Kiwi B777 burst 12 tyres in aborted takeoff at NRT
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Most here seem to fall in one camp or the other. There is the "it's always the Captains decision" camp and the "If I'm qualified to fly the plane I'm qualified to call a reject" camp.
It's not a black and white situation. It would be very nice if it was, if we could simply make a rule that applies in every single situation, but we can't, the situations are too varied and dynamic.
Blah Blah Blah's example where he had two events unfolding but the Captain was only aware of one is a good example. The Captain was forced to make a decision ("continue") based on half of the information. The fully qualified pilot sitting next to him was privvy to all of the information not because of experience, not because of how many stripes he has on his shoulders, but by virtue of the fact he was the PM at that moment.
If you reside in "Camp One" how do you think this situation should have been dealt with?
Incapacitation (especially subtle incapacitation) is another situation that highlights the fact that although it would be nice to put it in a box and say "it is always the Captains decision" , that is not always the best course of action.
So how do we stop 500hour F/O's from rejecting when the Captain has called 'continue' while at the same time recognising that in some rare situations this would indeed be the correct thing to do?
Ahhhhh aviation, gotta love it
It's not a black and white situation. It would be very nice if it was, if we could simply make a rule that applies in every single situation, but we can't, the situations are too varied and dynamic.
Blah Blah Blah's example where he had two events unfolding but the Captain was only aware of one is a good example. The Captain was forced to make a decision ("continue") based on half of the information. The fully qualified pilot sitting next to him was privvy to all of the information not because of experience, not because of how many stripes he has on his shoulders, but by virtue of the fact he was the PM at that moment.
If you reside in "Camp One" how do you think this situation should have been dealt with?
Incapacitation (especially subtle incapacitation) is another situation that highlights the fact that although it would be nice to put it in a box and say "it is always the Captains decision" , that is not always the best course of action.
So how do we stop 500hour F/O's from rejecting when the Captain has called 'continue' while at the same time recognising that in some rare situations this would indeed be the correct thing to do?
Ahhhhh aviation, gotta love it
cjam;
Yep. Gotta love it.
We can build unlimited scenarios and bring individual experiences to bear on the case for doing something one way vice another. The key is in large data amounts and wide industry experience, not one's particular event. It's been said and we know that no situation is going to be fully covered and that takes us back to an important comment earlier in the thread - "decison making is what pilots are for".
Not necessarily. In and of itself, I would not consider an incapacitation a reason for a reject above 100kts so what we're really talking about here is a double failure over a period of about 5 to 8 seconds (100kts to V1) which means an incapacitation in combination with a Master Warning, an engine fire/failure, an unflyable airplane, or a runway incursion. And as I pointed out in a previous post above, incapacitation is part of the reason why verbal challenge-response calls regarding speeds, etc are made during the takeoff roll.
Given the timings and probabilities involved, while possible, such a double-failure is no more an issue than other significant but extremely rare occurrences during takeoff. If these circumstances obtain, yes, it is one of those really bad days where the remaining PF uses every ounce of experience and airmanship he/she can muster.
I think that is a worrisome and very possible scenario if any pilot can reject a takeoff. Disagreements and/or confusion in the cockpit at critical times have caused numerous accidents and THAT is (in today's industry, as presently constituted), the main reason why only the captain should be responsible for the reject.
So how do we stop 500hour F/O's from rejecting when the Captain has called 'continue' while at the same time recognising that in some rare situations this would indeed be the correct thing to do?
Ahhhhh aviation, gotta love it
Ahhhhh aviation, gotta love it
We can build unlimited scenarios and bring individual experiences to bear on the case for doing something one way vice another. The key is in large data amounts and wide industry experience, not one's particular event. It's been said and we know that no situation is going to be fully covered and that takes us back to an important comment earlier in the thread - "decison making is what pilots are for".
Incapacitation (especially subtle incapacitation) is another situation that highlights the fact that although it would be nice to put it in a box and say "it is always the Captains decision" , that is not always the best course of action.
Given the timings and probabilities involved, while possible, such a double-failure is no more an issue than other significant but extremely rare occurrences during takeoff. If these circumstances obtain, yes, it is one of those really bad days where the remaining PF uses every ounce of experience and airmanship he/she can muster.
So how do we stop 500hour F/O's from rejecting
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"I would not consider an incapacitation a reason for a reject above 100kts so what we're really talking about here is a double failure over a period of about 5 to 8 seconds (100kts to V1) which means an incapacitation in combination with a Master Warning, an engine fire/failure, an unflyable airplane, or a runway incursion."
