GF -072 :Very inexperienced flight crew?
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Roadrunner - you raise some interesting points but I am not sure that just because an FO is inexperienced a de facto single crew operation should occur.
As a captain of a TWO CREW aircraft every effort should be made to stay within the standard operating procedures for your type. In the case of GF072 it was clear that this did not happen. Although there was no intervention from the FO it was the Captain who flew the aircraft into the sea.
I feel that it is very shortsighted to blame inexperience outright for this accident when there were clearly other human factors n play.
As a captain of a TWO CREW aircraft every effort should be made to stay within the standard operating procedures for your type. In the case of GF072 it was clear that this did not happen. Although there was no intervention from the FO it was the Captain who flew the aircraft into the sea.
I feel that it is very shortsighted to blame inexperience outright for this accident when there were clearly other human factors n play.
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I didn't really want to go any further here but:
1) The personality type that will not 'throw away' an approach no matter how bad (there's a bit of that in all of us)
2) Poor handling skills
3) Somatogravic and possibly 'black hole' effects
4) Cockpit gradient issues which may have lead to an unwillingness to contribute
The list goes on and there are lessons for EVERYONE to learn, no matter what seat or aircraft type.
1) The personality type that will not 'throw away' an approach no matter how bad (there's a bit of that in all of us)
2) Poor handling skills
3) Somatogravic and possibly 'black hole' effects
4) Cockpit gradient issues which may have lead to an unwillingness to contribute
The list goes on and there are lessons for EVERYONE to learn, no matter what seat or aircraft type.
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M14P
Nice reply to Roadrunner...all points raised are good, but it was the captain who flew it into the sea. Inexperienced pairings is at it,s worst when the job market is bouyant, with the experienced people moving on all the time.........like right now!!
Nice reply to Roadrunner...all points raised are good, but it was the captain who flew it into the sea. Inexperienced pairings is at it,s worst when the job market is bouyant, with the experienced people moving on all the time.........like right now!!
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M14P
I’m only suggesting that in dire situations which require a far bit of fancy footwork, as against a more straight forward abnormal, that veeery low time F/O’s can be left far behind. Not for a moment am I suggesting that we all fly around the sky on an average day single pilot whilst accompanied by a low time F/O.
IMHO the GF 072 tragedy would not have occurred had there been an experienced F/O present that was prepared to speak up and finally take over when it was apparent that things were getting totally out of hand and far from normal procedures. A reasonably experienced F/O, I'm sure, would never have tolerated the departure from SOP’s that took place.
It’s obvious the Captain is to blame for the departure from SOP’s. He was definitely to blame for physically flying into the sea, as he was the PF. It is a sad indictment that the captain, even for a moment, believed he could get the machine stabilized anywhere near the ground, let alone 500ft HAT. They arrived at the descent point for the VOR at 317knots (from memory) with about 6 miles to the THOLD. To continue down was crazy. I repeat two pilot a/c require two pilots to operate and that the second pilot is there to counter just such a departure from SOP’s. That did not happen.
Yes, of course accidents occur due to many links in the infamous chain, no doubt there. It was not my intention to suggest that the very low time F/O was the ONLY contributing factor.
I was using this example to get on my soapbox and bleat about what I see as the abysmal situation re very low time people in the RHS of large, passenger carrying a/c worldwide. Airlines have made big savings with modern two pilot a/c. It is a shame they feel they need to further cut costs at the expense of experience in the RHS.
I believe that the innocent fare paying public, deserve far more from the airlines and from the pilots.
I’m only suggesting that in dire situations which require a far bit of fancy footwork, as against a more straight forward abnormal, that veeery low time F/O’s can be left far behind. Not for a moment am I suggesting that we all fly around the sky on an average day single pilot whilst accompanied by a low time F/O.
IMHO the GF 072 tragedy would not have occurred had there been an experienced F/O present that was prepared to speak up and finally take over when it was apparent that things were getting totally out of hand and far from normal procedures. A reasonably experienced F/O, I'm sure, would never have tolerated the departure from SOP’s that took place.
It’s obvious the Captain is to blame for the departure from SOP’s. He was definitely to blame for physically flying into the sea, as he was the PF. It is a sad indictment that the captain, even for a moment, believed he could get the machine stabilized anywhere near the ground, let alone 500ft HAT. They arrived at the descent point for the VOR at 317knots (from memory) with about 6 miles to the THOLD. To continue down was crazy. I repeat two pilot a/c require two pilots to operate and that the second pilot is there to counter just such a departure from SOP’s. That did not happen.
