Airblue down near Islamabad
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PJ2,
Thanks very much for this enlightenment.
No one knows whether he got to that stage or not. In the present context, executing a GA would be inhibited/constrained by a feeling of shock/disbelief at the alert/warning and the fact that it would be an admission of piloting failure. They do have ego's in the cockpit -- especially when you have 35 years of service and 25,000 plus hours and the guy sitting to your right thinks you are god!
And you know that.
But he may have been in GA mode as some witnesses on the ground attest...but too late for the reasons I have adduced.
Had he changed over to Cherat APP as someone suggested? No way. The last thing on my mind in the frantic last-second execution of this escape maneuver with the Margalla hills looming in front of me would be to look down and change frequencies to tell ATC what I was doing. He can wait -- especially after the bugger kept telling me how to fly the aeroplane. I would worry about that later -- when safely up in the sky.
I think ATC is hugely complicit in this tragedy since he must have been on their radar (unless it was U/S).
The captain was 61 so assuming he got his job with Airblue immediately after retirement from PIA he could not have many hours in-type. The F/O was on his first or second regular flight on the line. Were they 'paired' correctly?
Contributory factors I would say but not sufficient to explain flying a fatally-flawed approach at what appears to be a 45 degree off-set from a parallel down-wind. The mind boggles.
Thanks again.
Thanks very much for this enlightenment.
No one knows whether he got to that stage or not. In the present context, executing a GA would be inhibited/constrained by a feeling of shock/disbelief at the alert/warning and the fact that it would be an admission of piloting failure. They do have ego's in the cockpit -- especially when you have 35 years of service and 25,000 plus hours and the guy sitting to your right thinks you are god!
And you know that.
But he may have been in GA mode as some witnesses on the ground attest...but too late for the reasons I have adduced.
Had he changed over to Cherat APP as someone suggested? No way. The last thing on my mind in the frantic last-second execution of this escape maneuver with the Margalla hills looming in front of me would be to look down and change frequencies to tell ATC what I was doing. He can wait -- especially after the bugger kept telling me how to fly the aeroplane. I would worry about that later -- when safely up in the sky.
I think ATC is hugely complicit in this tragedy since he must have been on their radar (unless it was U/S).
The captain was 61 so assuming he got his job with Airblue immediately after retirement from PIA he could not have many hours in-type. The F/O was on his first or second regular flight on the line. Were they 'paired' correctly?
Contributory factors I would say but not sufficient to explain flying a fatally-flawed approach at what appears to be a 45 degree off-set from a parallel down-wind. The mind boggles.
Thanks again.
Lonewolf_50;
The question is an excellent one.
I do know the difference between the two speeds but in truth I'm not sure what the software is programmed for - I suspect rate of climb given how I've seen it perform in the sim. The performance is pretty spectacular, especially in a light aircraft. I once tried it in the sim, with a low weight...held the stick full-back, applied TOGA thrust and released the brakes. The aircraft rotated at about 90kts, it simulated a "scraping of the tail" so to speak, and lifted off at about 115kts and went into Alpha Floor immediately. It continued to climb at about 3000fpm; by the end of the runway (9500ft long), the aircraft was 3000' above the end of the runway - 20deg bank turns while climbing were not a problem. It was essentially an escape maneuver with turns.
What I do know from the FCOM is, for a maximum effort escape maneuver with the stick held full back and the aircraft "sits" just above AlphaProt, (a prot + 1° ) and is only maintaining an AoA - the pitch attitude "floats" in relation to the AoA. Although the SOP is to firewall the thrust levers, the thrust is automatically set to TOGA in Alpha Floor mode. As described, the airplane will vary the AoA to stay just above the stall. In Normal Law it is not possible to pull hard enough to "stall" the airplane. The AFS limits the pitch rate change to keep the AoA out of the stall range. But under certain circumstances the AFS could go into Alpha Floor mode with the sudden increase in AoA - but that's how it's designed. In Normal Law, the pitch rate is limited by the AoA, (and the rate is still very respectable).
At high pitch angles during the escape maneuver, Normal Law still applies. It is only when the pitch attitude exceeds 50deg that the AFS reverts to 'Abnormal Attitude Law'. Reversion to Alternate Law (with or without protections), is different, and is a function of autoflight capabilities/failures and associated systems, (hydraulics/electrics) and not pitch attitude.
