Airbus prepares safety warnings following A321 incident
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Is there a tie-in, the name 'Captain Crunch' and all this talk of CFIT?!!
Quote "It doesn't know the whole flying picture."
Had to laugh when I read the above since the all seeing, all knowing pilot in command 'knew the whole picture' but was needing a high G pull up! Surely he would see this coming and have acted accordingly if he was that switched on....?!! An old instructor once taught me that he used all of his years of experience and cunning to stay well away from those situations that required him to actually use it!
A later poster hit the nail on the head when he said that the use of full back stick and very fast application of 2.5g was a winner from Airbus. I agree. If you haven't seen it, you should.
Quote "It doesn't know the whole flying picture."
Had to laugh when I read the above since the all seeing, all knowing pilot in command 'knew the whole picture' but was needing a high G pull up! Surely he would see this coming and have acted accordingly if he was that switched on....?!! An old instructor once taught me that he used all of his years of experience and cunning to stay well away from those situations that required him to actually use it!
A later poster hit the nail on the head when he said that the use of full back stick and very fast application of 2.5g was a winner from Airbus. I agree. If you haven't seen it, you should.
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It's just another aircraft. A tool to do a job. Boeing use FBW now too, they were just slower to catch on.
Why can't you young computer controled airline pilots admit that the manufacturers are trying to design you out of the aircraft completely with all this new "technology" that you speak so highly of? Don't think it can't be done. And...yes...people will eventually get used to the idea that noone is up there !! Will there still be accidents? Yes. But at least they will no longer be blamed on pilot error !! Then perhaps the cycle will start all over again with cable operated aircraft with real pilots and no computers.
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what are you lot going on about. All Airbus FBW aircraft can be reduced back down to manual flying very easily. Not ideal though because the protections are there in the first place because you lot kept crashing.
Get over it. The technology is there as a result of your human failings and it works. Flying has never been so safe.
Get over it. The technology is there as a result of your human failings and it works. Flying has never been so safe.
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Originally Posted by Safety Concerns
All Airbus FBW aircraft can be reduced back down to manual flying very easily. Not ideal though because the protections are there in the first place because you lot kept crashing.
Beside that, what is manual flying if not FBW ... Please explain.
Do you think protections disappear when AP is selected OFF ... you have some reading to do here.
FBW is not the issue, protections are the concern.
Originally Posted by DC-ATE
Why can't you young computer controled airline pilots admit that the manufacturers are trying to design you out of the aircraft completely with all this new "technology" that you speak so highly of?
Originally Posted by DC-ATE
Why can't you young computer controled airline pilots admit that the manufacturers are trying to design you out of the aircraft completely with all this new "technology" that you speak so highly of? Don't think it can't be done.
Originally Posted by CONFiture
protections are the concern.
Originally Posted by CONFiture
If it was true it would show up immensely in the statistics ...
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From Captain Crunch
?????
Were you 'tired' when you wrote this. How can GPWS escape maneuvres come in to play after we have avoided terrain? Sorry to state the obvious but GPWS maneuvres are FOR avoiding CFIT. Being able to pull 3.5 instead of 2.5 g in an 'old' aircraft is of no benefit whatsoever for the following reasons:
1. The difference in clearance is in the order of a few feet over a period of a fraction of a second, the FBW aircraft will offer more clearance with its alpha prot in almost any recorded or likely GPWS event.
2. Your assertion assumes that your 'old' aircraft is being flown by a pilot who can accurately pull instantly to 3.5g and no more. If he pulls 1.0g less you have lost your benefit, if 0.25g (the standard margin) more he has folded your wings. He will alos have to apply full control deflection until the required g is achieved and then accurately sustain it for the second or so before he stalls.
If you really believe such a pilot exists and is therefore likely to be able to get a better GPWS maneuvre from a conventional aircraft than a FBW type then I can only marvel at your innocence.
FBW alpha prot gives better GPWS performance.