Yes, of course accidents occur due to many links in the infamous chain, no doubt there. It was not my intention to suggest that the very low time F/O was the ONLY contributing factor.
I was using this example to get on my soapbox and bleat about what I see as the abysmal situation re very low time people in the RHS of large, passenger carrying a/c worldwide. Airlines have made big savings with modern two pilot a/c. It is a shame they feel they need to further cut costs at the expense of experience in the RHS.
I believe that the innocent fare paying public, deserve far more from the airlines and from the pilots.
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Roadrunner:
Two excellent posts. I couldn't agree more with you. Let's face it: Very (extremely) low time hires are becoming a plague in this industry. And in fast expanding carriers low time F/Os eventually become low time Capts.
Those who say that it's not taking a toll in incidents/accidents better wake up from their dreams. Just check out last years' accidents worldwide and see how many times the same scenario is repeated: Capt with low time on type paired with a green inexperienced F/O.
I feel proper regs on this issue are long overdue. Without them it's up to the individual carrier to establish the rules so that a competent crew is dispatched for every flight. Those very same carriers that hired the low time pilots.
PS: Could anyone please provide the FARs governing this issue in the US?
Two excellent posts. I couldn't agree more with you. Let's face it: Very (extremely) low time hires are becoming a plague in this industry. And in fast expanding carriers low time F/Os eventually become low time Capts.
Those who say that it's not taking a toll in incidents/accidents better wake up from their dreams. Just check out last years' accidents worldwide and see how many times the same scenario is repeated: Capt with low time on type paired with a green inexperienced F/O.
I feel proper regs on this issue are long overdue. Without them it's up to the individual carrier to establish the rules so that a competent crew is dispatched for every flight. Those very same carriers that hired the low time pilots.
PS: Could anyone please provide the FARs governing this issue in the US?
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I agree that low experience pairings are undesirable but the 'dire situation' in this case could have been predicted by a properly trained 200 hour cadet as the aircraft passed 12 nm above 300 kt and above 3000 feet.
There are always more reasons than simply 'inexperienced FO'. Training and emphasis on situational and energy awareness as well as aircraft/automatic systems. If the captain had been slightly more experienced he may have never flown the aircraft in such a way thereby eliminating the need for intervention from the FO.
In summary, yes the GF072 flight crew were inexperienced; however, did their inexperience DIRECTLY cause to the accident? No.
Remember the old adage: 'A superior pilot uses his superior judgement to avoid a situation where he may need his superior skill' - Never truer than here (?) I guess that you develop judgement through experience and experience is built on good training.
[This message has been edited by M14P (edited 22 May 2001).]
There are always more reasons than simply 'inexperienced FO'. Training and emphasis on situational and energy awareness as well as aircraft/automatic systems. If the captain had been slightly more experienced he may have never flown the aircraft in such a way thereby eliminating the need for intervention from the FO.
In summary, yes the GF072 flight crew were inexperienced; however, did their inexperience DIRECTLY cause to the accident? No.
Remember the old adage: 'A superior pilot uses his superior judgement to avoid a situation where he may need his superior skill' - Never truer than here (?) I guess that you develop judgement through experience and experience is built on good training.
[This message has been edited by M14P (edited 22 May 2001).]
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Please correct me if I am wrong but the rumour was..... there was also another "qualified Gulf Air trained and current national 320 pilot in the observers seat.
Thus as in the Trident Stains there were more qualified on type company trained pilots on the flight deck than legally required and both aircraft got into horrible and uncorrected, then fatal situations.
So could it be Gulf Airs Training and checking department is at the same stage of development as the British in 1972 i.e. Is it 28years out of date?
IMHO.. To prove that this is not the case British Airways trainers who learned and changed their simulator sessions after the facts of Stains emerged should certainly now do a full indepth and detailed report on Gulf Air training and checking personnel and the techniques that they today employ.
Particularly wise thought is required as to how these old and out of date techniques impact and adversely effect human factors and the high stress they may cause to Gulf Air pilots.
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We will do the drill according to the amendments to the amendments I er think?
Thus as in the Trident Stains there were more qualified on type company trained pilots on the flight deck than legally required and both aircraft got into horrible and uncorrected, then fatal situations.
So could it be Gulf Airs Training and checking department is at the same stage of development as the British in 1972 i.e. Is it 28years out of date?
IMHO.. To prove that this is not the case British Airways trainers who learned and changed their simulator sessions after the facts of Stains emerged should certainly now do a full indepth and detailed report on Gulf Air training and checking personnel and the techniques that they today employ.