Meekal;
For what it's worth, my discussion regarding go-arounds was more for information...I don't think this aircraft was in a "go-around" mode. As for what the crew did within a minute of the accident, we must wait for the recorders.
I understand both the "shock/surprise" response and the "ego" factor you describe. Disbelief may be the response to the first factor, and denial may be the response to the second. I do not believe these are broad, cultural issues but they could be training issues.
I think we cannot state anything about ATC until much later. There is not enough known about these communications, ATC's capabilities (what they saw on radar) and what was going on in the cockpit, to make statements of complicity, etc. I think we have to be very careful about affirming or attributing actions when we don't know about them.
PJ2
Is the escape maneuver based on best angle of climb or best rate of climb? Which "best" is "every ounce of performance" trying to achieve for you?
I do know the difference between the two speeds but in truth I'm not sure what the software is programmed for - I suspect rate of climb given how I've seen it perform in the sim. The performance is pretty spectacular, especially in a light aircraft. I once tried it in the sim, with a low weight...held the stick full-back, applied TOGA thrust and released the brakes. The aircraft rotated at about 90kts, it simulated a "scraping of the tail" so to speak, and lifted off at about 115kts and went into Alpha Floor immediately. It continued to climb at about 3000fpm; by the end of the runway (9500ft long), the aircraft was 3000' above the end of the runway - 20deg bank turns while climbing were not a problem. It was essentially an escape maneuver with turns.
What I do know from the FCOM is, for a maximum effort escape maneuver with the stick held full back and the aircraft "sits" just above AlphaProt, (a prot + 1° ) and is only maintaining an AoA - the pitch attitude "floats" in relation to the AoA. Although the SOP is to firewall the thrust levers, the thrust is automatically set to TOGA in Alpha Floor mode. As described, the airplane will vary the AoA to stay just above the stall. In Normal Law it is not possible to pull hard enough to "stall" the airplane. The AFS limits the pitch rate change to keep the AoA out of the stall range. But under certain circumstances the AFS could go into Alpha Floor mode with the sudden increase in AoA - but that's how it's designed. In Normal Law, the pitch rate is limited by the AoA, (and the rate is still very respectable).
At high pitch angles during the escape maneuver, Normal Law still applies. It is only when the pitch attitude exceeds 50deg that the AFS reverts to 'Abnormal Attitude Law'. Reversion to Alternate Law (with or without protections), is different, and is a function of autoflight capabilities/failures and associated systems, (hydraulics/electrics) and not pitch attitude.
Meekal;
For what it's worth, my discussion regarding go-arounds was more for information...I don't think this aircraft was in a "go-around" mode. As for what the crew did within a minute of the accident, we must wait for the recorders.
I understand both the "shock/surprise" response and the "ego" factor you describe. Disbelief may be the response to the first factor, and denial may be the response to the second. I do not believe these are broad, cultural issues but they could be training issues.
I think we cannot state anything about ATC until much later. There is not enough known about these communications, ATC's capabilities (what they saw on radar) and what was going on in the cockpit, to make statements of complicity, etc. I think we have to be very careful about affirming or attributing actions when we don't know about them.
PJ2
Last edited by PJ2; 4th Aug 2010 at 22:32. Reason: edit terminology, Alpha Floor specification
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GPWS was max power 20 degrees nose up so that sounds like a lot closer to best angle than best rate for obvious reasons. Clearing close in terrain is the object, not reaching altitude quickly.
p51guy;
I'm just thinking this through a bit. Since Max "Rate of Climb" is maximum altitude over time and "Max Angle of Climb" is max altitude over distance and since EGPWS works on a specified time (60" and 30" approx), and therefore varies distance according to speed, it is reasonable to conclude that the priority is Rate of Climb, but I gotta say that in Alpha Floor, the actual speed is just above the stall (at AlphaMax) so perhaps the designers chose an immediate pitch-up & power response and never considered either rate or angle of climb, neither of which would likely be the actual speed flown when executing the maneuver!
The other thing to consider of course, now that we're on this tack and which renders moot any discussion of rates and angles of climb, is, 99% of the time, the aircraft is a long, to a very long way from Alpha Floor. So the response to any full back-stick (or 20deg pitch-up) and TOGA thrust application will be very brisk indeed....6000 to 8000 fpm for a brief period, trading energy for altitude, would not be unrealistic.
