Turkish airliner crashes at Schiphol
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CVR according to a Turkish Newspaper
Some Turkish Newspaper states that they have reliable information which is,
aprentice was in control on right seat, FO in the jumper, FO is the one who recognizes the situation and starts shouting throtle-throtle but as we all now it was to late.
Turkish Version (not the CVR, only the article)
"Gaz Hocam gaz" - GÜNDEM - HABERTÜRK - Türkiye'nin En Büyük Ýnternet Gazetesi
aprentice was in control on right seat, FO in the jumper, FO is the one who recognizes the situation and starts shouting throtle-throtle but as we all now it was to late.
Turkish Version (not the CVR, only the article)
"Gaz Hocam gaz" - GÜNDEM - HABERTÜRK - Türkiye'nin En Büyük Ýnternet Gazetesi
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Turkish Hurriyet newspaper today
headlined that investigation concluded that there are 3 reasons for the crash 1-) ATC forced the A/C quick landing pattern
2-) pilots paniced from the 1st reason
3-) Altimeter
I wrote this post with a details how funny reasoning and newsmaking without reliable evidence and moderator erased it i think some moderators here also manipulated .......
sami aker
No Sami it wasn't your 'funny reasoning.' The English could not be easily understood - that's all. Rob
2-) pilots paniced from the 1st reason
3-) Altimeter
I wrote this post with a details how funny reasoning and newsmaking without reliable evidence and moderator erased it i think some moderators here also manipulated .......
sami aker
No Sami it wasn't your 'funny reasoning.' The English could not be easily understood - that's all. Rob
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Daniel
In response to your question of "And yes, we hop into a new plane and we are thrilled by knowing how it can activate retard mode by RA indication. Ok that is cool, but what if the RA fails? What is the backup for this system if it fails and what is the backup for the other systems if this same system fails".
There are also two pilots to fit into the "system". Surely they are the primary means of controlling the aircraft, whether by monitoring the automation to ensure it is working correctly, or flying the aircraft manually.
Do you want backup systems to your backup systems, that aren't actually backup systems but aids to the pilot?
In response to your question of "And yes, we hop into a new plane and we are thrilled by knowing how it can activate retard mode by RA indication. Ok that is cool, but what if the RA fails? What is the backup for this system if it fails and what is the backup for the other systems if this same system fails".
There are also two pilots to fit into the "system". Surely they are the primary means of controlling the aircraft, whether by monitoring the automation to ensure it is working correctly, or flying the aircraft manually.
Do you want backup systems to your backup systems, that aren't actually backup systems but aids to the pilot?
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I'll attempt to add to what's been said and not just repeat.
It's hard not to jump to certain conclusions about this accident as this thread plainly shows. Before the investigators do their work, we're in the dark.
But to expand on what's been said and maybe give a focus to all the conjecture, I don't know if anyone's looked at the work of Dr. Charles Billings, former Chief Scientist at the NASA/Ames Research Centre. He put forward the idea of human-centered automation. To summarise, the basic premise is that the pilot/pilots are responsible for the safety of the flight. The axiom that flows from this is that the pilots must remain in command/control of their flights.
However, and this is the interesting bit I feel, in order to achieve the above, the pilots must be actively involved, the operators must be adequately informed and the automated systems must be predictable (my italics).
Leading on from this, it's interesting to note that the FAA have summarised two aircraft companies as having the following design philosophies near the top in a list of priorities:
Company 1: both crewmembers are ultimately responsible for the safe conduct of the flight.
Company 2: automation must not lead the aircraft out of the safe flight envelope and it should maintain the aircraft within the normal flight envelope. (source: Orlady and Barnes).
I'll let you decide which company is which.
It's easy for us to gloss over no.1 as stating the obvious, but it's crucial that pilots are aware of this philosophy so that they understand how they must approach and use the automatics.
(Similar to that page of explanation at the start of the QRH, easy to skim over, but again crucial to comprehension of what's expected of us when dealing with a non-normal).
I feel we will hear more of this in the weeks to come.
It's hard not to jump to certain conclusions about this accident as this thread plainly shows. Before the investigators do their work, we're in the dark.
But to expand on what's been said and maybe give a focus to all the conjecture, I don't know if anyone's looked at the work of Dr. Charles Billings, former Chief Scientist at the NASA/Ames Research Centre. He put forward the idea of human-centered automation. To summarise, the basic premise is that the pilot/pilots are responsible for the safety of the flight. The axiom that flows from this is that the pilots must remain in command/control of their flights.
