Air France Safety report
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AF's hull losses in accidents were:
1940s - 22
1950s - 24
1960s - 9
1970s - 2 (one B747; one Caravelle)
1980s - 3 (one B747; one A300 caused by engine failure (GE CF6); A320 Habsheim)
1990s - 2 (one B747; one B737)
2000s - 3 (one Concorde; one A340 Toronto; one A330 Atlantic)
1940s - 22
1950s - 24
1960s - 9
1970s - 2 (one B747; one Caravelle)
1980s - 3 (one B747; one A300 caused by engine failure (GE CF6); A320 Habsheim)
1990s - 2 (one B747; one B737)
2000s - 3 (one Concorde; one A340 Toronto; one A330 Atlantic)
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Fair use? sure!
Since Concorde was brought down by hitting bits that fell off a USA owned and maintained aircraft - is it fair to use it in a discussion about AF safety?
That the Concorde in question was overweight and that the wind had shifted to a tailwind, extending their take off time - a prudent thought might have been to recalculate the take-off parameters. If they were not overweight and insisting of taking of in a tailwind perhaps they would have survived a loss of a tire or even an engine.
Their response to the fire is another thing.
You could be cruel and say its 'pilot error' because the Captain is always responsible, even to the point of getting out of bed that morning. Or you could be accurate and note that a few decisions made in another direction would have the Concorde flying today? That disaster was waiting to happen. In a way, it was exactly like our own shuttle disaster! For years we watched chunks of foam flail away at the heat shield on blast off - the one thing that prevented the shuttle from burning up on reentry... we played the numbers and we lost. The house always wins
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That the Concorde in question was overweight and that the wind had shifted to a tailwind, extending their take off time - a prudent thought might have been to recalculate the take-off parameters. If they were not overweight and insisting of taking of in a tailwind perhaps they would have survived a loss of a tire or even an engine.
Your quote reminds me of a passenger I had once out of London being some 15 minutes late. Right after gear up, we heard a loud bang explosion like noise. It was dark and we didn't have a clue about what had happened.
We turned back to LHR, as always LHR ATC was great and found out we had hit a goose. Plenty of blood and feathers under my window.
Lufthansa engineering came for the inspection during which one pax started complaining about being delayed.............and probably scared too.
I explained that as cock up and fate had it, we had a goose on our conscience.
The answer was baffling, a bit like your quote
" Had you left on time...................you would never have hit that goose"
According to witnesses....................I did look like a Goldfish for a few seconds.
Last edited by Me Myself; 30th Aug 2009 at 10:51.
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LOL... interesting story, but would not have mattered in YOUR case, since you collided with the 9:30 goose. If you had left on time, then you would have simply collided with the 9:15 goose, so it's not totally your fault (tho I still blame you ! 
Runway debris and animal incursions (including geese) are a fact of life to be planned for and prepared. No doubt Air France is undertaking legal action against Branta canadensis
All is not lost however, the unity and resolve shown by the pilots in demanding new pitot probes is an example of a more proactive approach I hope.
Previous tyre incidents In November, 1981, the American NTSB sent a letter of concern, which included safety recommendations for the Concorde, to the French BEA. That communiqué was the result of the NTSB's investigations of four Air France Concorde incidents, during a 20 month period, from July 1979, through February, 1981. The NTSB described those incidents as “potentially catastrophic,” because they were caused by blown tyres during takeoff. The NTSB also expressed concern about the lack of adequate remedies, on the part of the French, as well as improper crew responses to those incidents.
All is not lost however, the unity and resolve shown by the pilots in demanding new pitot probes is an example of a more proactive approach I hope.
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Since Concorde was brought down by hitting bits that fell off a USA owned and maintained aircraft - is it fair to use it in a discussion about AF safety?
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All is not lost however, the unity and resolve shown by the pilots in demanding new pitot probes is an example of a more proactive approach I hope.
)Unity and resolve is something I have never seen when it comes to french unions.
Bickering ??? Plenty.
" Thou shall not covet thy neighbour's member " simply does not apply.
Had the situation not been so tragic, I would have rolled on my back reading the outrageous claims of " having saved the day " some made, even live on the tele.
As a member of the most representative union ( at least by numbers ) I can tell you these guys closed the door to the stable once the horse had already bolted.
You have a point with your tyre and NTSB thing.
Mr Above post, AF didn't get away with it, they lost an aircraft, a crew, 98 passengers and a great deal of their reputation. Nobody got away with anything I'd say.
Can we go center field here ?
