Aeroflot B737 Down near Perm
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Not only was the guy suffering from slurred speech, he was also confused and had trouble remembering his callsign. Aeroflot 821, 921, 721, 827, 991
(hint- correct answer is 821!) He also couldn't tell up from down. The ATC even asked them Is everything OK with you guys?
PS the company has instituted post-flight checks
(hint- correct answer is 821!) He also couldn't tell up from down. The ATC even asked them Is everything OK with you guys?PS the company has instituted post-flight checks
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Awl flyer, well, I do consider myself an expert on drunk behavior, and I can certainly confirm that there are stages of inebriation when you can still realize that you're in deep trouble, cannot pull it all together, and get scared ****less.
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I found this video in youtube about throttle problems on the same aircraft 2 days before accident:
Nothing is ever as it seems in Russia. Never take anything at face value - and that includes this alleged "leaked" CVR audio. Always respect your colleagues especially those who are not here to defend themselves!
With respect.
Flash.
With respect.
Flash.
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From that video on You Tube I can see a possible problem with EGT margin on the rigth engine, for the same N1 it has a difference of 30ş C (+) compared to the other.
Maybe that is the reason for throtle back in cruise...
Best Regards,
Joăo Cunha
Maybe that is the reason for throtle back in cruise...
Best Regards,
Joăo Cunha
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Hi ya.
Report about this accident is out and indeed, an interesting read:
In English
http://www.aaib.gov.uk/cms_resources...t%2520(en).pdf
In Russian
http://www.mak.ru/russian/investigat...bko_report.pdf
Regards,
Stubenfliege
Report about this accident is out and indeed, an interesting read:
In English
http://www.aaib.gov.uk/cms_resources...t%2520(en).pdf
In Russian
http://www.mak.ru/russian/investigat...bko_report.pdf
Regards,
Stubenfliege
thanks... completely scathing.... however kudos to the Russian authorities for what seems at first reading a completely transparent report... there is hope yet.
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it's no CVR transcript, it's a radio-intercept (ATC-planes), if you mean that link to www.radioscanner.ru website
there's not much to translate. first ATC to different flights conversation goes. in the end ATC-821 mostly. ATC guides them to land. they reply but with quite strange voice.
I don't know if it's fake or no fake. Just helping with translation.
there's not much to translate. first ATC to different flights conversation goes. in the end ATC-821 mostly. ATC guides them to land. they reply but with quite strange voice.
I don't know if it's fake or no fake. Just helping with translation.
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it's no CVR transcript, it's kind of radio-intercept if you mean that link to www.radioscanner.ru
there's not much in it, however. it's a ATC to planes conversation. first ATC talks to different fights incuding Lufthansa. then, in the end, ATC talks to 821 mostly. he guides them to land. they reply, but quite strangely.
don't mean if it's fake or no fake. just helping to translate.
there's not much in it, however. it's a ATC to planes conversation. first ATC talks to different fights incuding Lufthansa. then, in the end, ATC talks to 821 mostly. he guides them to land. they reply, but quite strangely.
don't mean if it's fake or no fake. just helping to translate.
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Back to the top.
It must be just bad timing with the A330 loss that this accident is not being discussed.
A truly unbelievable accident.
Section 3.15 "Findings And Conclusion" Pages 132-133
The abnormal situation on board started developing when the aircraft was at base leg, with landing gears extended and flaps 30 at 600 m. The aircraft was flying with the autopilot engaged and the autothrottle disengaged.
The autothrottle was disengaged (with the relative alert activated) earlier, at establishing 2100 m by the cruise split monitor due to the significant thrust split. The crew did not attempt re-engaging the autothrottle.
The Co-pilot was the PF during most of the approach. As he did not have basic skills of flying multiengine aircraft with spaced-apart engines, he synchronically shifted the throttles for manual speed control and thus created a significant yawing moment to the left due to the thrust split. The PIC (as the PM) was engaged in the radio communication and did not monitor the engine parameters. The crew did not attempt to match the N1.
The pilots did not apply rudder to compensate the yaw moment, which led to a constant left banking. The autopilot's ability to counteract it by right wheel inputs was decreasing as the airspeed was dropping and the aerodynamic efficiency of the ailerons was decreasing.
After the autopilot was saturated followed by 30° left bank, the Co-pilot, while compensating the roll, overrode the autopilot to the CWS ROLL and CWS PITCH mode.
Then, in the CWS mode, the Co-pilot inadvertently pressed the manual stabilizer pushbutton, which disengaged the autopilot, accompanied with the relative alert. The crew switched off the alert and did not attempt to re-engage the autopilot.
As the pilot lacked steady piloting skills, he could not monitor all the flight parameters (altitude, speed, roll and pitch) when flying manually. The flight was unstabilized with significant changes of altitude, speed, pitch and roll, and fluctuations of thrust. An increase in thrust led to a significant noseup pitching moment, high pitch attitude (up to 23°) and consequently to significant reduction of airspeed (three times – down to 112, 110 and 113 knots).
The PIC was leading lengthy discussions with the Controller and did not monitor the flight properly, only interfering with the flight control from time to time.
The crew did not follow the Controller’s instruction to terminate the approach and prepare for the second one.
At altitude about 1200 m with airspeed of 120 knots (10 knots lower than Vref) and left bank of about 30° the PIC, following the Co-pilot’s request, took control.
Not having proper situation awareness the PIC abruptly applied left wheel, increasing the left bank up to over 70°. Despite the correct remark from the Co-pilot after which he initially used right wheel (decreasing the left bank to 30°), the PIC then abruptly and disproportionately made several wheel inputs causing rapid left banking, followed by left overturn and deep descent with 65° nosedown pitch. It was impossible to recover from such upset at a low altitude.
