Chronus

I have recently finished reading the book. I must say I am left with a sense of disappointment. The book is an account of the personal difficulties suffered by the family as a result of the crash , developing into a crisis and affecting even the eldest of their young children. But I am afraid the question that it has brought to my mind is how much of the post-crash events are of their own making and how much of these are down to BA. Is it 10:90, 50:50, 40:60 or any other. Where is that particular display of stiff upper lip, understatement and sang froid which was once so much the conduct expected of a British Captain at times of adversity and crisis. Instead we have a Captain accepting advice to go and get paraletic drunk immediately after such a serious accident, could it not be said that this is yet another display of conformance to the current binge culture. Ofcourse the most important question is the one that his FO posed why did Peter put his name forward for early retirement. The whole issue is one of good judgement and correct decision making at all times.
Even taking account of the time factor this was not the greatest feat of deadsticking an airliner. Let us not forget the Azores Glider, the A330-200 of Air Transit Flight 236. Captain Robert Piche and his FO pulled off the biggest stunt ever in an all engines out at night landing at Lajes Air Base on the tiny rock of Tercia, Azores. I would recommend Robert Poche`s book "Hands on Destiny". It is enlightening. I would be interested to read commentry on the differing backgrounds of the two Captains, institutionilised but in their own particularly different ways.

S76Heavy

Having yet to read the actual book, I understand that its initial purpose was to later explain to the children why their parents' lives had changed so much when they were much too young to understand when it all happened.

As such, it is probably not a hero's tale of how he saved the day by saving the lives of his passengers, but more a tale of what happens to people when something unforeseen occurs in their lives and the decisions they make based on their understanding of the facts at that time.

I'm eager to put my order in and read the story for myself, but to me the most interesting part will be after the crash landing. Flying much smaller hardware in a somewhat more risky environment, dealing with a potential incident or accident (and I have lost friends and colleagues already) as a family (or by my family as it may be) is what is often on my mind. To me the hero part is not in gliding the aircraft but in keeping the family together in difficult times under a lot of pressure and public scrutiny. That is the bit I want to read about.

I agree that there have been many other examples of good airmanship that saved the day and that books have been published about. That does not detract from the merit of this book and the real subject of the story, IMO.

Now off to order a book..

captplaystation

Chronus

I have to say I find that just a little harsh.

Very difficult to know how one would react given the back stabbing innuendo going on behind his back which no-one seemed too keen to eradicate in a timely fashion.
We are all different, and just because someone isn't a hard nosed b@st@rd able to rest totally insensitive to what is said & happening around him , doesn't , in my eyes at least, disqualify him from having "the right stuff."

BALPA seem to have been pretty ineffectual too, sorry to dissapoint you but I would probably have gone out and got totally trashed too, however I wouldn't have done so with the union lackies as my first choice of company.

Don't think this incident compares too well with either Sully or Air Transat.
If you want a better comparison try Ryanair in Ciampino, they both had to react instinctively in a very short time scale, the other two incidents, whilst also displaying exemplary handling skills, were also blessed with just a bit more time to execute the manouveres required.
Something you do miss in your eulogy to them however, is that there was, I believe, some criticism attached to the procedures used and lack of monitoring prior to the Air Transat incident.
They did famously to pick up all the pieces at the end, but if memory serves me well were judged to have had a part in the problem along with the technical issues they were handed. This is most certainly NOT the case in the other 3 incidents I have mentioned.

M.Mouse

Not read the book yet but how exactly do you control rumours and innuendo?

woodpecker

Perhaps you have to go back a few years to understand the attitude of Cabin Crew trainers at Cranebank. During new entrant cabin crew training various means were employed to make it easier for the new entrants to remember equipment locations on the 757. The one that upset many of us was the aide memoir to remember the location of the BCF and Water Glycol extinguishers in the flight deck....