We're agreed then, that the studies of GPWS escape maneuvers at low altitude come into play AFTER Controlled Flight Into Terrain is avoided with an aggressive pull up, not before
Were you 'tired' when you wrote this. How can GPWS escape maneuvres come in to play after we have avoided terrain? Sorry to state the obvious but GPWS maneuvres are FOR avoiding CFIT. Being able to pull 3.5 instead of 2.5 g in an 'old' aircraft is of no benefit whatsoever for the following reasons:
1. The difference in clearance is in the order of a few feet over a period of a fraction of a second, the FBW aircraft will offer more clearance with its alpha prot in almost any recorded or likely GPWS event.
2. Your assertion assumes that your 'old' aircraft is being flown by a pilot who can accurately pull instantly to 3.5g and no more. If he pulls 1.0g less you have lost your benefit, if 0.25g (the standard margin) more he has folded your wings. He will alos have to apply full control deflection until the required g is achieved and then accurately sustain it for the second or so before he stalls.
If you really believe such a pilot exists and is therefore likely to be able to get a better GPWS maneuvre from a conventional aircraft than a FBW type then I can only marvel at your innocence.
FBW alpha prot gives better GPWS performance.
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For those pilots trying to bend the limitations or boldly going where no sane pilot has ventured before, yes.
What is your definition of immense show up when we're discussing the statistics of small numbers?
Can you produce figures that would support such statement ?
Originally Posted by 320 driver
The difference in clearance is in the order of a few feet over a period of a fraction of a second, the FBW aircraft will offer more clearance with its alpha prot in almost any recorded or likely GPWS event.
If the XL Airbus in Perpignan don't follow the pilot request in the final dive, that's because of the G load protection to make sure that the aircraft is intact up to the crash site. BEA and Airbus did not publish that key G load graph ... any reason why ?
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ahh yes, alpha prot will save us....
If i'm on my 'dinosaur' aircraft flying at 330kts and want to pull up to 60 deg up and wash the speed off, i can, because i.m in control.
The 'scarebus' won't let you pull more than 30deg up from the horizon ?, nothing to do with the AOA ??
OEB's ? the thing that the airbus 'tech guys' publish in the back of the QRH because they can't be bothered to fix the problem.
Checklists that are half ECAM / half paper.
Fmgc's that dump the flight plan because they 'think' they have landed, because you flew to 'near' the airport.
Landing calculations, the like of which no one has ever seen before, multiplying this percentage by that percentage but only if icing with flap 3 landing otherwise multiply by 8% + landing correction and add it to the landing distance required if all is ok.
And all while the other bloke might be handflying ??
Returning to subject, is there not an 'OEB' for sparking generator plugs causing half the electrical system to 'flicker' ?
If i'm on my 'dinosaur' aircraft flying at 330kts and want to pull up to 60 deg up and wash the speed off, i can, because i.m in control.
The 'scarebus' won't let you pull more than 30deg up from the horizon ?, nothing to do with the AOA ??
OEB's ? the thing that the airbus 'tech guys' publish in the back of the QRH because they can't be bothered to fix the problem.
Checklists that are half ECAM / half paper.
Fmgc's that dump the flight plan because they 'think' they have landed, because you flew to 'near' the airport.
Landing calculations, the like of which no one has ever seen before, multiplying this percentage by that percentage but only if icing with flap 3 landing otherwise multiply by 8% + landing correction and add it to the landing distance required if all is ok.
And all while the other bloke might be handflying ??
Returning to subject, is there not an 'OEB' for sparking generator plugs causing half the electrical system to 'flicker' ?
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Great post Goldfish85,
Exactly the real-world insight I was trying to tease out with my remarks. Direct experience, not just as line pilot, but emergency pull-up with a A320 test pilot from the manufacturer.
So if I understand the scenario correctly,
this ridge-targeted-pull-up contest was done with level wings level?
The reason I ask, is that if you were in constant altitude 60 degree bank, you are already pulling two g's, right? If you "snap back" full aft stick in the 60 degree bank what will the A320 FBW give you? Point two G's over level? (0.2 g?)
Now try this in a stone age 737. Sure, it's likely to momentarily reach critical angle of attack. But you might be able to recover from stall after you clear the ridge. Even if you don't clear the ridge or recover from stall, you might survive a full stall impact, whereas you have no chance with one way above shaker that's stopped your FBW pull up due to an operational g limit. So I'm still not convinced of the superiority of FBW in this case.
