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Continental TurboProp crash inbound for Buffalo

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Continental TurboProp crash inbound for Buffalo

Old 2nd Aug 2009, 03:03
  #1521 (permalink)  
 
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PTH

I learned on a C-150, have 300 hours in a radioless Champ and flew checks, which has to be one of the worst "sink or swim" corners of aviation. I know all sides of the equation. I still believe a structured program does the best job of training pilots. Don't believe me, believe every military force in the world, most of the world's major airlines. Believe the recruiters at the largest American carriers--just about every one gave extra credit to candidates that graduated from a structured program--military, college-level programs, etc.

I am NOT against light airplane general aviation, just trying to point the value of other programs. Gulfstream Academy didn't do anyone any favors considering three commuter airline accidents in the last few years involved one or both of their pilots at the helm.

Agreement--there are good and bad pilots in all areas of aviation, but FAR 121 carriers need consistently good pilots who are well-trained, follow the book and are professional enough to report in sick or not fit for duty. Regardless of the consequences, personal or business.

GF
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Old 2nd Aug 2009, 07:37
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Control column force

Looking at the charts, it seems pretty clear that someone was pulling back on that column for all they were worth at the end. If I assume a torque tube sort of connection between the right and left columns, it seems the the left seat is most likely applying most of the force. The left seat is also using the rudder pedals, so I'll assume the left seat is flying. It isn't clear to me from the NTSB description if the force shown on the right column is an artifact of that applied to the left column, or if it indicates the perons in the right seat also pulling back on the column. The NTSB seems to be saying this is an artifact; but I'd sure like to see some mechanical diagrams before I believe that out of hand.

I think there is a "reasonable" (I suppose) rationale for this back force. The AoA was far positive toward the end, but the pitch was far negative, getting up to -30 or so at the end. I suspect that this pitch down may have been obvious to the pilots in the form of gravity pulling forward, despite being somewhat countered by the engine thrust. I think at the end the pilot just paniced and forgot training, and pulled back on the stick to come out of the "dive", completely forgetting he was stalled and that was the wrong thing to do. (Maybe he had never had stall training? I find that hard to believe, but others seem to be suggesting the possibility.)

This maybe doesn't say much for pilot training, or maybe it was because he was under the weather and not thinking clearly. In either case the result was obviously ungood for all concerned. I'd be willing to give him a freebie for "anyone would likely panic at 1000 feet and -30 degrees" except for one thing -- the indications are that he was pulling back on the stick with increasing pressure all along. If he'd pushed over and then pulled back I might give him the freebie.

Wrong people in the wrong place at the wrong time. It seems clear nobody was watching airspeed after the last throttle decrease, so I suppose they thought they were flying by some cookbook recipe. Or maybe the PF was just distracted. Sigh. More training, or maybe just calling in sick would heve helped. Shame mgmt thinks both of those are bad things to do, "cheating" them out of their quarterly bonus for reducing costs.

Question on autotrim: if you don't have trim wheels, what indication do you have of the current trim situation, so you can notice if the AP is cranking in lots of trim, or just see what the trim situation is? I assume there is a trim indicator of some sort on the panel? Is it easy to read, or some little out of the way needle that is hard to get to and harder to read?
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Old 2nd Aug 2009, 15:25
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Ab Initio Stall training has the student reduce power and hold the nose up. This is what was happening here, albeit by a different (autopilot) mechanism; power was reduced and the a/p maintained altitude by trimming nose up. Enter the Stick Shaker (by increased ref), and the pilot's training in his firm.

If he was trained to "Fly through shaker with power", while maintaining altitude, wasn't he doing as trained (back pressure to maintain alt.?)

