Qantas A380 uncontained #2 engine failure

[DozyWannabe]

Originally Posted by lomapaseo

I doubt that the words "Massive, "Bloody Great" and Major Imbalance" will be in the AAIB report

Have you ever *been* to Australia?

[lomapaseo]

Originally Posted by lomapaseo
I doubt that the words "Massive, "Bloody Great" and Major Imbalance" will be in the AAIB report
Have you ever *been* to Australia?

I forgot about the ATSB's, "fair dinkum" and "jolly good show"

[glad rag]

Nice post sunfish.

At the end of the day, despite seemingly tremendous damage, the big bird brought all back safe and without injury.

I wonder how the burning dreamliner is going along

""Boeing is working with the FAA to allow a 787 to remain in service for up to 10 days if the fuel-inerting system should fail."

And the seattle times has deleted the above reference to the 10 day MEL for the inerting system in it's report of that incident.

Truth hurts huh!

chinchin.

[TopBunk]

GR

"Boeing is working with the FAA to allow a 787 to remain in service for up to 10 days if the fuel-inerting system should fail."

And the seattle times has deleted the above reference to the 10 day MEL for the inerting system in it's report of that incident.

Truth hurts huh!

... and let's not forget that fuel-inerting is not available 365 days per year on virtually every other aircraft flying today.

[ILS27LEFT]

Uncontained engine failure

As many have said in here before, it must be clear to all pprune readers that all "uncontained" engine failures must be treated as catastrophic failures whatever the outcome in terms of lives or damages. These are extremely serious incidents simply because by definition the outcome of these failures is unknown and unpredicatable because nobody knows where the uncontained flying piece/pieces is/are going when the explosion starts.
Great job done by the crew, fantastic response by the beast, but it is only pure luck that this plane did not go down. You can have the best pilots in the world, the most perfect FBW, etc but you have not got a chance to survive if the flying parts coming from an uncontained engine failure decide to hit the most nevralgic parts of the machine. No plane is specifically designed to cope with an uncontained engine failure simply because all engine failures should be contained unless something totally unpredictable has happened.
This is why this one, together with all other uncontained engine accidents, remains clearly a very serious incident that could have easily destroyed hundreds of lives.
This accident is pure gold for the designers and RR: they will make 100% sure that this same type of failure will never happen again on the T900. This is guaranteed or the engine would have already been "suspended" in full.
A priceless lesson for RR.

[Spooky 2]

Gladrag, I don't think the fuel Inerting system had anything to do with this fire issue. I believe that once again the press simply got it wrong and jumped on some early Boeing press releases.

[infrequentflyer789]

Originally Posted by TopBunk

GR

... and let's not forget that fuel-inerting is not available 365 days per year on virtually every other aircraft flying today.

...and lets also not forget that the 787 _had_ to have inerting because the composite structure _increased_ the ignition risk (due to poor electrical conductivity) compared to virtually every other aircraft flying today.

[ChristiaanJ]

All airplane manufacturers have to design for possible uncontained rotor burst.

And since Sioux City, they've done so to some extent, haven't they?
Even hanging the engines under the wings, we can see some nasty damage, as just now.
But at least this uncontained failure didn't take out both all conventional rudder and elevator control in a single shot....

Still, let's all agree there was a degree of luck in this eevnt.... ?

It could have happened slightly earlier or later and we'd now be fishing for the CVR and FDR, instead of looking at photos.
Or there might have been a huge crater where that village on Batam now is?

Simplistically speaking, uncontained rotor failures are just not supposed to happen.
Let's hope there's not another one in the next few weeks through beancounter shortsightness somewhere.
The outcome might not be as fortunate.

CJ

[kwateow]

Ils27left

Quote "No plane is specifically designed to cope with an uncontained engine failure"

Then what is this, from EASA? FAAs are of course similar:

"Practical design precautions should be used to minimise the damage that can be caused by uncontained engine and APU rotor fragments. The most effective methods for minimising the hazards from uncontained rotor fragments include location of critical components outside the fragment impact areas or separation, isolation, redundancy, and shielding of critical aeroplane components and/or systems."

[Capt Kremin]

Any takers on the regulators stepping in and the RR powered A380's to be grounded for some time? RR will have to come up with a fix and one suspects that won't be quick. New, spare and untarnished Trent 900's just don't sit around idly for situations like this.

IFALPA VP Richard Woodward, also a QF A380 captain, hinted as much yesterday. If not a grounding, then limited to low power take-offs and other restrictions?

Reliable sources report that, apart from the litany of problems in the list above, this crew also lost roll control for a brief period. Well done guys!

