Emirates A345 Tail Strike Captain breaks his silence
Air Tourer, you quite rightly ask what should be done to the pilots in this case: IMHO they should have been taken off-line, given a right bollocking, put into the simulator (if only to be seen to be retraining) and then perhaps docked a years' seniority or whatever EK use to 'reward' longer-serving crew.
Sacking them will not remedy the situation one iota. It's sweeping the dirt under the carpet. Sooner or later the dirt spills back out.
Outdated relics like 411A crankily sit in the safety of their comfy armchairs at their typewriters and rattle off stuff like No Fault but their own etc etc and that is typical of the 1930's managerial style still occasionally exhibited by airlines like EK. It's a sign of limited intellect to simply say you did it so you're fired. There are usually many factors leading up to the incident. It's a bit like sacking Gordon Brown because the UK economy is stuffed. Yes he's in charge but there were many factors outside his control that led to this situation. It might feel good to kick Gordon's ass but it won't resolve the problem.
If I am correct, some years back the EK CRM instructors were told they would no longer receive allowances for conducting the classes, so they all elected not to present CRM any more. If my story is right, I understand they were then contacted by a senior manager and told that they were engaging in industrial action, which is banned in the UAE. They were then informed the penalty for this behaviour was imprisonment. Most returned to their CRM presenting. Maybe my story is completely wrong (happy to be corrected) but there are big worries when any organisation uses such tactics. Resentment, fatigue and fear do not a happy or safe airline make.
Obviously unless there are more of these instances few passengers will boycott EK but I suspect what will happen is you may see pilots voting with their feet when the economies resume growth and the pilot shortage again starts to bight (as it really was in 2007). Heaven knows there isn't much going for living in the Middle East!
And yes Geepers Eprs we lot are still at it because it's clearly an issue that affect us all.
Aviation managerial skills seem to be retreating backwards into the 19th century and we all bear the brunt of it. Bollocking our own only serves to strengthen the hand of those managers.
Sacking them will not remedy the situation one iota. It's sweeping the dirt under the carpet. Sooner or later the dirt spills back out.
Outdated relics like 411A crankily sit in the safety of their comfy armchairs at their typewriters and rattle off stuff like No Fault but their own etc etc and that is typical of the 1930's managerial style still occasionally exhibited by airlines like EK. It's a sign of limited intellect to simply say you did it so you're fired. There are usually many factors leading up to the incident. It's a bit like sacking Gordon Brown because the UK economy is stuffed. Yes he's in charge but there were many factors outside his control that led to this situation. It might feel good to kick Gordon's ass but it won't resolve the problem.
If I am correct, some years back the EK CRM instructors were told they would no longer receive allowances for conducting the classes, so they all elected not to present CRM any more. If my story is right, I understand they were then contacted by a senior manager and told that they were engaging in industrial action, which is banned in the UAE. They were then informed the penalty for this behaviour was imprisonment. Most returned to their CRM presenting. Maybe my story is completely wrong (happy to be corrected) but there are big worries when any organisation uses such tactics. Resentment, fatigue and fear do not a happy or safe airline make.
Obviously unless there are more of these instances few passengers will boycott EK but I suspect what will happen is you may see pilots voting with their feet when the economies resume growth and the pilot shortage again starts to bight (as it really was in 2007). Heaven knows there isn't much going for living in the Middle East!
And yes Geepers Eprs we lot are still at it because it's clearly an issue that affect us all.
Aviation managerial skills seem to be retreating backwards into the 19th century and we all bear the brunt of it. Bollocking our own only serves to strengthen the hand of those managers.
What, Me Pay Attention?
One top pilot on A.net tells me he has no idea of what runway length is left, (or gone),
Computers are great aids, but "Garbage in, garbage out."
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MarianA -
Almost right, except that flex thrust tends to even out the thrust-to-mass variation, so that the primary variation in X is due to field length and elevation. 
So true, as has been pointed out several times.
I understand that in normal day to day operation you will expect widely varying values for that accelaration X because of wide variation in the input data making it impossible to judge by feel whether it's about right or not and will take you airborne in the available space.
Measuring acceleration is certainly already done by inertial systems aboard and if the data is not available GPS would propably be good enough for that. The rate of change of distance covered over time. Not a critical system, a simple add-on, collateral use of available data.
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Hi Al.E
Sorry you believe my posts nothing more than drivel, I have points to raise which I believe are valid, apologies if you find them not worth consideration.