Particularly wise thought is required as to how these old and out of date techniques impact and adversely effect human factors and the high stress they may cause to Gulf Air pilots.
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We will do the drill according to the amendments to the amendments I er think?
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I started as an F/O on the 737 with 250 hrs. This is common for cadets who have come through the rigorous sponsorship scheme which the airline runs. Yes, I was inexperienced, and BUT I WAS NEVER AFRAID TO SPEAK UP IF A CAPTAIN DEPARTED FROM SOP'S TO A DANGEROUS LEVEL. Even with 250hrs, I would NOT have let a captain fly an a/c into the ground. Monitoring the a/c is the primary task of the PNF, and he should not have been distracted from this.
Surely it is the F/O's (and Captain's)PERSONALITY not inexperience that contributed to this. Even if an F/O has 2000 hrs, he may still be afraid to speak up due to a meek personality / domineering Captain.
Certain Captain's attitude (as shown on this thread), is that inexperienced F/O's are useless. This leads to Captains becoming obviously insulted if an F/O questions something he has done, and so he may not feel like questioning him again. It is the CAPTAIN who sets the atmosphere on the flight deck.
5 APU's Captain and Boeinguy - what kind of atmosphere do you create - is it one where an inexperienced F/O feels he can question you if he's not happy? I hope so.
I agree there is no substitute for experience, however, in my company the Command rating is regarded as one of the toughest around, and only competent (and experienced - 4000hrs min., or around 6 yrs) become Captains.
Experience doesn't always equal safety - it depends on the individual - if he allows himself to become slack wih age - not following SOPs etc., then this is as bad as being inexperienced.
Low time pilots are not dangerous in themselves, if they are good, follow SOPs and fly with a good Captain. However, I agree that if this isn't the case, then the inexperience will compund any other faults in the individuals - a gash inexperienced F/O is worse than an experienced gash F/O!
Surely it is the F/O's (and Captain's)PERSONALITY not inexperience that contributed to this. Even if an F/O has 2000 hrs, he may still be afraid to speak up due to a meek personality / domineering Captain.
Certain Captain's attitude (as shown on this thread), is that inexperienced F/O's are useless. This leads to Captains becoming obviously insulted if an F/O questions something he has done, and so he may not feel like questioning him again. It is the CAPTAIN who sets the atmosphere on the flight deck.
5 APU's Captain and Boeinguy - what kind of atmosphere do you create - is it one where an inexperienced F/O feels he can question you if he's not happy? I hope so.
I agree there is no substitute for experience, however, in my company the Command rating is regarded as one of the toughest around, and only competent (and experienced - 4000hrs min., or around 6 yrs) become Captains.
Experience doesn't always equal safety - it depends on the individual - if he allows himself to become slack wih age - not following SOPs etc., then this is as bad as being inexperienced.
Low time pilots are not dangerous in themselves, if they are good, follow SOPs and fly with a good Captain. However, I agree that if this isn't the case, then the inexperience will compund any other faults in the individuals - a gash inexperienced F/O is worse than an experienced gash F/O!
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BM pilot21 it is interesting to see that you described a potentially hazardous F/O as one who has a 'meek personality' ,because after the gulf air crash several captains were asked to describe the F/O regarding his general psychology and they themselves use the phrase 'meek personality' - interesting.
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hey ScanScanScan
if you don't know whether the plane is stalling or whether to stall it if it is giving you an aural warning then one wonders what you are doing at all in the airplane???
Sure basic IR training will show you what your plane is doing.....trust your instruments....
As for pairing low time pilots.....yeah i do think it is a recipe for disaster....in
United we try to make sure that a new Captain is flying with a senior Co-Pilot and vice versa...
The old saying goes that if it takes an accident for you to realise there's a problem then you ARE already part of that problem......
Too bad there is more blood spilt before someone realises that there is a problem!!!
if you don't know whether the plane is stalling or whether to stall it if it is giving you an aural warning then one wonders what you are doing at all in the airplane???
Sure basic IR training will show you what your plane is doing.....trust your instruments....
As for pairing low time pilots.....yeah i do think it is a recipe for disaster....in
United we try to make sure that a new Captain is flying with a senior Co-Pilot and vice versa...
The old saying goes that if it takes an accident for you to realise there's a problem then you ARE already part of that problem......
Too bad there is more blood spilt before someone realises that there is a problem!!!
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I remember when i was junior,new on type and relatively low time on one of the many sequenced approaches to the usual busy airport: i was used to lower the gear at about 7-6 miles on the ILS and everything had always gone well and according to the manual...this one day we had about 20kts tail wind (but i thought "what's 20kts at 3000'?It surely makes no difference.").
