Continental TurboProp crash inbound for Buffalo
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Am I right in thinking that the landing gear was not down when flying clean at 137knts.
The reason i ask is that the a/c i fly J41 the low speed horn sounds if the speed goes below 150knts. That really gets your attention.
Surely they must have had some warning !
The reason i ask is that the a/c i fly J41 the low speed horn sounds if the speed goes below 150knts. That really gets your attention.
Surely they must have had some warning !
Can anyone remind me when the gear horn would go off?
Is it similar to the 146 where you could, in certain cases, cancel the horn?
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Love
I love my Helio Courier, however, I'll be the first to tell anyone who is not very proficient in tail draggers to get comfortable in Cubs and Citabrias first.
That said, the Helio is a great airplane with no bad habits other than wanting to swap ends on landing and takeoff if you don't have fast feet.
However, I really dislike airplanes that surprise me, especially if I'm carrying SLF who think they're paying for a safe ride.
Maybe an adventure surcharge could be added to a Q400 ticket.
That said, the Helio is a great airplane with no bad habits other than wanting to swap ends on landing and takeoff if you don't have fast feet.
However, I really dislike airplanes that surprise me, especially if I'm carrying SLF who think they're paying for a safe ride.
Maybe an adventure surcharge could be added to a Q400 ticket.
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It's not a kt difference, it's a Stick Pusher AoA reference.
And for those interested the Pusher exerts 36kg of push force, this can be overridden by an opposite breakout force of 36kg, you then have to maintain 30kg of force to continue the override.
And for those interested the Pusher exerts 36kg of push force, this can be overridden by an opposite breakout force of 36kg, you then have to maintain 30kg of force to continue the override.
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Autopilot level-off from a descent in an aircraft without autothrottles is a bit of a trap. Although I don’t know of any similar accidents, there’s beginning to emerge a story of a catalogue of similar frightening incidents on the Q400 where pilots have become preoccupied with resetting (or setting up ) the FMS and not noticing, whilst heads down, the body angle changing rapidly to nose-up (once below about 180kts the Q400 reputedly does this slowdown rather fast, iced up or not). The normal speeds for intermediate level-offs are 200 to 210 knots. It’s believed that Colgan 3407 slowed to as little as 134kts. Some of the anecdotes have both pilots heads down trying to resolve an FMS button-punching glitch and/or looking back at the special “wing inspection” lights illuminating the Q400 wingtips - to see if the ice is actually being dislodged.
Does the Q400 simply level off and start bleeding airspeed without any indications at all? Is setting this trap something that should be happening during high pilot workload on approach?
Should the autopilot instead be set to a descent rate and the altitude alerter set to clue the flight crew to do the level off manually - instead of the autopilot just capturing the altitude and slowing whilst awaiting the pilots setting of an appropriate thrust? At least then there would be an expected alerting chime or suchlike.
So did the "low time on type" Colgan Flt 3407 pilot respond to a sudden stick-shaker [and rapidly following stick-pusher] by raising the nose, cleaning up the gear and flap and attempting a go-round from a dangerously low speed (instead of taking the correct stall recovery action of adding power and lowering the nose?). At first glance, that possibility exists. Surprise can be quite a mind-numbing wake-up call. It’s called Instant Overload. It results from fatigue or loss of Situational Awareness (SA)
But why and how would he achieve 31 degrees nose up before the aircraft stalled and started spinning? Did he mean to? The logical response is “no, of course he didn’t”.
The simple answer is that that extreme nose-up pitch-up tendency would be the autopilot’s legacy to him after it kicked itself out due to reaching full nose-up auto-trim in pitch (in its attempt to maintain the set capture altitude against the added drag of ice, gear and flap - likely with something near idle power inadvertently LEFT set).
Once the autopilot kicked out and the panicky pilot added max power, the full noseup trim would be conducive to the aircraft looping the loop of its own accord. The pilot would be flummoxed by this setup and, after a confused pause, fighting hard against powerful nose-up trim forces to lower the nose. Adding max power at low IAS itself produces a powerful nose-up trim change. Add that to the already full nose-up trim state and they didn’t have a chance…… of avoiding a deadly stall/spin outcome.
I couldn’t imagine a nastier surprise. Fancy building in such a death-trap as an autopilot without autothrottle and an FMS that needs lots of head-down two-pilot trouble-shooting and reprogramming? His available solutions were:
a. Not to add full power, but just enough to keep it flying and, as per my flight school's SOP technique (see below)
b. Roll sufficiently (about 50 degrees bank) so that the fully back-trimmed airplane only pitched mostly into the turn - giving him a chance to wind the trim nose forward whilst minimizing the speed loss..