Cutting to basics:
- yes I am a pilot, shorthaul, do my 90-95 hours with just an F/o, no supp crew, I get tired occasionally
- I am not generally vitriolic towards my fellow aviators but I will be critical towards those who do not understand, or accept, the ultimate responsibility of Command/PIC
- to my knowledge the captain involved has NEVER stated that, yes, he made an error, the buck stops with him
- he makes generalised statements that only allude to fatigue - there well may have been a fatigue factor - but it is others who are talking about fatigue directly NEVER the captain concerned
- there were a total of 4 persons on the flightdeck who are all paid to be professional pilots and NONE of them twigged "it just didn't seem right", if the captains of the present and future can do no more than push buttons and are incapable of thinking/feeling about what's happening and incorperating commonsense then god help the airline industry.
When this captain accepts responsibility AND drives the argument about the factors that may have contributed to this situation to raise awareness/create discussion and hopefully put some pressure on regulators I will start to have some respect.
I remain convinced that present and future captains who do not understand, or accept, the final responsibilty should do aviation a service, and improve aviation safety immeasurably, by retiring and getting a 9 to 5 job at the post office.
And yes - there are a whole heap of issues surrounding Emirates (and others) that should be confronted and dealt with by regulators around the world; if only wishing made it so!
I'm just amazed no-one's jumped in yet and blamed it on a faulty thronomeister!
cheers all
Sorry you believe my posts nothing more than drivel, I have points to raise which I believe are valid, apologies if you find them not worth consideration.
Cutting to basics:
- yes I am a pilot, shorthaul, do my 90-95 hours with just an F/o, no supp crew, I get tired occasionally
- I am not generally vitriolic towards my fellow aviators but I will be critical towards those who do not understand, or accept, the ultimate responsibility of Command/PIC
- to my knowledge the captain involved has NEVER stated that, yes, he made an error, the buck stops with him
- he makes generalised statements that only allude to fatigue - there well may have been a fatigue factor - but it is others who are talking about fatigue directly NEVER the captain concerned
- there were a total of 4 persons on the flightdeck who are all paid to be professional pilots and NONE of them twigged "it just didn't seem right", if the captains of the present and future can do no more than push buttons and are incapable of thinking/feeling about what's happening and incorperating commonsense then god help the airline industry.
When this captain accepts responsibility AND drives the argument about the factors that may have contributed to this situation to raise awareness/create discussion and hopefully put some pressure on regulators I will start to have some respect.
I remain convinced that present and future captains who do not understand, or accept, the final responsibilty should do aviation a service, and improve aviation safety immeasurably, by retiring and getting a 9 to 5 job at the post office.
And yes - there are a whole heap of issues surrounding Emirates (and others) that should be confronted and dealt with by regulators around the world; if only wishing made it so!
I'm just amazed no-one's jumped in yet and blamed it on a faulty thronomeister!
cheers all
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as a mere piece of SLF doing AU > EU frequently, I read on these forums maybe 18-24 months ago that Emirates was driving its crews too hard. I thought then that seeing I have the choice, I would stick with my usual suspects of QANTAS, Singapore and Cathay (used to like BA too until they dumped Melbourne). I realise that there are issues in all airlines but Emirates attitude and reaction generally and to this incidents has my gut telling me to stay away.
Reading all the above leads me to think the default settings will stay in place for a while longer.
Reading all the above leads me to think the default settings will stay in place for a while longer.
With Respect:
Those looking for admissions of responsibility may wish to take into account that the captain may have been advised, or decided himself, that such an admission would be inadvisable in case future action, legal or otherwise, might be affected by it being brought up.
I remember very well in the UK having minor traffic accidents (and I am not necessarily equating the two, only the attitude) and being told "Don't say anything, don't say sorry, don't sympathise with the other party."
After any event where there may be repercussions one would be wise to keep one's mouth firmly shut and that is notwithstanding some places now have "I'm sorry" laws.
Those looking for admissions of responsibility may wish to take into account that the captain may have been advised, or decided himself, that such an admission would be inadvisable in case future action, legal or otherwise, might be affected by it being brought up.
I remember very well in the UK having minor traffic accidents (and I am not necessarily equating the two, only the attitude) and being told "Don't say anything, don't say sorry, don't sympathise with the other party."
After any event where there may be repercussions one would be wise to keep one's mouth firmly shut and that is notwithstanding some places now have "I'm sorry" laws.
