Continental TurboProp crash inbound for Buffalo
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I take it as being an implication of your statement Will Fraser that you do not consider yourself to be a dullard.
Of course you wouldn't. So, says you, CVidRs would be O.K. ......
Given the history of the abuse of CVR and Data Recorders of all types your ignorance might be considered in some circles to qualify you as a bit of a dullard. Would you consider that to be "fair comment"?
I agree, of course, that CVidR's would of considerable technical assistance to investigators of all types (including abusers). But that's just a good technical argument. Just remember that way back when VCRs were first introduced some people thought that their presence would concentrate the minds of the dullards, etc. Same with the introduction of Flight Data Recorders. But "dullards" are in the mind of the beholder and they will always be with us.
The dullard argument is pretty weak but, far more importantly, the risks and dangers are immediate. All previous promises by airlines and ICAO and many states about date protection were broken on several occasions. Why would it be different for CVidRs?
Answer: it would not.
Of course you wouldn't. So, says you, CVidRs would be O.K. ......
Given the history of the abuse of CVR and Data Recorders of all types your ignorance might be considered in some circles to qualify you as a bit of a dullard. Would you consider that to be "fair comment"?
I agree, of course, that CVidR's would of considerable technical assistance to investigators of all types (including abusers). But that's just a good technical argument. Just remember that way back when VCRs were first introduced some people thought that their presence would concentrate the minds of the dullards, etc. Same with the introduction of Flight Data Recorders. But "dullards" are in the mind of the beholder and they will always be with us.
The dullard argument is pretty weak but, far more importantly, the risks and dangers are immediate. All previous promises by airlines and ICAO and many states about date protection were broken on several occasions. Why would it be different for CVidRs?
Answer: it would not.
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Goodness, one has touched a nerve. What difference could it make, one's dullard index? If my comment has any value, fine, if not, move on. Take a pill. FAA approved of course.
Fraser, mind the spelling. (thanks)
Ah, I see your green dot is extinguished. Lob and Leave?
Will
Fraser, mind the spelling. (thanks)
Ah, I see your green dot is extinguished. Lob and Leave?
Will
Last edited by Will Fraser; 17th May 2009 at 20:21. Reason: correct some dullard punctuation
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delwy brings up an important issue. The adversarial atmosphere twixt pilot and airline needs to be addressed immediately. Duty hours and fatigue most importantly. Salaries (t and c's) as well. Prior to the situation degrading into one of criminal exposure by the Companies one would hope.
Will
Will
Last edited by Will Fraser; 17th May 2009 at 19:43. Reason: correct the gentleman's avatar spelling
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I know FDRs and QARs can be readily used to identify hard landings, overspeeds, and other events that warrant further maintenance action, but that strikes me as rather benign and justifiable.
Are there any anecdotal tales of management abuse of flight crew stemming from QAR downloads?
The CVoxR has an Erase Button. Doesn't that mitigate the "abuse" aspect?
Are there operators that threaten their flight crew with punitive action should they discover a CVR erased after an uneventful flight?
Why can't the CVidR have a like function?
Are there any anecdotal tales of management abuse of flight crew stemming from QAR downloads?
The CVoxR has an Erase Button. Doesn't that mitigate the "abuse" aspect?
Are there operators that threaten their flight crew with punitive action should they discover a CVR erased after an uneventful flight?
Why can't the CVidR have a like function?
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AND I wish we had a cockpit video recorder showing us what the instruments showed the pilots.
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Zeffy:
So "we" are inferring that the red bricks of the Low Speed Cue weren't functioning or displayed on this sector?
Not at all. Just that neither the captain nor the FO saw them (registered them or their significance, if you like) if they were there. Why that may be is something the investigation will look into I'm sure.
So "we" are inferring that the red bricks of the Low Speed Cue weren't functioning or displayed on this sector?
Not at all. Just that neither the captain nor the FO saw them (registered them or their significance, if you like) if they were there. Why that may be is something the investigation will look into I'm sure.
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The FAA sets the minimum standard. The FAA also approves all training events to be demonstrated and trained in simulator or the aircraft.