I had a similar situation (but not unexpected) tonight after a night take-off. The EFATO drill for a practice (or real) engine failure after take-off is for the front-seat student to raise the nose, simulate putting the throttle to “stop”, call Mayday on intercom and then he releases the stick after having run the pitch trim to full nose up (for his optimal survival seat-vector), places both hands on his left knee and calls “abandoning now” (simulating an ejection). The rear-seat instructor then takes over, banks into the circuit direction (turns “crosswind” essentially), to help the nose drop from around 25 to 30 degrees nose-up - all whilst running the elevator trim nose-down towards neutral and adding near to max power. It’s a silly drill (it’s like practising dying) but meant to be very realistic for the trainee - and it’s a requirement for him to do it prior to his NF3 night solo sortie. You wouldn’t want it to happen suddenly without warning however. It’d be a quite difficult recovery (particularly at night or in IMC).
Prima facie, and in light of all the similar anecdotes now emerging about turboprops with this cheap option (i.e.no autothrottles and a heads down FMS keypad), this would have been the scenario surrounding Flt 3407’s fate. For that Colgan pilot it would have all happened very fast. It’s a nasty setup just begging for a tech remedy.
Automation can be a half-baked bitch.
Does the Q400 simply level off and start bleeding airspeed without any indications at all? Is setting this trap something that should be happening during high pilot workload on approach?
Should the autopilot instead be set to a descent rate and the altitude alerter set to clue the flight crew to do the level off manually - instead of the autopilot just capturing the altitude and slowing whilst awaiting the pilots setting of an appropriate thrust? At least then there would be an expected alerting chime or suchlike.
So did the "low time on type" Colgan Flt 3407 pilot respond to a sudden stick-shaker [and rapidly following stick-pusher] by raising the nose, cleaning up the gear and flap and attempting a go-round from a dangerously low speed (instead of taking the correct stall recovery action of adding power and lowering the nose?). At first glance, that possibility exists. Surprise can be quite a mind-numbing wake-up call. It’s called Instant Overload. It results from fatigue or loss of Situational Awareness (SA)
But why and how would he achieve 31 degrees nose up before the aircraft stalled and started spinning? Did he mean to? The logical response is “no, of course he didn’t”.
The simple answer is that that extreme nose-up pitch-up tendency would be the autopilot’s legacy to him after it kicked itself out due to reaching full nose-up auto-trim in pitch (in its attempt to maintain the set capture altitude against the added drag of ice, gear and flap - likely with something near idle power inadvertently LEFT set).
Once the autopilot kicked out and the panicky pilot added max power, the full noseup trim would be conducive to the aircraft looping the loop of its own accord. The pilot would be flummoxed by this setup and, after a confused pause, fighting hard against powerful nose-up trim forces to lower the nose. Adding max power at low IAS itself produces a powerful nose-up trim change. Add that to the already full nose-up trim state and they didn’t have a chance…… of avoiding a deadly stall/spin outcome.
I couldn’t imagine a nastier surprise. Fancy building in such a death-trap as an autopilot without autothrottle and an FMS that needs lots of head-down two-pilot trouble-shooting and reprogramming? His available solutions were:
a. Not to add full power, but just enough to keep it flying and, as per my flight school's SOP technique (see below)
b. Roll sufficiently (about 50 degrees bank) so that the fully back-trimmed airplane only pitched mostly into the turn - giving him a chance to wind the trim nose forward whilst minimizing the speed loss..
I had a similar situation (but not unexpected) tonight after a night take-off. The EFATO drill for a practice (or real) engine failure after take-off is for the front-seat student to raise the nose, simulate putting the throttle to “stop”, call Mayday on intercom and then he releases the stick after having run the pitch trim to full nose up (for his optimal survival seat-vector), places both hands on his left knee and calls “abandoning now” (simulating an ejection). The rear-seat instructor then takes over, banks into the circuit direction (turns “crosswind” essentially), to help the nose drop from around 25 to 30 degrees nose-up - all whilst running the elevator trim nose-down towards neutral and adding near to max power. It’s a silly drill (it’s like practising dying) but meant to be very realistic for the trainee - and it’s a requirement for him to do it prior to his NF3 night solo sortie. You wouldn’t want it to happen suddenly without warning however. It’d be a quite difficult recovery (particularly at night or in IMC).
Prima facie, and in light of all the similar anecdotes now emerging about turboprops with this cheap option (i.e.no autothrottles and a heads down FMS keypad), this would have been the scenario surrounding Flt 3407’s fate. For that Colgan pilot it would have all happened very fast. It’s a nasty setup just begging for a tech remedy.
Automation can be a half-baked bitch.
Gender Faculty Specialist
The Q400 seems to be getting a bit of a poor rep. hereabouts. Bless it. It really isn't as bad as it sounds.
