the reason to de-ice

[scr1]

BBC NEWS | UK | Scotland | Highlands and Islands | Alert plane had not been de-iced

[bumpfich]

and Commercial Pressures...

and also of interest...

"It [AAIB report] also revealed the pilot had been recovering from a bad cold but felt pressure to fly being the only pilot in Aberdeen qualified to fly to the Faroe airport. "

and Eastern's response...

"As a company, our policies regarding 'fitness to fly' have always clearly stated that crew members should not operate if they do not feel fit to do so."

This will always be the response from any airline if a pilot reports (provided they are still alive) on any investigation (internal, ASR or AAIB) that they felt under commercial pressure to operate...

[Beanbag]

As you say, they'll always counter with that argument. Perhaps one way to head that off, for those unfortunate enough to be assisting an investigation, would be to refer to the monitoring procedures that the companies presumably have (my non-airline employer does anyway) for counting sick days and having 'offer to help' (meaning 'we're watching you') meetings for those who have more sick days than average.

I'm not sure that was the story in this case though - the way I read the story was that he was being a good guy and wanting to get the pax to their destination. It's not like there'll be another one along in a minute from Aberdeen to the Faroes.

[MungoP]

In the last 20 years I've worked both permanent/ long term and short term contracts for many companies.. almost never have had to call in sick but with the exception of one company (US non-profit) have in every case been given a hard time and made to feel that I'm letting the company/fellow crew and pax down...
In the current market there's even less slack in the system to allow for short notice changes in the rosters.

[CapitainKirk]

Very lucky they were

It would appear from reading the AAIB report that not only was the Captain not fit to fly but neither was the aeroplane with an elevator coated with slush.

Since the elevator trim gave reversal - does anyone who knows the Jetstream 41 - know if it is a tab that acts aerodynamically on the elevator - that would explain that methinks.

Sounds like they lucky missed (probably down to the extensive experience on type of the Captain) the third mistake that could have caused a tragedy. Too many holes in perfect aligment there lucklily the last one like their elevators hinges was blocked or the story would have be quite different i suspect.

For sure he was under pressure to GO but deep down he suspected he was pushing his luck - hand flying and not using the A/P to make sure things were OK I wonder being a contractor - if he would he not get paid if he had backed out of taking that flight at such short notice.

[Basil]

Pity when an elder captain has a do like that.
Good reminder that we can all make poor decisions when ill and/or under pressure to go.

[CapitainKirk]

Tis easy for me to say nowadays BUT I always remember(ed) taking off is optional and for sure i could not exist in these days of SOP's hand flying discouraged - positive climb gear up and A/P on - then the regular meetings with the THE BOSS to explain why you did THAT!!! OK i was never one of the quiet ones and more than once said we are NOT GOING for various reasons. Once when we had been sitting too long in snowy conditions in GLA after we had been de-iced - What is the problem Captain you have been de-iced - well look at the wings will you i want her de-iced again. The dynamics are all wrong now those on the ground from C/P to Accountant have too much power now and are only focused on the bottom line NOT that this is a problem - Commercial concerns have to be considered of course but not to the exclusion of everything else - the days of the Captain being King are sadly long gone.

I only do yacht delivery trips now and for sure i wont go if i think anything is wrong sailing to someone elses deadline is another silly way to die.

[35hPA28]

Turboprop icing

I've always had the impression that turboprop are more prone to experience icing problems than small GA aircraft or jets. Could anyone please comment on what the causes are?

[Capot]

Would a simplified generalisation be that small GA aircraft are not flown much in icing conditions, and jets fly above them?

[Clandestino]

Quite correct. Also flying around at 250 KIAS or more does wonders for ram air temperature rise so even as jets fly through icing areas, much less of ice clings to airframe than it would at typical turboprop climbing speeds of 140-210 KIAS. Not to mention media hysteria that every time turboprop crashes brings stories like "Turboprops are flying coffins in ice!". I suppose that Joe Publics who still remember Colgan disaster mainly think it was ice related.

This incident is a wonderful example of experience vs. knowledge. Capt was 63, he was TRE, he had 12 000 hrs, 4000 on type, he was formerly employed by BaE. And yet he decided to take-off with snow merely swept away from the airframe and with no anti-icing fluid on the aeroplane, despite the snowfall. Of course it's best to be both knowledgeable and experienced, but even the members of 10000hrs+ club sometimes have to do something for the first time in their flying careers. Outcome tends to be better if they know what they're doing.

[BOAC]

Clandestino - I think your second paragraph is a liitle harsh? Yes, the guy made an error of judgement, but as hinted at above, there may well have been several other 'errors' in the chain behind him which may not have been addressed. He will undoubtably have 'learnt' from this (indeed, one never stops 'learning') but have the 'others'? Was there a collective sigh of relief "Whew, we got away with it".