Prior to degregulation, ie.. prior to 1978, every major airline was far more conservative in just about every area than the FAA minimum standard. As an example most major airlines had duty day limits of 12 to maybe 14 hours not 16 extendable to what ever. Late night hours were often limited to 10 or less hours. Crew rest was a minimum of 11 or 12 hours, with some reduction for very short flow on days. Of course in 1978 regional airlines were unknown or just begining to show. Only PBA comes to mind. (And that one failed due to its own stupidity and greed.)
Maximum flight hours per month were historically in the mid 70's. Maximum workdays fell somewhere for a line holder between 12 and 14 days. There were lots of three days on, four days off. Reserve was maybe 16 days with a minimum hourly pay just short of a line holder.
Today...its to what ever the FAA sets as the minimum.
This accident, I would suggest, the major contributor is the FAA. The group who oversees Cogan's FAA POI, (primary operations inspector) hold just as much liablility as the crew members operating that ill-faited aircraft.
As deregulation grabbed hold the added safety rules of all majors started the slow transition to the FAA minimum standards.
Of course it was the need for the company to ink out some profit that drove these give-back, that had been hard fought for, by the pilot groups, in the 1960's and 70's.
Just a few of my thoughts on the subject.
Prior to degregulation, ie.. prior to 1978, every major airline was far more conservative in just about every area than the FAA minimum standard. As an example most major airlines had duty day limits of 12 to maybe 14 hours not 16 extendable to what ever. Late night hours were often limited to 10 or less hours. Crew rest was a minimum of 11 or 12 hours, with some reduction for very short flow on days. Of course in 1978 regional airlines were unknown or just begining to show. Only PBA comes to mind. (And that one failed due to its own stupidity and greed.)
Maximum flight hours per month were historically in the mid 70's. Maximum workdays fell somewhere for a line holder between 12 and 14 days. There were lots of three days on, four days off. Reserve was maybe 16 days with a minimum hourly pay just short of a line holder.
Today...its to what ever the FAA sets as the minimum.
This accident, I would suggest, the major contributor is the FAA. The group who oversees Cogan's FAA POI, (primary operations inspector) hold just as much liablility as the crew members operating that ill-faited aircraft.
As deregulation grabbed hold the added safety rules of all majors started the slow transition to the FAA minimum standards.
Of course it was the need for the company to ink out some profit that drove these give-back, that had been hard fought for, by the pilot groups, in the 1960's and 70's.
Just a few of my thoughts on the subject.
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Revelations on pilot pay, working conditions at regional airlines raise safety issues
Members of Congress said they were stunned by the salaries of the pilots of Continental Connection Flight 3407, employees of the smaller commuter airline Colgan Air Inc. The pilots may have tried to snatch sleep in an airport crew lounge, which is against company policy. The first officer lived with her parents near Seattle and commuting cross country to work in New Jersey.
"All these things raise questions: Are they an aberration or are FAA (Federal Aviation Administration) standards sufficient? Or are the standards not enforced?" said Democratic Sen. Byron Dorgan of North Dakota, chairman of the Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation subcommittee on aviation.
Members of Congress said they were stunned by the salaries of the pilots of Continental Connection Flight 3407, employees of the smaller commuter airline Colgan Air Inc. The pilots may have tried to snatch sleep in an airport crew lounge, which is against company policy. The first officer lived with her parents near Seattle and commuting cross country to work in New Jersey.
"All these things raise questions: Are they an aberration or are FAA (Federal Aviation Administration) standards sufficient? Or are the standards not enforced?" said Democratic Sen. Byron Dorgan of North Dakota, chairman of the Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation subcommittee on aviation.
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Mustangsally
And in 1978, jets would be used between Newark and BUF, not props.
Its funny, 30 years ago the airlines still wanted to show how safe they were so that the customer would buy tickets...now they want to show how cheap they are.
One giant leap backwards for man
And in 1978, jets would be used between Newark and BUF, not props.
Its funny, 30 years ago the airlines still wanted to show how safe they were so that the customer would buy tickets...now they want to show how cheap they are.
One giant leap backwards for man
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AOA vs Low Speed Cue and Stick Shaker
Kindly refer to the slide presentation of the Bombardier representative, (especially slides # 7 & 8) describing the function of the Q400's ice protection system.
Also to the Bombardier slides describing the stall protection system.