"The BCF is behind the Bast**d and the Water is behind the Wank*r"

Our management were made aware of these practises but did nothing.

captplaystation

M Mouse, don't think this post will be here for long. . . but, indeed you cannot control it, however a bit more effort to identify those responsible for propogating it might not have gone amiss. Of course the ones responsible seem to have somehow elevated themselves, in the useless self serving middle managements eyes, to having status superior to the mere "drivers".

Unfortunately, when you allow a bunch of "luvvies" to call themselves "directors" and to actually believe THEY are actually in charge of the cabin of the aircraft (I.E. responsible legally , and indeed ahead of the SFO /F/O in pecking order) Oh and to add insult to injury pay them as if they ACTUALLY were, well what can you expect.

One of the reasons why the company is in the sh1t now too of course, or are we not allowed to say that (or indeed use the word luvvie) on pprune ?

Bah Humbug ! !

OverFlare

I doubt any of us knows quite how we'd react in the circumstances Peter and Maria have found themselves in. But I don't think they are looking for sympathy or trying to suggest they did nothing they might now regret. They certainly give the impression they wish they had been able to communicate better with each other during the period and I think, on the whole, the book is a very brave approach to take.

It was in this sense that I think the two are heroes - for having the guts to reveal these things to help other people. Having said that, I think getting the aircraft down with no deaths, in a situation that nobody ever practices, was definitely something to be very proud of.

I don't think they are particularly trying to blame others either although I agree with them that BA could look at some of its protocols. If I were in their shoes I would definitely throw more mud at BA's door (subject to UK libel laws I suppose, yawn); and if I were a BA manager I'd be very unhappy with how this all played out - I might even resign.

And for me, as I wrote above, reading the book has been, I think, very helpful. Would I do everything the same way as the Burkills have done? I doubt it but that's not to criticise: we are all different, have different perspectives on life, and different instincts. Would I suffer from the form of post-trauma stress that they did? I just don't know and neither does anybody really. Would this approach that I've got planned work out any better for me than their approach did for them. Again, absolutely no idea at all.

Edited to add: the moderators appear to have deleted my super cool last sentence. Suffice it to say I'm not sure the "stiff upper lip" would have been that helpful.

Feathers McGraw

M. Mouse I think that the way one controls rumours and innuendo is to make an unequivocal, accurate statement to all of the company detailing what was done by all of the flight and cabin crew on BA38. It may not square with the "say nothing until the AAIB report is out" approach, but surely getting this information out is beneficial to everyone because it clears the air and ensures that people have knowledge of the things that didn't work as they should have (evacuation alarm).

Coireall

:

Date: Thu, 15 Apr 2010 15:38:09 +0800
Subject: CX780 SUB-HKG 13 April 2010
To All Airbus Cockpit Crew,
As already covered by company news information and the public media, a major event occurred on flight CX780 Surabaya – Hong Kong on 13 April.
The crew had operated the aircraft, B-HLL, on the previous evening from Hong Kong to Surabaya. Crew complement was normal with two pilots and eleven cabin crew.
Routine maintenance checks were carried out overnight. All pre-departure preparations ex SUB were normal. There was nothing unusual about the aircraft weight, FOB (CFP fuel) and distribution. RTOW data used was in accordance with the Minimum Ground roll procedure as applicable to Surabaya. Weather at departure, en-route and arrival was good and not considered to be relevant to the event.
Initial Onset Conditions
Just before TOC, the aircraft experienced minor low frequency EPR oscillations. These oscillations had associated tracking of Fuel Flow. Later, this observation was followed with an ECAM message on ENG 2. After consultation with IOC, it was decided that the situation did not warrant an in-flight diversion.
Subsequent Engine Behaviour
During initial descent (passing FL310) ENG 2 experienced a surge and stall, and the engine could only be recovered to sub-idle speed for the remainder of the flight. Whilst levelling off at an intermediate lower altitude in the latter part of the descent, ENG 1 additionally experienced a gradual loss of thrust lever control, eventually resulting in an uncontrolled thrust increase to approximately 70% N1. The engine remained at this thrust level for the remainder of the flight.
Aircraft Flight Path
The aircraft was able to maintain altitude and speed until closer to the airfield, when further descent was commenced for an ILS approach onto RWY 07L. With the high residual thrust present on No1 engine, speed on intermediate and final approach remained high. Final configuration consisted of Flap 1 (with flap lever position at Flap 2), resulting in an approach speed of 230kts at the threshold. Flare and touchdown (at 220kts) was normal for these circumstances. Successful selection of REV, and appropriate braking enabled the aircraft to be stopped within 1,000ft of the threshold of RWY 25R.
After Landing
After the aircraft came to a stop, both engines were shut down (thrust on Eng 1 had remained at 70% N1). Brake temperatures rose rapidly. Comms were established with rescue services who advised tyre deflation and the presence of smoke/fire around the wheels. An emergency evacuation was successfully carried out with minor injuries to a small number of passengers.
Crew Actions
The Captain and First Officer both displayed commendable professionalism and airmanship of the highest order in successfully handling the challenging situation they faced.

