Airblue down near Islamabad
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pilotsaab
The procedure is 20 secs per 500' AGL, corrected for wind. If 10kts tailwind component on the downwind, remove 10 secs from your timing. Flying downwind at the circling minima (860' AGL), when you get abeam the threshold start your stopwatch, fly for 25secs and turn base. Your config should be Gear down & Flap 3.
7 miles is way too far downwind. If this is a accident whilst circling it bears so much similarity with the Air China B767 crash at Pusan, Korea
The procedure is 20 secs per 500' AGL, corrected for wind. If 10kts tailwind component on the downwind, remove 10 secs from your timing. Flying downwind at the circling minima (860' AGL), when you get abeam the threshold start your stopwatch, fly for 25secs and turn base. Your config should be Gear down & Flap 3.
7 miles is way too far downwind. If this is a accident whilst circling it bears so much similarity with the Air China B767 crash at Pusan, Korea
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Ah, BOAC,
You'd make a great Chief Pilot because your logic is good.
Unfortunately, they'd probably fire you for speaking such legal department heresy as not computing the landing distance like a good little line soldier (on some properties.)
I like your idea, and that's what I'm angling at: reduce meaningless cockpit chores, paperwork and standardization babble. At some places, the number of required briefings is absolutely ridiculous now. A4 has the politically correct training answer: Go into holding and start over. But I prefer briefing the circle to land and dispensing with as much distracting garbage as possible before let down. If you don't work for an airline where the Captain has authority to dispense with some of this happy horsechit down low, then you risk being turned in by your F/O for being non-standard.
BTW, when I flew the old bus, even though the MA is the same on Circle to 12, you still had to manually reset heading (by re-centering the blue heading reference AFTER rolling on to final), and THEN turning the heading bug to the right to 240 degrees (preset), or believe it or not, that old airbus would remember a left turn to MA heading where you originally set it and turn flight directors the wrong way! Boeing knew to take the shortest path to the heading preset. Airbus did not. One more friggin distraction!
You also had to check and see that the MA was still in the FMS, IIRC. Sometimes it just didn't stay in there with the runway change. So all this automation actually loaded up the crew where everything was "azzholes and elbows" on a tight circle to land. We finally outlawed them.
I know what I'm saying sounds silly, but early glass Airbuses were very, very different from steam-gage boeings. Having flown both, I can assure you that the FCP autoflight had more bugs than a bait store. Every time a new operator went into a Bob Hoover tail slide, I was not surprised at all.
Don't get me wrong. I loved hand-flying the airplane. I just couldn't trust it's automation, it's nav display or it's flight guidance, that's all.
Now another poster says the F/O was a two-year veteran, so if that's true, please disregard my rookie F/O theory.
Crunch - out
You'd make a great Chief Pilot because your logic is good.
Unfortunately, they'd probably fire you for speaking such legal department heresy as not computing the landing distance like a good little line soldier (on some properties.) I like your idea, and that's what I'm angling at: reduce meaningless cockpit chores, paperwork and standardization babble. At some places, the number of required briefings is absolutely ridiculous now. A4 has the politically correct training answer: Go into holding and start over. But I prefer briefing the circle to land and dispensing with as much distracting garbage as possible before let down. If you don't work for an airline where the Captain has authority to dispense with some of this happy horsechit down low, then you risk being turned in by your F/O for being non-standard.
BTW, when I flew the old bus, even though the MA is the same on Circle to 12, you still had to manually reset heading (by re-centering the blue heading reference AFTER rolling on to final), and THEN turning the heading bug to the right to 240 degrees (preset), or believe it or not, that old airbus would remember a left turn to MA heading where you originally set it and turn flight directors the wrong way! Boeing knew to take the shortest path to the heading preset. Airbus did not. One more friggin distraction!
You also had to check and see that the MA was still in the FMS, IIRC. Sometimes it just didn't stay in there with the runway change. So all this automation actually loaded up the crew where everything was "azzholes and elbows" on a tight circle to land. We finally outlawed them.
I know what I'm saying sounds silly, but early glass Airbuses were very, very different from steam-gage boeings. Having flown both, I can assure you that the FCP autoflight had more bugs than a bait store. Every time a new operator went into a Bob Hoover tail slide, I was not surprised at all.
