Eurocypria Airlines LTD Incident EPKT 2009-11-09

[A4]

Yes, I'm talking about the approach ban. There is nothing to stop an aircraft commencing an approach. It could be 75m RVR on your CAT 1 runway - you need 550m - but you can start an approach in the hope that the RVR will improve. However, the RVR must have improved by the time you reach 1000' ARTE (above runway threshold elevation). The outer marker or 4 miles are also usable as alternatives. If at the "approach ban" point (1000') the RVR is still below the required value - you MUST go around.

If the value is above required at 1000' - you can continue. If it falls below required RVR after you have passed the ban point, you can continue down to your applicable minima to land or go-around as required.

So on the incident in question is it highly likely that RVR was below required at the approach ban point so a go-around should have been executed....... breaking the sequence which lead to the subsequent events.


Clear?

A4

[act700]

A4, right on, thx mate.

On the west side of the lake you can't even start an approach unless you have the required landing minimums. Hence the confusion.
A bit different here. Maybe I'm one of the few on this board who learned something?!

Cupoftea,

see how it's done?? I saved myself the trouble of hitting the books and doing all that work, and just had it explained to me!!
Now, if that's not efficient....

[sweetie76]

A4

Yes, I'm talking about the approach ban. There is nothing to stop an aircraft commencing an approach. It could be 75m RVR on your CAT 1 runway - you need 550m - but you can start an approach in the hope that the RVR will improve.


Are you sure you can commence an approach on a CAT I runway when the RVR is lower than CAT I minima?

[FlightDetent]

Perhaps I could attempt to help clarify few country-specific issues.

"Approach ban" is a descriptive term for a UK specific procedure, which is definitely not applicable in Polish sovereign airspace and I pretty much doubt that Cypriot operator would be affected either. Hence it is quite possible for even the smartest of folk to never have heard of it, until they are trained for UK ops.

This UK specific procedure enables ATC to (verbally) prohibit aircraft from continuing approach if met conditions are below some sort of "absolute minimum". There even exist a RT phrase that shall be cited to the commander of offending A/C.

The EU-OPS (by today's status a pan European aviation law) has a similar provision that targets shooting an approach below MNM. EU-OPS is uniformly applicable to all operators from EASA states - Cyprus included.

OPS 1.405 Commencement and continuation of approach
(a) The commander or the pilot to whom conduct of the flight has been delegated may commence an instrument approach regardless of the reported RVR/visibility but the approach shall not be continued beyond the outer marker, or equivalent position, if the reported RVR/visibility is less than the applicable minima.
(b) /.......removed for simplicity...../
(c) If, after passing the outer marker or equivalent position in accordance with (a) above, the reported RVR/visibility falls below the applicable minimum, the approach may be continued to DA/H or MDA/H.
(d) /.......removed for simplicity...../
(e) The approach may be continued below DA/H or MDA/H and the landing may be completed provided that the required visual reference is established at the DA/H or MDA/H and is maintained.
(f) The touch-down zone RVR is always controlling. /.......removed for simplicity...../

Sure it seems that among others the investigator will need to pull these drawers out:
- what was the reported RVR over OM/eq. position, i.e. was the crew legal to continue to DH?
- was the required visual reference achieved at and maintained below DH, i.e. was the crew legal not to go around?

I understand that you'll had been saying this for few posts upwards already, just wanted to make sure you don’t rip yer head off over different lingo while in agreement otherwise. Of course, I will be most happy and stand by to be educated further. Point one: I recall the definitions of "required visual reference" for CAT II, CAT IIIa, and CAT IIIb with DH. Could you help me pull out the official specs of required visual reference for CAT I?