When the a/c did stall, with roll, he entered a regime that may have been completely unfamiliar to him, and probably to F/O as well. Now he's stalled, very LOW, and carrying ~max. power, an aspect of flight with which he may have been totally unfamiliar. Thinking power would maintain altitude, (that was his line training, after all) his job is to keep the a/c in the air. Here, advanced training is in direct conflict with ab initio, and he is after all, a fairly new pilot, with 'fresh' initial training perhaps too easily retrieved in an emergency situation. It may have been the conflict of line training with introductory that caused him to lose focus. It may have been as simple as Captain Renslow doing what he was trained, hold back stick during shaker with power, then when the Pusher chimed in, his 'instinct' (consistent with training again) ordered him to pull, he wouldn't have had time to think quickly enough to counter his trained in 'response'. He would have had to switch from Line training to basic Stall Recovery; It appears he wasn't able to 'Switch' techniques. So if this is true, he didn't 'forget' training; he honored it until he Stalled, which wasn't trained in this a/c; in the Stall he continued trying to fly through the Shaker.

If Shaw was following his actions, she may have even been intuitively acting with Renslow, having had the same training; dumping drag to increase a/s. The flap action makes sense in this way, back pressure to counter sink; the engines are full, ample power, etc.

Trying to put myself in their boots, it must have been confusing as Hell if it happened this way. Training didn't work, Stall, Panic, etc. not to mention dark, low, slow, dirty, bottom of curve, ice, comms, pax, chimes, on second thought I'll not go there.

Edit to add that both pilots hadn't had airspeed in scan, and 'forgot' that ref speed had increased early on, and automatically.

Last edited by Will Fraser; 2nd Aug 2009 at 17:22.
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Old 2nd Aug 2009, 23:42
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With ref to the large 'pull' that P1 surprisingly used.

He was plainly trying to go around.

OK, that sounds daft but nowadays pilots are taught to GA at every eventuality.

They teach that pretty much every problem will be solved if you only, perleeeease, will just take it around again!

So when it turned nasty, I bet this guy thought 'I know! Go around!...........Heave!'

Does anybody think that this was his version of a stall recovery? Nope.

This ever increasing reliance on the go around to solve all our problems is pernicious, misleading and flies in the face of proper airmanship.
 
Old 3rd Aug 2009, 00:02
  #1525 (permalink)  
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BBB;
This ever increasing reliance on the go around to solve all our problems is pernicious, misleading and flies in the face of proper airmanship.
That is a comment with which I never thought I would concur, but it is an accurate statement of affairs. The go-around maneuver can be as risky as the event it is trying to prevent. A number of accidents attest to this. As a flight data analyst as well as a airline pilot (retired) I never thought I would say this. To me this not as much pernicious as it is a serious training issue.

This does not mean I concur with the speculation that this is what P1 was trying to do. Though a reasonable speculation, we will never know what was intended because there is no confirmation of same - (Q400 operators, are there "GA" switches on the thrust levers that must be pressed at the same time?)

To accept that theory, one must also accept that the crew was not monitoring the declining airspeed (as per Surplus1's and Will Fraser's observations) and "tried to go-around" without sufficient energy to do so. Either way, they stalled the airplane.

In my view, Surplus1's view of this as an organizational accident is absolutely correct and focusing solely on the crew will accomplish nothing. In fact the NTSB already smells this in the nature of this accident.
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Old 3rd Aug 2009, 00:02
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Disagree. After a/p drops, his training was to fly through the shaker. The elevator was trimmed nose up, and he settled in with a column that relaxed at the elevator's position, to him, that was 'neutral' and backpressure made sense as he advanced the throttles to get off the shaker with a/s. At the pusher, he gets his second surprise, but keeps the backpressure, 'against the pusher', not the 'heave' or massive pull on the column. Eventually seventy pounds of 'resistance' against the column's forward push. At the last moment, with full back on the column but a 30 degree nose down, he might still be thinking, 'climb,baby'. Ken ?

1. Renslow was trained at Colgan to fly through the Shaker with power.

2. Flying through Shaker while maintaining Altitude can involve back pressure.

3. I think he may have been using the column's 'feel' to give him an horizon. Thinking pitch at a/p disconnect was 'neutral' (level)

4. I think GA was not his intention, but maybe his F/O's assumption, lifting flaps, waiting for his 'Gear Up'.

Last edited by Will Fraser; 3rd Aug 2009 at 00:13.
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Old 3rd Aug 2009, 00:40
  #1527 (permalink)  
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If I got the shaker, I'd push.
 