However, and this is the interesting bit I feel, in order to achieve the above, the pilots must be actively involved, the operators must be adequately informed and the automated systems must be predictable (my italics).
Leading on from this, it's interesting to note that the FAA have summarised two aircraft companies as having the following design philosophies near the top in a list of priorities:
Company 1: both crewmembers are ultimately responsible for the safe conduct of the flight.
Company 2: automation must not lead the aircraft out of the safe flight envelope and it should maintain the aircraft within the normal flight envelope. (source: Orlady and Barnes).
I'll let you decide which company is which.
It's easy for us to gloss over no.1 as stating the obvious, but it's crucial that pilots are aware of this philosophy so that they understand how they must approach and use the automatics.
(Similar to that page of explanation at the start of the QRH, easy to skim over, but again crucial to comprehension of what's expected of us when dealing with a non-normal).
I feel we will hear more of this in the weeks to come.
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Capt. ARISAN
As I mentioned before Cpt. ARISAN was a great person (yes he was an ex-military) every first officer in the company wanted to fly with him, we are really sad very sad...Just know that fact...Thank you...
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No hard data yet
Unless I have lost my ability to search there has been no transcript, public playback, or even one direct quote from the CVR. Further, Boeing's memo on the FDR data fairly soon after the incident is pretty much the sum total from that box aside from some 'interpretations' during the Dutch presser. Meanwhile some of the more vociferous pilots here have been hanging the crew for various reasons but mostly for possibly violating the pilot code of 'be smarter than the machine or it will replace you'. On the other side some software types are pointing to this incident and saying 'see we need to make the software smarter to keep the pilots from making mistakes'.
Getting close to the definition of Catch-22 it seem to me.
Yes...that is generalizing but it seems to be the undercurrent for some of the last 30-40 pages in here. I agree wholeheartedly with those who have posted in here that we need to wait for all the data...a statement echoed repeatedly by the ATP licensed pilots that fly similar and larger aircraft that I interact with daily.
Getting close to the definition of Catch-22 it seem to me.
Yes...that is generalizing but it seems to be the undercurrent for some of the last 30-40 pages in here. I agree wholeheartedly with those who have posted in here that we need to wait for all the data...a statement echoed repeatedly by the ATP licensed pilots that fly similar and larger aircraft that I interact with daily.
Meanwhile some of the more vociferous pilots here have been hanging the crew for various reasons but mostly for possibly violating the pilot code of 'be smarter than the machine or it will replace you'. On the other side some software types are pointing to this incident and saying 'see we need to make the software smarter to keep the pilots from making mistakes'.
Any machine that will do that reduces me to a jelly. The system designer who allowed a side effect like that should be ashamed of himself.
And yes, of course the crew should have noticed what was going on, but I think we all know that something else was happening on that flight deck. If the CVR doesn't reveal it, perhaps the autopsies will.
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Originally Posted by idle_bystander
To be fair to the non-pilot types (not only software engineers, there are some system engineers) I think that what makes them, and certainly me, pretty cross is that a non-essential bit of kit (the RA), in fulfilling a non-essential function (retard in the flare) is allowed to announce its failure by two irrelevant, and confusing side-effects: first by telling the crew that the gear is still up, which they understandably ignored, being at 2,000ft, and secondly, and TWICE, retarding the power levers to Flight idle in the middle of an approach.
Any machine that will do that reduces me to a jelly. The system designer who allowed a side effect like that should be ashamed of himself.
Any machine that will do that reduces me to a jelly. The system designer who allowed a side effect like that should be ashamed of himself.
You presented it in a very well manner.
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automation
the only reason I can think automation is installed is to make sure mediocre pilots can handle an airliner.
Lindbergh made it across the atlantic without an autopilot and he was awake a huge amount of time.
Yes, there were times things came a bit too close for comfort, but he made it.
So, instead of making sure pilots can fly the heck out of a plane, even ''expediting'' things with ATC, we have computers that can't do it and pilots who depend on the computers.
Damn shame. How many of you fine flyers out there know what a ''crowbar'' approach is? How many times have I intercepted a glideslope from above? There are thousands of you out there who know how to do it and make it work...even being spooled up in time to make sure you can get out of trouble.
Lindbergh made it across the atlantic without an autopilot and he was awake a huge amount of time.
Yes, there were times things came a bit too close for comfort, but he made it.
So, instead of making sure pilots can fly the heck out of a plane, even ''expediting'' things with ATC, we have computers that can't do it and pilots who depend on the computers.