I agree that an incapacitation in the high speed phase is not cause for rejecting. I think incapacitation here is fairly subjective though. Many people think of it as a heart attack or passing out or some other obvious ailment. In reality subtle incapacitation is much more likely and can be caused (as I'm sure you know) by many many things. Is it for example "subtle incapacitation", if the shock and surprise of an engine failure 15kts before V1 results in a stunned mullet reaction from a pilot as the event seeps slowly into his/ her fatigued brain? Another subject perhaps.
"I think that is a worrisome and very possible scenario if any pilot can reject a takeoff. Disagreements and/or confusion in the cockpit at critical times have caused numerous accidents and THAT is (in today's industry, as presently constituted), the main reason why only the captain should be responsible for the reject. "
I tend to agree with you on that, I think you have come close the the reality of the situation with that statement. But it still needs recognising that that is not the optimal situation. That may be how we can get the safest environment for operations in the near term, but I don't think it is the best we can do long term. Your paragraph above conceedes problems with the industry. It is a band-aid to cover a wound not a scratch. We may not be able to reverse the situation we find ourselves in now (inexperienced fo's flying large modern jets with the bare minimal recurrent training, maximum duty hours and low salaries), but if we don't we will have to continue to have "less than optimum" SOP's such as the one above.
"Continue...."
I agree that an incapacitation in the high speed phase is not cause for rejecting. I think incapacitation here is fairly subjective though. Many people think of it as a heart attack or passing out or some other obvious ailment. In reality subtle incapacitation is much more likely and can be caused (as I'm sure you know) by many many things. Is it for example "subtle incapacitation", if the shock and surprise of an engine failure 15kts before V1 results in a stunned mullet reaction from a pilot as the event seeps slowly into his/ her fatigued brain? Another subject perhaps.
"I think that is a worrisome and very possible scenario if any pilot can reject a takeoff. Disagreements and/or confusion in the cockpit at critical times have caused numerous accidents and THAT is (in today's industry, as presently constituted), the main reason why only the captain should be responsible for the reject. "
I tend to agree with you on that, I think you have come close the the reality of the situation with that statement. But it still needs recognising that that is not the optimal situation. That may be how we can get the safest environment for operations in the near term, but I don't think it is the best we can do long term. Your paragraph above conceedes problems with the industry. It is a band-aid to cover a wound not a scratch. We may not be able to reverse the situation we find ourselves in now (inexperienced fo's flying large modern jets with the bare minimal recurrent training, maximum duty hours and low salaries), but if we don't we will have to continue to have "less than optimum" SOP's such as the one above.
"Continue...."
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lomapaseo writes:
I always thought that it was important for only the two guys at the controls to know who who calls the abort and unimportant/ambigous to anybody else
I always thought that it was important for only the two guys at the controls to know who who calls the abort and unimportant/ambigous to anybody else
Later on while sorting out facts and trying to apply those facts to improve safety, then it's everyone's business.
Or at least "everyone" as it applies to sorting out the facts.
Much better to learn from someone's bad adventure than to repeat it.
RR
I fly for an outfit where either pilot can call the abort. We also operate a policy where the NHP (PM) can call 'what he sees' leaving the PF to make the call, even if the PM is the captain and the PF the co. As PF we will always have a hand on the throttles until V1 is called.
Not sure I can ever see a scenario where an abort was called below V1 when the captain would know better and ignore it. If you abort below V1 then you will always be safe and at least can talk about it safely and comfortably in the crewroom.
Not sure I can ever see a scenario where an abort was called below V1 when the captain would know better and ignore it. If you abort below V1 then you will always be safe and at least can talk about it safely and comfortably in the crewroom.
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Interesting that with so much ill informed speculation about the RTO speed and what actually occurred that others with real information of what happened have not come forward to comment.
I think you will find that the vast majority of the worlds airlines operate that way on the advice of Boeing and Airbus who both consider it provides the best percentage chance of a good decision. Perhaps you would rather have a nice inclusive group hug and a chat about it as the end of the runway looms at 300ft per second.
Actually the Captain has sole responsibility for just about everything that happens anyway, CRM is about using your available resources effectively to make good decisions not about sharing or spreading the responsibility for those decisions.
Think there are a lot people who rejected close to V1 who would disagree with that statement, you might have no choice but safe it ain't.
Actually the Captain has sole responsibility for just about everything that happens anyway, CRM is about using your available resources effectively to make good decisions not about sharing or spreading the responsibility for those decisions.