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Have I missed it or has no one noticed that the MTOW A340-300 vs the A340-5/600 is about 100 tonnes? Do Emirates pilots fly both (and A330's as well). If yes that would explain a lot and if no then I will STFU!
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Of course it's not very good if you fire a crew that made a mistake, but I can understand that EK's management had to do it.
After already the second similar incident, they had to blame the pilots. If they wouldn't, the company would be blamed, and that would put a very bad light on the company. That's why they fired them right away, before they got a final acident report. The pilots have been sacrified.
It's a pitty, but that's how it is.
Dani
(not EK Management)
After already the second similar incident, they had to blame the pilots. If they wouldn't, the company would be blamed, and that would put a very bad light on the company. That's why they fired them right away, before they got a final acident report. The pilots have been sacrified.
It's a pitty, but that's how it is.
Dani
(not EK Management)
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Have I missed it or has no one noticed that the MTOW A340-300 vs the A340-5/600 is about 100 tonnes? Do Emirates pilots fly both (and A330's as well). If yes that would explain a lot and if no then I will STFU!
...........there were a total of 4 persons on the flightdeck
If not part of the operating crew I wouldn't have expected them to have been involved in the take-off calculations, although from a self-preervation point of view I might have expected them to say something as the runway was slowly being eaten up before them with slow acceleration, even as a passenger down the back I time the take off roll, and have a mental point beyond which I might start to get worried !
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Usual array of the 'I would have done so much better' brigade like galdian and others. Great to know you are such a top bloke mate, but I imagine the rest of us feel nothing but a sense of 'there but for the grace of God go I'. Also, some of the comments by non-aviators are frankly embarrassing in their content. Maybe if you have no knowledge or experience on this issue it would be best to keep your thoughts to yourself.
Murphy's law states that if it can go wrong it will go wrong - nowhere is that more evident than here. This is a top class captain (and possibly FO too) who went through a rigorous selection process to join Emirates. Were the Company just completely wrong and did their recruitment procedures fail in some way? No - they got a couple of highly professional aviators whose sole failings were to be human. Sure, they should have done better, but as long as such errors can happen they will happen. I guarantee that as a result of that incident procedures will have changed - therefore we have to say the procedures were incorrect. It is really not good enough to hound the crew, and crow quietly to yourself about how that would have never happened to you. Standard Arab fare as that may be, particularly if the crew is not Arab themselves, you have to tackle the systemic failing.
Murphy's law states that if it can go wrong it will go wrong - nowhere is that more evident than here. This is a top class captain (and possibly FO too) who went through a rigorous selection process to join Emirates. Were the Company just completely wrong and did their recruitment procedures fail in some way? No - they got a couple of highly professional aviators whose sole failings were to be human. Sure, they should have done better, but as long as such errors can happen they will happen. I guarantee that as a result of that incident procedures will have changed - therefore we have to say the procedures were incorrect. It is really not good enough to hound the crew, and crow quietly to yourself about how that would have never happened to you. Standard Arab fare as that may be, particularly if the crew is not Arab themselves, you have to tackle the systemic failing.
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ChrisVJ
Very fair point, was only thinking of the incident and all its implications, might well be some legal reason regarding "responsibility", sadly that may not assist any investigation looking to ultimately improve methods, systems etc.
NSF
- where have I ever indicated (or "crowed" as you so inaccurately state) that this could never happen to me??
I make errors and mistakes all the time - as all humans do, it's unavoidable, however the ones I don't pick up are hopefully always so small to have no impact on overall safety.
What I HAVE said or implied is that I can never imagine making such a huge error as in this case as that would go against all the training, procedures, methodology, instinct, commonsense, gut feeling and occasional pure rat cunning I've accumulated whilst flying.
However thanks for thinking I'm a great bloke - big call seeing we've never met but in this instance, however you came to your judgement, your call's spot on!
Cheers all.
Very fair point, was only thinking of the incident and all its implications, might well be some legal reason regarding "responsibility", sadly that may not assist any investigation looking to ultimately improve methods, systems etc.
NSF
- where have I ever indicated (or "crowed" as you so inaccurately state) that this could never happen to me??
I make errors and mistakes all the time - as all humans do, it's unavoidable, however the ones I don't pick up are hopefully always so small to have no impact on overall safety.
What I HAVE said or implied is that I can never imagine making such a huge error as in this case as that would go against all the training, procedures, methodology, instinct, commonsense, gut feeling and occasional pure rat cunning I've accumulated whilst flying.