Do I understand the following three concepts correctly?:
Thus, it would appear that a failure to bug the "additive" speeds would result in the bugged speeds appearing within the red-bricked band on the airspeed tape and the stick-shaker firing prior to the airspeed decreasing to the non-icing references.
This description of a Colgan Q400 stick-shaker incident in Vermont (during a line-check no less) appears to confirm the above thoughts.
Am I missing anything?
Also to the Bombardier slides describing the stall protection system.
Do I understand the following three concepts correctly?:
- Both the Low Speed Cue (red bricks on the airspeed tape) and the Stick Shaker are driven by AOA -- not indicated airspeed.
- During icing conditions, the "REF SPEEDS" switch re-indexes the AOA stall-warning thresholds for Stick Shaker activation as well as for the Low Speed Cue. In other words, both the LSC and the Stick Shaker become more conservative when the "REF SPEEDS" switch is activated as the warning threshold is set to a lower AOA reference.
- The airspeed additives specified in the QRH are selected/entered manually by the pilots.
Thus, it would appear that a failure to bug the "additive" speeds would result in the bugged speeds appearing within the red-bricked band on the airspeed tape and the stick-shaker firing prior to the airspeed decreasing to the non-icing references.
This description of a Colgan Q400 stick-shaker incident in Vermont (during a line-check no less) appears to confirm the above thoughts.
Am I missing anything?
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MU3001A
to give the benefit of the doubt to two dead pilots, to understand the world fo computers, I have to ask: could they have seen the correct IAS displayed, yet have it not be correct?
COULD the INCREASED VREF speed switch somehow be crosswired and just display 20 more knots than they really had?
IF there were a camera recording what a human eye would have seen would have cleared this up right away.
Awhile ago, an air traffic controller I know said that at KSFO/Bay Approach (awhile ago boys and girls) said that what was displayed on their scopes was not always recorded by their gadgets...and they wanted a camera over their shoulder to prove what they saw.
And they were seeing things that the computer didn't record...the modern age!
to give the benefit of the doubt to two dead pilots, to understand the world fo computers, I have to ask: could they have seen the correct IAS displayed, yet have it not be correct?
COULD the INCREASED VREF speed switch somehow be crosswired and just display 20 more knots than they really had?
IF there were a camera recording what a human eye would have seen would have cleared this up right away.
Awhile ago, an air traffic controller I know said that at KSFO/Bay Approach (awhile ago boys and girls) said that what was displayed on their scopes was not always recorded by their gadgets...and they wanted a camera over their shoulder to prove what they saw.
And they were seeing things that the computer didn't record...the modern age!
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Zeffy, you've pretty much got it.
The SPS (Stall Protection System) does also include, however, such inputs as flaps, power, accel/decel trends, etc, to massage the trip points.
That's why the stick pusher may kick several seconds after onset of shake, or almost concurrently, depending on the situation.
There's also the Rad Alt, to disable the pusher when close to trees.
PTH, the IAS is derived from the DADC and is displayed as "raw" data. Further downstream in the computational course do we find the low speed cue and the trend indicator. The most likely IAS error would be from water accumulation in the pitot statics and would normally cause a IAS MISMATCH annunciation. And those usually happen shortly after takeoff, after having overnighted in heavy rain.
Because all this is digital data, what is displayed on the PFD is what gets sent on the ARINC 717 line to the DFDR. By definition, what is on one is on the other.
Stubs400
The SPS (Stall Protection System) does also include, however, such inputs as flaps, power, accel/decel trends, etc, to massage the trip points.
That's why the stick pusher may kick several seconds after onset of shake, or almost concurrently, depending on the situation.
There's also the Rad Alt, to disable the pusher when close to trees.
PTH, the IAS is derived from the DADC and is displayed as "raw" data. Further downstream in the computational course do we find the low speed cue and the trend indicator. The most likely IAS error would be from water accumulation in the pitot statics and would normally cause a IAS MISMATCH annunciation. And those usually happen shortly after takeoff, after having overnighted in heavy rain.
Because all this is digital data, what is displayed on the PFD is what gets sent on the ARINC 717 line to the DFDR. By definition, what is on one is on the other.
Stubs400
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PTH, you could very well be right, like the recorder saw the baseball land in the park, then mysteriously transit over the fence.
