Continental TurboProp crash inbound for Buffalo
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OK.. for a start I admit to being one of the biggest critics of these low cost operations and the level of experience of the crews sends shivers through me....
I'm one of the many who have no doubt looked at the operation and thought.. for that money you won't get me out of bed in the morning never mind taking a $16 million a/c and fifty people up into storms/icing on multiple leg days flying people who think flying anywhere in the country should rival the costs of greyhound busses.
Having said that... let's keep it in proportion... hundreds of Pinnacle/Colgan pilots fly hundreds of schedules every day and don't come to grief. The US, unlike Europe experiences severe weather at all times of the year....
This accident was fortunately, a rare event and that is testimony to the effort put in by these people.
Many factors played a part but probably had the crew grown up in a more strict environment of cockpit discipline it would not have happened. In the airlines that I worked for chatting away while involved in an approach or at any time other than cruise would not only be frowned upon it would likely lead to tea and buscuits with the fleet chief pilot.
Most of these crews are reasonably talented as far as handling of a/c goes but that alone does not make a safe pilot.
I'm one of the many who have no doubt looked at the operation and thought.. for that money you won't get me out of bed in the morning never mind taking a $16 million a/c and fifty people up into storms/icing on multiple leg days flying people who think flying anywhere in the country should rival the costs of greyhound busses.
Having said that... let's keep it in proportion... hundreds of Pinnacle/Colgan pilots fly hundreds of schedules every day and don't come to grief. The US, unlike Europe experiences severe weather at all times of the year....
This accident was fortunately, a rare event and that is testimony to the effort put in by these people.
Many factors played a part but probably had the crew grown up in a more strict environment of cockpit discipline it would not have happened. In the airlines that I worked for chatting away while involved in an approach or at any time other than cruise would not only be frowned upon it would likely lead to tea and buscuits with the fleet chief pilot.
Most of these crews are reasonably talented as far as handling of a/c goes but that alone does not make a safe pilot.
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The holes in the cheese are becoming too large!
Our favourite metaphor for safety is speaking of how "the holes in the cheese lined up," to cause an accident. (Another, perhaps better, one is to speak of "the accident chain," a sequence of events that cause an accident.)
Well, you can buy cheese with little tiny holes or you can buy stuff with more holes than cheese, when both are still "cheese" but one will be much more prone to having its holes line up.
We already have regulations that mandate standards for this sort of thing; might it be worth raising those standards a bit? I know there were just some hearings re: Colgan (not that they are alone in this) but that doesn't seem to have brought any significant change to "business as usual." Somehow, just saying that burger-flipper wages are acceptable for aviation professionals... there has to be a flaw in that logic somewhere.
Well, you can buy cheese with little tiny holes or you can buy stuff with more holes than cheese, when both are still "cheese" but one will be much more prone to having its holes line up.
We already have regulations that mandate standards for this sort of thing; might it be worth raising those standards a bit? I know there were just some hearings re: Colgan (not that they are alone in this) but that doesn't seem to have brought any significant change to "business as usual." Somehow, just saying that burger-flipper wages are acceptable for aviation professionals... there has to be a flaw in that logic somewhere.
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chatting away while involved in an approach or at any time other than cruise
I wonder if the understanding of CRM has got something to do with more vocalisation, at in-appropriat times ?
As for this accident lets all remember they are dead and give them a break. Both pilots had reasonable total hours. Maybe "but for the grace of god go I"
I wonder if the understanding of CRM has got something to do with more vocalisation, at in-appropriat times ?
As for this accident lets all remember they are dead and give them a break. Both pilots had reasonable total hours. Maybe "but for the grace of god go I"
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The US, unlike Europe experiences severe weather at all times of the year....
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pool
I'm not stating that US pilots are better... I had 15 yrs of operating in Europe prior to moving here... I can state that without doubt that the extremes of weather here are greater than Europe... In the UK we complain constantly about the weather but in reality we don't have much in the way of extreme weather. On the whole, certainly as far as met goes.. the US guys work harder for their money.