Damn shame. How many of you fine flyers out there know what a ''crowbar'' approach is? How many times have I intercepted a glideslope from above? There are thousands of you out there who know how to do it and make it work...even being spooled up in time to make sure you can get out of trouble.
There have been several meaningless statements about poor CRM or lack of airmanship, or that crew should have ‘just flown the aircraft’; none provided explanatory detail, any reasoning, or offered a practical solution.
What part of CRM failed, how, why – if we knew, then solutions could be found? Similarly, for airmanship or flying ability, what critical aspects would have saved this crew?
One view of safety is that humans generate safety. Thus establishing what other crews have done in similar circumstances may help with an understanding of this accident and provide points of learning.
It is reported that at least one crew knew of the RA abnormality. Additionally, it’s hard to imaging that in the long history of the 737 that other crews have not encountered this fault – so how did they manage.
How did the crews detect the RA fault;- by viewing the display, an unusual alert (gear), or AT mode change?
Even discounting seeing the display, the alert and AT mode should still have occurred providing a range of cues.
An EGPWS gear alert is given when RA <500ft, which suggest that the fault occurred at the time of the alert, i.e. not earlier when the RA operating / display logic became valid.
The AT mode change requires a combination of flap and RA <27ft, thus in the accident the AT mode change may not have been coincident with the gear alert, i.e. it required a flap selection. The crew may have considered the gear alert as an isolated problem – possibly cured by lowering the gear. In this instance then the flap selection started the low speed event and the AT mode change; was this the same for other crews.
In comparison to an ideal operation the accident approach profile appears higher than normal (joining GS from above) and possibly fast/tight on an energy schedule; if so, the flap selection may have been later than ideal, which reduced the time for detecting the AT mode change, time which could be further compressed by the pressures of a training flight.
In other operations, did the crews have extra time, by either earlier flap selection or not suffering similar pressures of operation; - time in which to scan the flight deck and check the display. Scanning – situation awareness, and time management are aspects of CRM.
During the accident approach, it would be expected that the AT would be at idle, enabling speed reduction on the GS and deceleration with further flap selection. Did previous crews have a similar expectation, if not why not? Checking and control of expectation - CRM, discipline - Airmanship.
A problem for the accident crew was the drift from normal operations – small deviations in height (above GS) and higher speed (energy), compressed time, and in a training environment.
A Training Captain requires skill to judge how far to let a training situation drift (skill / judgment; qualities of airmanship).
All crews require similar skills of judging how far a normal operation can be allowed to drift towards the boundary of safe operation, but as our judgments can be biased, distorted, and fallible, we need to introduce constraints – boundaries or check points.
The stabilized flight path concept has constraints and check points, but these depend on discipline to adhere to the procedures – doing what we say we will do (airmanship).
As for the skills of flying, many of these come from practice and exposure to similar situations, which are the basis of experience. Without sufficient experience, such as during training, then the boundaries of normal operations must be strictly respected, even tightened to ensure that if the unexpected happens there is time to adjust and remain within the bounds of a safe operation.
I suggest that many of the safety points from this accident come from identifying the things we (industry and individual) do routinely to maintain safe operations, and from those rare occasions where we drift towards the edge of safety. We have to look to ourselves before looking too closely at others, and share best practices of normal operation and lessons learnt from the non-normal operations.
What part of CRM failed, how, why – if we knew, then solutions could be found? Similarly, for airmanship or flying ability, what critical aspects would have saved this crew?
One view of safety is that humans generate safety. Thus establishing what other crews have done in similar circumstances may help with an understanding of this accident and provide points of learning.
It is reported that at least one crew knew of the RA abnormality. Additionally, it’s hard to imaging that in the long history of the 737 that other crews have not encountered this fault – so how did they manage.
How did the crews detect the RA fault;- by viewing the display, an unusual alert (gear), or AT mode change?
Even discounting seeing the display, the alert and AT mode should still have occurred providing a range of cues.
An EGPWS gear alert is given when RA <500ft, which suggest that the fault occurred at the time of the alert, i.e. not earlier when the RA operating / display logic became valid.
The AT mode change requires a combination of flap and RA <27ft, thus in the accident the AT mode change may not have been coincident with the gear alert, i.e. it required a flap selection. The crew may have considered the gear alert as an isolated problem – possibly cured by lowering the gear. In this instance then the flap selection started the low speed event and the AT mode change; was this the same for other crews.