Old 3rd Aug 2009, 01:01
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As would I. Marvin had some shaker training at Colgan, and besides, at 1500AGL (He had to have known that), who wants to lose altitude? Turns out pushing even a little would have probably saved the day, and cost little if any altitude; he forgot to respond to all that thrust, on top of everything else.
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Old 3rd Aug 2009, 01:33
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Push or pull?

If I got the shaker, I'd push.
That seems real reasonable. But read the NTSB description of the Colgan stall training: you do three stalls. One clean, one in landing configuration, and one in takeoff configuration. This last must occur in the middle of a 30 degree bank.

In all cases you must maintain current altitude +-100 feet, or you fail the test. According to many of the Colgan check pilots, the 100' is a hard limit, and there are no excuses. You aren't going to be able to push over very much and maintain altitude unless you are also very good on the throttles and prop pitch. Also (according to the NTSB) Colgan doesn't train or even much mention the stick pusher. So there is a chance they wouldn't even know what it was or what was happening.

This tells me two things, I think. 1) The pilot has never had "stall" training in this plane. He has had (I guess you could call it) "stall anticipation training". More exactly, he has never seen a real stall, only stick shaker or stall buffet. And 2) he is trained to get out of a stall with added power while maintaining altitude within 100'. I think I agree with Will: he was probably doing as trained to fly out of a "stall".

(I wonder if powering out of a "stall" is good training or bad. Most stalls happen at low altitude, where you better recover in a few hundred feet. So from that POV powering out seems like a good idea. And if you are far enough from a real stall, I suppose it makes a good deal of sense.

But if you are in a real stall it might be the last thing you want to do in a prop plane. There were planes where cranking up the torque when stalled would twist you into a vicious spin. It is an open question in my mind whether this plane naturally falls off on the left wing in a stall, or if having lots of power on caused it to fall off.)
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Old 3rd Aug 2009, 02:20
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WhyIsThereAir

Somebody was Ruddering, let's assume it was Captain Renslow. If as trained he powered up and 'tried to maintain altitude' +-100feet, he was pulling, ever harder (assuming he was wrong in his pitch awareness), he would have his feet on the pedals, which move, independently. Was he supposed to balance his foothold purchase to prevent other than neutral Rudder deflection?? Probably, but he couldn't, hence the dropped wing and aileron chase. A very cool customer with 2-3,000 time in type may have handled it differently, but if our stand-in missed the E trim, he would have done what Captain Renslow did, IMHO. Probably would have pushed at the Pusher, though. It's hard to let go of a yoke when your in a battle for control. Even if you know what your doing. Did either one figure out what was happening? Shaw didn't do anything re, control, except 'I raised the flaps'.
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Old 3rd Aug 2009, 03:42
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In all cases you must maintain current altitude +-100 feet, or you fail the test.
Then he failed the test spectacularly, because he gained a lot of altitude in excess of 100 feet before the aircraft eventually stalled as the pusher activated.