Yours,
FD (the un-real)

[BOAC]

FD - while I'm sure your question was rhetorical, I will paste EU-OPS for CATI visual references from Appendix 1 (new) to Ops 1.430 Table2/4/b/6 (my bold) for the benefit of all -

6. Visual reference. A pilot may not continue an approach below MDA/MDH unless at least one of the following visual references for the intended runway is distinctly visible and identifiable to the pilot:
(i) elements of the approach light system;
(ii) the threshold;
(iii) the threshold markings;
(iv) the threshold lights;
(v) the threshold identification lights;
(vi) the visual glide slope indicator;
(vii) the touchdown zone or touchdown zone markings;
(viii) the touchdown zone lights;
(ix) runway edge lights; or
(x) other visual references accepted by the Authority.

In other words, just about anything that will let the dog find the rabbit.

[FlightDetent]

The version I have just found on-line seems to indicate that your paragraph was copied from non-precision section of App to 1.430. Needless to say the CAT I paragraph says pretty much the same with exempt of (x).

The vague principles for required visual reference at (M)DA for NPAs and CAT I are based on one very important premise. That being the RVR is 550 or more (nee 300!).

Only then, one could decide to continue with only one distinctly visible and identifiable cue knowing that further down the approach the visual field will expand enabling the pilot to see clearly for the flare, touchdown, and rollout even with simple light facilities. Unlike the (most demanding - no HUD) CAT II manual where lateral and longitudal elements are mandatory at the decision for the sole purpose of making the last seconds of flight and subsequent landing possible for Mk1 eyeball at all.

Yours, FD
(the un-real)

BOAC: You indicate Appendinx (NEW) to OPS 1.430 but the text within still has MDA/H for NPAs. Out of sheer curiousity shouldn't that be DA/H? See, we still operate App (OLD) so I am clueless here...

[BOAC]

Too late in the evening to look at your last para, FD, but you are indeed correct on the rest. The copy of EU-OPS I have jumbles together NPA and Cat I vis requirements in the same para. The heading of para b in which lies /6

(b) Category I, APV and non-precision approach operations

and x) is there!

Maybe it has been tidied up since my copy?

[act700]

FD, thanks for that (first) post clearing things up.

In that case, I take back what I said about things being different on the left side of the ocean, as really, by reading the last 2 or 3 posts, it boils down to the same thing!

In laymen's terms...you can't continue past the OM or equivalent, unless you have required visibility/RVR (for the type of approach you are conducting). And if vis goes down below req'd mins, once inside the OM/FAF, you can continue to DH/MDA "and have a look"!!
Continuing to land only if you have all the other stuff BOAC mentioned, otherwise MAP.

Correct me if I'm wrong, but over here (Euro/JARland) you also must have the minimum ceiling, whereas in the US only visibility is a controlling factor on whether you can start an approach or not (precision or non).

[FlightDetent]

No, for ILS approaches the meteorological minimum is only expressed by terms of RVR (VIS). No ceiling required. (based on JAR-OPS1 a.k.a. EU-OPS (old)).

FD (the un-real)

[BOAC]

act - I think the 'ceiling' thing is an 'historic' from those 'cut off by the English Channel' and I believe even 'les' have come in line.

[Ptkay]

Just to throw some more light on the conditions on that day,
the Wizzair A320 scheduled to EPKT diverted (without starting approach)
to EPKK, where the conditions were bad enough to cause a go-around.

No further approach attempt was undertaken at EPKK and the a/c eventually
diverted and landed in EPWA.

(Source: Polish AAIB web site, events register.)

[stansdead]

The Wizzair aircraft that diverted to EPKK had a system failure that required a mandatory Go Around very close to the Barometric minima.

Enough fuel was on board to still divert to WAW and land, in CAT1 conditions with over 1900 kg in tanks on shutdown. An airline with sensible fuel policy. Especially in Winter.

That is my understanding of events.

[A4]

..... had a system failure that required a mandatory Go Around very close to the Barometric minima.

So presumably it was Cat 1 or better at EPKK? Below Cat 1 you operate to a DH (Decision Height) based on RA (RadAlt) not to a Baro DA (Decision Altitude).