[Kangaroo Court]

I don't think anyone should be down playing the part of skill in this event...rather than just dismissing it and talking about pure luck!

The passengers were lucky; Rolls Royce is unlucky and the crew were skilled.

[infrequentflyer789]

Originally Posted by edmundronald

That list by TopBunk looks scary. Not a case of "Oh,one engine stopped, no worry, three left".

That's uncontained engine failure for you. I'd say the list looks about what you'd expect for what we've seen. Loss of the fire handle control to #1 and loss of fuel dump and crossfeed control maybe a little more scary.

But... no cabin penetration mentioned and no wing spar or pylon structural damage (although they may not know that yet?). Lack of cabin penetration is just good luck - in similar events, shrapnel has killed pax with the aircraft still on the ground.

What would be interesting to know is whether this incident could have taken out the other hydraulic system too, or whether just one system is routed in each wing?

Edmund

Both systems route through both wings (or they wouldn't be redundant). Simultaneous loss of multiple hydraulic systems due to uncontained engine failure is not unknown... Since they all need to reach the same control surfaces, sooner or later they all tend to route through the same point and hence may all be severed by the same bit of engine, no matter how many you have.

In the A380, don't forget, there are also electro-hydraulic backup systems (hence the drop to only two hydraulic). I suspect it is easier to route the electrical controls and potentially route them redundantly, which may increase survivablity in this case.

Loss of green system is, I think, to be expected since pumps for it are (were!?) on #2 - probably making any shrapnel damage to the circuit a bit irrelevant. TopBunks list reads as though the hydraulics were otherwise intact and that the failure of some flight controls was due to direct damage (although I may be reading too much into it there).

[barit1]

Anybody remember the red stripe that used to encircle the fuselage of early military jets? That marked the plane of rotation of the turbine of those early engines. Too often the disc failed, or sometimes uncontained turbine blades instead; any shrapnel from such an event would be thrown out in approximately that plane of rotation. Hence it was not a good idea to linger in that plane during runups.

The principle still applies, even though the statistics are much more in your favor today.

Nevertheless, pay a visit to a good engine test bench (or test cell on this side of the pond) and inquire how many cm of concrete surrounds the tested engine. At some cells, you may find evidence of disc fragments impacting the sidewalls at predictable locations.

[HotDog]

Latest Emergency AD:

EASA AD No : 2010-0236-E
EASA Form 111 Page 1/3
EASA EMERGENCY AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE
AD No.: 2010-0236-E
Date: 10 November 2010
Note: This Emergency Airworthiness Directive (AD) is issued by EASA, acting in
accordance with Regulation (EC) No 216/2008 on behalf of the European Community, its
Member States and of the European third countries that participate in the activities of
EASA under Article 66 of that Regulation.
This AD is issued in accordance with EC 1702/2003, Part 21A.3B. In accordance with EC 2042/2003 Annex I, Part M.A.301, the
continuing airworthiness of an aircraft shall be ensured by accomplishing any applicable ADs. Consequently, no person may
operate an aircraft to which an AD applies, except in accordance with the requirements of that AD, unless otherwise specified by
the Agency [EC 2042/2003 Annex I, Part M.A.303] or agreed with the Authority of the State of Registry [EC 216/2008, Article
14(4) exemption].
Type Approval Holder’s Name :
ROLLS-ROYCE PLC
Type/Model designation(s) :
RB211 Trent 900 series engines
TCDS Number : EASA.E.012
Foreign AD : Not applicable
Supersedure : None
ATA 72 Engine – High Pressure / Intermediate Pressure (HP/IP)
Structure – Inspections
Manufacturer(s): Rolls-Royce plc
Applicability: RB211 Trent 900 series engines, variants RB211 Trent 970-84, RB211
Trent 970B-84, RB211 Trent 972-84, RB211 Trent 972B-84, RB211 Trent
977-84, RB211 Trent 977B-84 and RB211 Trent 980-84, all serial
numbers.
These engines are known to be installed on, but not limited to, Airbus
A380 series aeroplanes.
Reason: An uncontained engine failure has recently occurred on a Rolls-Royce
Trent 900 involving release of high energy debris and leading to damage
to the aeroplane.
Analysis of the preliminary elements from the incident investigation shows
that an oil fire in the HP/IP structure cavity may have caused the failure of
the Intermediate Pressure Turbine (IPT) Disc.
This condition, if not detected, could ultimately result in uncontained
engine failure potentially leading to damage to the aeroplane and hazards
to persons or property on the ground.
For the reasons described above and pending conclusion of the incident
investigation, this AD requires repetitive inspections of the Low Pressure
Turbine (LPT) stage 1 blades and case drain, HP/IP structure air buffer
cavity and oil service tubes in order to detect any abnormal oil leakage,
and if any discrepancy is found, to prohibit further engine operation.
The requirements of this AD are considered as interim action. If, as a
EASA AD No : 2010-0236-E
EASA Form 111 Page 2/3
result of the on-going incident investigation, a terminating action is later
identified, further mandatory actions might be considered.
Effective Date: 10 November 2010
Required Action(s)
and Compliance
Time(s):
Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously:
(1) Within the compliance times indicated in Table 1 of this AD,
accomplish the following actions in accordance with Rolls-Royce
Non Modification Service Bulletin (NMSB) 72-AG590, Par 3.
Accomplishment Instructions, 3.A or 3.B as applicable to the engine
configuration:
(1.1) Carry out an extended ground idle run.
(1.2) Inspect the Low Pressure Turbine (LPT) stage 1 blades and
case drain.
(1.3) Inspect the HP/IP structure air buffer cavity and oil service
tubes.
Table 1
Compliance time
Engine
Configuration
Initial Threshold Repetitive Interval
On-wing Within 10 Flight Cycles
(FC) after the effective
date of this AD.
At intervals not exceeding
20 FC.
In-shop After the engine test
procedure and before
next flight.
Not applicable (after
engine installation refer to
on-wing repetitive
inspection intervals).
(2) If any discrepancy is found during the inspections required by
paragraph (1) of this AD, any further engine operation is prohibited.
Within one day after the accomplishment of the inspection, report the
findings to Rolls-Royce.
(3) Inspections accomplished in accordance with the content of NMSB
72-AG590 before the effective date of this AD, are acceptable to
comply with the initial inspections required by this AD.
(4) After the effective date of this AD, do not operate an engine on an
aeroplane unless it has been inspected in accordance with the
requirements of this AD.
Ref. Publications: Rolls-Royce RB211-Trent 900 Alert Non Modification Service Bulletin
72-AG590 dated 10 November 2010.
The use of later approved updates of this document is acceptable for
compliance with the requirements of this AD.
Remarks : 1. If requested and appropriately substantiated, EASA can approve
Alternative Methods of Compliance for this AD.
2. The safety assessment has requested not to implement the full
consultation process and an immediate publication and notification.
3. Enquiries regarding this AD should be referred to the Airworthiness
Directives, Safety Management & Research Section, Certification
Directorate, EASA. E-mail [email protected].
EASA AD No : 2010-0236-E
EASA Form 111 Page 3/3
4. For any question concerning the technical content of the requirements
in this AD, please contact:
Your designated Rolls-Royce representative or download the
publication from your Aeromanager account at
Aeromanager by Rolls-Royce. If you do not have a designated
representative or Aeromanager account, please contact Corporate
Communications at Rolls-Royce plc. PO Box 31, Derby, DE24 8BJ,
United Kingdom. Phone: [phone], or e-mail from
Civil Aerospace - Rolls-Royce identifying the
correspondence as being related to Airworthiness Directives.

[infrequentflyer789]

Originally Posted by Capt Kremin

Any takers on the regulators stepping in and the RR powered A380's to be grounded for some time?

More likely increased inspections while RR fix it. As long as they know which bit is failing (and I suspect they do), it will be check that carefully for signs of impending failure.

That is what the recommendation was, for one example, following four incidents with other (GE in this case) engines. See:
SB-10-20
NTSB Identified A Critical Safety Issue With A GE Turbofan Engine

In these incidents, the amount of damage is largely down to luck - any of them could have ended very very badly. Credit to the QF crew for getting the damaged big bird back down safely.

[win_faa]

Singapore Airlines Finds More Trouble With Rolls-Royce Airplane Engines




Singapore Airlines (SINGF) pulled three of its A380 superjumbos from service Wednesday after tests uncovered problems with the planes' Rolls-Royce engines less than a week after an engine on a Qantas A380 exploded shortly after take-off.

Tests revealed oil stains in three engines on three of the airline's A380s, Singapore Airlines said in a statement. The planes, in Melbourne, Sydney and London, will be flown to Singapore, where they'll be fitted with new engines, the airline said.

"We apologize to our customers for flight disruptions that may result and we seek their understanding," airline spokesman Nicholas Ionides said in a statement.

