Turkish airliner crashes at Schiphol

[BOAC]

Jumbo - if you look back here you will see that 2) does not apply as it would appear that they did not actually notice any fault until it was late and then a botched semi-manual recovery from a near stalled condition brought the end.

[Rananim]

Vino,

Forget 5deg PNU, it's AT/AP off, firewall (and keep 'em there in this case) , PLI's or intermittent Stick Shaker or 20deg, spd brake/wings lvl etc etc. and try and trade your way out with as much forward stick and trim as you can manage.

Thats GPWS escape/windshear.This was stall with gnd contact imminent.They needed speed not altitude.You wont get any of your speed back at 20deg(Vref-40).FIVE degrees..then adjust.
AP/AT off is 100% correct which wasnt done.TOGA is not a correct response.This needs to be done manually with very careful attention to pitch/airspeed/IVSI with FO reading off RA(if its working!)

[Troy McClure]

Most airlines will stipulate that PF must keep his hands on the thrust levers and control column below MSA at all times, other than briefly to alter Heading Bug etc. In gusty conditions (not applicable here), the autothrottle can't always keep up,so you often find yourself 'helping' with the thrust levers anyway.

Why an automatic landing? LVP's weren't in force, so that wouldn't be an option anyway (ILS not protected). The autopilot would be disconnected at around 150 feet minimum (depending on SOPs) and typically at 500 feet or above to carry out a manual landing.

Only one AP would have been engaged, so any fault would have to be spotted by the PF who should disconnect the AP and fly manually, either to land or go around.

[Jumbo Driver]

BOAC, the way I see it is that if my 1) is carried out (i.e. monitoring the approach against raw data, as if you were hand flying), then I would suggest such faults would be picked up very much earlier.


JD

[Raredata]

Jumbo Driver I couldn't agree more!

[BOAC]

Originally Posted by Troy

Why an automatic landing?

JD - full agreement, but therein lies the problem. Automatics are 'encouraged' but need to be watched. It was 'suckers corner' - throttles 'expected' to be closed a bit if things were a bit behind, and I suspect 'raw data' needles spot on the ILS - just 2 things missing?
1) Unstable approach = g/a
2) ASI

[pichu17]

ASA light

These conditions cause the A/T warning light to flash AMBER:

_ Airspeed is 10 knots more than target speed and not decreasing.

_ Airspeed is 5 knots lees than target speed and not increasing.

_ Airspeed is equal to or less than the alfa floor ( 1.3 times stall speed)

Not is a conspicuous advisory off decreasing speed?

[blueloo]

It is interesting that most peoples comments say pilots skills are declining (which they may or may not be) - as a result of people relying on automation to much - but if this accident is the result of mismanaged automation - surely more emphasis should be not just on manual skills, but also (and maybe more importantly in this case) learning how to use, manage and operate the automation?

If guys on a 737 don't have manual skills then i'd be surprised (I say this with the caveat that I don't know what sectors, flying hours, and company policy are) - 737's are typically high sector jets with crews getting loads of takeoffs and approaches. (eg my airline we were often doing 4 day trips with 4 to 5 sectors a day - sector for sector b/w Capt and F/O) Using the automation on long multi sector trips is important as you do start getting tired.

Our training departments emphasised initially when I joined the company as much manual operation as possible in the sim...... till they realised nobody knew a great deal about automation..... and to this day the automation is not well understood, nor taught very well particularly VNAV approaches in fleets other than the 737.

[Jumbo Driver]

Originally Posted by BOAC

JD - full agreement, but therein lies the problem. Automatics are 'encouraged' but need to be watched.

So, why are Trainers not training that way then ... ???


JD


mutter, mutter ... not like that in my day ... mutter, mutter ...

[BOAC]

Best ask the training managers and DFOs about that, Sir, and, I hate to say it but it appears that TC was certainly not. Mutter mutter

[Whippersnapper]

whippersnapper
Quote:
My interpretation of the initial report is that a minor malfunction combined with the crew's failure to monitor the aircraft resulted in CFIT.
I don't think the "C" applies here...
OK, the stall was technically a loss of control, but there were no tech or environmental factors that cause should have caused this accident, so FIT or CFIT is a matter of semantics.
Quote:
Given that this failure cause erroneous indications on the PFD
True or false? I think the indications were probably correct (I am not 737 rated) - unexpected at that height perhaps, but not erroneous.If I'm at 5000+ feet, how can a rad alt reading of -8 be anything other than erroneous? And how can the _8' be "probably correct"?
Quote:
As for the comparison to Airbus, from what I gather, never having flown one, they're great until things start going awry, at which point mode confusion becomes a really big problem.
Perhaps you should go and work for Airbus and help them fix the really big problem? Oh, sorry, I didn't notice that you've never flown one.It's an observation made by friends that fly them and the stereotypical last words on many Bus CVRs of "what's it doing now?" I did specifically make the comment that I have no experience on type and that this was an impression, not a statement of fact, so why the defensiveness?
Quote:
(I don't like the idea of the throttles and stick not moving on the Bus).
They are THRUST LEVERS, they do move, as do the sidesticks - the difference is that they are not backfed by the automatics. In this accident moving throttles do not appear to have made any difference to the crews' S/A.Well, of course they move when you control the aircraft by hand. I thought it was pretty obvious that I was referring to automatic flight. Pedantry is not helpful to a discussion of this nature.
Quote:
The important thing, regardless of type, is that the pilots monitor the aircraft properly and have a good knowledge of how it works.At least we see eye to eye on the most important point.
Agreed.
TP

[Tee Emm]

The captain should NOT take over in the event of a stall normally (maybe different on a training flight if the trainee fails to react). The F/O is PIC/US and is fully trained and should be expected to react correctly to a stall warning

You must be kidding! Meekly leaving it to the F/O simply because it is "his leg" is a complete abrogation of the captain's responsibility for the safe conduct of the flight. And if the F/O stuffed it up, how long should the captain sit on his hands before he decides to take over control of a fully stalled 737. At the altitude that 737 stalled, it takes swift and concise action and it would take a competent captain barely a nano-second to take control. The blind faith that the F/O is a highly experienced eminently skilful copilot leads to complacency and complacency can kill. The claim that any F/O is "fully trained" has zilch to do with situation. The captain, too is presumably "fully trained".