Don't get me wrong. I loved hand-flying the airplane. I just couldn't trust it's automation, it's nav display or it's flight guidance, that's all.
Now another poster says the F/O was a two-year veteran, so if that's true, please disregard my rookie F/O theory.
Crunch - out
Last edited by Captain-Crunch; 29th Jul 2010 at 13:31.
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Map shift has nothing to do with this accident if a circling approach is involved.
For circling into ISB, is done as a procedure (as all circling approaches are done), commences from a point on an ILS (VOR), thereafter the landing runway must be in sight and visual, thereafter, it is a timed visual procedure, flown with a constant speed and configuration. The landing runway remains visual and further descent from circling altitude may only commence on base provided sufficient cues remain available.
If the MCDU's fail, or the FM's fail, (no map available/map shift, you name it) this circling procedure can still be flown in the exact same way as it has always been flown, or will be flown.
Having circled into ISB with A332 myself, it is no problem, and I have flown with former Air Blue pilots in my current airline. That being said, if you forget to turn downwind from the initial offset of 45 degrees from runway track, you might land up into those hills, which means the circling procedure and visual sighting of the runway never happened and the procedure was never adhered too. This was a very sad day for all of us mere mortals.
For circling into ISB, is done as a procedure (as all circling approaches are done), commences from a point on an ILS (VOR), thereafter the landing runway must be in sight and visual, thereafter, it is a timed visual procedure, flown with a constant speed and configuration. The landing runway remains visual and further descent from circling altitude may only commence on base provided sufficient cues remain available.
If the MCDU's fail, or the FM's fail, (no map available/map shift, you name it) this circling procedure can still be flown in the exact same way as it has always been flown, or will be flown.
Having circled into ISB with A332 myself, it is no problem, and I have flown with former Air Blue pilots in my current airline. That being said, if you forget to turn downwind from the initial offset of 45 degrees from runway track, you might land up into those hills, which means the circling procedure and visual sighting of the runway never happened and the procedure was never adhered too. This was a very sad day for all of us mere mortals.
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While recognizing that Circling to Land is a visual maneuver, could this crash share aspects that are reminiscent of Addis Abeba -- i.e., EGPWS sans GPS?
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Thunderbug:
There are similarities, yet great differences. In the current accident the protected airspace was a generous PANS-OPS radius of 5.2 nm. At Pusan, the captain thought it was PANS-OPS, but it was tiny/little, politically motivated U.S. TERPs. The Chinese captain at Pusan got had in my view.
7 miles is way too far downwind. If this is a accident whilst circling it bears so much similarity with the Air China B767 crash at Pusan, Korea
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JetJock330,
You might be right; you think he forgot go parallel to the runway?
We need a flight track leaked to wikileaks... Anybody?
And one point: A map shift is not likely a failure of the airplane. It's caused primarily by a failure of one of the ground stations sometimes even hours before letdown. The update system is doing what it was designed to do. But the shift might be insidious when you've got your hands full.
Q: How do you disable all auto updates in the A330?
I bet if you try it sometime you will be surprised how hard it is to do (since A/B doesn't want you to ever do that, if my hunch is correct.)
CC
You might be right; you think he forgot go parallel to the runway?
We need a flight track leaked to wikileaks... Anybody?And one point: A map shift is not likely a failure of the airplane. It's caused primarily by a failure of one of the ground stations sometimes even hours before letdown. The update system is doing what it was designed to do. But the shift might be insidious when you've got your hands full.
Q: How do you disable all auto updates in the A330?
I bet if you try it sometime you will be surprised how hard it is to do (since A/B doesn't want you to ever do that, if my hunch is correct.)
CC
Ut Sementem Feeceris
Greetings Crunch
I can see why you think my answer is "politically correct". We live in a litigious society and those of us in the LHS must always remember that. We are responsible and answerable for our decisions and actions. If we choose to rapidly rebrief "on the hoof" for an unexpected circling approach in cr@p wx and something goes wrong, if you survive you better have a good explanation. I agree that there is no need to recompute landing distance on a 2700m runway but on the 'bus you do need to ensure the Secondary flight plan is set up correctly (for groundspeedmini computation). This doesn't take long but could be a distracter if PF is monitoring an inexperienced FO to ensure he's doing it right ....... and who knows, suddenly your 7 miles on your ILS break-off heading......