PJ2
GPWS was max power 20 degrees nose up so that sounds like a lot closer to best angle than best rate for obvious reasons. Clearing close in terrain is the object, not reaching altitude quickly.
The other thing to consider of course, now that we're on this tack and which renders moot any discussion of rates and angles of climb, is, 99% of the time, the aircraft is a long, to a very long way from Alpha Floor. So the response to any full back-stick (or 20deg pitch-up) and TOGA thrust application will be very brisk indeed....6000 to 8000 fpm for a brief period, trading energy for altitude, would not be unrealistic.
PJ2
Last edited by PJ2; 5th Aug 2010 at 06:27. Reason: add comment re 20deg pitch-up response
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I realise this is heavily simplified for the TV audience, but apropos of nothing, the "full backstick" escape maneouvre is demonstrated in this video:
YouTube - Bruce Dickinson flies the A320
Obviously it's a completely different situation when simulated over the Pyrenees as opposed to following a TOGA event in Islamabad, but for anyone interested it should give you an idea.
YouTube - Bruce Dickinson flies the A320
Obviously it's a completely different situation when simulated over the Pyrenees as opposed to following a TOGA event in Islamabad, but for anyone interested it should give you an idea.
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p51guy;
Okay, see what you meant now, thanks. The 20deg/max power is likely airplane-related, not airline related. The 20deg/Max power is a standard GPWS response (from the DC9 on, if I recall)- some advise "until the stickshaker", (B767), Embraer (190) advises "increase pitch to a max climb attitude" which seems to leave the pitch open to interpretation.
PJ2
PJ2, we were required to add max power and pitch up 20 degrees for max angle of climb if we got a GPWS alert. It might not be the same for all airlines.
PJ2
For PJ2 and P51guy: many thanks, my brain hurts less now. 
In re PJ2:
We used to teach in CRM courses that those responses were common to all pilots, low time, high time, and a trap for any of us.
Reducing to the smallest possible time fragment the transition from "WTF" and "what was that" and "can this be happening to me?" to diagnosis and problem solving, and acting mode, ( and eventual return to standard OODA loop) requires teaching crews about that tendency, and why going into pure problem solving mode is how to recover.
That said, from some of the drills we ran to task saturate crews in the sims, the time delta in transition was as much personality driven as anything else. Training and habit forming, and reforming, and continual awareness (the infamous "war against complacency") were the equalizer.
I think my favorite anecdote was an evening sim one of our wing's sqaudrons scheduled to get some instrument time to keep up on proficiency. These events were typically "let's shoot x approaches and get the numbers up in the log book."
I turned it into a series of opportunities to discover how they handled surprises.
While I got a few "why are you screwing with us?" remarks between approaches, by the time we were done, we had all learned a thing or two.
I bought the first round at the O'Club after the debrief. I admit I'd been indulging myself a bit.
In re PJ2:
I understand both the "shock/surprise" response and the "ego" factor you describe. Disbelief may be the response to the first factor, and denial may be the response to the second. I do not believe these are broad, cultural issues but they could be training issues.
Reducing to the smallest possible time fragment the transition from "WTF" and "what was that" and "can this be happening to me?" to diagnosis and problem solving, and acting mode, ( and eventual return to standard OODA loop) requires teaching crews about that tendency, and why going into pure problem solving mode is how to recover.
That said, from some of the drills we ran to task saturate crews in the sims, the time delta in transition was as much personality driven as anything else. Training and habit forming, and reforming, and continual awareness (the infamous "war against complacency") were the equalizer.
I think my favorite anecdote was an evening sim one of our wing's sqaudrons scheduled to get some instrument time to keep up on proficiency. These events were typically "let's shoot x approaches and get the numbers up in the log book."
I turned it into a series of opportunities to discover how they handled surprises.
While I got a few "why are you screwing with us?" remarks between approaches, by the time we were done, we had all learned a thing or two.
I bought the first round at the O'Club after the debrief. I admit I'd been indulging myself a bit.
Last edited by Lonewolf_50; 5th Aug 2010 at 12:09.
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I'm not quite sure why we are so engrossed in the AB go-round software? We do not know for sure whether a g/a was in progress, and SURELY the focus needs to be on why were they anywhere near the cumulo-granitus?
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If evidence is provided that passengers were informed before crash. Will this be help full.
I have received cell phone of a passenger . Lets see if i recover any data out of it. People do make videos during landing and take offs. cell phone must be working at this Altitude...