The buck stops at the captain - not at the first officer.

[GlueBall]

wingletflyer . . ."I am also searching a clue suggesting that the A/T system was designed to switch to the correct RA in case of false reading. So far nothing...

Don't you see a semantics problem with your statement? What logic would apply in differentiating whether RA1 or RA2 is reading correct altitude? How would RA1 "know" that its value was incorrect? How would RA2 "know" that its value was correct?

I think that what you want to research is if one RA becomes inoperative [red flag] that control will be switched to the other RA?

[Tee Emm]

The nose just pitches up too much further delaying the increase in speed needed to recover. Perhaps the procedure might be amended

Our simulator training includes a go around at 300 feet at the point of stall (stick shaker operation). This is done in simulated IMC. The pitch up caused by firewalling the thrust levers (ground contact imminent) is easily held by elevator and a touch of stab trim. With flap 40 and gear down the 737 will climb away.

If pilots under training stuff up, we simply practice the manoeuvre until they improve. It takes about four go's and then no further problems unless of course you have difficulty with raw data go-arounds on instruments.

Obviously it is a critical stage of flight and the trick is to gradually let the speed to increase to Vref before first flap retraction while at the same time ensuring a gentle climb. Naturally if the pilot cross reference on instruments is slack, and he allows the pitch up to become excessive, then the stick shaker will warn him to lower the nose slightly.

Because few operators conduct the power on stall recovery at such a critical altitude, it becomes a bit of a bogeyman when conducted for the first time. But in reality the manoeuvre does not require superman skills - just ordinary flying ability.

[GearDown&Locked]

The claim that any F/O is "fully trained" has zilch to do with situation. The captain, too is presumably "fully trained".

I totally agree with your post.

I'd like to add a small comment to that if I may:
When "fully trained" pilots sit at the sim they have to pay attention to what they're doing even if it's just a uneventful flight from A to B, because they're being watched (and evaluated) at that period of time, and I suspect that is the main reason for not having such simple malfunctions like a LH RADALT reproduced in the sim, because only a blindfolded pilot would have missed it and it would be regarded as pure waste of sim time.
When doing business as usual they don't have that "eye over the shoulder" so some just might relax a bit their attention to detail.

Wasn't it Epicurus who has said "Do every thing like someone is contemplating you"?

GD&L

[ant1]

For whatever reason one of the Swiss cheese slices (namely the crew) aligned its holes with the RA slice.

While we all agree that we have to strive to maintain the highest possible SA, we are still a slice with some holes that dynamically vary in size and position.

That's why over time we have added more and more slices, GPWS, EGPWS to name a few.

Sure we can fly without them, it's been done for ages, but they surely have improved aviation safety by saving some arses, maybe mine one day.

I wish Boeing had mounted a RA comparator on those NG's that had saved the day.

[golfyankeesierra]

It is now being reported on dutch news that on 11 feb in a "fleetmessage" Boeing advised customers to check RA antennae connectors because of several earlier complaints with "altimeters" (presumably Radalts).

BNR news radio is quoting Boeing:

"Boeing issued a Next-Generation 737 fleet message on Feb 11, 2009. The message asked operators to let Boeing know of any discrepancies in the radio altimeter operations. It was not a warning. Communications with our operators are considered proprietary and we can not release the message."

Link to BNR (dutch)

[six7driver]

Its such a simple thing one would think, to make sure throttles are guarded by the PF during this most important phase of the approach, on any Boeing I can't help to think but that it could have saved the day, as idle thrust would have given instant tactil feedback to the PF. Of course though, there but for the grace of god go I.

[timraper]

how, here's how

Have you ever been driving your family on the motorway, and all of a sudden thought 'How the hell have we travelled that last half mile without hitting anything', then you think hard about the periods of time you just didn't pay proper attention to the road ahead. Try shutting your eyes for even 3 seconds(don't) because I bet many of us aren't attentive for at least that from time to time, and after all we do have a valuable cargo on board don't we? Thats how quickly things can 'get away' from you in a car at 70mph.
If your 'passengers' in the car are wrapped up in a conversation they're not going to notice.
I hope this low tech analogy makes a bit of sense.

[vonbag]

Good day to all!

From the link of golfyankeesierra above:

Boeing was dus op de goede weg bij het constateren van problemen met de hoogtemeter. Zo stelt luchtvaart-deskundige Benno Baksteen. Zoals het hoort, had de fabrikant de vliegmaatschappijen verzocht om problemen door te geven. Maar een oplossing was nog niet gevonden.

Vocht is volgens Boeing de mogelijke oorzaak van de slecht functionerende meter. Luchtvaartmaatschappijen zouden de antennes moeten inspecteren op roestvorming.

~

"Thus, Boeing acted correctly by acknowledging the problems with the (- radar -) altimeter. So it is surmised by Aviation expert Benno Baksteen. The manufacturer had appropriately invited the Airlines to report problems. Even though, a solution was not yet found.

According to Boeing, the possible cause of the incorrectly functioning instrument is humidity. Airlines should have inspected the antennae for any rust formation. "

Good continuation,
vonbag

(edited 4 times for grammar and syntax + 1 bad tech. error)