What are we exactly debating ?? I thought it was AF or even french safety culture and ability to operate complex technology. Some even implied we were so goofy we couldn't operate a toaster. Some others marvel at our nuclear plants ( let me tell you no one marvels round about Cherbourg where the water almost glows in the dark ) our TGV and our health system...........which by the way is turning to complete crap. But, that's beside the point.
I tried to explain, in my very humble opinion, where part of the problem may come from and it is certainly a lot more complicated than that.
I very much believe in my boat and crew story ( see above ) and the lack of management purposely displayed all these years to achieve a greater goal....................if that makes any sense because it almost doesn't to me !
A valid point however has been made earlier. France has indeed a Mandarin culture in the industrial world and remembering my early years as a school boy, freedom came when I was sent abroad.
The system was very rigid and questioning your elders absolutly not tolerated.
So yes, in a big industrial outfit like AF or National railways, speaking out requires some courage and this leads to slow down in the decision making process. Nuclear plants ?? I suppose they are so scared to blow us to Mars that they are really extra carefull. Dunno.
Non pun intended, but around a pool, give me well behaved french kids instead of ( sorry, it's going to sting a bit ) noisy little american brats.
Taking into account the loss of 22 hulls in....................zxuze moi ????
1940 ????
Do you have an idea of what kind of stuff was flying in those days, not that I was born ??? Just looking at the pictures makes me freak. 22 was probably an outstanding record for the time.
I think we should start looking post war, let's say 60's ??
In the 60's, with the kind of culture I just described, it came clear there was a problem that needed to be adressed, and fast. Almost all the skippers then had joined right after the war logging...............well, zero time as an F/O. Straight from heaven !! They got to fly all the new toys coming on the market right to the Concorde and many of them turned out to be tyrans. Pan Am wasn't any better, according to a fantastic book " Sky Gods " written by an ex Delta Skipper.
Some are now dead tyrans having slammed at least 2 707's in a mountain directly related to poor CRM.
When I joined, AF hadn't had a hit in 20 years. This brings me back to my merger theory.
Over to you...............and please, leave Asseline in his dark closet.
Last edited by Me Myself; 30th Aug 2009 at 17:18.
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This might be the report here:
http://www.bakchich.info/IMG/pdf/Rap...n_2006_bis.pdf
In French of course.
http://www.bakchich.info/IMG/pdf/Rap...n_2006_bis.pdf
In French of course.
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Me Myself (and I)
I seem to get from your posts there is a problem of immiscible elements: you see it here too, the sometimes gentle (and not so gentle) antagonism between the old school pilots and the new school pilots.. interesting to see that dynamic in a cockpit! So are you saying that AF basically started to breakdown (internal cohesiveness) after the different mergers? i.e. the newly assimilated units just did not merge well or work together?
Just AF safety culture, but thinking out loud, the specific sense of national identity and cultural pride identified by the Concorde, and later, by Airbus... would that affect the ability to look critically and act proactively regarding any faults?
What are we exactly debating ?? I thought it was AF or even french safety culture and ability to operate complex technology.
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Cessnapupp
The answer to your first question is a loud yes. The merger with Air INter was very poorly handled. UTA wasn't so bad, they came with a long haul only network which was easy to integrate and it didn't do too much damage, still you always have the few who stay in mourning for ever.
Air Inter brought with it the whole of the domestic network. Very good for AF as a whole, not so good for those who want to sun themselves under the tropics. I mean, Marseilles isn't really my idea of fun.
For the rest I think I explained extensively how it went.
Second question, the answer is a definite no. No one here, exept the street pundit, does really give a hoot about pride Concorde and Airbus. By the way, Airbus is a consortium and not a french product, this being skillfully reminded whenever there is a purpose to serve.
I guess, it is just hard for people to take a good look at themselves even more when the spot light is on you. I suppose this is only human and not specifically french. As I said earlier, speaking out loud what you think is a risky exercise in a big french corporation with a very strong national culture.
Don't expect the sort of AA confession. " Hi, I am Me Myself and I am a jerk of a pilot " which by the way..........I am not)
The answer to your first question is a loud yes. The merger with Air INter was very poorly handled. UTA wasn't so bad, they came with a long haul only network which was easy to integrate and it didn't do too much damage, still you always have the few who stay in mourning for ever.
Air Inter brought with it the whole of the domestic network. Very good for AF as a whole, not so good for those who want to sun themselves under the tropics. I mean, Marseilles isn't really my idea of fun.
For the rest I think I explained extensively how it went.