I have received cell phone of a passenger . Lets see if i recover any data out of it. People do make videos during landing and take offs. cell phone must be working at this Altitude...
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Weather Radar for terrain avoidance
.
Old school here again.
In your super-side-stick airbus of tomorrow, that I'm always told is so advanced and superior to older models, do we not pan the radar on the mountains anymore? I always did on the A310's and A300's. I used to fly into volcanic rock bowls, and would manually point the antenna tilt down to see bright red where the rocks were.
Why wasn't this crew doing this? Why aren't you doing this? I'll tell you why: because you are over-reliant on automation and autopilots. You (Glass pilots) seem to think nothing can go wrong with the moving map. This all but guarantees that the first time that this very possible phenomenon happens to you due to a dicked up automatic Nav update it could very well put mountain goats in your windscreen. It's even more possible though, I think, as PJ2 said, that in this accident the Captain locked-in on the main drag and mistook it for the runway. This would sorta explain why maybe he didn't turn downwind and got so far North. But the F/O should have caught it. Maybe if somebody was in rose mode, they would have seen this circuit was not parallel with the runway.
Maybe the fairly new F/O was hunched down putzing around with the Honeywell-two-finger-torture device instead of cross-checking raw DME and Weather radar in manual gain, and looking out the window. 
It was a left circuit. It's probable in that poor weather the Capt was flying.
Weather Radar is another back up, along with raw DME which if thrown into your cross-scan is unlikely to fool you like a map shift might. One guy in the crew room quipped: But how can you know the difference between a cell and mountains?
Our answer was "Hey, who cares, we want to avoid all that stuff!"
Get out of auto, turn up the manual gain, tilt the antenna down till you get a little ground clutter, and avoid that dangerous RED!
Crunch
(The above is all just my opinion only).
.
Old school here again.
In your super-side-stick airbus of tomorrow, that I'm always told is so advanced and superior to older models, do we not pan the radar on the mountains anymore? I always did on the A310's and A300's. I used to fly into volcanic rock bowls, and would manually point the antenna tilt down to see bright red where the rocks were.
Why wasn't this crew doing this? Why aren't you doing this? I'll tell you why: because you are over-reliant on automation and autopilots. You (Glass pilots) seem to think nothing can go wrong with the moving map. This all but guarantees that the first time that this very possible phenomenon happens to you due to a dicked up automatic Nav update it could very well put mountain goats in your windscreen. It's even more possible though, I think, as PJ2 said, that in this accident the Captain locked-in on the main drag and mistook it for the runway. This would sorta explain why maybe he didn't turn downwind and got so far North. But the F/O should have caught it. Maybe if somebody was in rose mode, they would have seen this circuit was not parallel with the runway.
Maybe the fairly new F/O was hunched down putzing around with the Honeywell-two-finger-torture device instead of cross-checking raw DME and Weather radar in manual gain, and looking out the window. It was a left circuit. It's probable in that poor weather the Capt was flying.Weather Radar is another back up, along with raw DME which if thrown into your cross-scan is unlikely to fool you like a map shift might. One guy in the crew room quipped: But how can you know the difference between a cell and mountains?
Our answer was "Hey, who cares, we want to avoid all that stuff!"
Get out of auto, turn up the manual gain, tilt the antenna down till you get a little ground clutter, and avoid that dangerous RED!
Crunch
(The above is all just my opinion only).
.
Last edited by Captain-Crunch; 5th Aug 2010 at 14:35. Reason: minor enhancements
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If you can't stand the heat, get out of the kitchen
25000-30000 hrs, the majority long haul boredom, then retirement and into the world of short haul on an unfamiliar aircraft, and with new SOP.
What was his age when he crashed? As BOAC said; "With my eyesight; I could probably not see an airport from 10 miles".
Age does not improve ones vision, and after 60, things start to go downhill quite fast.
With (allegedly) two aircraft diverting before this accident, one have to ask why this captain saw the situation differently.
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Back to post #353. Now we are talking about panning down with the radar to see terrain during a circling approach? Really!
These guys either knew where they were going in which case they were at the wrong altitude or thought they were in the circuit - which they were not. Forget mapping radar, g/a mode, ATC radar, DME arcs. They were either both being stupid or both ....... being stupid.