[Tmbstory]

The need to De-ice

The whole of an aircraft needs to be de-iced prior to take off, either by fluid or manually, otherwise safe flight cannot be assured.

In the past, in Far Eastern Russia, when the fluid had run out (sometimes by drinking), it could take up to four hours to manually de-ice a Corporate jet sized aircraft prior to departure. It was a welcome time when we obtained a heated hangar!

Tmb

[no sig]

BOAC, you have it one. I know the Captain concerned and would fly with him anyday. And if there is anyone who will have searched his soul over this event, its him.

[excrab]

Clandestino,

To be fair, this may not have been something he was doing for the first time. Reading the AAIB report he decided that the aircraft needed de-icing and he decided on a method by which it could be done. He asked the local engineering contractor to carry out this service, and accepted a thumbs up from them as being that the work had been done, assuming that it included the tail surfaces. He should perhaps have bothered to get out of his seat and open the door and talk to them, or open the window and do the same to get a proper report, but other than that his decision that despite the weather there was no problem with hold over times so anti-iceing wasn't needed seems to be borne out by the fact that there were no deposits on the wings when they got airborne, so if the tail had been de-iced also the event would not have occurred.

I am also a member of the "10,000 hour club", and it doesn't mean you always get things right, that is why you have someone, normally a member of the "less than 10,000 hour club", sitting next to you so you can spot each others mistakes. But in all the times I have sat in the left hand front seat of an aircraft during de-icing, or boarded one which has been de-iced, I have never asked for the loan of a cherry picker or other means to inspect the tail, and no F/O has suggested that I should -I have inspected the parts of the airframe that I can reach or see, and taken the report from the de-icing crew that the job has been done properly to mean that it has.

This appears to be an issue as much for Eastern and their de-icing contractor at ABZ as anything else - if they cannot provide the service required because of a lack of de-icing rigs then the airlines quality department, which presumably also audits contractors, should be discussing with them the need for more equipment and proper training if they wish to keep the contract.

[Misterredmist]

DE-ICE

Well said Excrab, that clears a lot up.......... I think everyone should
be reminded of Rudi Kapustin's (NTSB) words about ice on the airframe
= people are going to die......

[FEHERTO]

It is always funny to hear the stories about de-icing from old times in Russia.

"People had been drinking de-icing fluid ....". The Russian Arktika Fluid, at these times the only one available, had been made out of Di-Ethylene-Glycol. 100ml would kill a big man with a weight of 100kg. So, I would suggest to stop such stupid stories.

I am dealing in these countries when they still had been in the USSR and 95% of the stories I hear are simply "bla bla bla".

Reality is: Every pilot, who is taking of an aircraft with a contaminated wing or flight controls or any other critical surface is risking the life of crew and passengers and the loss of the aircraft. His/her licence should has to be taken immediately.

But not only focus on the pilots. Before 1998 mainly engineers made the treatment job and final check, now we often have absolutely unqualified ground staff doing it. In such a case the flight crews need to do a little bit more extra, if possible.

The commercial aviation business (not counting the former USSR) lost more than 70 aircraft because of icing up, or improper de-icing/anti-icing in the last 30 years. There is no room for "stories", to serious. And no not kill me for this statement, it is true: Pilots of business jet operators or corporate flight squads are the ones with the lowest knowledge.

[FEHERTO]

EXCRAB

But you face a major problem in a lot of airports: You often have only one service provider and you are forced to take the service as it is or you will not fly.

Especially business jet operators have to deal with this problem on a daily basis in winter. But exactly most of them are not spending a minute and a dollar on an audit program. Look on the statistics and you will see that the last three accidents happened in the range of business jets:
- Moscow-Vnukovo, February 2007, CL600
- Almaty, December 2007, CL600
- Yerevan, February 2008, CRJ200

A lot of these operators do not have the most essential things:
- training for flight crews
- updated hold-over-time charts
- list of qualified fluids
- and some more

Being in this business for nearly 20 years, the standard in a lot of places is going down and does not improve at all. A lot of pilots are forced to deal with such conditions and do it, meaning they fly. I know only a few guys who step out of the cockpit and say "NO".

[Madbob]

What more reason than this do you need to de-ice?