Last week, Qantas grounded its fleet of A380s - the world's newest and largest airliner - after one of the aircraft's Rolls-Royce engines burst during a flight from Singapore to Sydney. The explosion showered debris over Indonesia's Batam island. The plane, carrying 466 people, made a safe emergency landing in Singapore.


Superjumbos Get Grounded

On Monday, Qantas CEO Alan Joyce said tests had uncovered oil leaks in the turbine area of three engines on three different A380s. All six of the Australian airline's A380s remained grounded Wednesday.

London-based Rolls-Royce, an aerospace, power systems and defense company that is separate from the manufacturer of Rolls-Royce cars, had recommended a series of checks for the Trent 900 engines that are used in the A380s operated by Qantas, Singapore Airlines and Germany's Lufthansa.

Singapore Airlines grounded its entire fleet of 11 A380s following last Thursday's engine explosion on Qantas. After initial checks, Singapore returned those to service on Friday. However, on Wednesday, based on fresh analysis of the tests, Singapore took three of its A380s out of service again, due to oil stain results.

Singapore's eight other A380s, also flying with Trent 900 engines, remain in service.
Bryony Duncan-Smith, a Sydney-based spokeswoman for Singapore Airlines, said she did not know whether the oil staining found in the Singapore engines was similar to the oil leaks found on the Qantas planes.

The affected engines will all be replaced with Trent 900s, Duncan-Smith said. The airline does not know how long that will take, she said.
Cause of Explosion Unclear

Rolls-Royce did not immediately respond to a request seeking comment Wednesday. On Monday, it issued a statement saying it had made progress in understanding what caused the Qantas engine to burst, but offered no details on what that cause might be.
Joyce said Monday that Qantas was focusing its investigation on the oil leaks, which he said were abnormal and should not be occurring on new engines.

Singapore said the engine changes don't affect its eight other A380s at this point.

The Qantas and Singapore incidents are not the first problems Rolls-Royce have faced with its engines. In September 2009, a Singapore Airlines A380 was forced to return to Paris mid-flight after an engine malfunction. Last August, a Lufthansa crew shut down one of its engines as a precaution before landing in Frankfurt after receiving confusing information on a cockpit indicator. (The same month, Boeing also said a Rolls-Royce engine had shredded itself and its casing during testing.)

On Tuesday, the European Aviation Safety Agency said it was closely monitoring the probe into the Qantas incident. The agency issued orders twice this year advising airlines about extra inspections or repairs needed for the Trent 900s.

A380s flown by Emirates and Air France (AFLYY) are instead kitted out by the Engine Alliance, a 50/50 joint venture between GE Aircraft Engines (GE) and Pratt & Whitney.

[YorkshireTyke]

manual extension of landing gear

?? Can anyone who KNOWS pls. explain ?

The thought of maybe moving pax out of their seats to physically wind down a million wheels seems a little improbable, alternative landing gear extension systems, yes, but MANUAL ?

I might have thought that anything MANUAL might have given Airbus designers a heart attack !!

[noip]

YT,


Manual lowering of A380 gear.

There is a guarded "switch" on the centre instrument panel.
Release the cover
Move it to the "down" position.
Uplocks are electrically released.
Gear lowers by gravity in sequence.
Gear lever placed in the "down" position.


Supposedly takes just over a minute.
Gear doors remain open.



n

(actually it is the 11th Nov 01.56z)

[GemDeveloper]

Getting warm...

Seems from the Emergency AD that my postulated theory may have been at least partially valid:

http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/4...ml#post6045314

I do feel for the Service Engineers (and there may be a few Development Engineers out in the field as well by now), who are having to make a call, based on their inspection, as to whether to 'pull' an engine... or not. No-one wants to have an AOG a minute longer than they can avoid, and the reputational consequences, for both Airbus and RR, of lots of WhaleBuses sitting around, are not good... the only thing worse, of course, would be another in-flight emergency.

Good luck, guys. Well, actually, it's not luck, it's experience and skill...

[vapilot2004]

Oil fire may have been the cause of the rotor failure.

SYDNEY – Europe's air safety agency says an oil fire inside the engine of a Qantas superjumbo may have caused the failure that forced it into an emergency landing last week.

The statement was the first indication that investigators suspect an oil fire may have preceded the disintigration of the Rolls-Royce Trent 900 engine on the Qantas jet.

The European Aviation Safety Authority on Thursday ordered airlines using the Trent 900 engine to carry out more checks to ensure the planes fitted with them are safe to fly.

In its order to airlines, the agency said that analysis of information so far from the investigation "shows that an oil fire" in part of the engine "may have caused the failure" of a turbine disc in the engine.