I mentioned non-technical skills previously. We need to recognise when it is and is not appropriate to press on or "take 5" and ensure you're ready. I've seen it in the sim numerous times - getting the balance between prioritisation and maintaining standards a bit skewed.
It doesn't sound encouraging regarding the release of factual information on this one which is a pity because it looks like there could be some fundamental lessons we could learn.
A4
I can see why you think my answer is "politically correct". We live in a litigious society and those of us in the LHS must always remember that. We are responsible and answerable for our decisions and actions. If we choose to rapidly rebrief "on the hoof" for an unexpected circling approach in cr@p wx and something goes wrong, if you survive you better have a good explanation. I agree that there is no need to recompute landing distance on a 2700m runway but on the 'bus you do need to ensure the Secondary flight plan is set up correctly (for groundspeedmini computation). This doesn't take long but could be a distracter if PF is monitoring an inexperienced FO to ensure he's doing it right ....... and who knows, suddenly your 7 miles on your ILS break-off heading......
I mentioned non-technical skills previously. We need to recognise when it is and is not appropriate to press on or "take 5" and ensure you're ready. I've seen it in the sim numerous times - getting the balance between prioritisation and maintaining standards a bit skewed.
It doesn't sound encouraging regarding the release of factual information on this one which is a pity because it looks like there could be some fundamental lessons we could learn.
A4
Aterpster, re #127. Yes, Honeywell have promoted the use of an internal GPS card, but Airbus chose a different route.
The preferred Airbus option was for an external GPS/Nav sensor (MMR), which improved navigational accuracy and EGPWS performance (Operators Information Telex 5 Feb 04). Furthermore, at that time, they would not certificate “a solution based on a GPS card”.
Whilst this policy appears sensible in that it provides an accurate navigation (and terrain) map and thus should aid pilots to avoid situations where EGPWS may activate, the more complex (and expensive?) installation might result in fewer aircraft updates.
These aspects together with the apparent difficulty in isolating unsuitable navigation sensors might show as a difference between aircraft types.
Safety estimates circa 2000 comparing high vs low nav accuracy input to EGPWS, showed factor of two in favour of the high nav solution.
I have seen similar data for unmodified Airbus aircraft (2006) where the difference was also estimated to be two. I doubt that many aircraft would have been upgraded subsequently in the modern commercial climate. In addition, safety estimates considered the distribution of suitable ground based nav aids, the lack of which (at that time), further increased the risk of CFIT (associated with ‘map shift’) in less well equipped geographic regions.
Thus the lack of a high accuracy navigation input to EGPWS, the difficulty in isolating systems, and the very compelling features of map displays (our addiction to modern technology) significantly increases the risk of CFIT.
Several operators appear to have recognised these hazards and introduced procedures and training to mitigate the threats; noting that procedures and training are soft barriers.
Unfortunately humans forget (complacency), aircraft are sold on, but not necessarily with specific operational procedures and training, and humans remain vulnerable to the attraction of ‘salient’ displays, especially in stressful situations, and may overlook the most basic of safety behaviours when circling – staying visual.
EGPWS is one of the best (if not ‘the’ best) safety system, but it, like any other computer (and humans), depends on the accuracy of the inputs.
Whether these aspects have any relevance to this accident or not, it would be worth checking how current aircraft are equipped (first line of defence) and thus how they should be operated (last line of defence).
The preferred Airbus option was for an external GPS/Nav sensor (MMR), which improved navigational accuracy and EGPWS performance (Operators Information Telex 5 Feb 04). Furthermore, at that time, they would not certificate “a solution based on a GPS card”.
Whilst this policy appears sensible in that it provides an accurate navigation (and terrain) map and thus should aid pilots to avoid situations where EGPWS may activate, the more complex (and expensive?) installation might result in fewer aircraft updates.
These aspects together with the apparent difficulty in isolating unsuitable navigation sensors might show as a difference between aircraft types.
Safety estimates circa 2000 comparing high vs low nav accuracy input to EGPWS, showed factor of two in favour of the high nav solution.
