite of ATC suggesting EIKY.

We might as well blame ATC for not denying landing clearance, since they couldn't land without busting minima.

Inadvertent engagement of beta by experienced crews does seem a recurring theme in this class of aircraft.
2012/05 eng | sht
"Last ned rapport"

But most of the holes were lined up for them before they signed up, never mind got up that morning.

[mad_jock]

There is a theory/practise out there that some lift the gate before landing.

Some have managed to jam the gate by applying pressure backwards at the same time as trying to lift them. This occurred mostly when they fitted the lock out solenoid linked to the squat switch to prevent beta in the air on the Jetstream.

The solution is just to release the pressure and try again.

But some so they can ram the levers into reverse as soon as the mains touch lift it with the power levers forward of flight idle.

I am struggling to see how the delta P system can have any effect on the NTS system.

The torque is sensed by either a strain gauge bridge on a metal ring or a hydraulic pressure sensor with a piston linked to the ring. Once it goes negative the NTS opens a valve which dumps the oil pressure out of the beta tube which then allows the spring to push the blades towards feather. Which I have always been told it is not strong enough to do against the aerodynamic forces with the aircraft in flight from the beta power regime.

If you are flying your ball its exactly the same as a single engine failure during go-around.

[Sunnyjohn]

From Page 110 of the report (on my PDF copy there are no page numbers; p 110 is the PDF location)

The CVR indicates that the Commander (PNF) took control of the power levers during the final approach, this action being acknowledged by the PF. This was significant, as both power levers were subsequently retarded below Flight Idle — an action which would have been unexpected by the PF.
The recorded data shows that the No. 1 engine reached a minimum torque value of -9% in Beta range, while No. 2 engine reached a minimum value of 0%. This thrust asymmetry was coincident with the aircraft commencing a roll to the left (maximum recorded value 40 degrees of bank). It is possible that the PF may have made a control wheel input to the right in response to the unanticipated left roll. However, without the FDR parameters of control wheel or control surface position the Investigation cannot determine if such input was made. The subsequent application of power to commence the go-around, at approximately 100 feet, coincided with the commencement of a rapid roll to the right and loss of control. This roll continued through the vertical, the right wingtip struck the runway and the aircraft inverted.

So although they had corrected from the known torque difference, at this point the asymmetry, due to the undetected thrust fault I previously mentioned was nine percent, sufficient to produce the 20 degree bank to the left.