Second question, the answer is a definite no. No one here, exept the street pundit, does really give a hoot about pride Concorde and Airbus. By the way, Airbus is a consortium and not a french product, this being skillfully reminded whenever there is a purpose to serve.
I guess, it is just hard for people to take a good look at themselves even more when the spot light is on you. I suppose this is only human and not specifically french. As I said earlier, speaking out loud what you think is a risky exercise in a big french corporation with a very strong national culture.
Don't expect the sort of AA confession. " Hi, I am Me Myself and I am a jerk of a pilot " which by the way..........I am not
)
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In France no matter how good you are at work only important is your education background and diploma...and on top of all: your relationships!
This leads to a very bad SMS in management.
Say people they are what the Earth has the best made and you have a good chance to improve your accident record list.
That doesn't mean this can explain all the AF accidents.
Remember the Tenerif accident and the authocratic behaviour of the KLM chief pilot (peace to his soul).
Proudiness and self confidence have nothing to do with aviation safety and that's unfortunally the way people behave in AF and probably in other majors...
An other thing I would like to point out concerning the French management.
At the opposite of the anglosaxon system French managers (In the airlines at least) are most of the times choosen in the "friends tank" more than in the "tank of good guys" and if possible the chief will choose a guy that is not good enough to take his own position
This leads to a very bad SMS in management.
Say people they are what the Earth has the best made and you have a good chance to improve your accident record list.
That doesn't mean this can explain all the AF accidents.
Remember the Tenerif accident and the authocratic behaviour of the KLM chief pilot (peace to his soul).
Proudiness and self confidence have nothing to do with aviation safety and that's unfortunally the way people behave in AF and probably in other majors...
An other thing I would like to point out concerning the French management.
At the opposite of the anglosaxon system French managers (In the airlines at least) are most of the times choosen in the "friends tank" more than in the "tank of good guys" and if possible the chief will choose a guy that is not good enough to take his own position
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Many thanks Me Myself for those fantastic posts about that AF inside history that I remember quite well. The Unions description is a typical French situation , not limited to AF, we have exactly the same mess in ATC.
Having left France, my home country, 30 years ago , and re- trained to different safety philosophies when I was still young and impressionable, I always looked in the past at the "French cultural exception " with a mix of amazement and sympathy. Like the sympathy one has for the small outsider fighting against the big US Anglo-Saxon machine. It was Ziegler-David fighting Boeing-Goliath, French on the R/T at all costs, Concorde with an "e" in the end, landing an helicopter on top of Mt Everest, just to name a few .
Now a few years later, a lot of incidents/accidents later and looking at the end result (St Odile, Gonesse, Brest, Cayenne/Toronto , Pau, South Atlantic etc..) this feeling has turned to real embarrassment.
I do not want to bring Asseline out of the closet again but It is amazing to think that for a few meters more, the crowd would have cheered and, as training Capt on the first A320s in AF then, he would most probably be chief OPS at AF today.
To change a culture normally takes a generation , but AF managed to pass on that culture from generation to generation.
The Dutch were in a similar situation in the 70s and 80s with blunt overconfidence causing an accident every 3 years , but managed to turn that around completely. The French (and AF) unfortunately has not done that yet. I hope they get the message this time.
The name of the imminent replacement of Gourgeon is already known apparently but will he read and learn from the Colin report and start changing the culture ?
Having left France, my home country, 30 years ago , and re- trained to different safety philosophies when I was still young and impressionable, I always looked in the past at the "French cultural exception " with a mix of amazement and sympathy. Like the sympathy one has for the small outsider fighting against the big US Anglo-Saxon machine. It was Ziegler-David fighting Boeing-Goliath, French on the R/T at all costs, Concorde with an "e" in the end, landing an helicopter on top of Mt Everest, just to name a few .
Now a few years later, a lot of incidents/accidents later and looking at the end result (St Odile, Gonesse, Brest, Cayenne/Toronto , Pau, South Atlantic etc..) this feeling has turned to real embarrassment.
I do not want to bring Asseline out of the closet again but It is amazing to think that for a few meters more, the crowd would have cheered and, as training Capt on the first A320s in AF then, he would most probably be chief OPS at AF today.
To change a culture normally takes a generation , but AF managed to pass on that culture from generation to generation.
The Dutch were in a similar situation in the 70s and 80s with blunt overconfidence causing an accident every 3 years , but managed to turn that around completely. The French (and AF) unfortunately has not done that yet. I hope they get the message this time.
The name of the imminent replacement of Gourgeon is already known apparently but will he read and learn from the Colin report and start changing the culture ?
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Sounds like you are saying that there is a cowboy element at the company that is looked upon favourably, with rules coming in second.