At about 9-10 miles the Capt. told me "I would lower the gear..." but i arrogantly said that i would do it at 6-7 miles as usual not to spoil my smooth and nicely flown approach so he let me do it my way....well i got to my ref speed just before touch down with the throttles at idle all the way and nowadays i know the effect of just 20kts blowing on your tail during the approach.
This is just a normal and apparently insignificant everyday story but that day i learnt an important lesson for the rest of my career...but this is thanks to an experienced and confident captain who knew to what limits i could stretch my errors and he let me do it so that i could see for myself.
Low time pairings hardly enjoy this professional growth me thinks.
At about 9-10 miles the Capt. told me "I would lower the gear..." but i arrogantly said that i would do it at 6-7 miles as usual not to spoil my smooth and nicely flown approach so he let me do it my way....well i got to my ref speed just before touch down with the throttles at idle all the way and nowadays i know the effect of just 20kts blowing on your tail during the approach.
This is just a normal and apparently insignificant everyday story but that day i learnt an important lesson for the rest of my career...but this is thanks to an experienced and confident captain who knew to what limits i could stretch my errors and he let me do it so that i could see for myself.
Low time pairings hardly enjoy this professional growth me thinks.
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From the inside, but no secret, there was a personal conflict between this Capt, and the f.o. had been ongoing throught the block of trips, hence perhaps the hesitance on part of the f.o. to interject, and was probably just as disoriented as the capt..the f.o. was known to be assertive and contributory on the flight deck, but the apparent conflict between the two, might have caused him to "shut down"
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Ontheairwaves.
Thats correct, if you dont know what is going on, you should not be there.
Why and how you may ask did you get there? Who allowed you to fast track and bent the rules to get you there? Who failed to protect you? Who guards the GF guards?
But if you are there, and at 300 feet on a black night and in it up to your neck, (maybe you personaly have not "yet" been exposed to a humbling and overwhelming situation) where it is all turning to poo in your hands, then IMHO a very positive input is required to help you and not confuse you further.
You have already recorded your progress in the recorders and you have experienced your former pride destroyed in minutes, you are very stressed and worried about the consequences of all this.
You now need help at least to stay alive to be fired.
If this is not forthcomeing from the fo or the fo in the jumpseat, what then?
I feel the aircraft warning generated needs at this point, to be, as a last resort, instructional and effectively strong enough to break through the frozen thought paths of the overwhelmed pilots and instruct/guide them to safety, NOT airspeed, flaps, stall, go figure it all out guys, the clock is ticking,gotcha its all to late, bang, you and 142 others are history, goodbye, you were the weakest link!
Your comment regarding being part of the problem is also very true and rumour is some management changes have been made and outside guidence hired as a result of all these deaths.
However knee jerk reactions to accidents such as this by senior airline execs and governments who have zero operational experiance often introduce and produce a far WORSE system than existed in the first place, and the spin off from these hasty fixes damages lots of innocent people.
I was a pilot for 36years, and was with Gulf Air 26 years until terminated May 2000.
I failed the United "Staynine" Psyco testing in 1966, but was comforted to find in the 1980's United needed a lot of Crm retraining as they now decided some of the right stuff was now some of the wrong stuff as they had a number of cockpit incidents.I believe the Staynine was used by most US carriers in the 1960's and I refused the cheat the Staynine service then available for $500.00 offered, in fact I am not sure if that is even how it is spelt and today care even less, however it really was a stoper with the majors if you had failed it then.
IMHO the main important point is United and Bea Trident accidents produced a series of positive and for the good changes, and it is my earnest wish these should now occur at Gulf Air and be properly introduced by British Airways or United Airlines teams.
Dream on did I hear you say?
Thats correct, if you dont know what is going on, you should not be there.
Why and how you may ask did you get there? Who allowed you to fast track and bent the rules to get you there? Who failed to protect you? Who guards the GF guards?
But if you are there, and at 300 feet on a black night and in it up to your neck, (maybe you personaly have not "yet" been exposed to a humbling and overwhelming situation) where it is all turning to poo in your hands, then IMHO a very positive input is required to help you and not confuse you further.
You have already recorded your progress in the recorders and you have experienced your former pride destroyed in minutes, you are very stressed and worried about the consequences of all this.
You now need help at least to stay alive to be fired.
If this is not forthcomeing from the fo or the fo in the jumpseat, what then?