What it failed to record, but everyone in the bleachers saw, was the dog that bit down on it, then jumped over the fence to freedom with his new chew toy.
What I'm talking about is a single data point, like airspeed. If the PFD shows 131 knots, that's what's on the FDR. If there was anything wrong with it, it would have been corrected after the first functional test procedure on the final assembly line, let alone get to production test flight.
Don't get me wrong, I know where you're coming from. There's been more than one "Foo Fighter" on the scope since radar was invented!
Stubs400
What it failed to record, but everyone in the bleachers saw, was the dog that bit down on it, then jumped over the fence to freedom with his new chew toy.
What I'm talking about is a single data point, like airspeed. If the PFD shows 131 knots, that's what's on the FDR. If there was anything wrong with it, it would have been corrected after the first functional test procedure on the final assembly line, let alone get to production test flight.
Don't get me wrong, I know where you're coming from. There's been more than one "Foo Fighter" on the scope since radar was invented!
Stubs400
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protectthehornet
The low speed cue on the ASI (red bricks) is derived from the stall warning system which senses a preset AOA to warn of an impending stall. The INCR SPEEDS switch changes this to a slightly lower AOA to simulate the effects of ice accumulation.
The low speed cue on the ASI (red bricks) is derived from the stall warning system which senses a preset AOA to warn of an impending stall. The INCR SPEEDS switch changes this to a slightly lower AOA to simulate the effects of ice accumulation.
Sooooooo.....are you guys saying that
1/ the sick shaker went off early due to the ice switch
2/ if they had done nothing but let the flaps run (they had already selected F15 one second earlier), and set an appropriate power setting everything would have been pretty much normal.
3/ the inapropriate reaction to the stick shaker pretty much took an aircraft that was a little slow but still a bit away from the stall and with lift devices running....and stalled it big time with the aft movement of the yoke.
Is that the hypothesis?
1/ the sick shaker went off early due to the ice switch
2/ if they had done nothing but let the flaps run (they had already selected F15 one second earlier), and set an appropriate power setting everything would have been pretty much normal.
3/ the inapropriate reaction to the stick shaker pretty much took an aircraft that was a little slow but still a bit away from the stall and with lift devices running....and stalled it big time with the aft movement of the yoke.
Is that the hypothesis?
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My ten bucks is on Framer!
As shown on the NTSB video simulation, the stick pusher didn't fire until AFTER the 1.42 G pitch up.
How could an aircraft this massive generate +1.42 G, unless it still had some pretty effective lift in them wings?
Both the Capt (pull up) & FO's (retract flap) reactions were consistent with only one scenario - tail plane stall.
Unfortunately, that wasn't it.
Stubs400
As shown on the NTSB video simulation, the stick pusher didn't fire until AFTER the 1.42 G pitch up.
How could an aircraft this massive generate +1.42 G, unless it still had some pretty effective lift in them wings?
Both the Capt (pull up) & FO's (retract flap) reactions were consistent with only one scenario - tail plane stall.
Unfortunately, that wasn't it.
Stubs400
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framer
Basically yes. Engaging the INCR speeds switch will cause the stick shaker/pusher to operate at a relatively lower AOA than the normal preset value. Absent actual icing contamination, this would be a 'false' warning of an impending stall. I believe this is almost certainly what happened. Thinking of it another way, if someone had thought to turn off the INCR speed, the stick shaker would have quit - problem solved.
Basically yes. Engaging the INCR speeds switch will cause the stick shaker/pusher to operate at a relatively lower AOA than the normal preset value. Absent actual icing contamination, this would be a 'false' warning of an impending stall. I believe this is almost certainly what happened. Thinking of it another way, if someone had thought to turn off the INCR speed, the stick shaker would have quit - problem solved.
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MU3001A
That was what a lot of people were doing when we first got the Q400. The trouble with doing so was it almost became a standard recovery (read bad habit) from the stick shaker which, I'm sure you'll agree, isn't a good thing if you got a stick shaker for real.
That was what a lot of people were doing when we first got the Q400. The trouble with doing so was it almost became a standard recovery (read bad habit) from the stick shaker which, I'm sure you'll agree, isn't a good thing if you got a stick shaker for real.