I agree with others who feel the standard imminent stall training recovery may have a lot to do with it. I see a lot of sim partners at recurrent that are afraid of the stalls and unusual attitude recovery drills because they have little or no experience of actual stalls or anything approaching an aerobatic maneuver and certainly none in the class of aircraft they are being evaluated on. I believe there is an irrational fear of stalls and unusual attitudes among many in the professional pilot community and if we are to significantly improve safety in this area, then we must grab the bull by the horns and require training programs that incorporate efforts to identify and eradicate such irrational fears from the ranks of professional crews.
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Old 3rd Aug 2009, 04:34
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Like many accidents, when unwound, there is a change of fortune, a slip, or a missed item. Forgetting the increased ref speed, Renslow was settled with expectations that went missing in a flash. The shaker dislodged his plan, he thought he had ample speed (he did), the reversion gifted him with an a/c trimmed for maintaining altitude with low power, a nose up and increasing. I think he reacted correctly to the shaker, as he was trained to do. The rising nose rose even faster as he 'held altitude', then applied power, raising the nose even more, I think he didn't know his AoA, he'd have seen the blue below the line, and pushed. One additional miss in scan, perhaps. Besides, he was 'straight and level', except he'd forgotten to advance power with condition. When the pusher tried to pull on his back pressure, he resisted, was he trying not to bust a checkride?
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Old 3rd Aug 2009, 05:27
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I believe there is an irrational fear of stalls and unusual attitudes among many in the professional pilot community
But is it irrational? When was the last time they experienced a real stall? In primary in a single place Piper? Have they ever experienced a real stall in any kind of twin? How about a transport-catgory twin, even in a sim? I'd bet few except test pilots these days have ever seen a real stall in a four engine beast.

Its not particularly irrational to fear the unknown, especially when you are told that unknown can kill you if you don't do the right thing, and you have never had (since Piper days) a chance to try doing the right thing.

I'm told a PPL no longer requires spin training. Does ATPL?
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Old 3rd Aug 2009, 05:41
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Will

he would have his feet on the pedals, which move, independently. Was he supposed to balance his foothold purchase to prevent other than neutral Rudder deflection?? Probably, but he couldn't,
What you say sounds plausible, but I don't buy it. The ruddering was violent and appeared to be following roll and in opposition to same, The pullback was more or less linearly increasing. I think he was doing a good job handling the controls the way he had been taught, and there wasn't any particular exess foot reaction from the column pull.

My knowledge of modern plane characteristics is small, but I know several of the WW II era twin prop planes would fall off on the left wing when going into a stall, some quite violently.
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Old 3rd Aug 2009, 05:56
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I'm told a PPL no longer requires spin training. Does ATPL?
Without looking it up and if I remember correctly, only the CFI rating requires a demonstration of spin recovery.

The point is that if pilots do have a fear of stalls/unusual attitudes (they do - I have witnessed it) irrational or otherwise, then the best place to confront that fear and learn to control it while applying correct recovery technique is in the simulator. Current simulator training on imminent stall and unusual attitude/upset recovery tends to be treated as a handling warm up exercise before getting down to the serious work of flying approaches and dealing with systems failures. IMHO if we allowed pilots to experience full stalls and how to recover from them safely in the simulator that would be the best preparation for mastering correct recovery technique from an imminent stall.
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Old 3rd Aug 2009, 06:21
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CFI is the only ''ticket'' that requires spins...and not on the checkride...just an endorsement that you have done them with an instructor.

your requirement for parachutes is waived for this.

modern stall training is awful...but remember it is never fully stalled.

and in real life, wolfgang langweische's advice is best...stick forward.

WE will never really know what happened , how this whole thing fell apart.

BUT the fact that both pilots did the wrong thing is an indictment of colgan training and evaluation.
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Old 3rd Aug 2009, 06:57
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BUT the fact that both pilots did the wrong thing is an indictment of colgan training and evaluation.
Training, evaluation, and I think most important management practices.
There is an addendum to the CVR report that goes back and covers the hour from pushback to TO. From my point of view it is incredibly depressing / grisly / freightening reading. Almost the entire conversation of both pilots seems to be "everything I do is so I can get more pay".

There is a side note of someone that came to work that day and for the first time in 6 years forgot to bring some book with him, and was white as a sheet expecting to be fired instantly as a result. The pilot lent him his book to keep him from being fired.

I stopped reading after the first 20 pages or so, it was just too depressing. But it sure makes one wonder. This isn't the conversation of professionals. This is the conversation of indentured servants that know that they won't be paid enough to keep themselves healthy, and are in fear of their lives to be caned half to death at the slightest whim of the Master.