S1/2002 - Bombardier Challenger CL-600-2B16, N90AG

AAIB Bulletin No: S1/2002 Ref: EW/C2002/1/2 Category: 1.1
Aircraft Type and
Registration:

Bombardier Challenger CL-600-2B16, N90AG

Serial Number:

5414

Year of Manufacture:

1999

Date & Time (UTC):

4 January 2002 at 1207 hrs

Location:

Birmingham International Airport

Type of Flight:

Private (FAR Part 91)

Persons on Board:

Crew - 2 Passengers - 3

Injuries:

Crew - 2 Fatal Passengers 3 Fatal

Nature of damage:

Aircraft destroyed

Commander's Licence:

FAA Airline Transport Pilot's Certificate

Commander's Flying
Experience:

Approximately 10,000 hours (of which about 500
were on type)

Information Source:

AAIB Inspector's Investigation

History of the flight

The aircraft arrived at Birmingham Airport on 3 January 2002 at 2039 hrs after a non-stop
international flight from West Palm Beach Airport, Florida, USA. The Birmingham METAR for
2050 hrs indicated that the surface wind was from 120° at 6 kt, visibility 8 km, no significant
weather, temperature minus 1°C, dew point minus 2°C, QNH 1026 mb.
On arrival, the commander stated that the refuelling could be done the following morning in time
for the planned 1200 hrs departure to Bangor Airport, Maine, USA. The aircraft was parked
overnight on the Western Apron. The same 2 pilots and 3 passengers were to board the aircraft for
the accident flight the following day.
There was no precipitation while the aircraft was at Birmingham. The air temperature remained
below zero with a minimum temperature of minus 9°C at 0550 hrs. Initially, the sky was clear but
the amount of cloud increased to give variable cloud cover after midnight. The surface wind
remained south-easterly at less than 5 kt.
The next morning, one of the crew, together with one of the passengers, arrived at the aircraft at
approximately 1040 hrs. The commander arrived at approximately 1100 hrs. At different times,
each crew member was seen to carry out an independent external inspection of the aircraft. Aircraft
refuelling commenced at about 1105 hrs and the aircraft fuel tanks were reported full (20,000 lb) at
about 1140 hrs. Then, following the arrival of the remaining two passengers, the aircraft doors were
closed. During the morning, other witnesses stated that they had seen frost or ice on the wing
surfaces of N90AG prior to departure.
Other aircraft, which had been parked overnight, were de-iced during the morning, with associated
reports of moderate to severe ice or frost accumulations. Neither crew member requested de-icing,
so N90AG was not de-iced prior to departure. The Birmingham METAR at 1150 hrs indicated that
the surface wind was from 150° at 6 kt, visibility 8 km, scattered cloud, base 700 feet agl and
broken cloud, base 800 feet agl. The outside air temperature was minus 2°C with dew point minus
3°C. The QNH was 1027 mb.
There were no ATC flow restrictions to affect the flight and ATC start clearance was obtained
immediately on request. The engines were started at 1156 hrs and N90AG was cleared to taxy at
1201 hrs.
The preceding aircraft movement on Runway 15 was a landing BAe 146 aircraft about one minute
before N90AG's departure. The previous departing aircraft had been an Embraer 145 a few minutes
before that.
At 1206 hrs, N90AG was cleared to line up on Runway 15 and at 1207 hrs take-off clearance was
issued with a surface wind from 140° at 8 kt.
The pilot in the left seat was handling the controls and the commander was seated in the right seat.
Flap 20 had been selected for take-off and the following speeds had been calculated and briefed by
the pilots: V1 137 kt; VR 140 kt; V2 147 kt. Initial post-accident assessment has shown these
speeds to be appropriate to the estimated weight of the aircraft.

Flight recorder information

The aircraft was fitted with a solid state Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR), and a solid state Flight
Data Recorder (FDR). All available data was successfully recovered from both recorders.
The take-off appeared normal up to the time of lift-off. Rotation was initiated at about 146 kt with
an initial pitch rate of approximately 4°/second. Lift-off occurred 2 seconds later, at about 153 kt,
with a pitch attitude of about 8° nose-up. Once airborne, the elevator position reduced from 8° to 3°
(aircraft nose-up) whilst the pitch rate increased to about 5°/second.
Immediately after lift-off, the aircraft started to bank to the left. The rate of bank increased rapidly
and 2 seconds after lift-off the aircraft had reached 50° left wing down. At that point, the aircraft
heading had diverged about 10° to the left. Opposite aileron, followed closely by rudder, had been
applied as the aircraft started banking; full right aileron and rudder had been applied within 1
second and were maintained until the end of the recording. As the bank angle continued to increase,
progressively more aircraft nose-up elevator was applied. The last recorded aircraft attitude was
approximately 111° left bank and 13° nose-down pitch.
Initial analysis of the FDR parameters indicated that both engines were functioning normally from
start-up until the end of the recording. There was no indication of any abnormality which could
have accounted for the uncommanded left roll.
The CVR indicated that the crew members were operating normally with no apparent time
pressure. The left seat pilot was handling. There were no audio warnings activated until shortly
after take-off when the automatic voice "Bank Angle" sounded; this occurred within 2 seconds of
the end of the recording. From the CVR, there was no indication that the aircraft's Wing and Cowl
Anti-ice systems were selected ON prior to take-off.