I have seen similar data for unmodified Airbus aircraft (2006) where the difference was also estimated to be two. I doubt that many aircraft would have been upgraded subsequently in the modern commercial climate. In addition, safety estimates considered the distribution of suitable ground based nav aids, the lack of which (at that time), further increased the risk of CFIT (associated with ‘map shift’) in less well equipped geographic regions.
Thus the lack of a high accuracy navigation input to EGPWS, the difficulty in isolating systems, and the very compelling features of map displays (our addiction to modern technology) significantly increases the risk of CFIT.
Several operators appear to have recognised these hazards and introduced procedures and training to mitigate the threats; noting that procedures and training are soft barriers.
Unfortunately humans forget (complacency), aircraft are sold on, but not necessarily with specific operational procedures and training, and humans remain vulnerable to the attraction of ‘salient’ displays, especially in stressful situations, and may overlook the most basic of safety behaviours when circling – staying visual.
EGPWS is one of the best (if not ‘the’ best) safety system, but it, like any other computer (and humans), depends on the accuracy of the inputs.
Whether these aspects have any relevance to this accident or not, it would be worth checking how current aircraft are equipped (first line of defence) and thus how they should be operated (last line of defence).
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PEI 3721:
That is a better solution. Honeywell was simply trying to prevent "Brand U" airline from using DME/DME on their pre-GPS airplanes instead of GPS. The minimal GPS sensor is far, far better than DME/DME.
Aterpster, re #127. Yes, Honeywell have promoted the use of an internal GPS card, but Airbus chose a different route.
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Things that should've helped avoid the tragedy:
EGPWS - And associated memory items/actions. Did they switch it off? ignore it? was it not working?
ATC - Asking crew to turn immediately, ignored because crew thought or lied (hey, some pilots do) that they were visual.
Early days but evidence so far points towards this accident being caused by very experienced (and over-confident) pilots who let the rules slip because they were content with their situation. This has always been and will be the death of many!
EGPWS - And associated memory items/actions. Did they switch it off? ignore it? was it not working?
ATC - Asking crew to turn immediately, ignored because crew thought or lied (hey, some pilots do) that they were visual.
Early days but evidence so far points towards this accident being caused by very experienced (and over-confident) pilots who let the rules slip because they were content with their situation. This has always been and will be the death of many!
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Originally Posted by A4
but on the 'bus you do need to ensure the Secondary flight plan is set up correctly (for groundspeedmini computation). This doesn't take long but could be a distracter if PF is monitoring an inexperienced FO to ensure he's doing it right ....... and who knows, suddenly your 7 miles on your ILS break-off heading......
I try to avoid too much 'AB bashing', but fer xxxx's sake- is it THAT bad? Can't you just fly it like an aeroplane? 'Ground speed mini'??? Don't you have an ASI? Does that mean that with an FMC failure you are doomed to crash somewhere?
I think I need stronger tablets - NURSE!
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Originally Posted by C-C
You might be right; you think he forgot go parallel to the runway? 
This is all becoming rather odd - now the chaps had water in their tubes and/or were unfortunate to encounter a down-draft over high ground below MSA outside the circling area? This thread is sadly going the way of all PPRune threads.
What about being shot down by the Taliban? We haven't tried that one yet.
Originally Posted by BOAC
- now, I am prepared to risk being accused of prejudging this accident, but I do think that judging by where the runway is and where they crashed - yes.
This is all becoming rather odd - now the chaps had water in their tubes and/or were unfortunate to encounter a down-draft over high ground below MSA outside the circling area?
For p.pilot:
It seems to have air data problem. s rain was reported ,some times Water in pitot tubes do not drain properly which can lead to un-reiable ASI or ADR failure
it seems they encountred sudden down drafts while crossing the ridge. and we also can consider the altimetre settings was correct or not
Did you read the entire thread before offering your analysis?
This thread is sadly going the way of all PPRune threads. What about being shot down by the Taliban? We haven't tried that one yet.
What about being shot down by the Taliban? We haven't tried that one yet.
Now that we have that out of the way, we can return to the discussion about weather, flying, circling approach, and the recently (and prematurely) departed folk on the Airblue flight.
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BOAC,
To the Taliban story you can add what is coming out in the local papers that the captain had just been released from hospital for various ailments and was too old to fly a 'glass' fly-by-wire jet.