Initial Investigations
CAD is conducting the investigation into this event, supported by CSD. An initial interview with the flight crew by CAD has taken place. EEC, QAR, and DFDR data have been successfully downloaded and are being analysed. All avenues of investigation, including fuel system fault and contamination, are being actively conducted with direct assistance and involvement from Airbus, and Rolls Royce.
Rolls Royce and Airbus have not issued any additional operational recommendations at this time. Updates on the investigation will be provided to all crew as soon as more information becomes available.
In the interim, crews are advised to contact Maintenance Control via IOC, if any abnormal engine behaviour is observed.

Kind Regards,

Steve Mihos & Gavin Haslemore
Airbus Fleet Office Attached Thumbnails



:

Errol Sinclair

Peter,

Really enjoyed the book. You, John and the crew did your company proud. You displayed great instinct and backbone - something the management obviously lacked. You and your crew are an inspiration, your management are a worry and I'm sad to say our management have also displayed very similar behaviour in a current incident investigation and I feel desperately sorry for the crew.

BALPA's actions were no great surprise. Have experienced and seen their 'input' all too often. Why o why couldn't they just ask "Pete, what do you need us to do?".

Well done and all the best!

rowan11

Congratulations on a great book Peter and Maria, what a difficult and horrendous time you have had, through no fault of your own.

Such situations require good managing and communication, and to put it mildly both were lacking in your case. Heard your broadcast yesterday, lets hope you and BALPA can get some protocols going soon. You are more than generous to your fellow professionals.

No Peter - you were not well enough to make your decision on VR, but more to the point, it should not have been accepted by your company, but words fail me regarding the company which led you to believe they wanted to employ you and then let you down.

Good luck to you both, you are very special people.

thecontroller

interview with pilot, starts at about 14 mins

BBC iPlayer - You and Yours: 28/04/2010

Biggles78

Personally I hope Peter applies for VAustralia. Imagine the advertising coup that Richard Branson is famous for. We have a pilot who with all time to think, made a decision that saved all the lives on his aircraft and this after 12 hours (?) sitting on bum contemplating the meaning of life. (Ok, the last bit is mine but I hope you know what I mean)

I for one would delay a flight just to make sure I knew the guy in the pointy end was not found wanting at crunch time. (No pun intended) Peter Burkill and his crew were not found wanting.

And just to go offtopic a bit, this is a classic reason why P2F should NOT occupy the RHS. If this had been the case with this flight, the outcome would have been substantially different. No way could the Captain have left the flying to a 300 hour Total Time FO. (I am making a point so please no flames for lack of technical accuracy. Ta )

Apologies if this has already been stated in the thread. Bit of a memory issue with the 2,500+ posts and 126 pages.

Nerik

Just finished reading the book. It is a very good read. I hope that many people read it. I hope that many people within aviation read it and that it helps companies learn how to deal with similar scenarios in the future.

DozyWannabe

Read the book last week, but I've been insanely busy and unable to post. Not only is it good stuff and well-written, but it provides a major cautionary tale for management.