In other words, I am still under the impression that a hard, for example, operational 2.2 g "snapback" limit will not prevent missing a rock outcrop that requires say 3.5 g's to clear it.
@ 320 driver,
My traditional perception of true CFIT means that there is nothing wrong with the airplane, that it hits the first rock outcropping with the crew and aircraft in control and unaware they or ATC screwed up until it is too late. GPWS escape maneuvers mostly came out AFTER the CFIT term was coined (FTL flight 66). Once a GPWS escape maneuver is commenced, the crew is really out of control, in my opinion, as they are uncertain of their navigational position and/or safe altitude and are engrossed in an unexpected emergency "Hail-Mary" that may or may not turn out well.
I was discussing a scenario in which the objective is missing the very first rock outcrop only; whereby once accomplished, the rest of the escape maneuver to miss secondary high obstacles is a different subject (in which airbus alpha mode would be superior if you live to see it.) I was trying to focus on the very first lethal ridge and whether or not FBW can out-G conventional controls.
I am sorry if I was not being clear.
CC
Exactly the real-world insight I was trying to tease out with my remarks. Direct experience, not just as line pilot, but emergency pull-up with a A320 test pilot from the manufacturer.
So if I understand the scenario correctly,
this ridge-targeted-pull-up contest was done with level wings level?
The reason I ask, is that if you were in constant altitude 60 degree bank, you are already pulling two g's, right? If you "snap back" full aft stick in the 60 degree bank what will the A320 FBW give you? Point two G's over level? (0.2 g?)
Now try this in a stone age 737. Sure, it's likely to momentarily reach critical angle of attack. But you might be able to recover from stall after you clear the ridge. Even if you don't clear the ridge or recover from stall, you might survive a full stall impact, whereas you have no chance with one way above shaker that's stopped your FBW pull up due to an operational g limit. So I'm still not convinced of the superiority of FBW in this case.
In other words, I am still under the impression that a hard, for example, operational 2.2 g "snapback" limit will not prevent missing a rock outcrop that requires say 3.5 g's to clear it.
How can GPWS escape maneuvres come in to play after we have avoided terrain? Sorry to state the obvious but GPWS maneuvres are FOR avoiding CFIT.
My traditional perception of true CFIT means that there is nothing wrong with the airplane, that it hits the first rock outcropping with the crew and aircraft in control and unaware they or ATC screwed up until it is too late. GPWS escape maneuvers mostly came out AFTER the CFIT term was coined (FTL flight 66). Once a GPWS escape maneuver is commenced, the crew is really out of control, in my opinion, as they are uncertain of their navigational position and/or safe altitude and are engrossed in an unexpected emergency "Hail-Mary" that may or may not turn out well.
I was discussing a scenario in which the objective is missing the very first rock outcrop only; whereby once accomplished, the rest of the escape maneuver to miss secondary high obstacles is a different subject (in which airbus alpha mode would be superior if you live to see it.) I was trying to focus on the very first lethal ridge and whether or not FBW can out-G conventional controls.
I am sorry if I was not being clear.
CC
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"Locked-door" said:
CC says:
I've read the 777 thread and I know that ice all by itself is blamed for the accident. But I just don't buy it. Thousands of jet engines with fuel/oil heat exchangers have operated in icing temperatures all over the world for fifty years and I've never heard of a single crash caused by all engines just sitting there in idle. Aren't trent engines certified? Aren't the heat exchangers required to have some sort of a emergency fuel bypass? (this would allow power up which would extinguish any engine fuel ice lights once hot oil re-entered the exchanger.) Haven't you ever done this on jets? Pulled up the boards and shoved the power up on descent to kill the ice lights? I have. Since the machine was dirty, it didn't need boards, just a pilot to disconnect ATS and manually advance enough power to heat up the oil.
But engineers stated on that thread that we don't know for sure that FADEC commanded a throttle up since data points were infrequent and maybe only plotted software commands outside of FADEC instead of actual FCU position. I'm not a software expert, but even I know that FADECs have a reboot subroutine that rolls the engine back to idle if certain anomalies crop up. Not only that, but a programmer there was claiming the A and B channels are identical code adopted (allegedly) to save programmer costs.