In the 1700s in England and France it was normal for servants to live this way, it was a direct outgrowth of the feudal system. The early industrial age didn't change things much; Jenny still worked at the loom for 30% of what she was worth and could be fired on the slightest whim of some passing manager (who also lived in fear of being fired). It didn't change until the USA of the time showed that you got better results by paying people decently.

And now we have Jenny-at-the-loom flying airplanes in that same USA. In fear of their lives about being fired for trivial causes, and doing anything they can to get a little more pay so they can afford to eat every day, and not just other day.

I'm not sure I feel all that comfortable with Jenny flying; she is desperate to do good and win approval of management (and get paid). But desperation doesn't always lead to sound judgement, and sound judgement seem like it would be important in a dangerous position in charge of many random lives.

One could wonder how we got to this pass. But there is no need to wonder, just look at the history. More interesting is wondering just how bad it will get, and just what the result will be, before something changes. And wondering what it is that will make the change. History seems to say that the change will not occur internally; management is quite happy with their quarterly bonus society, and really doesn't care about the serfs; indeed, they are largely annoyed that they exist at all.

I have to wonder where this will lead. Will airlines cease to exist in another decade because all of their planes fall out of the sky? Or will they just go bankrupt and shut down first? Or something else... Maybe Good Sense will finally prevail at the last minute?
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Old 3rd Aug 2009, 14:30
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I learned to fly in the military. We were required to do spin recovery under the hood and roll-out of the spin on a specific heading.

It appears from my perspective that the crew was spring-loaded for a stall induced by tailplane icing. It appeared their recovery attempt was very similar to that of the recovery scenario used in the FAA tailplane icing video.

BS
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Old 3rd Aug 2009, 15:58
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WhyIsThereAir;
This isn't the conversation of professionals. This is the conversation of indentured servants that know that they won't be paid enough to keep themselves healthy, and are in fear of their lives to be caned half to death at the slightest whim of the Master.
We may be sure that this type of conversation was not an isolated one, limited to these two pilots; this conversation is taking place in most cockpits of connector and major airlines today. Use Chapter 11 to steal pensions from employees who have paid into such pensions is simply one symptom of the problem. Captain Sullenberger's comments before Congress in February is saying the same thing that all pilots at all airlines are saying. The conversation that took place in the Colgan cockpit is no different than the thousands of conversations now taking place in other cockpits.

To say that "low pay does not cause accidents", is trivially true but it misses the point completely and misapprehends the problem. No airline pilot I know would permit his or her skills to reduce because of low pay. It is a testimony to the professionalism of air crews that, despite low pay, no pension, few benefits, they continue to maintain very high standards of skill and knowledge, which airline managements know very well is a work ethic that can be historically exploited with impunity. Such short-term thinking is now widespread because it is "successful". However, low pay does not attract the best and brightest, does not permit first-class training environments and regimes, does not provide the tools necessary for professionals to do their job safely and properly.

Because they are so focussed on "the bottom line" and cost control and know less and less about aviation, it is no longer an exaggeration to state that airline managements not only do NOT know how to do flight safety work, they have no notion of what it takes to "do aviation" safely and no notion of why the industry is as safe as it is today. For those far away from the "coal face" and who do not see what flight crews see every day, they are "satisfied" with current levels of safety, unaware of the forces now gathering to change that trend, fundamentally. In fact, when it finally becomes visible to even the resistant or furthest-removed from the operation that the trend has changed, they will not have the slightest notion of why, and therefore will not know what to do to change, the original causes buried in complexity and lack of comprehension.

SMS, as originally conceived is far better alternative than the "enforce and discipline" methods of the old ways, but under tremendous economic pressures and faciliated largely by ignorance of the principles of aviation and flight safety work, SMS has become the de-regulation of flight safety. An enterprise which must at once make a profit for the shareholder while making decisions which are contrary to that primary goal, cannot deal with such a conflict of interest alone. What has occurred to Southwest Airlines, American and others in the US is already substantive proof of this. In Canada, that lesson has yet to be learnt but it will be, one way or another.