Good lord. This must mean you're all better regional pilots than poms or frogs
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On page 86 of this thread and I admit to not having read it all but has anyone pointed out that the stick shaker is not a stall but a condition of slow flight, the recovery to which is an application of power? Unless you are in an unusual attitude, That there is no reason to change the attitude? Is there anybody out there who does not understand that simple concept?
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Well, I guess you could find somewhere in the lower 48 states that has bad weather on any given day but there's a wide swathe of territory in the south that has remarkably fine weather for most of the year. That is why we have so many airports left over from when we were training aircrew for the Second World War in Florida, for instance. What all of that has to do with pilot ability though... no idea.
One comment here makes a lot of sense to me, that idea of setting the bar a bit low. Of course we are not all potential astronauts or test pilots, people with exceptional ability but you can read some accident reports where you have to wonder how that fellow ever got a job in the first place with such an obvious lack of aptitude. There perhaps the bar was set a bit too low, yes.
I remember when the USA went to requiring an ATP instead of a Commercial license for Part 135 operations because of a series of really stupid accidents. One that got everyone's attention was a Navajo pilot who lost an engine on departure off a nice, long runway, when all he had to do was cut both throttles and land on the runway straight ahead. Instead he let the speed decay until it went below Vmc, when he crashed. Of course a properly trained Commercial pilot should be able to handle this situation, when this fellow couldn't for some reason. Anyway, suddenly a Commercial ticket was no longer good enough and we all had to have ATPs to fly for the regionals.
Our wonderful capitalist system then sprang into action in the way it is designed to, supplying a need, when it ran many guys through schools that got them their ATPs as quickly and cheaply as possible. Most of these guys were no better pilots than before; all we did there was to degrade the average skill of an ATP holder (in my opinion). Possible proof of that can be to read of the same sort of accidents as before, just that now the crew hold ATPs where once they would have held Commercial/IFR tickets.
I remember my first (and last) Part 135 job in the States, for a little outfit called Atlantis Airlines, one of the first to start up after de-regulation. I had to pay for 50% of the cost of my uniform (made to look just like a Delta uniform) and I made a princely $800 per month before taxes as a Twin Otter First Officer. Well, that was in 1979-80 in the Carolinas! I remember a friend from Colgan who stopped by looking for a job with us, so I guess he was on about the same, flying a Beech 99 as an FO. He had just been told that his crew base was changing next Friday so that he would have all weekend to pack up and move, to sort out his own place so that he could be back on the program on Monday.
We had worked together for Colgan as flight instructors, when he went onto their 135 operation. I had seen enough of Colgan and I went with Atlantis instead. After a year there I got the boot, went to Florida to fly air taxi for a year and get my P1 XC hours up for my ATP, got a job in Africa on the back of that and never looked back. Part 135 was a dog's life in 1980 and it reads as though nothing much has changed. Well, perhaps it has got worse, when that is a change, yes...
One comment here makes a lot of sense to me, that idea of setting the bar a bit low. Of course we are not all potential astronauts or test pilots, people with exceptional ability but you can read some accident reports where you have to wonder how that fellow ever got a job in the first place with such an obvious lack of aptitude. There perhaps the bar was set a bit too low, yes.
I remember when the USA went to requiring an ATP instead of a Commercial license for Part 135 operations because of a series of really stupid accidents. One that got everyone's attention was a Navajo pilot who lost an engine on departure off a nice, long runway, when all he had to do was cut both throttles and land on the runway straight ahead. Instead he let the speed decay until it went below Vmc, when he crashed. Of course a properly trained Commercial pilot should be able to handle this situation, when this fellow couldn't for some reason. Anyway, suddenly a Commercial ticket was no longer good enough and we all had to have ATPs to fly for the regionals.