In comparison to an ideal operation the accident approach profile appears higher than normal (joining GS from above) and possibly fast/tight on an energy schedule; if so, the flap selection may have been later than ideal, which reduced the time for detecting the AT mode change, time which could be further compressed by the pressures of a training flight.
In other operations, did the crews have extra time, by either earlier flap selection or not suffering similar pressures of operation; - time in which to scan the flight deck and check the display. Scanning – situation awareness, and time management are aspects of CRM.
During the accident approach, it would be expected that the AT would be at idle, enabling speed reduction on the GS and deceleration with further flap selection. Did previous crews have a similar expectation, if not why not? Checking and control of expectation - CRM, discipline - Airmanship.
A problem for the accident crew was the drift from normal operations – small deviations in height (above GS) and higher speed (energy), compressed time, and in a training environment.
A Training Captain requires skill to judge how far to let a training situation drift (skill / judgment; qualities of airmanship).
All crews require similar skills of judging how far a normal operation can be allowed to drift towards the boundary of safe operation, but as our judgments can be biased, distorted, and fallible, we need to introduce constraints – boundaries or check points.
The stabilized flight path concept has constraints and check points, but these depend on discipline to adhere to the procedures – doing what we say we will do (airmanship).
As for the skills of flying, many of these come from practice and exposure to similar situations, which are the basis of experience. Without sufficient experience, such as during training, then the boundaries of normal operations must be strictly respected, even tightened to ensure that if the unexpected happens there is time to adjust and remain within the bounds of a safe operation.
I suggest that many of the safety points from this accident come from identifying the things we (industry and individual) do routinely to maintain safe operations, and from those rare occasions where we drift towards the edge of safety. We have to look to ourselves before looking too closely at others, and share best practices of normal operation and lessons learnt from the non-normal operations.
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I'm sorry, all this CRM is wishy-washy rubbish.
The facts are that there were three sets of eyes, one may have been looking out of the window looking for the runway, but someone, ANYONE, must have spotted the speedtape dropping into the red.
There is something very wrong with all of this, you glance at the EADI for one millisecond and the speed and pitch should become apparent.
It's not a scan, it's a natural reaction.
The facts are that there were three sets of eyes, one may have been looking out of the window looking for the runway, but someone, ANYONE, must have spotted the speedtape dropping into the red.
There is something very wrong with all of this, you glance at the EADI for one millisecond and the speed and pitch should become apparent.
It's not a scan, it's a natural reaction.
Ex Cargo Clown there is nothing in the view that I expressed above that said that the crew did not look at the speed tape and see the low speed. As has been discussed previously, it is possible that by the time that the crew understood the low speed aspect of the situation it was probably too late to prevent and/or recover from a stall (low altitude) or that a successful recovery was marred by the failure to disengage the AT – also with complications of mistrim.
If previous crews had progressed to this point then what aspects of their behavior saved them? Your premise is that someone ‘must’ have seen the speed – unfortunately ‘must’ (the obvious) is not always the case when you involve humans.
My premise above is that if there have been previous incidents (common contributors and circumstances), then the absence of accidents implies that either those crews behaved differently or some specific point of the circumstances differed from this accident - possibly under human control. If the difference was in human behavior then we might look toward CRM and Airmanship as solutions – but not as the only solutions..
If previous crews had progressed to this point then what aspects of their behavior saved them? Your premise is that someone ‘must’ have seen the speed – unfortunately ‘must’ (the obvious) is not always the case when you involve humans.
My premise above is that if there have been previous incidents (common contributors and circumstances), then the absence of accidents implies that either those crews behaved differently or some specific point of the circumstances differed from this accident - possibly under human control. If the difference was in human behavior then we might look toward CRM and Airmanship as solutions – but not as the only solutions..
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RA
the planes that I've flown had old style radar altitmeters...you know the type, an analog needle that moves....and it made a funny sort of scratchy sound when it moved rapidly, like during a press to test.
While flying along in the higher flight levels, the RA would occasionaly swing wildly from 2500plus to just 1000' or so, and the reason I saw it was the noise it made in the course of its normal operation. ( we flew over another plane it got a bounce ).
Anyway, with the modern RA's, I can imagine there is no noise in its normal movement...without the noise there might not be any alerting of the crew.
There are all sorts of old fashioned noises in planes that caused a pilot to become alert. Indeed, our open cockpit biplane forefathers said the wind whistling through the wires would warn of a stall by playing, "nearer my God to thee".