Ask yourself: how could both engines have enough fuel to remain in idle but not enough to produce partial power when commanded to? What are the odds ?
All I can fathom is that dual identical software bugs struck at the same time in the same conditions since the code is identical on both channels and identical on both engines. I'm told all performance is impossible to test before certification, since you're talking about millions of lines of computer code and exponential combinations of output. It might take ten or twenty years to test all the possible software decision trees. So they rubber stamp it and "finish it in the field."
An insane arrangement, but one that today's button pusher seems to have no problem with. An engine who knows better than the captain when to roll itself back or prevent a power up if expected engine and RPM values don't materialize!
Again, we've saved the equipment and lost the airplane.
What a concept!
Oh, Give me a steel cable connected directly to the FCU anyday!
(i.e, give me a way to turn the HAL 9000 off when it goes nuts).
Captain Dinosaur - out
By the way, I'm retired and all these are just my opinions only, and I could be wrong about everything.
..
How on earth do you attribute the BA777 dual rollback to the FADECS? The power loss was caused by fuel starvation due to ice in the fuel/oil heat exchangers. Your accuracy with this is as good as your Airbus knowledge.
I've read the 777 thread and I know that ice all by itself is blamed for the accident. But I just don't buy it. Thousands of jet engines with fuel/oil heat exchangers have operated in icing temperatures all over the world for fifty years and I've never heard of a single crash caused by all engines just sitting there in idle. Aren't trent engines certified? Aren't the heat exchangers required to have some sort of a emergency fuel bypass? (this would allow power up which would extinguish any engine fuel ice lights once hot oil re-entered the exchanger.) Haven't you ever done this on jets? Pulled up the boards and shoved the power up on descent to kill the ice lights? I have. Since the machine was dirty, it didn't need boards, just a pilot to disconnect ATS and manually advance enough power to heat up the oil.
But engineers stated on that thread that we don't know for sure that FADEC commanded a throttle up since data points were infrequent and maybe only plotted software commands outside of FADEC instead of actual FCU position. I'm not a software expert, but even I know that FADECs have a reboot subroutine that rolls the engine back to idle if certain anomalies crop up. Not only that, but a programmer there was claiming the A and B channels are identical code adopted (allegedly) to save programmer costs.
Ask yourself: how could both engines have enough fuel to remain in idle but not enough to produce partial power when commanded to? What are the odds ?
All I can fathom is that dual identical software bugs struck at the same time in the same conditions since the code is identical on both channels and identical on both engines. I'm told all performance is impossible to test before certification, since you're talking about millions of lines of computer code and exponential combinations of output. It might take ten or twenty years to test all the possible software decision trees. So they rubber stamp it and "finish it in the field."
An insane arrangement, but one that today's button pusher seems to have no problem with. An engine who knows better than the captain when to roll itself back or prevent a power up if expected engine and RPM values don't materialize!
Again, we've saved the equipment and lost the airplane.
What a concept!
Oh, Give me a steel cable connected directly to the FCU anyday!
(i.e, give me a way to turn the HAL 9000 off when it goes nuts).
Captain Dinosaur - out
By the way, I'm retired and all these are just my opinions only, and I could be wrong about everything.
..
Last edited by Captain-Crunch; 16th Dec 2010 at 08:26. Reason: better verbage
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I don't usually reply to ignorant commentary, because there is just so much of it. But there is ignorance, and then there is willful ignorance. Speculating in public on matters which are clearly dealt with in the existing literature is a disservice to anyone involved in or with this accident, including the investigators, and the engineers who worked on the airplane.
Yes, we can agree you are not a software expert. I am.
In the report, even preliminary reports, on this accident, it is clearly stated that the FADECs behaved exactly as intended and designed for the conditions with which they were presented. Even if there are anomalies somewhere, on this occasion they did not show.
We are talking about some small hundreds of thousands of lines, not millions. If that code is DAL A, there is a certification requirement to exercise all decision branches: it is called MC/CD testing. I don't know whether the code was MC/DC tested but I can find out.
However, this does not suffice to test the code adequately. In fact, thorough testing is impractical. Far from "ten or twenty years", to reach the conclusion that there are no dangerous errors in the software would require testing for as long as or longer than the entire service life of the aircraft. It is impractical to reach a conclusion with any reasonable level of confidence through statistical testing that the software has a lower rate of failure than once every hundred thousand operational hours on average. This is a hard mathematical boundary, one with which critical-software developers have to work.