Our wonderful capitalist system then sprang into action in the way it is designed to, supplying a need, when it ran many guys through schools that got them their ATPs as quickly and cheaply as possible. Most of these guys were no better pilots than before; all we did there was to degrade the average skill of an ATP holder (in my opinion). Possible proof of that can be to read of the same sort of accidents as before, just that now the crew hold ATPs where once they would have held Commercial/IFR tickets.
I remember my first (and last) Part 135 job in the States, for a little outfit called Atlantis Airlines, one of the first to start up after de-regulation. I had to pay for 50% of the cost of my uniform (made to look just like a Delta uniform) and I made a princely $800 per month before taxes as a Twin Otter First Officer. Well, that was in 1979-80 in the Carolinas! I remember a friend from Colgan who stopped by looking for a job with us, so I guess he was on about the same, flying a Beech 99 as an FO. He had just been told that his crew base was changing next Friday so that he would have all weekend to pack up and move, to sort out his own place so that he could be back on the program on Monday.
We had worked together for Colgan as flight instructors, when he went onto their 135 operation. I had seen enough of Colgan and I went with Atlantis instead. After a year there I got the boot, went to Florida to fly air taxi for a year and get my P1 XC hours up for my ATP, got a job in Africa on the back of that and never looked back. Part 135 was a dog's life in 1980 and it reads as though nothing much has changed. Well, perhaps it has got worse, when that is a change, yes...
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MungoP
No offense.
What makes me tick though, is that since lately, for obvious reasons, a lot of regional aviators from the US apply for jobs further away. Going through the same assessment as their counterparts from the rest of the world, believe us, they don't really look too good. And the rest of the world has some meteorological surprises up its sleeve that matches the US's.
So most probably this argument is a bit streched and chucks is somewhat closer to reality!
The FAA has some mopping up to do, as it now transpires.
No offense.
What makes me tick though, is that since lately, for obvious reasons, a lot of regional aviators from the US apply for jobs further away. Going through the same assessment as their counterparts from the rest of the world, believe us, they don't really look too good. And the rest of the world has some meteorological surprises up its sleeve that matches the US's.
So most probably this argument is a bit streched and chucks is somewhat closer to reality!
The FAA has some mopping up to do, as it now transpires.
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That is another thread in itself...
"American pilots are rubbish!" Discuss...
We have our share of muppets, sure. I wouldn't want to stand behind the performance of these two unfortunates flying the Colgan Q400; not even their boss was willing to do that!
I think we need to focus on the system and not single out individual pilot ability, otherwise we end up cherry-picking this or that horrible example of poor airmanship from across the world as if to show that low ability is a wide-spread problem, which it is! If we can find ways to:
A. Produce pilots of better ability.
and,
B. Find ways to de-select pilots of poor ability before a crash does that first.
then I think we will have used this tragedy to advance safety. I think we can all see that economics make this an uphill fight; I don't see the regulators having some sudden change of heart that improves both the pilot pool and the way they are treated. The system is very resistant to change.
We have our share of muppets, sure. I wouldn't want to stand behind the performance of these two unfortunates flying the Colgan Q400; not even their boss was willing to do that!
I think we need to focus on the system and not single out individual pilot ability, otherwise we end up cherry-picking this or that horrible example of poor airmanship from across the world as if to show that low ability is a wide-spread problem, which it is! If we can find ways to:
A. Produce pilots of better ability.
and,
B. Find ways to de-select pilots of poor ability before a crash does that first.
then I think we will have used this tragedy to advance safety. I think we can all see that economics make this an uphill fight; I don't see the regulators having some sudden change of heart that improves both the pilot pool and the way they are treated. The system is very resistant to change.
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I think it was summed up earlier in that but for the grace of God go I.
This thread has touched on many topics which all form the terms and conditions of a pilots lifestyle.
To have holes in the cheese is an unfortunate reality to have a solid block of cheese............. we'll keep the aircraft on the ground; the safest operation of all but as we all know impractical.