However thanks for thinking I'm a great bloke - big call seeing we've never met but in this instance, however you came to your judgement, your call's spot on!
Cheers all.
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Were they all on the flight deck ? Do relief crew sit on the flight deck for take-off on this aircraft / Airline ? If so, are they part of the operating crew, which could impinge on their ultimate, eventual, duty hours available ?
2. No, they are not part of the operating crew, as EK in its sublime wisdom does not want them to participate in vital operations, such as calculating TO weights or doing outside checks etc.
3. No, these hours do not count. They can only log the hours in the drivers seat as augmenting crew.
At EK, due to its sublime wisdom, the augmenting crew have three functions:
1. To be a pain in the a$$ during cockpit prep, TO and Ldg, because they are confined to sit in the two jump seats without any assigned task, therefore basically beeing only a element of distraction.
2. To be forced to lay down in the torpedo tube in the most remote part possible of the aircraft. This tube does not allow at all sitting up or eating. You can barely drink and read and can only watch the screen if your spine resembles the one of Houdini. During your sometimes 7 hours of torture, you are not allowed to sit in a empty pax seat to decently rest or eat, even if the whole class is empty (unless risking beeing reported by one of our collegues on board).
3. Augment the operating crew, which remains the best part of the flight.
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firing a pilot without a proper and thorough investigation does send a chilling msg to all in the industry about a companys culture. perhaps its the emerging sign of the times, however, its definitely a place to avoid employment.
as far as fatigue is concerned, we as pilots will always be tired, save the odd day when one might be at his chirpy best.
my opinion with hindsight in tow, is that it is a systemic, as well as a
procedural issue.
on most flights, i have noticed skippers keeping the loadsheet to themselves, as if to protect the crown jewels. rarely do they xcheck the numbers on a manual loadsheet, and even rarer, is there an attempt to concur or physically show the f/o, the numbers in question. mostly he will blurt out the numbers, followed by the f/o calculating the required data. the pressure on making schedule plays a part too as invariably, the loadsheet appears a minute or two before departure time. lmc's notwithstanding, there is a general rush to close the doors and get going.
unless there is a strong SOP, a mistake can be made at the 3 areas of required reference, namely the loadsheet, rtow charts/opt (on board performance tool), or FMC insertion.
and the unfortunate recipent of any penalty is quite correctly, the professional who signs above the dotted line. the buck has got to start, or stop somewhere.
as far as fatigue is concerned, we as pilots will always be tired, save the odd day when one might be at his chirpy best.
my opinion with hindsight in tow, is that it is a systemic, as well as a
procedural issue.
on most flights, i have noticed skippers keeping the loadsheet to themselves, as if to protect the crown jewels. rarely do they xcheck the numbers on a manual loadsheet, and even rarer, is there an attempt to concur or physically show the f/o, the numbers in question. mostly he will blurt out the numbers, followed by the f/o calculating the required data. the pressure on making schedule plays a part too as invariably, the loadsheet appears a minute or two before departure time. lmc's notwithstanding, there is a general rush to close the doors and get going.
unless there is a strong SOP, a mistake can be made at the 3 areas of required reference, namely the loadsheet, rtow charts/opt (on board performance tool), or FMC insertion.
and the unfortunate recipent of any penalty is quite correctly, the professional who signs above the dotted line. the buck has got to start, or stop somewhere.
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At EK, due to its sublime wisdom, the augmenting crew have three functions:
1. To be a pain in the a$$ during cockpit prep, TO and Ldg, because they are confined to sit in the two jump seats without any assigned task, therefore basically beeing only a element of distraction.
2. To be forced to lay down in the torpedo tube in the most remote part possible of the aircraft. This tube does not allow at all sitting up or eating. You can barely drink and read and can only watch the screen if your spine resembles the one of Houdini. During your sometimes 7 hours of torture, you are not allowed to sit in a empty pax seat to decently rest or eat, even if the whole class is empty (unless risking beeing reported by one of our collegues on board).
1. To be a pain in the a$$ during cockpit prep, TO and Ldg, because they are confined to sit in the two jump seats without any assigned task, therefore basically beeing only a element of distraction.
2. To be forced to lay down in the torpedo tube in the most remote part possible of the aircraft. This tube does not allow at all sitting up or eating. You can barely drink and read and can only watch the screen if your spine resembles the one of Houdini. During your sometimes 7 hours of torture, you are not allowed to sit in a empty pax seat to decently rest or eat, even if the whole class is empty (unless risking beeing reported by one of our collegues on board).