True?
True?
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A generation apart...
Flight deck crew Flight Captain:
* French
* 58 years old
* Entered Air France in 1988
* Qualified on Airbus A330/A340 in February 2007
* 11,000 flight hours, including 1,700 on Airbus A330/A340
2 co-pilots:
* French
* 37 and 32 years old
* Entered Air France in 1999 and 2004
* Qualified on Airbus A330/A340 in April 2002 and June 2008
* 6,600 flight hours, including 2,600 on Airbus A330/A340
* 3,000 flight hours, including 800 on Airbus A330/A340
One question. (before I get to the main) Is there a sub culture that might view 'diverting around weather' to be'somewhat of a pussy/coward' and do you think there may have been a subconcious need for the younger pilots to 'prove we can DO THIS' and ride through the storm? In AF447 you had a very experienced pilot, close to the end of his flight career at 58 with a lot of experience but less experienced in that particular aircraft than the copilot A situation similar to Colgan -Where the younger female copilot had much more hours on that particular type of plane than her senior, and at one point it seemed to me, was interjecting her own orders into the recovery attempt (?) based on what you guys know internally at AF is there room in the culture for a kind of conflict? i.e. The young studs wont heed the older pilot because they have more experience than him on that type or he's an old fart mired in the past? Or was it they felt compelled to fly through the storm out of some sense of deference or not to be seen as 'weak'? * French
* 58 years old
* Entered Air France in 1988
* Qualified on Airbus A330/A340 in February 2007
* 11,000 flight hours, including 1,700 on Airbus A330/A340
2 co-pilots:
* French
* 37 and 32 years old
* Entered Air France in 1999 and 2004
* Qualified on Airbus A330/A340 in April 2002 and June 2008
* 6,600 flight hours, including 2,600 on Airbus A330/A340
* 3,000 flight hours, including 800 on Airbus A330/A340
... I may be grasping at straws, but that night, a bunch of other planes navigated that stretch (with diversion) but otherwise no incident..
There is a particular flaw with the human risk evaluator that, once having committed to a course of action -any action - FURTHER RISK EVALUATION STOPS. It may be appropriate, as primates swinging from limb to limb, you dont have time to rethink - but as pilots should we ever stop?
You see it at Tenerife - the Captain made up his mind to take off, and the copilot made up his mind to say nothing.. all data henceforth, was taken as added confirmation authority for a decision already made.
cp;
No.
If anything may have been at play with any encounter with a thunderstorm (and not diverting around it), it would be the perception of risk/danger through a clear understanding of what the radar returns were indicating. From experience, I know there is a wide range of such understanding in new-hires and veterans alike. Part of that picture is training, standards and checking at an airline. In fact, that is the very reason I posted a long discussion on the use of radar right at the beginning of the second thread on AF447. Others added to the knowledge-base on that thread which I think was really the finest demonstration of professionalism at work.
We cannot possibly know of course if this factor played a part.
The difference is not material. Like most who fly, I have flown with those less, and those with more time on the particular equipment. Within a hundred hours (hard time) on type, (two months, roughly) and given the kind of training one is offered during a type certificate/IFR, one knows the airplane well enough.
That doesn't mean one can play the airplane like a pianist plays a concerto on grand piano. It means that the differences in experience are largely immaterial. It is simply "time in" that really counts.
In the book "Outliers" by Malcolm Gladwell the author posits a 10,000hr "bench-mark" at which point something becomes part of oneself, intuitively. I wouldn't suggest the same for airline pilots but nor do I consider a thousand hours in anything doing any kind of flying, "experienced".
PJ2
Is there a sub culture that might view 'diverting around weather' to be'somewhat of a pussy/coward' and do you think there may have been a subconcious need for the younger pilots to 'prove we can DO THIS' and ride through the storm?
If anything may have been at play with any encounter with a thunderstorm (and not diverting around it), it would be the perception of risk/danger through a clear understanding of what the radar returns were indicating. From experience, I know there is a wide range of such understanding in new-hires and veterans alike. Part of that picture is training, standards and checking at an airline. In fact, that is the very reason I posted a long discussion on the use of radar right at the beginning of the second thread on AF447. Others added to the knowledge-base on that thread which I think was really the finest demonstration of professionalism at work.
We cannot possibly know of course if this factor played a part.
In AF447 you had a very experienced pilot, close to the end of his flight career at 58 with a lot of experience but less experienced in that particular aircraft than the copilot
That doesn't mean one can play the airplane like a pianist plays a concerto on grand piano. It means that the differences in experience are largely immaterial. It is simply "time in" that really counts.