While perennially true, it is abundantly true today under difficult economic circumstances that the support for complex flight safety programs is extremely difficult to obtain and where done, the data and information results are not only unpopular and unwelcome but are "like Greek" to airline managements because they cannot understand the data and cannot interpret what it means for the operation. Nor are they receptive to input or data, preferring to dwell in plausible deniability rather than knowledge. Such programs require a long-term vision of balanced values of profit-making with intelligent awareness of risk. That is expensive. Instead however, airline passengers have been told for 30 years now, "how cheap" it is to fly. It is if, as Captain Sullenberger states, airlines use their employees "as ATM machines".

That illusion that our passengers have been sold on is now coming home to roost. Passengers have legitimate complaints when, because the airlines' resources and employee ranks are so thin and so poorly paid that an airline cannot look after its passengers during IRROPS, Irregular Operations, but the seeds of those complaints were sown in nickels and dimes for fares when in truth, it takes a lot more money than $39 return to fly an A320 for a two-hour flight.

Again, it is sad that the Colgan crew is the center of focus. Like the Lexington Kentuck crew, the Colgan crew are the industry's "canaries in the mine". It is apparent that they did what they were trained to do. They never set out to have an accident, (why would anyone even think such a thought?) but were put into circumstances of which they were not aware because it was "normal", (the notion of the "normalization of deviance" is well worth examining in and of itself). Especially Shaw, did not and could not know that she was at a disadvantage. I recall the early days well - I would have done anything to fly for a living, just as any eager young pilot would. It is the responsibility of airlines to ensure that such eagerness is not taken advantage of or permitted to blind one to the realities of real aviation - carrying passengers. Instead, airllines now see employees, "indentured serfs" - as liabilities to profit and have taken away all incentive to come to the profession and do well. Their intention at the negotiating table is to take away all they can and, for pilots, fly them to the FARs or CARs flight time and duty day limits.

This is an extended conversation within the industry itself but not for investors who's habits of no thoughts towards employees or the health of their investment other than short-term gain, is itself short-term thinking.

One does NOT run an airline based upon "quarterly" thinking but that is precisely how airlines are being run today.

There is now plenty of evidence to base change upon. Whether passengers, employees and perhaps investors see that evidence or not is open to question.

The turned-around phrase, "I'll see it when I believe it" applies - the facts and the trends may be staring one in the face but until one believes it one cannot see it.

It will be the public and passenger outcry, (not to mention the insurers' outcry) to the change in accident statistics and not a willingness to change that will govern the outcome of this major crisis within the airline industry. Airline managements today don't know what they don't know so the statistics are going to remind them. The Colgan accident and crew, just like the Comair crew at Lexington, Kentucky, and their unsuspecting passengers were among those tragically to do so. However, the lesson is at great risk of being lost and the pattern repeated.
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Old 3rd Aug 2009, 16:28
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For whatever reason, when one turns to government to 'save' one, the die is cast. I do not imply anything sinister here, though that thought process is acknowledged. When airlines go into bankruptcy, (a government process) and come out with pensions disappeared, and salaries reduced yet again, what is next?

If the trend is to disruption, ruinous competition ( Hyenas are ready to fill in at this moment if Colgan goes under, make no mistake), the result is obvious. Here in America, the last entity to enter the market, when Historical tradition is abandoned, is the Federal Government. Chrysler motors is gone, Medicine is about to be swallowed up. One doesn't need to believe in conspiracies, reality is enough.

I grew up in the fifties, in one of the most affluent cities in America. On a par salary wise with MD's were Airline Captains. That they commanded an aircraft made them more admirable than Doctors, believe me. My best friend was the son of a well known Pan American Captain. Captain E. flew Clippers and was one of the intro pilots on the 747. To think that a Captain at any airline was making what Captain Renslow was, was laughable.

I wanted to be President. Or an Airline Captain, either way, all the same.

I don't know about you, but the culture at any given Airline today scares me. From Colgan to UAL to AirFrance, it doesn't bode well.
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