It's no worse than the 146 in terms of automatics. Both have a two axis autopilot and no auto throttle. In fact the Q400 A/P is a lot more accurate than the 146 (having to set the alt 100 feet low because it climbed when it accelerated - no pressure error correction!).
Handling wise. Ok you get a bit of instability due to the straight wing, but that isn't exclusive to the Dash is it? It's a bit sensitive in pitch but so is the E195. I actually enjoyed hand flying it more than I do the 195.
Lots of redundancy - It's got 4 hydraulic sytems!
Reliability - Well it's got better! Most snags are computer derived. Turn it off and on again and 90% of the time you've fixed it.
It does have it's foibles but name an aeroplane that hasn't.
Bottom line - If I didn't think it was safe I wouldn't have flown it for two years. No doubt.
It's no worse than the 146 in terms of automatics. Both have a two axis autopilot and no auto throttle. In fact the Q400 A/P is a lot more accurate than the 146 (having to set the alt 100 feet low because it climbed when it accelerated - no pressure error correction!).
Handling wise. Ok you get a bit of instability due to the straight wing, but that isn't exclusive to the Dash is it? It's a bit sensitive in pitch but so is the E195. I actually enjoyed hand flying it more than I do the 195.
Lots of redundancy - It's got 4 hydraulic sytems!
Reliability - Well it's got better! Most snags are computer derived. Turn it off and on again and 90% of the time you've fixed it.
It does have it's foibles but name an aeroplane that hasn't.
Bottom line - If I didn't think it was safe I wouldn't have flown it for two years. No doubt.
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PT6Driver: Ref speeds
Chealander, in his 3d & last press conference prior to returning Washington, gave the following info (I watched this as occurring):
1. NSTB estimated wt of A/C at 55,000 lbs (closely 25,000 kg) at location of incident-- NSTB estimated fuel burn enroute. (Possibly ans to quest).
2. 30-pg flight folder (terminology?) for crew said that (instructed?) configuration for landing on runway involved would be 119 kts 15 flaps if no ice (might have said no icing expected); in icing conditions it would be 139 kts 15 flaps. (Think this was in prepared remarks.)
3. [Careful] review by MET officals had determined icing at this location to be between 4000 MSL down to 2500 MSL. (Prepared remarks, I think).
4. A turbulence sigmet was issued prior to the event [that would apply to this area]. It was not in the 30-page folder. It was not known at this time if it had been transmitted to the A/C [TTX--he did not have exact term].
5. Engines found in full run position [full if I recall]; all 6 blades attached to one engine, and missing blades on other found at scene.
There were other remarks and Q/A; I missed last one (2 if short) Q/A due TV station switching away; he was going to promised press contact numbers when I reaquired.
OE
1. NSTB estimated wt of A/C at 55,000 lbs (closely 25,000 kg) at location of incident-- NSTB estimated fuel burn enroute. (Possibly ans to quest).
2. 30-pg flight folder (terminology?) for crew said that (instructed?) configuration for landing on runway involved would be 119 kts 15 flaps if no ice (might have said no icing expected); in icing conditions it would be 139 kts 15 flaps. (Think this was in prepared remarks.)
3. [Careful] review by MET officals had determined icing at this location to be between 4000 MSL down to 2500 MSL. (Prepared remarks, I think).
4. A turbulence sigmet was issued prior to the event [that would apply to this area]. It was not in the 30-page folder. It was not known at this time if it had been transmitted to the A/C [TTX--he did not have exact term].
5. Engines found in full run position [full if I recall]; all 6 blades attached to one engine, and missing blades on other found at scene.
There were other remarks and Q/A; I missed last one (2 if short) Q/A due TV station switching away; he was going to promised press contact numbers when I reaquired.
OE
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I just read a bulletin that there could possibly be a problem with the glideslope at BUF rwy 23 that could cause a sudden pitchup under some conditions and intercept angles while using the autopilot to capture the approach course. Something about an earthen obstruction located near the glideslope transmitter. I'm sure this will be on the news shortly.
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Belgique -
Where do people get this information?!?! I never flew an airplane with auto throttles and I 'saved' many an airplane (I guess) by managing to recover form all the descents I made in thirty years!
I'm not so sure that large type was necessary either.
Autopilot level-off from a descent in an aircraft without autothrottles is a bit of a trap.
I'm not so sure that large type was necessary either.
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I am sorry, that question shows my ignorance of the facts here. I would assume any pilot experiencing stall would pre-occupy him/herself with recovery which is not likely to include immediate (if any) flap deployment.
But.. remember from what I believe was reported by the NTSB: severe pitch and roll as a result of flap deploy.
How can this possibly be pilot induced stall?
But.. remember from what I believe was reported by the NTSB: severe pitch and roll as a result of flap deploy.