The amount of holes is the race to the bottom in our industry. Tell the public their ticket price is directly proportional to the quantity and size of these holes.
2 types of experience out there, quantitive and qualitive. Fill your pockets with both if you can. Remember that self praise is no recommendation but self belief is your anchor.
Remember too that protected aircraft, warning systems, override systems are based on a clean wing aerodynamics. Ice contaminated wings will alter the aerodynamics and this can be a rule changer and all bets are off that any of these systems will work as envisaged.
But most of all remember like us, the 2 pilots for all their strengths and weaknesses probably read these forums too.
This thread has touched on many topics which all form the terms and conditions of a pilots lifestyle.
To have holes in the cheese is an unfortunate reality to have a solid block of cheese............. we'll keep the aircraft on the ground; the safest operation of all but as we all know impractical.
The amount of holes is the race to the bottom in our industry. Tell the public their ticket price is directly proportional to the quantity and size of these holes.
2 types of experience out there, quantitive and qualitive. Fill your pockets with both if you can. Remember that self praise is no recommendation but self belief is your anchor.
Remember too that protected aircraft, warning systems, override systems are based on a clean wing aerodynamics. Ice contaminated wings will alter the aerodynamics and this can be a rule changer and all bets are off that any of these systems will work as envisaged.
But most of all remember like us, the 2 pilots for all their strengths and weaknesses probably read these forums too.
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you mention that the shaker is mearly slow flight...while what you say may work...you get away from the shaker and the impending stall alot faster by pushing forward on the stick.
now, that is simple...all this bs about holding altitude is so easily lost in real life.
if you get the shaker inflight, in a passenger airliner, you have ****** up bad...unless it is a short circuit in the shaker or something.
so get out fast...once flying again you can add firewall power and regain your altitude.
you mention that the shaker is mearly slow flight...while what you say may work...you get away from the shaker and the impending stall alot faster by pushing forward on the stick.
now, that is simple...all this bs about holding altitude is so easily lost in real life.
if you get the shaker inflight, in a passenger airliner, you have ****** up bad...unless it is a short circuit in the shaker or something.
so get out fast...once flying again you can add firewall power and regain your altitude.
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It's not only a matter of pilot and training quality. You have to add aircraft design and industry regulation/oversight.
We all know about the shortcomings of big props in severe weather (ATR72 Q400). Was there ever a major grounding and redesign? No. As far as i know, the last major grounding was imposed on the DC10. Since then the industry has built up enough lobbying power to avoid such measures, even with huge design flaws. It is as if everyone involved prefers to save a couple of thousand jobs rather than 50 lives every now and then.
It seems as if the car industry is less cynical. Aided by consumer right groups and not to forget the fierce competition, they are more accountable and recalls are much more common.
Have you ever heard of a recall of licences given by specific academies or airlines? Again, no. Some of them deliver such a low standard and this is known right down to the regulators. Every now and then a small surgical and announced audit does not really deal with the problem. The amount of forged hours (that i have seen) must lead to the assumption that even licences may be forged (assumption) or at least more "bought" than aquired.
The sad part is that basically all insiders know about such flaws. But because everone is more or less tied up in the same circle, most are protecting their own job by simply looking the other way.
Complaining happens on anonymous forums, but as such can't lead to improvement.
The real blame lies with the regulating oversight. It's the body we pay with our taxes and is only here to do exactly this, oversight, and they fail miserably. Their own oversight, the ministry and ministers couldn't care less than their next election. To me it's the politics that fail, and politics, at least in our hemisphere, is the people, is us. So we deserve failure ...
We all know about the shortcomings of big props in severe weather (ATR72 Q400). Was there ever a major grounding and redesign? No. As far as i know, the last major grounding was imposed on the DC10. Since then the industry has built up enough lobbying power to avoid such measures, even with huge design flaws. It is as if everyone involved prefers to save a couple of thousand jobs rather than 50 lives every now and then.