Edited to show source
It must be just bad timing with the A330 loss that this accident is not being discussed.
A truly unbelievable accident.
Section 3.15 "Findings And Conclusion" Pages 132-133
The abnormal situation on board started developing when the aircraft was at base leg, with landing gears extended and flaps 30 at 600 m. The aircraft was flying with the autopilot engaged and the autothrottle disengaged.
The autothrottle was disengaged (with the relative alert activated) earlier, at establishing 2100 m by the cruise split monitor due to the significant thrust split. The crew did not attempt re-engaging the autothrottle.
The Co-pilot was the PF during most of the approach. As he did not have basic skills of flying multiengine aircraft with spaced-apart engines, he synchronically shifted the throttles for manual speed control and thus created a significant yawing moment to the left due to the thrust split. The PIC (as the PM) was engaged in the radio communication and did not monitor the engine parameters. The crew did not attempt to match the N1.
The pilots did not apply rudder to compensate the yaw moment, which led to a constant left banking. The autopilot's ability to counteract it by right wheel inputs was decreasing as the airspeed was dropping and the aerodynamic efficiency of the ailerons was decreasing.
After the autopilot was saturated followed by 30° left bank, the Co-pilot, while compensating the roll, overrode the autopilot to the CWS ROLL and CWS PITCH mode.
Then, in the CWS mode, the Co-pilot inadvertently pressed the manual stabilizer pushbutton, which disengaged the autopilot, accompanied with the relative alert. The crew switched off the alert and did not attempt to re-engage the autopilot.
As the pilot lacked steady piloting skills, he could not monitor all the flight parameters (altitude, speed, roll and pitch) when flying manually. The flight was unstabilized with significant changes of altitude, speed, pitch and roll, and fluctuations of thrust. An increase in thrust led to a significant noseup pitching moment, high pitch attitude (up to 23°) and consequently to significant reduction of airspeed (three times – down to 112, 110 and 113 knots).
The PIC was leading lengthy discussions with the Controller and did not monitor the flight properly, only interfering with the flight control from time to time.
The crew did not follow the Controller’s instruction to terminate the approach and prepare for the second one.
At altitude about 1200 m with airspeed of 120 knots (10 knots lower than Vref) and left bank of about 30° the PIC, following the Co-pilot’s request, took control.
Not having proper situation awareness the PIC abruptly applied left wheel, increasing the left bank up to over 70°. Despite the correct remark from the Co-pilot after which he initially used right wheel (decreasing the left bank to 30°), the PIC then abruptly and disproportionately made several wheel inputs causing rapid left banking, followed by left overturn and deep descent with 65° nosedown pitch. It was impossible to recover from such upset at a low altitude.
Last edited by Jet_A_Knight; 6th Jun 2009 at 00:00.
Metrosexual
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FD
Section 3.15 "Findings And Conclusion" Pages 132-133 of the report.
There is alot of disturbing info in this report, however, I thought that quote was the most obvious to stimulate discussion.
Some similarity to the SF340 accident inSwitzerland a few years ago with Eastern Bloc pilots flying Western ADI's.
Section 3.15 "Findings And Conclusion" Pages 132-133 of the report.
There is alot of disturbing info in this report, however, I thought that quote was the most obvious to stimulate discussion.
Some similarity to the SF340 accident inSwitzerland a few years ago with Eastern Bloc pilots flying Western ADI's.
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The average level of ethanol in isolated fragments (1.08 ‰) and fragment parts (1.19 ‰) of the PIC’s body are significantly higher (by 0.46 ‰ and 0.96 ‰ respectively) than the abovementioned average values, which confirms the presence of ethyl alcohol in his body before death.
Via the AAIB UK the investigation team got access to a text message (SMS) sent from the aircraft by one of the passengers to her friend in UK. The message was sent before the engine startup (approx. at 20:59) and said that the sender was very scared, because when the PIC addressed the passengers his voice sounded “like he is totally drunk”. According to the message, the passengers were worried, but the flight attendants said everything was all right.
Last edited by TripleBravo; 6th Jun 2009 at 00:45.
In fact the crew did not follow any of the SOP recommended procedures.
If the Captain was actually drunk as infered what were the ground staff doing at SVO - twiddling their thumbs? both SVO's are bad yes... but they aren't lawless.
The first port of call for the Russian authorities should be the Airlines Management. But that won't happen, or if it does, cosmetically only. Its a very sad day for Russian Aviation, but the reports transparency brings hope - that is truly encouraging.
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Insurance companies will not pay money for the families of the crash victims if the final report indicates that the crash happened because the captain or the crew was drunk. Very important to know!!
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Russian Attitude Indicator
Would I be correct in saying that a Russian attitude indicator would depict a movable aircraft symbol as opposed to the fixed aircraft on a Western AI?
Only Russian aircraft I have flown is the Yak 18T with a Western AI (speed indications in kilometres an hour still confound me at times though). It is so easy to revert to type when tired or distracted.
Lack of type training and experience as well as an approach in IMC plus the communication overhead and it easy to comprehend why a pilot might revert to a previously learned mode of thinking.
The question of inebriation doesn't even bear countenancing.
Only Russian aircraft I have flown is the Yak 18T with a Western AI (speed indications in kilometres an hour still confound me at times though). It is so easy to revert to type when tired or distracted.
Lack of type training and experience as well as an approach in IMC plus the communication overhead and it easy to comprehend why a pilot might revert to a previously learned mode of thinking.
The question of inebriation doesn't even bear countenancing.