How can this possibly be pilot induced stall?
as I recall the DFDR has both the pilot inputs as well as the aircraft response at the point of stickshaker stick push.
It seems that we are making an awfull lot of assumptions about pilot input (chicken and the egg query) that clearly should be a known fact to the NTSB.
We need a reliable sources before expending so much discussion which seemingly echoes what's all over the press.
It seems that we are making an awfull lot of assumptions about pilot input (chicken and the egg query) that clearly should be a known fact to the NTSB.
We need a reliable sources before expending so much discussion which seemingly echoes what's all over the press.
Back on page 23, I posted: "If the pilot was alert to the possibility a tail stall, could he have misidentified a wing stall and yanked back on the stick?".
The NYT article on quoted on page 33 says: "He may have been alert to the possibility of the nose dropping in icing for that reason. "
I guess there's only so many ways to say something, but given my total lack of qualifications, anything other than coincidence would be scary.
The NYT article on quoted on page 33 says: "He may have been alert to the possibility of the nose dropping in icing for that reason. "
I guess there's only so many ways to say something, but given my total lack of qualifications, anything other than coincidence would be scary.
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Wise statement Iomapaseo.
However, speculation is not wrong as long as you realize you are doing it. We can talk to each other and learn from these things. All we have to do is separate facts from opinions.
Next time you look to the right -or left- (if you can see some of the wing), how will you react to ice? Before the NTSB comes out with an official report in the year 20xx, we need to think about what happened. Personally, some ice never bothered me. Maybe I was wrong every time I felt confidence when I saw the boots break it off (or melt for some hours).
BTW
where do we get the most up to date NTSB info? I tried the website..
However, speculation is not wrong as long as you realize you are doing it. We can talk to each other and learn from these things. All we have to do is separate facts from opinions.
Next time you look to the right -or left- (if you can see some of the wing), how will you react to ice? Before the NTSB comes out with an official report in the year 20xx, we need to think about what happened. Personally, some ice never bothered me. Maybe I was wrong every time I felt confidence when I saw the boots break it off (or melt for some hours).
BTW
where do we get the most up to date NTSB info? I tried the website..
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FWIW
Just received this from our union's safety committee:
There is a potentially significant hazard concerning the ILS to runway 23 in BUF.
Information has been received indicating it is possible to obtain a significant nose pitch up, in some cases as much as 30 degrees, if the glide slope is allowed to capture before established on centerline. Pilots who are preparing to configure and land have the potential to experience abrupt pitch up, slow airspeed, and approach to stall if conditions present themselves in a certain manner.
This effect is the result of an earthen obstruction close enough to the ILS to affect the integrity of the glide slope signal. This has resulted in the issuance of an advisory given on ATIS which states that "the ILS Glide Slope for runway 23 is unusable beyond 5 degrees right of course."
When attempting to intercept the runway 23 ILS from right traffic, the ILS glide slope indication may read full deflection down. Just prior to intercept it may then move up in such as manner as to enable approach mode to capture in such a way as to result in a nose up pitch and loss of airspeed.
Until further notice, when executing the KBUF ILS/LOC Runway 23, DO NOT select Approach Mode until established on the localizer inbound.
This issue is being addressed on several levels in an attempt to address procedures, facilities, and communication regarding this matter.
Information has been received indicating it is possible to obtain a significant nose pitch up, in some cases as much as 30 degrees, if the glide slope is allowed to capture before established on centerline. Pilots who are preparing to configure and land have the potential to experience abrupt pitch up, slow airspeed, and approach to stall if conditions present themselves in a certain manner.
This effect is the result of an earthen obstruction close enough to the ILS to affect the integrity of the glide slope signal. This has resulted in the issuance of an advisory given on ATIS which states that "the ILS Glide Slope for runway 23 is unusable beyond 5 degrees right of course."
When attempting to intercept the runway 23 ILS from right traffic, the ILS glide slope indication may read full deflection down. Just prior to intercept it may then move up in such as manner as to enable approach mode to capture in such a way as to result in a nose up pitch and loss of airspeed.
Until further notice, when executing the KBUF ILS/LOC Runway 23, DO NOT select Approach Mode until established on the localizer inbound.
This issue is being addressed on several levels in an attempt to address procedures, facilities, and communication regarding this matter.
excru
Agree, so lets not let the browsing reader think that we are concluding the news is correct.
All options are still open in my book
meanwhile we can all have a go at the open discusion and every now and then come back to the reality that we are mostly working from inference.
the devils avocate
However, speculation is not wrong as long as you realize you are doing it. We can talk to each other and learn from these things. All we have to do is separate facts from opinions.
All options are still open in my book
meanwhile we can all have a go at the open discusion and every now and then come back to the reality that we are mostly working from inference.
the devils avocate