It seems as if the car industry is less cynical. Aided by consumer right groups and not to forget the fierce competition, they are more accountable and recalls are much more common.
Have you ever heard of a recall of licences given by specific academies or airlines? Again, no. Some of them deliver such a low standard and this is known right down to the regulators. Every now and then a small surgical and announced audit does not really deal with the problem. The amount of forged hours (that i have seen) must lead to the assumption that even licences may be forged (assumption) or at least more "bought" than aquired.
The sad part is that basically all insiders know about such flaws. But because everone is more or less tied up in the same circle, most are protecting their own job by simply looking the other way.
Complaining happens on anonymous forums, but as such can't lead to improvement.
The real blame lies with the regulating oversight. It's the body we pay with our taxes and is only here to do exactly this, oversight, and they fail miserably. Their own oversight, the ministry and ministers couldn't care less than their next election. To me it's the politics that fail, and politics, at least in our hemisphere, is the people, is us. So we deserve failure ...
Last edited by pool; 9th Feb 2010 at 02:55.
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Are Stick Pushers Lethal by their very nature?
on the Buffalo crash
Even if you don't presently have any strong feelings about stick-pushers and stall warnings generally, please read into the link above and comment as appropriate. Interested in incident histories, personal experiences and thoughts generally on what constitutes a preliminary alert (rather than a disturbing instantaneous alarm)
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Even if you don't presently have any strong feelings about stick-pushers and stall warnings generally, please read into the link above and comment as appropriate. Interested in incident histories, personal experiences and thoughts generally on what constitutes a preliminary alert (rather than a disturbing instantaneous alarm)
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I glanced at the stick pusher article...if a plane needs a pusher, then it either should have a pusher or not be certified.
so
I do think the pusher should have a substantial warning, like a longer period of stick shaker activation. I also think pilots should have knowledge of such a vital system.
I've flown two airplanes wih pushers *not the Q400 though...both had very large warning lights that the pusher was activated...it also had easy to disconnect pusher methods.
so....what can I say....
so
I do think the pusher should have a substantial warning, like a longer period of stick shaker activation. I also think pilots should have knowledge of such a vital system.
I've flown two airplanes wih pushers *not the Q400 though...both had very large warning lights that the pusher was activated...it also had easy to disconnect pusher methods.
so....what can I say....
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That article is a tough one to read, poorly written and very, very colourful!
Anyway... The first thing is that speed isn't the problem but AoA (Angle of Attack). If you aren't familiar with that term you can look it up but basically when it is too high then airflow begins to detach from the wing's upper surface and this leads to what we call "a stall." The airplane doesn't "lose lift" or "fall out of the sky" and it has nothing to do with the engines "stalling" but it's certainly not going to be flying very well when it is stalled, especially at low altitude.
The FAA does not want AoA directly displayed to the pilot so we use speed instead, since there is a loose relationship between speed and AoA, dependent on weight and acceleration, hence all this about "flying too slow."
Your first warning is the triple airspeed displays in the cockpit which are meant to be monitored by the two crewmembers, particularly the PF (Pilot Flying). You can read how this was not done in the Colgan crash.
Next you have the stick shaker, a device that mimics the natural pre-stall buffet present in many aircraft, something familiar to us from our early training in stall recovery, something we get before we even do a solo flight as a student. If you missed the airspeed displays this warns you that your AoA is dangerously high.
Finally you get the stick pusher, which actuates to lower the nose of the aircraft, getting it away from that now too-high AoA. If the pusher comes as a surprise to them then that means the crew have missed the triple airspeed displays and the shaker, when they obviously have a problem carrying out their expected duties there!
Transport aircraft are very carefully designed and tested so that I reject the thrust of the argument that stick shakers and stick pushers are somehow unsafe. They are accepted safety devices but they cannot completely compensate for failure to fly properly; they do not make an airplane uncrashable but leaving them off would make it less safe.
