Emergency landing Air Maroc on EHAM june 6th
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Everyone is correct in so many ways. I'm also curious that he banked 37.5 INTO the LIVE engine. That takes a lot off very deliberate control input. The fact that N1% was reduced made it easier. At 100% it would have been extremely difficult. As for the F/O, was he sitting there waiting to be toast? The questions arise as to where these guys were trained? They must have flown for an airline before they became contractors. What background checks did the agency carry out, and what checks/tests/training did RAM conduct? The latter should be very interesting and necessary to their local CAA.
Last edited by RAT 5; 5th Dec 2011 at 10:25.
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So it is true: nowadays loss of control is the public enemy number one of aviation safety.
So much for the CFIT reign.
All those years bombarding us with CRM... OK, there was lack of crew communication and lack of first officer assertivenes, but the main problem here was inability to control the aircraft.
What has to be analyzed is: why was the pilot unable to control the airplane? the only explanation is that the captain saw the large flock of birds, felt the impacts and thought that he had lost or could lose both engines. Hence the cracy turn, and lowering the landing gear. I can't explain the thrust reduction, though.
Again, everything seems easy from my chair. Keep wings level, keep climbing, may day, checklists, vectors, landing. Only and engine fire with vibration.
And the nose gear warning.
And not knowing exactly what was going on, who knows maybe you lost two engines...
damn, not so simple!
So much for the CFIT reign.
All those years bombarding us with CRM... OK, there was lack of crew communication and lack of first officer assertivenes, but the main problem here was inability to control the aircraft.
What has to be analyzed is: why was the pilot unable to control the airplane? the only explanation is that the captain saw the large flock of birds, felt the impacts and thought that he had lost or could lose both engines. Hence the cracy turn, and lowering the landing gear. I can't explain the thrust reduction, though.
Again, everything seems easy from my chair. Keep wings level, keep climbing, may day, checklists, vectors, landing. Only and engine fire with vibration.
And the nose gear warning.
And not knowing exactly what was going on, who knows maybe you lost two engines...
damn, not so simple!
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The F/O had 2308 hrs on the B737 of which 2147 hrs at Atlas Blue (RAM). He got most of his hrs/training at Atlas Blue. The Capt. had 7200 hrs on the B737 of which 1218 hrs flying for Atlas Blue. For which operators the Capt. worked before Atlas Blue isn't clear.
Note Atlas Blue was joined with RAM in March of 2011.
Note Atlas Blue was joined with RAM in March of 2011.
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Very true RAT 5, however the decision to turn into the knackered engine undoubtably wasn't a conscious decision. I think capacity had been completely strained here. The reason for the left turn was probably something along the lines departing from 18L ( in order to keep the runway on the captains side ) or something as simple as the captain sitting on the left of the aircraft! Who knows. Yes, the manouvre would be very difficult to control, especially with the gear down. I don't believe the thrust was decreased on number 2 due to this. I don't think the guy displays the necessary capacity. I may be wrong.
As for their training records, these may be difficult to track. I have flown with many contractors. The vast majority have flown for airlines across the globe; many now defunct. From their stories, recurrent training and checking standards vary widely. However can you really accumulate 7200hrs on type with a command without displaying some degree of awareness. That's baffling
As for their training records, these may be difficult to track. I have flown with many contractors. The vast majority have flown for airlines across the globe; many now defunct. From their stories, recurrent training and checking standards vary widely. However can you really accumulate 7200hrs on type with a command without displaying some degree of awareness. That's baffling
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Quote:
and completed programming of the flight management computer,
Give me strength, who needs an FMS when a vector to final is needed. Can no modern Jet been flown without a computer being involved or is it just that the pilots do not know how to do it?
and completed programming of the flight management computer,
Give me strength, who needs an FMS when a vector to final is needed. Can no modern Jet been flown without a computer being involved or is it just that the pilots do not know how to do it?
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I think it's fair that the DSB spends quite some paper on the topic of goose control, because implementing measures will mean a structural safety improvement for EHAM.
On the incident flight, it looks like the captain lost his cool, made several bad decisions and seemed to have forgotten all he was trained to do in this situation, I don't think that a CVR transcript will show more than "panic in the cockpit".
We all agree that a pilot who panics because of an incident is likely to make the already bad situation worse. The big question is how to get cool heads in the cockpit so that we don't depend on luck to get the plane safely on the ground. In my opinion simulator training plays a big role in this.
But to asses whether a pilot will "break" it is important that the situation of an incident is simulated as good as possible, and that includes the aspect of surprise. It is not too difficult to include that in a simulator session...
On the other hand, pilots in a simulator know that they'll walk away from a "crash"; creating the true fear of death will be impossible in a sim.
On the incident flight, it looks like the captain lost his cool, made several bad decisions and seemed to have forgotten all he was trained to do in this situation, I don't think that a CVR transcript will show more than "panic in the cockpit".