In the book "Outliers" by Malcolm Gladwell the author posits a 10,000hr "bench-mark" at which point something becomes part of oneself, intuitively. I wouldn't suggest the same for airline pilots but nor do I consider a thousand hours in anything doing any kind of flying, "experienced".
PJ2
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Punkalouver :
Interesting that you use the term : "cowboy" I would not use it the way I understand it ( no rules at all ) " but rather, if you bend the rules and get something extraordinary then it is worth it . Like buzzing the TWR in the Top Gun film if you know what I mean. There was that element in the past , yes ,but I am not sure it is still there today in AF probably no, only an insider can tell. But the glorifying of that past era is still firmly anchored in the French culture.
Cowboy makes me think of the title of the biography book of Ziegler " the Airbus cowboys " just out.
Cowboys d'Airbus, Bernard Ziegler tous les livres à la Fnac
Reading it ( in French again , sorry ) makes you understand that bending the rules was an institution in those ( not too far away) days.
Sounds like you are saying that there is a cowboy element at the company that is looked upon favourably, with rules coming in second.
True?
True?
Interesting that you use the term : "cowboy" I would not use it the way I understand it ( no rules at all ) " but rather, if you bend the rules and get something extraordinary then it is worth it . Like buzzing the TWR in the Top Gun film if you know what I mean. There was that element in the past , yes ,but I am not sure it is still there today in AF probably no, only an insider can tell. But the glorifying of that past era is still firmly anchored in the French culture.
Cowboy makes me think of the title of the biography book of Ziegler " the Airbus cowboys " just out.
Cowboys d'Airbus, Bernard Ziegler tous les livres à la Fnac
Reading it ( in French again , sorry ) makes you understand that bending the rules was an institution in those ( not too far away) days.
Ref Concorde
I understood AF had not done the mods that BA had in putting some sort of sandwich in the fuel tanks. If they had it may well have helped.
I'm sure I'll be corrected if I'm wrong
I'm sure I'll be corrected if I'm wrong
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Busy B :
You are and you will, don'worry ( by someone who knows more about CONC than I do. )
Dysag :
correct ! fortunately for Airbus there were many more people like Beteille , still are today.
I'm sure I'll be corrected if I'm wrong
Dysag :
correct ! fortunately for Airbus there were many more people like Beteille , still are today.
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Originally Posted by cessnapuppy
One question. (before I get to the main) Is there a sub culture that might view 'diverting around weather' to be'somewhat of a pussy/coward' and do you think there may have been a subconcious need for the younger pilots to 'prove we can DO THIS' and ride through the storm?
The last known position was 3 NM west of track.
Why the BEA did not explicitly mention it in their preliminary report ?
Originally Posted by ATC Watcher
Cowboys d'Airbus, Bernard Ziegler tous les livres à la Fnac
Reading it ( in French again , sorry ) makes you understand that bending the rules was an institution in those ( not too far away) days.
Reading it ( in French again , sorry ) makes you understand that bending the rules was an institution in those ( not too far away) days.
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CONF iture :
No the book starts in 1967, His " Valee blanche " exploits are not mentioned .
When I first met him in 1972 he was giving a lecture to us in Toulouse and introduced himself lke this (from memory ) Hi, Your remember the jet that cut the cable in valee Blanche doing low level, > It was me... Now I am head of flight testing Airbus... In those days he was impressive .
In the book he describes many interesting annecdotes unknown (to me at least) like the first in flight presentation of the A300 in le Bourget in 1973:
Just after take off in front of the officials there is a fire in the cabin. " What to do, : At his first public appearance the A300 gets on fire ? No , I pull the column and started to do the "circus" presentation. What else to do ? The F/E managed to control the fire, and when we landed there was smoke but no more fire..." ( page 132)
Has he devoted a chapter to tell his own remarkable feat of arms ?
When I first met him in 1972 he was giving a lecture to us in Toulouse and introduced himself lke this (from memory ) Hi, Your remember the jet that cut the cable in valee Blanche doing low level, > It was me... Now I am head of flight testing Airbus... In those days he was impressive .
In the book he describes many interesting annecdotes unknown (to me at least) like the first in flight presentation of the A300 in le Bourget in 1973:
Just after take off in front of the officials there is a fire in the cabin. " What to do, : At his first public appearance the A300 gets on fire ? No , I pull the column and started to do the "circus" presentation. What else to do ? The F/E managed to control the fire, and when we landed there was smoke but no more fire..." ( page 132)