Anyway... The first thing is that speed isn't the problem but AoA (Angle of Attack). If you aren't familiar with that term you can look it up but basically when it is too high then airflow begins to detach from the wing's upper surface and this leads to what we call "a stall." The airplane doesn't "lose lift" or "fall out of the sky" and it has nothing to do with the engines "stalling" but it's certainly not going to be flying very well when it is stalled, especially at low altitude.
The FAA does not want AoA directly displayed to the pilot so we use speed instead, since there is a loose relationship between speed and AoA, dependent on weight and acceleration, hence all this about "flying too slow."
Your first warning is the triple airspeed displays in the cockpit which are meant to be monitored by the two crewmembers, particularly the PF (Pilot Flying). You can read how this was not done in the Colgan crash.
Next you have the stick shaker, a device that mimics the natural pre-stall buffet present in many aircraft, something familiar to us from our early training in stall recovery, something we get before we even do a solo flight as a student. If you missed the airspeed displays this warns you that your AoA is dangerously high.
Finally you get the stick pusher, which actuates to lower the nose of the aircraft, getting it away from that now too-high AoA. If the pusher comes as a surprise to them then that means the crew have missed the triple airspeed displays and the shaker, when they obviously have a problem carrying out their expected duties there!
Transport aircraft are very carefully designed and tested so that I reject the thrust of the argument that stick shakers and stick pushers are somehow unsafe. They are accepted safety devices but they cannot completely compensate for failure to fly properly; they do not make an airplane uncrashable but leaving them off would make it less safe.
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All this talk of pushers/shakers, speed tapes etc is largely superfluous... more junk to look at, more distractions, bells and whistles. A/c today are a lot more forgiving in handling and in spite of more complex systems are actually a lot easier to fly ... all we need to do as pilots is fly the damn thing.
As for relative skills of pilots worldwide... since leaving the UK I've operated for 10 years on four continents with pilots from just about every corner of the globe and am currently keeping people from many nations up to speed in simulators... Withouit getting into the politics of the selection process in some of the less developed nations I can promise you that there is no obvious difference in skill levels between Europe and anywhere else... it's down to the individual... yes the ground exams for the JAA licence are way over the top in requirements.. yes the ground exams for the FAA licence are a joke... the ideal would be somewhere in between, but the result in skill levels in the cockpit doesn't reflect the differences... I see similar levels of competance and incompetance from most nationalities. This crew proved to be less than competant and paid the ultimate price... as have other crews from all nations... let's not get bogged down in technical difficutlies... the Q400 is a superb a/c... all they had to do was fly the damned thing... that's all any of us have to do when we climb into the cockpit.
70% of accidents/incidents involve some aspect of CRM... let's focus on THAT and resist the temptation to want the techtronics to do the job we are paid to do.
As for relative skills of pilots worldwide... since leaving the UK I've operated for 10 years on four continents with pilots from just about every corner of the globe and am currently keeping people from many nations up to speed in simulators... Withouit getting into the politics of the selection process in some of the less developed nations I can promise you that there is no obvious difference in skill levels between Europe and anywhere else... it's down to the individual... yes the ground exams for the JAA licence are way over the top in requirements.. yes the ground exams for the FAA licence are a joke... the ideal would be somewhere in between, but the result in skill levels in the cockpit doesn't reflect the differences... I see similar levels of competance and incompetance from most nationalities. This crew proved to be less than competant and paid the ultimate price... as have other crews from all nations... let's not get bogged down in technical difficutlies... the Q400 is a superb a/c... all they had to do was fly the damned thing... that's all any of us have to do when we climb into the cockpit.
70% of accidents/incidents involve some aspect of CRM... let's focus on THAT and resist the temptation to want the techtronics to do the job we are paid to do.
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Missing the point
Chuks said
I don't think that compendium of articles is contesting the functionality or design of stick-pushers and shakers. As long as the AoA probe hasn't been struck by a ground-handler and not reported (Abidjan A310 crash on take-off and another CONUS take-off accident of a widebody - plus a number of others), then the stick-shaker/pusher will do what it's designed to do.
