AA 757 departed runway at ORD - no injuries

[sevenstrokeroll]

is it or isn't it true that at least one board member of the NTSB dissented with the final report?

also

I read a summary of what happened at the ORD incident and it said that the thrust reversers didn't automatically deploy

now, I think it was misprint and they meant spoilers, but will someone verify.

[bubbers44]

I looked at the above post showing what was on the 4 busses lost and didn't see reversers. I think they meant the 3 pairs of spoilers that were lost.

[bubbers44]

Landing gear air/ gnd system circuit was affected reading it again. That might have put the logic for the reversers in air mode.

[ZimmerFly]

I think the clue might be

Landing gear air/ground system

This will prevent reverse being selected (amongst other things) if the signal is "in air" rather than "on ground"

I see you came to the same conclusion !

[Flamin_Squirrel]

Would that prevent the fuel cut off switches from moving to cut off when they tried to shut down the engines too?

[IGh]

AA587 P.C. & "Members statement"

In slot 141, SSR posed a question about the P.C. wording for AA587 [that P.C. statement is shown in slot #108, bottom].

From AAR-04/04, pg 165:

"Board Member Statements

"Member Carol J. Carmody’s Statement, in which Member Richard F. Healing joined

"I support the probable cause language in the original staff draft, which listed contributing factors as the ... Advanced Aircraft Maneuvering Program and characteristics of the A300-600 rudder system. I heard no reason either during the staff presentations, or in the explanation provided by the Vice Chairman in submitting his substitute, to reverse this order. To diminish the role of the AAMP in the accident is to downplay the role it played in the pilot’s actions which caused the accident. One of the undeniable facts of this accident is the pilot’s inappropriate use of rudder. Staff was unable to find any example of unusual rudder use by the pilot before his AAMP training. When questioned by a captain for using the rudder in an earlier incident, the first officer “insisted that the AAMP directed him to use the rudder pedals in that manner.” To elevate the characteristics of the A300-600 rudder system in the hierarchy of contributing factors ignores the fact that this system had not been an issue in some 16 million hours of testing and operator experience—until the AAMP trained pilot flew it. The justification for the change was that the Board must address the future and, therefore, must give more attention to the aircraft rudder characteristics. That is what our recommendations are designed to do, and our recommendations do address the design issues. The probable cause should reflect accurately what the investigation and the report demonstrate; the substitute probable cause does not do that."

The final P.C. reads:

"... 3.2 Probable Cause
... Safety Board determines ... probable cause of this accident was the in-flight separation of the vertical stabilizer as a result of the loads beyond ultimate design that were created by the first officer’s unnecessary and excessive rudder pedal inputs. Contributing to these rudder pedal inputs were characteristics of the Airbus A300-600 rudder system design and elements of the American Airlines Advanced Aircraft Maneuvering Program.

For "AA73", who revealed his objection or suspicion about the Board's P.C. in the AA587 case: I was going to disagree with your skeptical comments about the Board's investigations -- then I recalled one more recent case in which the Board, the airline, and YOUR pilots' association completely botched their roles in an investigation. Take a look at the corrected [and still erroneous] PC for this case: DEN06IA051 21Mar06, DEN06IA051 then click "narrative".
Note the "**" which reflect the revisions from the originally published report, which included such interesting assertions as the Pitch ATT at touchdown was 31.6 degrees NU. That operator has always published a deception, showing an erroneous transcription from FAA Order 8400.10. See if you can recognize the deception: the difference between that airline's wording, and the FAA's actual wording in 8400.10 for "turbojet" ops. Those mishap-pilots had no way of knowing about the airline's deception.