If you abort below V1 then you will always be safe.
Originally Posted by WindSheer
That goes totally against modern CRM practices.
As has been pointed out, the rejected takeoff decision isn't a group decision because there is no time. Where CRM enters into such a decision is in the takeoff briefing during the cockpit check where the captain ensures that everybody comprehends and agrees with how a reject will be done and what each members' duties are.
If your comment is of the thinking that the F/O, if he/she is doing the takeoff, should have the decision-making capability, then you are just changing the location of the single decision to reject.
Beyond this, if you haven't already, please read the entire thread as this and other similar points have been discussed and your point, if this isn't it, may be addressed.
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At the airline I fly for it is the Captain's responsibility to reject the takeoff. The PM will call out the malfunction and, as the Captain always has his hands on the thrust levers, he will initiate the rejected T/O.
CRM is for who pays for the first beer. Just kidding, CRM has it's place but a rejected T/O is not one of them. CRM is useful for situations where there is time to set up a plan of action.
CRM is for who pays for the first beer. Just kidding, CRM has it's place but a rejected T/O is not one of them. CRM is useful for situations where there is time to set up a plan of action.
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Theres no reason for a F/O to not be able to make that call. If something doesn't feel right in terms of controls etc to either pilot then not calling an abort is utterly stupid.. Aborting a t/o is a serious thing , something that doesnt get done often however if theres reason for either pilot to call it then they should be able too. Safety first. F/O's arent stupid.
That goes totally against modern CRM practices.
F/O's arent stupid.
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A devil's advocate would say that most professional crew have not experienced a real technical failure leading to a high-speed RTO.
CRM is a red herring if everyone is briefed and knows what they are doing in the flightdeck - either approach can be feasible and right.
What is not acceptable are jumpy FOs calling RTO for minor occurrences, and Captains who don't listen to the best advice of their highly-trained colleagues albeit with less flying time.
Black and white is never right...
CRM is a red herring if everyone is briefed and knows what they are doing in the flightdeck - either approach can be feasible and right.
What is not acceptable are jumpy FOs calling RTO for minor occurrences, and Captains who don't listen to the best advice of their highly-trained colleagues albeit with less flying time.
Black and white is never right...
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Exactly
If your company SOP is that the nominated commander makes the decision, then the other guy should call what he sees. Give him the info to make that decision.
If you're really convinced that you're going to die as a result of that decision, then you're between a rock and a hard place. All bets are off, do what you believe to be best, but be prepared to defend your your actions if you survive.
If your company SOP is that the nominated commander makes the decision, then the other guy should call what he sees. Give him the info to make that decision.
If you're really convinced that you're going to die as a result of that decision, then you're between a rock and a hard place. All bets are off, do what you believe to be best, but be prepared to defend your your actions if you survive.
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AD 2010-06-09
Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing Company Model 777-200, - 200LR, -300, -300ER, and 777F Series Airplanes
SUMMARY: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Model 777-200, -200LR, -300, -300ER, and 777F series airplanes. This AD requires installing new operational program software for the autopilot flight director computers. This AD results from reports of rejected takeoffs at speeds above takeoff decision speed following inadvertent autopilot engagement on the ground, and from the discovery during flight simulations that the climb gradient is less than optimal for obstacle clearance during a performance-limited takeoff situation. We are issuing this AD to prevent inadvertent engagement of the autopilot during takeoff roll, which could result in rejected takeoff at rotation speed, and consequent possible overrun of the runway. We are also issuing this AD to prevent a lower-than-optimal climb gradient during takeoff, and consequent failure to clear obstacles on the ground during a performance-limited takeoff.
DATES: This AD is effective April 1, 2010.
Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing Company Model 777-200, - 200LR, -300, -300ER, and 777F Series Airplanes
SUMMARY: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Model 777-200, -200LR, -300, -300ER, and 777F series airplanes. This AD requires installing new operational program software for the autopilot flight director computers. This AD results from reports of rejected takeoffs at speeds above takeoff decision speed following inadvertent autopilot engagement on the ground, and from the discovery during flight simulations that the climb gradient is less than optimal for obstacle clearance during a performance-limited takeoff situation. We are issuing this AD to prevent inadvertent engagement of the autopilot during takeoff roll, which could result in rejected takeoff at rotation speed, and consequent possible overrun of the runway. We are also issuing this AD to prevent a lower-than-optimal climb gradient during takeoff, and consequent failure to clear obstacles on the ground during a performance-limited takeoff.
DATES: This AD is effective April 1, 2010.