What really struck me was the thought that in an organisation with a safety record like BA's, largely due to fostering a culture of attention to detail when it comes to operational matters - that safety record can have a negative impact in breeding another type of complacency when it comes to providing a safety net when things do go wrong - in this case through no fault of any member of the crew.

I hope that Peter and his family have a much smoother ride from here on.

Whiskey Papa

I’ve read Peter and Maria’s book, and I was intrigued by Peter’s analysis of the effect of the ILS antenna and runway approach lighting array could have had on the aircrafts’ structure. Peter is convinced that the extra few metres gained by the flap retraction resulted in G-YMMM missing these obstructions which could have inflicted serious damage to the aircraft. All very logical.

Two days later I drove on the M1 immediately adjacent to the extended centre line of runway 27 at East Midlands Airport, exactly where the British Midland 734 came to grief in January 1989. Imagine my astonishment when I saw that a massive full motorway width sign gantry has been erected exactly on the crash site! The gantry is just a few feet in front of the penultimate array of approach lighting, precisely on the runway centre line and if it had been present when the BM 737 arrived, the result that day could only have been worse. It’s just 600 metres from the runway threshold, and an aircraft has already needed to occupy the space where it stands waiting like a giant can opener! Google Earth shows this well. Did no one think to keep this area clear of obstructions? Where’s ‘elf and safety when you need them?

WP

Tarq57

WP, in an ideal world.....
The required obstacle clearance limits and spaces are defined, as is the runway end safety area.
Mostly, when all is well, they are adequate.
You can't design an aerodrome that will guarantee a safe arrival for every eventuality, sadly. There will always be a case where a little more flat land a little further from the airport would have made a difference.
(Case in point, Smolensk, where the Polish president's a/c crashed. Plenty others.)

Airclues

These were also my thoughts as I read the book. Could I ask Mmmayday38 whether he has taken legal advice on this?

Dave

Bronx

If what Captain Burkill says is the truth and the WHOLE truth about why he took voluntary redundancy then I guess he'd have a substantial case for legal action against BA for defamation of character / slander or constructive dismissal, but before you get into a legal action you got to make sure there ain't a skeleton you'd prefer to keep in the closet.

There can be times when a company and an employee part company amicably with both sides agreeing to say nothing about the true reason.

Aviation's a very small world.


Just for example - to avoid publicizing in the UK an incident that happened down route, or to avoid embarassing/hurting an innocent third party or third parties, or even a mixture of both reasons.
Maybe BA have been a whole lot more generous to the captain than some folks have been led to believe.
As I say, aviation's a very small world.

Mmmayday38

Airclues

I can say that I have not sought legal advice as regard action against BA. However, it is also my understanding that any action (if any were to be taken) should have been lodged within 2 years of an incident. This time frame has passed.


Bronx

I took Voluntary Redundancy which was 52 weeks basic pay. I received no other payment or even payment in kind. BA have not been "any more generous" to me than they were to the other 77 pilots who took VR in Aug 09.

I have nothing to hide, in fact I believe that the worst photos that could have appeared from already appeared in a red top tabloid within days of the accident. I am sure if there had been other skeletons in the closet they would have already appeared. What can be worse than a chocolate covered pilot being licked clean by hosties/licorice games/and articles describing sx fests in a Sunday national newspaper?

I have taken great pains to ensure that our book was written correctly, accurately and factually, so therefore our book is the WHOLE truth - sometimes hard and uncomfortable to believe, but was necessary to attempt to prevent any other pilot having to go through the same.

I am aware the airline industry is a small world, unfortunately for me 17 Jan 2008 made it even smaller. After having applied to numerous recruiting airlines for both 777 (9 currently recruiting non-rated pilots that I am aware of) and also aircraft a lot smaller (eg Biz Jets), my current tally of those who have refused to interview me is now 19.

Obviously some of these airlines have refused to interview me based on the fact I am not type rated to their aircraft and there are plenty of pilots who are, there have been some refusals based on the airline not wanting a pilot to have been involved in a crash. I have been told by various people in various size airlines that the "high profile nature and media interest in the BA38" has gone against me.