PBL
Originally Posted by Captain Crunch
I'm not a software expert, .... All I can fathom is that dual identical software bugs struck at the same time in the same conditions since the code is identical on both channels and identical on both engines.
In the report, even preliminary reports, on this accident, it is clearly stated that the FADECs behaved exactly as intended and designed for the conditions with which they were presented. Even if there are anomalies somewhere, on this occasion they did not show.
Originally Posted by Captain Crunch
you're talking about millions of lines of computer code and expotential combinations of output. It might take ten or twenty years to test all the possible software decision trees.
However, this does not suffice to test the code adequately. In fact, thorough testing is impractical. Far from "ten or twenty years", to reach the conclusion that there are no dangerous errors in the software would require testing for as long as or longer than the entire service life of the aircraft. It is impractical to reach a conclusion with any reasonable level of confidence through statistical testing that the software has a lower rate of failure than once every hundred thousand operational hours on average. This is a hard mathematical boundary, one with which critical-software developers have to work.
PBL
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Let's all get over it. A well-designed envelope protection scheme really works. It's saved airplanes. In the twenty some years of commercial FBW, I don't know of any caused by g-envelope protection.
The fact is there may well be one scenario out there where no protections is desirable but even if there was the protections have already saved literally thousands of pilots backsides already.
Many of you also have selective memory. Military jets have been FBW since the 70's. It works. I remember one smart arse who claimed the protections prevented him from displaying his full dog fight skills and so prevented him from saving the world. Yes he switched them off (as can be done on any FBW aircraft) and promptly ejected after losing control in his next battle.
Hudson river hero successfully landed his stricken A320 on a river. What more evidence do you non believers need to confirm that the design is sound.
And I quote the NTSB, page 88 by the way:
The NTSB concludes that, despite being unable to complete the Engine Dual Failure checklist, the captain started the APU, which improved the outcome of the ditching by ensuring that a primary source of electrical power was available to the airplane and that the airplane remained in normal law and maintained the flight envelope protections, one of which protects against a stall.
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Blame it on the Ice boogieman, not the computer
Hey PBL,
Thanks for the great post. It's clear from everybody that my ignorance knows no bounds.
It seems like the older I get, the less I know. However that's why I make these posts, in order to learn. And speaking of learning; since you offered, I would in fact, be interested to learn if Trent FADEC code is MC/CD tested. I stand corrected then: it's not millions, but hundreds of thousands of lines of FADEC code that are used (however I was told, it isn't the standard commercial version, additional cross check blocks have been added.) Isn't it conceivable that certain paths could result in an unexpected "rollback" to idle? From previous unexpected rollbacks I know that the flight crew isn't part of this decision to kill engine thrust. Personally I'd rather have partial power or explosive power to get the machine safely to the TDZ and then just junk the engine (instead of a rollback). But that's just me.
Fascinating insight.
Thank you for your frank honesty (even if it takes a beer to put out the flames.
) It's not easy being the point man for the Dinosaur Squad. You see, we dinos don't trust the goverment/industry to tell us the whole story. They've lied and covered-up so much in the past that taking an accident report at face value seems very foolish to many of us. It's more likely, considering human nature and liability, that they just quietly issued a new FADEC software"load" to fix the machines inability to deal with common ice in the fuel and upped the dia of the fuel lines.
And guys, sorry for the thread drift to 777 FADEC. Back to the subject, A320 shuttering in flight, PBL, I have another unfounded theory, since I'm not privy to any of the data beyond what I read here, that this A320 was severely cross controlled. Aircraft wants to go left with flight spoilers, but is confronted with excess right rudder introduced by a faulty centering solution every time power is interrupted. Plausible?
A friend told me:
A question I have is does the roll logic know where the rudder trim is?
I'll betcha it doesn't. I'll betcha it just dumbly keeps feeding in more roll spoiler to counter the stronger rudder trim. The result is that the rudder wins, and a gross navigational error occurs. Not sure you can commend a computer crew who didn't disconnect this thing at the first sign of trouble.