I feel the aircraft warning generated needs at this point, to be, as a last resort, instructional and effectively strong enough to break through the frozen thought paths of the overwhelmed pilots and instruct/guide them to safety, NOT airspeed, flaps, stall, go figure it all out guys, the clock is ticking,gotcha its all to late, bang, you and 142 others are history, goodbye, you were the weakest link!
Your comment regarding being part of the problem is also very true and rumour is some management changes have been made and outside guidence hired as a result of all these deaths.
However knee jerk reactions to accidents such as this by senior airline execs and governments who have zero operational experiance often introduce and produce a far WORSE system than existed in the first place, and the spin off from these hasty fixes damages lots of innocent people.
I was a pilot for 36years, and was with Gulf Air 26 years until terminated May 2000.
I failed the United "Staynine" Psyco testing in 1966, but was comforted to find in the 1980's United needed a lot of Crm retraining as they now decided some of the right stuff was now some of the wrong stuff as they had a number of cockpit incidents.I believe the Staynine was used by most US carriers in the 1960's and I refused the cheat the Staynine service then available for $500.00 offered, in fact I am not sure if that is even how it is spelt and today care even less, however it really was a stoper with the majors if you had failed it then.
IMHO the main important point is United and Bea Trident accidents produced a series of positive and for the good changes, and it is my earnest wish these should now occur at Gulf Air and be properly introduced by British Airways or United Airlines teams.
Dream on did I hear you say?
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bmpilot21, You wrote: "BUT I WAS NEVER AFRAID TO SPEAK UP IF A CAPTAIN DEPARTED FROM SOP'S TO A DANGEROUS LEVEL. Even with 250hrs" How a hell did you know when he reached a DANGEROUS LEVEL, with 250 hours??
Most likely you were still in row 30, hangin on for your life... Let me guess, you must be Dutch or a Brit?
[This message has been edited by Jennifer Lopez (edited 25 May 2001).]
Most likely you were still in row 30, hangin on for your life... Let me guess, you must be Dutch or a Brit?
[This message has been edited by Jennifer Lopez (edited 25 May 2001).]
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Capt. Claret : I didn't mean to imply that pilots necessarily become slack with age. I've flown with several guys who have been in the seat for 30 years and are still as diligent, standard, and profesional as you could wish. You are right, people can become slack with any experience. My only point is that experience doesn't GUARANTEE safety. This is especially true IF they become slack or non-standard etc.
'Jennifer Lopez' - yes, I'm British and proud of our selection process and very high standards that prevail in our pilot culture. This is what allows us to safely have 250hr. pilots in the RHS. It is down to excellent training, SOP's and safety culture. No, we're not perfect, but the fact that we openly admit this is what leads to safety.
You have a valid point to an extent, however:
1. I know that if a guy overbanks and descends towards the ground on a missed approach that he's reached a dangerous level!! I'm inexperienced, not stupid.
2. Sometimes I'm not sure about something, and generally I will question what the Captain is doing. I endeavour to do it in a way that doesn't undermine his authority, and I hope that he will take it in the spirit that it is meant - I am inexperienced and am interested in why he is doing it that way, and he should not take it as a slight or that I'm questioning his authority. There is a good chance he is right, or has a very valid reason for doing it that way. By asking I will either learn something new, or will be correcting a mistake he has genuinly made - either way surely this is ok?
I generally think I cope very well with the jet, but yes it still 'bites' occasionaly, and I learn from it. That's why there are two crew members to pick each other up on their mistakes.
'Jennifer Lopez' - yes, I'm British and proud of our selection process and very high standards that prevail in our pilot culture. This is what allows us to safely have 250hr. pilots in the RHS. It is down to excellent training, SOP's and safety culture. No, we're not perfect, but the fact that we openly admit this is what leads to safety.
You have a valid point to an extent, however:
1. I know that if a guy overbanks and descends towards the ground on a missed approach that he's reached a dangerous level!! I'm inexperienced, not stupid.
2. Sometimes I'm not sure about something, and generally I will question what the Captain is doing. I endeavour to do it in a way that doesn't undermine his authority, and I hope that he will take it in the spirit that it is meant - I am inexperienced and am interested in why he is doing it that way, and he should not take it as a slight or that I'm questioning his authority. There is a good chance he is right, or has a very valid reason for doing it that way. By asking I will either learn something new, or will be correcting a mistake he has genuinly made - either way surely this is ok?
I generally think I cope very well with the jet, but yes it still 'bites' occasionaly, and I learn from it. That's why there are two crew members to pick each other up on their mistakes.