To the Taliban story you can add what is coming out in the local papers that the captain had just been released from hospital for various ailments and was too old to fly a 'glass' fly-by-wire jet.
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No cover-up
I have little doubt that the CVR and FDR will provide the necessary information to explain this accident.
Pressure must be brought to bear on the Pakistan CAA to release a full report. To do otherwise, as has been suggested in earlier comments, would be negligent in the extreme. (I assume the Pakistan CAA is part of ICAO.)
Pressure must be brought to bear on the Pakistan CAA to release a full report. To do otherwise, as has been suggested in earlier comments, would be negligent in the extreme. (I assume the Pakistan CAA is part of ICAO.)
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I assume the Pakistan CAA is part of ICAO.
This might be a case of "who pays the piper, calls the tune", and one country comes to mind!
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As has just been confirmed, yes, Pakistan is a member of ICAO. However, in 62 years, there has been no published, or publically-assessible air accident report. PIA pilot's are given an internal summary memo of the salient facts and/or safety recommendations, but that is strictly confidential.
PIA's no.1 pilot in seniority Capt. A.A Khan flew his 720B into the ground on approach on the inaugural flight to Cairo. No one knows why.
My class-mate Capt. K.Wyne was departing Jeddah one night in a 707-320 and it is rumored he had an in-flight cabin fire. He turned around but did not make it. Crashed in Taif.
Capt. I. Janjua flew his A300B4 one step ahead of the step-down Sierra One approach into Khatmandu, Nepal. He hit a ridge. A classic CFIT from which valuable lessons could have been learnt.
I mentioned that very senior commander Capt. Siraj in the 747-200 who forgot to put his gear down landing at Islamabad. Why? All I know is that Capt. Siraj retired.
Finally, an F.27 Fokker Friendship departed Multan on a very hot day when climb performance is degraded and got an engine-fire just after lift-off. He crashed in a field. It was rumored that the aircraft was over-loaded. Since some big shots from the judiciary got killed, the government grounded the entire Fokker fleet. We now have the ATR42.
Not to mention the most dramatic crash of all, the VVIP C-130 of General Zia with the US Ambassador and others on board. It took off after they had witnessed a tank display in central Pakistan and after experiencing several phugoid ossilations [forgive my spelling if wrong] plunged 90 degree nose-down into the ground. Lockheed came to assist; since the US Ambassador was killed the FBI came to assist too. To this day his son asks where is the report!
I will apply pressure, speak to others in and out of government but the struggle could be in vain. I suppose the ICAO cannot force government to publish. What a pity. They should expel (or suspend) Pakistan from membership of the organization for lack of transparency and actions prejudicial to air safety.
PIA's no.1 pilot in seniority Capt. A.A Khan flew his 720B into the ground on approach on the inaugural flight to Cairo. No one knows why.
My class-mate Capt. K.Wyne was departing Jeddah one night in a 707-320 and it is rumored he had an in-flight cabin fire. He turned around but did not make it. Crashed in Taif.
Capt. I. Janjua flew his A300B4 one step ahead of the step-down Sierra One approach into Khatmandu, Nepal. He hit a ridge. A classic CFIT from which valuable lessons could have been learnt.
I mentioned that very senior commander Capt. Siraj in the 747-200 who forgot to put his gear down landing at Islamabad. Why? All I know is that Capt. Siraj retired.
Finally, an F.27 Fokker Friendship departed Multan on a very hot day when climb performance is degraded and got an engine-fire just after lift-off. He crashed in a field. It was rumored that the aircraft was over-loaded. Since some big shots from the judiciary got killed, the government grounded the entire Fokker fleet. We now have the ATR42.
Not to mention the most dramatic crash of all, the VVIP C-130 of General Zia with the US Ambassador and others on board. It took off after they had witnessed a tank display in central Pakistan and after experiencing several phugoid ossilations [forgive my spelling if wrong] plunged 90 degree nose-down into the ground. Lockheed came to assist; since the US Ambassador was killed the FBI came to assist too. To this day his son asks where is the report!
I will apply pressure, speak to others in and out of government but the struggle could be in vain. I suppose the ICAO cannot force government to publish. What a pity. They should expel (or suspend) Pakistan from membership of the organization for lack of transparency and actions prejudicial to air safety.