What that link is overall saying is simply that you can expect that what the Buffalo Q400 pilots did wasn't unexpected - against a background of factual statistics. He backs this up with the NTSB investigator's factual input of 70% of airline pilots tested (and expecting a stall and recovery situation), having responded in exactly the same way that the Q400 captain did.
If that's not a cause for deep concern, what is? Re-read the link matey. You've totally missed the point.
That instinctive contrary response to an extraneous uncommanded flight control input (i.e. a melded stick-shake/stick-push during the rapid deceleration of an unpowered configured level-off)?
Methinks that this human factors handling anomaly (for 70% of the pilot population) needs to be looked at by a battery of clinical psychologists.
It's worth reflecting upon just how much automation has compounded and confused something as fundamental as stall warning and recovery. Reflecting upon the (as yet) unknown cause of the AF447 crash, the Report upon the prior Air Caraibes A330 near accident says:
from link
Transport aircraft are very carefully designed and tested so that I reject the thrust of the argument that stick shakers and stick pushers are somehow unsafe.
What that link is overall saying is simply that you can expect that what the Buffalo Q400 pilots did wasn't unexpected - against a background of factual statistics. He backs this up with the NTSB investigator's factual input of 70% of airline pilots tested (and expecting a stall and recovery situation), having responded in exactly the same way that the Q400 captain did.
If that's not a cause for deep concern, what is? Re-read the link matey. You've totally missed the point.
That instinctive contrary response to an extraneous uncommanded flight control input (i.e. a melded stick-shake/stick-push during the rapid deceleration of an unpowered configured level-off)?
Methinks that this human factors handling anomaly (for 70% of the pilot population) needs to be looked at by a battery of clinical psychologists.
It's worth reflecting upon just how much automation has compounded and confused something as fundamental as stall warning and recovery. Reflecting upon the (as yet) unknown cause of the AF447 crash, the Report upon the prior Air Caraibes A330 near accident says:
The picture given by the message RESPECT STALL WARNING AND DISREGARD "RISK OF UNDUE STALL WARNING" STATUS MESSAGE IF DISPLAYED ON ECAM is of someone flying an airplane where the stall warnings are saying that the airplane is stalling, the ECAM screen is telling the pilot to disregard the stall warnings, and the manual is telling the pilot to disregard the ECAM and heed the stall warnings, but the pilot doesn't believe that the airplane is stalling. It's like having your chief pilot, training manager and captain all on the flight deck, telling you do different things. The next part of the Air Caraibes memo then analyzes the event and the warnings in terms of the Airbus protections offered by ALTERNATE LAW, NORMAL LAW, and DIRECT LAW, detailing what was and lost or changed in response to the various alarms, such as the F/CTL ADR DISAGREE. He points out that the checklists contradict each other when the unreliable speed indication checklist says, RELY ON THE STALL WARNING THAT COULD BE TRIGGERED IN ALTERNATE OR DIRECT LAW. IT IS NOT AFFECTED BY UNRELIABLE SPEEDS, BECAUSE IT IS BASED ON ANGLE OF ATTACK, while the icing checklist warns UNDUE STALL WARNINGS MAY MAINLY OCCUR IN THE CASE OF AN AOA DISCREPANCY. (AoA is angle of attack, measured by vanes outside the aircraft, which in severe icing can also be unreliable).
(With the autothrust selected off and the crew confident that they were not in a stall, no stall recovery inputs were made. Which is good, because [as the AF447 pilots possibly found], the result of stall recovery inputs when you are not in a stall could be an overspeed, and in alternate law the high speed protection warnings are reduced).
(With the autothrust selected off and the crew confident that they were not in a stall, no stall recovery inputs were made. Which is good, because [as the AF447 pilots possibly found], the result of stall recovery inputs when you are not in a stall could be an overspeed, and in alternate law the high speed protection warnings are reduced).