If the were indeed autolanding then they followed the correct procedure to go around for the failure - any more detail on what it was Stan?

A4

[1+F]

The Captain resigned almost three weeks ago.

[Ptkay]

Any more details. please?

[Welcome to HEL]

Well as I know it you dont need ALL of the visual cues. Initially (on minima) you will see approach lights which means contact and you can land. As you get further, the more you will see... My experience tells me that during night with 550m RVR you will see approach lights between 300-200ft RH. (very roughly depending on the fog and lights of course..)

w.t.HEL

[stansdead]

Welcome to HEL,

Extract from our "OM A" with the requirements for a CAT1 ILS approach, in terms of visual references required at MDA:

Visual reference
No pilot may continue a precision approach below the CAT-I decision height as
determined above, unless at least one of the following visual references for the
intended runway is distinctly visible to and identifiable to the pilot.

Elements of the approach light system;

The threshold;

The threshold markings;

The threshold lights;

The threshold identification lights;

The visual glide slope indicator;

The touchdown zone or touchdown zone markings;

The touchdown zone lights;

The runway edge lights.

That should make things clear for everyone. I hope.

[Welcome to HEL]

Yes act700 wrote "Continuing to land only if you have all the other stuff BOAC mentioned, otherwise MAP" and I opposed to the word "all".

w.t.HEL

[Ptkay]

The album with the photos of the damages to the runway and a/c,
as well as some documents has been published on the PKBWL (Polish AAIB) page:

http://www.mi.gov.pl/files/0/1792161/2009962A.pdf

1) This album contains pictures provided by the ports and LAX KTW
and made by PKBWL.
2) As part of describing the album contains pictures of damage to wheels wheels
mounted on an airplane (ie, under load) and pictures of disassembled wheel
( made in the hangar). Images depicting a mounted wheel
show the image as to be seen by the pilots.
3) According to Boeing, and the documentation:
â ˘ 737-6/7/8/9 AMM-ILF ILF-D633A102-rev. 40-Oct 15/2009,
â ˘ Task 32-45-00-700-803,
the damages on each damaged tire eliminates it from service.

It seems they were damn lucky to be able to take off from EPKT and
land in EPWA with such damages to wheels and tires without incident...



Also the final report, unfortunately in Polish, but good images and drawings.

http://www.mi.gov.pl/files/0/1792161/2009962RKPKBWL.pdf

[Ptkay]

The comment of the Polish Board in the final report:
(crew "A" was landing in KTW, crew "B" continued to WAW.)

The Commission draws attention to the unethical behaviour of the crew "A" in relation to
Crew 'B' and failure of current procedures contained in the
Operator Procedures, and international law. The Commission is aware that the crew of the "A"
was in a very big stress after landing, but comparing the damage to the
aircraft, damage to the runway edge lights and the grass
loading it seems unlikely that the crew was not aware
they rolled off the runway. You must emphasize here the importance of
mutual trust and the importance of the flight crew compliance with operating procedures,
which are the final barrier to prevent the occurrence of aviation incident or accident.
In light of all the analysis you must
note that although the captain is
entitled to delegate tasks to his crew and "other
skilled staff" it, after all, that power does not release him, or his F/O from the requirement to comply with the pre-flight check of the aircraft as
described in the procedures of the Operator. Loading Crew 'A' has not completed
the notification of the incident, and did not transfer ABSOLUTELY NO information and comments to the crew of "B"
and the lack of implementation of the PDI procedure by the crew of "B" - because of her confidence
to the crew of "A" - testified to the lack of awareness of the current technical condition of the
plane. As a result, made a flight from KTW to WAW on a malfunctioning airplane.
This whole chain of events led to a big threat to the flight safety
the return flight to WAW and, as a further consequence, the execution of subsequent three commercial flights
without the implementation of the structural review of the aircraft as prescribed by the "after hard landing" procedure.

(sorry for my poor translation)