Just something to think about, loud clicks, buzzes, the whole myriad of sounds...even that lovely 400hz sound of the electrics... a traine ear can hear problems of all kinds...UNLESS they are designed OUT of the system.
While flying along in the higher flight levels, the RA would occasionaly swing wildly from 2500plus to just 1000' or so, and the reason I saw it was the noise it made in the course of its normal operation. ( we flew over another plane it got a bounce ).
Anyway, with the modern RA's, I can imagine there is no noise in its normal movement...without the noise there might not be any alerting of the crew.
There are all sorts of old fashioned noises in planes that caused a pilot to become alert. Indeed, our open cockpit biplane forefathers said the wind whistling through the wires would warn of a stall by playing, "nearer my God to thee".
Just something to think about, loud clicks, buzzes, the whole myriad of sounds...even that lovely 400hz sound of the electrics... a traine ear can hear problems of all kinds...UNLESS they are designed OUT of the system.
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On any approach in any airplane, speed and altitude maintenance is King...
everything else is a side issue.....
hey, Protecthehornet...sounds like a Classic 747 you've been riding in...
Cheers...FD...
everything else is a side issue.....
hey, Protecthehornet...sounds like a Classic 747 you've been riding in...
Cheers...FD...
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Ex CC
Whilst what you state may be true and factual, for me the most important reason is why.
Facts do not help the aviation industry to improve safety. "Someone should have done this or that" is not that important, it's already known. Why didn't they pursue the correct course of action? Why did they think everything was according to plan when it was not? Why did they miss a critical indication? Why, why why?
idle bystander
Do you really think that the system designer is solely responsible for certifying an aircraft or system? Do you seriously think that safety assements, FHAs, FMECAs, HF testing, pilot cockpit working group decisions, FAA auditing, plus a multitude of other operational and safety justifications did not go into the design of the NG?
Whilst what you state may be true and factual, for me the most important reason is why.
Facts do not help the aviation industry to improve safety. "Someone should have done this or that" is not that important, it's already known. Why didn't they pursue the correct course of action? Why did they think everything was according to plan when it was not? Why did they miss a critical indication? Why, why why?
idle bystander
Do you really think that the system designer is solely responsible for certifying an aircraft or system? Do you seriously think that safety assements, FHAs, FMECAs, HF testing, pilot cockpit working group decisions, FAA auditing, plus a multitude of other operational and safety justifications did not go into the design of the NG?
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We checked that one in the SIM, the hardest to us was to look at the tape and see the speed drop. It took an awfull long time to get to the point where the stick shaker came. The pitch was amazing! Recovery was very very easy. However, once you let the A/T Retard from G/A Thrust again and fly the recovery with IDLE for 6 sec, you are bust!
Sad and unneccessary, no matter what contributed to the distraction.
Sad and unneccessary, no matter what contributed to the distraction.
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Rainboe wrote:
Nigd3 wrote:
History has proven Boeing (and others) makes mistakes like bad design. I can reel off many examples. The newest one:
Federal transportation safety officials Wednesday issued an "urgent" recommendation calling for a redesign of a component on some Boeing 777 aircraft engines -- a component blamed for two major mishaps in the past year.
Found on 'Urgent' repair recommended for some Boeing 777 engines - CNN.com
What about the famous cargo door on the 747? United Airlines Flight 811 some 20 years ago. Bad design!
So why should we believe that "This time they've got it right!" ?
And life on this thread has taught me to add: The above is not directly related to this accident, but as a comment to those who flame laymen for insinuate aircraft manufactures may make a mistake or two...
How can people be so arrogant that they know where a company like Boeing is allegedly going wrong?
Do you really think that the system designer is solely responsible for certifying an aircraft or system? Do you seriously think that safety assements, FHAs, FMECAs, HF testing, pilot cockpit working group decisions, FAA auditing, plus a multitude of other operational and safety justifications did not go into the design of the NG?
Federal transportation safety officials Wednesday issued an "urgent" recommendation calling for a redesign of a component on some Boeing 777 aircraft engines -- a component blamed for two major mishaps in the past year.
Found on 'Urgent' repair recommended for some Boeing 777 engines - CNN.com
What about the famous cargo door on the 747? United Airlines Flight 811 some 20 years ago. Bad design!
So why should we believe that "This time they've got it right!" ?
And life on this thread has taught me to add: The above is not directly related to this accident, but as a comment to those who flame laymen for insinuate aircraft manufactures may make a mistake or two...