We all agree that a pilot who panics because of an incident is likely to make the already bad situation worse. The big question is how to get cool heads in the cockpit so that we don't depend on luck to get the plane safely on the ground. In my opinion simulator training plays a big role in this.
But to asses whether a pilot will "break" it is important that the situation of an incident is simulated as good as possible, and that includes the aspect of surprise. It is not too difficult to include that in a simulator session...
On the other hand, pilots in a simulator know that they'll walk away from a "crash"; creating the true fear of death will be impossible in a sim.
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RAT 5, sorry, I'm cooking and enjoying a beer with it, but it seems to me that banking into the dead engine does not require any decisive control input! Just let go of the controls and every airplane will bank into the dead engine!! Like I said, I'm enjoying a nice beer but did I read your comment correctly or is my brain really failing me?
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Don't be sorry vanHorck, eyewitnesses can be reliable as well ...
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It is pretty disconcerting (to put it mildly) to think, when boarding a commercial flight, that such an inept pilot may be at the controls.
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Following the Hudson incident, Ryanair in Ciampino, and for those of us with longer memories, Dan Air in Newcastle, it is reasonable to be afraid in any major strike that you have buggered both engines, but. . . . . if (for some reason we cannot fathom) he was convinced this was the case,regardless of the evidence available, why didn't he simply request a visual teardrop & immediate reland on the reciprocal runway, & then maximise the performance available to gain enough height to make a 180 (yes yes I know , more like a 220/230 I have played in the Sim with this scenario) & reland in some sort of controlled fashion ? This guy seems to have panicked completely, resulting in. . . A -Failed to ascertain he had no particular problem with the good engine & /or B - decided the severe vibration he was feeling was due to the good engine , ignoring the fact the duff one was still running C - seems to have really panicked himself into taking precipitous action , at very low altitude, without even telling the guy next to him what he had decided & why (never mind involving ATC in the secret) + D - having made this decision, compounded the cock-up by pretty poor flying & bizarre actions (lowering the gear/ decreasing power on the good engine.)
Totally agree with previous posters, they were very lucky this didn't happen anywhere involving terrain or weather, or we would be discussing an accident report.
One has to ask " WHAT WERE THEY DOING ? ? ? " it doesn't really appear they had an answer to this question.
Totally lost the plot, is how it sadly appears.
Totally agree with previous posters, they were very lucky this didn't happen anywhere involving terrain or weather, or we would be discussing an accident report.
One has to ask " WHAT WERE THEY DOING ? ? ? " it doesn't really appear they had an answer to this question.
Totally lost the plot, is how it sadly appears.
1. Shortly after takeoff a collision with a bird caused damage to the left hand engine which reduced the available thrust from that engine by about 45%. The crew decided correctly to return to Amsterdam's Schiphol Airport.
2. The implementation of the return however were not in line with standard operating procedures, the deviations were:
- the execution of a right hand turn at 260 feet AGL with a bank angle of 37.5 degrees instead of continuing straight until minimum safe altitude has been reached and the gear has been retracted
2. The implementation of the return however were not in line with standard operating procedures, the deviations were:
- the execution of a right hand turn at 260 feet AGL with a bank angle of 37.5 degrees instead of continuing straight until minimum safe altitude has been reached and the gear has been retracted
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The F/O had 2308 hrs on the B737 of which 2147 hrs at Atlas Blue (RAM). He got most of his hrs/training at Atlas Blue. The Capt. had 7200 hrs on the B737 of which 1218 hrs flying for Atlas Blue. For which operators the Capt. worked before Atlas Blue isn't clear.
Note Atlas Blue was joined with RAM in March of 2011.
Note Atlas Blue was joined with RAM in March of 2011.
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Not to mention that he was single engine, gear down, flaps out and if I remember correctly, it was a landing over MLW, so it was a heavy bird. Its sluggish enough on single engine with gear up. Lack of performance created by his actions made him to question the aircrafts performance?
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The fact that thrust lever reached the firewall makes me think they were in a "slow flight", inside the reverse command region. Small increments of thrust will not suffice, and more and more thurst is required to maintain an airspeed, until you are almost in TOGA. It takes a large overpower to get out of that situation.
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734 Fuel dumping
Only an SLF, but have a keen interest in Boeing aircraft. I understood that the 737 series doesn't have fuel dumping capability. I don't mind being proved wrong, just interested to know.
Can any of real pilots confirm / disagree?
Can any of real pilots confirm / disagree?
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To all who noticed my deliberate mistake about Dead & Live engine I award you an early Christmas present and a Prune Pen. I've amended my error, but you all knew what I meant, not what I said. Brain and finger disconnect. Ah, there comes another source of an incident when you did what you thought I meant and not what I said.