Initial engineering investigation

Witness marks indicated that, following lift-off, N90AG first made ground contact with its left
winglet. Initial contact had been onto the tarmac-surfaced left shoulder of the runway,
approximately 1,415 metre along the 2,605 metre runway (Figure 1). The runway marks and
wreckage damage characteristics showed that the aircraft had been banked approximately 80° left
at this point and had been descending at a comparatively low rate.

After initially tracking 10-15° left of the runway heading, the winglet scraped across the left edge
of the shoulder onto the grass-covered ground adjoining the runway. Ground contact became
progressively heavier, causing the outboard part of the left wing to progressively deform and breakup,
while the aircraft continued to roll to the left. After the left wing had scraped for a total of 120
metres, fuel released from the ruptured wing tank ignited. At the same time, the forward, upper, left
part of the fuselage contacted the ground heavily. This caused severe damage to the upper portion
of the forward fuselage, structural severance of the forward fuselage at the front of the wing centre
section and localised rupture of the right and centre wing fuel tanks. Shortly thereafter, horizontal
stabiliser ground contact caused detachment of the fin from the fuselage and thus separation of the
whole empennage.
The main wreckage, consisting of the wings and the centre and aft fuselage, slid inverted for
approximately 320 metres from the fuselage ground contact point before coming to rest. The
remains of the forward fuselage remained attached by cables and pipelines to the main wreckage, in
approximately its normal relative position, but came to rest upright.
The Airport Fire Service was in attendance less than 1 minute after the aircraft came to rest and
within a short period extinguished a substantial fire centred in the forward fuselage area.
After on-site examination with the assistance of the aircraft manufacturer, the wreckage was moved
to the Western Apron for further examination and to prepare it for onward transportation. The
wreckage has now been moved to the AAIB at Farnborough for more detailed inspection.

Effect on airport operations

The airport was closed from the time of the accident until 1200 hrs on 6 January. Aircraft
operations could not be recommenced until the crash site had been searched and examined in detail,
as a large part of the wreckage trail was located within the runway cleared and graded area. This
area was then required to be completely cleared of debris. This work had to be done primarily
during daylight hours. The search and recovery operation was expedited using extensive resources
from the West Midlands Police in co-operation with Birmingham International Airport Ltd and the
Royal Air Force Aircraft Recovery and Transportation Flight.

Future investigation

The Chief Inspector of Air Accidents has ordered an Inspector's Investigation into the
circumstances of this accident under the provision of the Civil Aviation (Investigation of Air
Accidents and Incidents) Regulations 1996. Investigation work will continue on engineering and

operational aspects.

[BOAC]

Madbob - can we bring this back to reality? Are you suggesting this "63 year old, TRE, 12000 hour etc etc" is not aware of a 'reason to de-ice'? The BBC headline was actually incorrect, and should have read "had not been properly de-iced" which is what the news item goes on to say - quite different?

I do not have any enquiry results available, but comments are 'no anti-icing fluid' was applied, "he did not inspect the tail" etc. Re-read excrab's post. Without knowledge of detail here, why is it assumed that 'anti-icing fluid' was needed? Was precipitation falling or forecast before departure? I have often just 'de-iced' with no anti-ice. In my airline time I have always accepted the 'ok' of the de-icing operative that it has been done correctly and NEVER gone out to 'check the tail' or whatever - common standard practice in many operations. So, was there a misunderstanding between the crew and the de-icers? Did the ground-staff fail to do their job properly?

To 'hint' that the Captain somehow 'failed' in his duties is a little strong, in my opinion, without a little more evidence. I would tend to apply 'benefit of the doubt' here"!

[FEHERTO]

BOAC

Whenever you spray a fluid on your wing it is also an anti-icing. A de-icing process would be only possible with pure water only and this is not approved by any authority. Most pilots are forgetting that they have something on the wing, which may re-freeze, even no active precipitation is present. Very often the wing temperature is much lower than the OAT and well below freezing point. This can cause the fluid to freeze and you have no longer a clean wing.

It is a wrong assumption, I "made a de-icing only". This would only exist, when your temperatures (OAT and surface) are well above freezing point. Which in most cases never happen in winter. Several larger airlines made a wing temperature test programme a few years ago. I had been one of them being involved and I can guarantee you, that your wings stay much longer on cold temperatures you expect.

As a flight crew member you have to take the fact that whenever fluid is sprayed on your wings you better calculate hold-over-time.