But I wasn't there... they were probably fighting the ecam and paper check list from hell; so distracted, that nobody was flying the airplane, and I'll admit that many button pushers don't know how to trim the airplane for fastest mach, so the habit to disconnect and find out what's wrong just isn't there.
They have a: Severe Fear of autopilot disconnect
Now, just let me don my flack jacket here....
CC
still on the ragged edge
Thanks for the great post. It's clear from everybody that my ignorance knows no bounds.
It seems like the older I get, the less I know. However that's why I make these posts, in order to learn. And speaking of learning; since you offered, I would in fact, be interested to learn if Trent FADEC code is MC/CD tested. I stand corrected then: it's not millions, but hundreds of thousands of lines of FADEC code that are used (however I was told, it isn't the standard commercial version, additional cross check blocks have been added.) Isn't it conceivable that certain paths could result in an unexpected "rollback" to idle? From previous unexpected rollbacks I know that the flight crew isn't part of this decision to kill engine thrust. Personally I'd rather have partial power or explosive power to get the machine safely to the TDZ and then just junk the engine (instead of a rollback). But that's just me.
However, this does not suffice to test the code adequately. In fact, thorough testing is impractical. Far from "ten or twenty years", to reach the conclusion that there are no dangerous errors in the software would require testing for as long as or longer than the entire service life of the aircraft. It is impractical to reach a conclusion with any reasonable level of confidence through statistical testing that the software has a lower rate of failure than once every hundred thousand operational hours on average. This is a hard mathematical boundary, one with which critical-software developers have to work.
Thank you for your frank honesty (even if it takes a beer to put out the flames.
) It's not easy being the point man for the Dinosaur Squad. You see, we dinos don't trust the goverment/industry to tell us the whole story. They've lied and covered-up so much in the past that taking an accident report at face value seems very foolish to many of us. It's more likely, considering human nature and liability, that they just quietly issued a new FADEC software"load" to fix the machines inability to deal with common ice in the fuel and upped the dia of the fuel lines. And guys, sorry for the thread drift to 777 FADEC. Back to the subject, A320 shuttering in flight, PBL, I have another unfounded theory, since I'm not privy to any of the data beyond what I read here, that this A320 was severely cross controlled. Aircraft wants to go left with flight spoilers, but is confronted with excess right rudder introduced by a faulty centering solution every time power is interrupted. Plausible?
A friend told me:
the A320's most important flight control computers, the ELACs, each contain one Motorola 68000 and one Intel 80186 processor, which run the same algorithms, but I do not know if their software was developed by isolated teams. There are 2 redundant ELACs, and if they both fail, there are 2 SECs, which also provide pitch and roll control, albeit in a degraded mode (alternate or direct law.)
I'll betcha it doesn't. I'll betcha it just dumbly keeps feeding in more roll spoiler to counter the stronger rudder trim. The result is that the rudder wins, and a gross navigational error occurs. Not sure you can commend a computer crew who didn't disconnect this thing at the first sign of trouble.
But I wasn't there... they were probably fighting the ecam and paper check list from hell; so distracted, that nobody was flying the airplane, and I'll admit that many button pushers don't know how to trim the airplane for fastest mach, so the habit to disconnect and find out what's wrong just isn't there.
They have a: Severe Fear of autopilot disconnect
Now, just let me don my flack jacket here....
CC
still on the ragged edge
Last edited by Captain-Crunch; 16th Dec 2010 at 09:04. Reason: enhanced prose
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Captain-Crunch -
Great post. I'd be interested in knowing what you are, or were, rated on. Thanks.
Great post. I'd be interested in knowing what you are, or were, rated on. Thanks.
I lost my medical, but flew:
GA bugsmashers
Beech 18's (radial engines!)
Fanjet Falcons, B727, B747, BAe-146,
Typed on B-737, A300s/A310's, DC-10's
picked up an A&P for fun.
But it's all dino junk now, and I'm telling you I just can't get no respect.
CC
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Hi,
Methink it's a unwanted comment 
Anyways pilot or not we will all obtain this rating
It looks like you have missed out your last rating..... Rocking chair in front of breakfast TV.
Anyways pilot or not we will all obtain this rating