The question we should be asking is WHY? One very experienced Captain, one ex-Mil F/O, both with some sort of acquired self-preservation instinct, surely? Things just do not stack up here.
These guys either knew where they were going in which case they were at the wrong altitude or thought they were in the circuit - which they were not. Forget mapping radar, g/a mode, ATC radar, DME arcs. They were either both being stupid or both ....... being stupid.
The question we should be asking is WHY? One very experienced Captain, one ex-Mil F/O, both with some sort of acquired self-preservation instinct, surely? Things just do not stack up here.
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RADAR tilt
Old school flying. From the era when airplanes did not crash?
Why did they install GPWS on the old irons? They were all hand flown by aces. No magenta line and a basic auto pilot. Hmm...
Why did they install GPWS on the old irons? They were all hand flown by aces. No magenta line and a basic auto pilot. Hmm...
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BOAC:
I would think an in-country air carrier, such as this one, would have all kinds of pointers and "gouges" for the CTL maneuver at the capital city's IAP-deficient airport.
A DME ARC certainly wouldn't be one of them. The geometry alone is bad, with the VOR being 2.2 miles SE of the approach end of Runway ("AER") 12.
Now, a waypoint at the AER of Runway 12 that could be referenced with an RMI in a GPS/RNAV aircraft, would be useful.
I hope we get the official information at some point. That would include what procedures, if any, did the carrier have for this inevitable requirement to land on Runway 12.
Being confined to flying my PC and doing U.S. TERPs these days, I was unaware until this thread that some countries in the region have moved forward with RNAP instrument approach procedures.; SSH and ADD being noteworthy.
These guys either knew where they were going in which case they were at the wrong altitude or thought they were in the circuit - which they were not. Forget mapping radar, g/a mode, ATC radar, DME arcs.
A DME ARC certainly wouldn't be one of them. The geometry alone is bad, with the VOR being 2.2 miles SE of the approach end of Runway ("AER") 12.
Now, a waypoint at the AER of Runway 12 that could be referenced with an RMI in a GPS/RNAV aircraft, would be useful.
I hope we get the official information at some point. That would include what procedures, if any, did the carrier have for this inevitable requirement to land on Runway 12.
Being confined to flying my PC and doing U.S. TERPs these days, I was unaware until this thread that some countries in the region have moved forward with RNAP instrument approach procedures.; SSH and ADD being noteworthy.
We do not know for sure whether a g/a was in progress, and SURELY the focus needs to be on why were they anywhere near the cumulo-granitus?
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aterpster- "I would think an in-country air carrier, such as this one, would have all kinds of pointers and "gouges" for the CTL maneuver at the capital city's IAP-deficient airport."
I really hope not! This is suppose dto be a visual manouevre and no pointers and "gouges" should be used or ..we finish up possibly with the same accident all over again.
"A DME ARC certainly wouldn't be one of them. The geometry alone is bad, with the VOR being 2.2 miles SE of the approach end of Runway ("AER") 12."
Yes - I did not mention the DME arc in the first place - it was the reticent Meekal!
I really hope not! This is suppose dto be a visual manouevre and no pointers and "gouges" should be used or ..we finish up possibly with the same accident all over again.
"A DME ARC certainly wouldn't be one of them. The geometry alone is bad, with the VOR being 2.2 miles SE of the approach end of Runway ("AER") 12."
Yes - I did not mention the DME arc in the first place - it was the reticent Meekal!
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Now we are talking about panning down with the radar to see terrain during a circling approach? Really!
Forget mapping radar, g/a mode, ATC radar, DME arcs. They were either both being stupid or both ....... being stupid.
All the things you just ruled out, would have probably have saved them, if they had known the importance of backing up your visual with some sort of safety net.
The question we should be asking is WHY? One very experienced Captain, one ex-Mil F/O, both with some sort of acquired self-preservation instinct, surely? Things just do not stack up here.
I'll get my hat and coat.....
CC
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BOAC:
"Fences," properly built, can serve to keep the foxes out.
One that would have been very, very useful would be ODALs for Runway 12. Ah, but that doesn't seem to be the way of this state's aviation authority.
I really hope not! This is suppose dto be a visual manouevre and no pointers and "gouges" should be used or ..we finish up possibly with the same accident all over again.
"Fences," properly built, can serve to keep the foxes out.
One that would have been very, very useful would be ODALs for Runway 12. Ah, but that doesn't seem to be the way of this state's aviation authority.