M.Mouse

atakacs makes plain, simple and unemotional statements and immediately gets shot down in flames.

He was asked what he would have done. The point is there was not much could be done given the time and circumstances. Raising the flaps gained 50 metres. It is claimed that Boeing test pilots could do no better but I have seen no details of what they tried and what they achieved. The main contentious issue is the AP being allowed to fly the aircraft to the point of stall before the aircraft hit the ground with insufficient energy remaining to arrest the high rate of descent.

So apart from instinctively raising the flaps with no other ideas or options was there not a great element of luck involved in the outcome?

The accident has, on the face of it, had a detrimental effect on Peter's whole life. It could well have been me in his place having flown that aircraft only a few months previously. I have no idea how I would have reacted no more than anybody else truly knows although we can all imagine how we would want to have reacted having thought about it for 24 months.

Having no real options, no real time and raising the flaps from F30 to F25 in my mind reaffirms my belief that he (Peter) was an experienced and competent captain faced with an unprecedented situation who also had a healthy dollop of luck when he most needed it. Luck that the undercarriage broke off and absorbed so much energy, luck that there was a large grass undershoot, luck that the aircraft on its belly in the soft ground rapidly decelerated, luck that the aircraft hit nothing, luck it stopped before the hard surface, luck that no fire ensued.

SiriusTheDogStar

"Where's the fix / improvement for the birds ? <deafening silence>
Is there even any research been recommened (like for BA38) ?
Doesn't anyone find that (more) worrying ?"

There are some eloquent master pieces of prose on this subject on this web site and occasionally the odd fling with applied science.

Well YES Infrequentflyer I agree.

It turns out that the academics these days no longer publish UNLESS the sponsor has filed a patent claim.

FAO Pprune moderators: please have the courtesy to inform me if you don't agree with my posts.

Joetom

I know it's a long thread, but need to remember.

A non-normal event on approach, power was ok but less than required, crew had very limited information, aircraft/eicas/cockpit indications were not clear as to problem.

Crew made some very very quick decisions with limited information, they appear to have ended the flight in good shape.

Appears to me this crew did a good job on that day, appears this event will save others.

Max Resepect to all crew and pax on that flight, you saved many others.....

p51guy

If this situation ever happens again what would have going full flaps right as they were about to hit the ground have done? Just wondering if it would have broke the descent rate.

TIMA9X

Just great words and from a pilot who flies the same AC type.
Sorry if you felt that I was emotional, it was not intended to come out like this, (it's hard to read into peoples feelings on threads such as this) but atakacs previously made some pretty good points in his posts, it was the last post I just did not understand in the context of his other ones. In all survival accidents there is always an element of luck, some in the high degree category and some in the low degree category. Sully said himself that he was lucky that day the Hudson was flat and calm, it can be a pretty windy rough patch of water more days than not. My post was not just aimed at atakacs but others as well. My reasons are;

1. Since the BA038 incident the British press never left the issue alone, in many cases quoting almost directly from Pprune, sometimes skewing the reasons for the incident towards the crew, it must have been hell at times for Peter and John!

2. Probably the same reason as you, the incident did change Peter and his families lives. I am sure this will be well explained in his book.

3. Every comment (some just plain stupid) from people who tend to cloud the pilot handling issues of that day may contribute the Peter finding it hard to get a new job! I know from many PM's I have exchanged with pilots who know Peter well worry about this issue.


For me one of the best posts for a long time since PB wrote his long informative post after the report came out. The report has not convinced me RR and Boeing have explained enough about their findings, but this has nothing to do with the way PBs crew as pilots handled the situation which they were faced with that day! (as M.MOUSE explained so well in his post.) For me there are two issues that have emerged now,

1.The great handling of the situation the crew were faced with, ending in a great result considering BA038 was an unprecedented situation for all well trained pilots.
2. The murky technical issues neither RR or Boeing have explained to my satisfaction possibly pointing to hidden commercial pressures of some kind.
3. May be it is time to split the thread on these two issues.

Finally,

A good question, but a question of timing, Trippe 7 flap movements take time, so it is my view with all the chaos going on in the cockpit even if the crew decided to go F25 (which they did) then somewhere in the diminishing seconds they had left, go to the full flap settings again is a timing issue that probably would not have changed the outcome too much, only my point view, would be interested in M.Mouse's point of view.

sky9

I would have thought that both RR and Boeing have a lot to thank the crew for.

You would have the that RR would have taken them down to Goodwood and asked them what colour they would like. The reputation of RR was saved by the crew that day.

I wonder if they did get a thank you.

lomapaseo

The engine behaved as designed and specified. No need for a thanks.

There is an interface issue between the design of the engine and the design of the aircraft which is being attended to by the airplane design regulator through research.

All the issues here are mostly chance and pilot skill. Whether it's extraordinary skill or average pilot skill is in the eye of the beholder. I suspect that based on the lessons learned so far that most of the like equipment pilots reading this thread will do as well

Joetom

A previous posting asks if selecting more flap just before contact may have been better.

History shows us that vertical and forward speeds plus pitch and roll and gear and flaps config were on the numbers in this event.

We can talk around the houses as to "what ifs" and "buts" however we can't change the outcome of this event, a super result, Max respect to crew and pax.

Mr Optimistic

Given the uncertainties over the mechanics of the build up to failure, no reason to suppose it couldn't have happened 30 seconds earlier. The crew must have nightmares about that.

captplaystation

Don't think it would have made so much difference. It was the demand for "more" thrust , and lack of response to that demand, that alerted them to the problem.

If, as the PIC has said, he hadn't flown a half-decent CDA however, well, whoops, additional thrust would have been required earlier, probably over a populated bit of W London.

You can imagine the rest, I would rather not.

regularpassenger

Just in response to the posts on previous page...questioning what they would have done.

Speaking as SLF of course...

Hindsight is a wonderful thing, but given this had never happened before, they could not have known what was causing the failure to command thrust, and they had only seconds to react I think they did a damn good job. An outstanding sign of airmanship is surely the ability to fly the aircraft primarily when its all going t*ts up around you. They did that even if it was with autopilot or whatever.

I'd be happy for both of them to be sat at the front of any aircraft I'm on any day of the week. In my humble opinion they are a credit to your profession.


RP

CONF iture

Then it's more like a Gimli / Terceira scenario, but with some little thrust available and full hydraulic. All about managing the drag out at the right time to reach but not overfly the 12000 feet runway ... I believe the crew would have loved that challenge compared to what they had to face.

atakacs

In any case I would find an actual study of glide performances - and subsequent recommendations as of how to best manage it most interesting. Be it bird strike, fuel leak or incomprehensible ice creation there have been a non negligible count of cases where a modern airliner had to glide. As far as I can tell these are so far considered exotic circumstances and not trained in sim or even mentioned in performance charts. It might be worth (re)visiting.

PJ2

atakacs;
Perhaps. We might first acknowledge the data already available on the PFD's of most later glass airplanes; the best L/D ratio is presented on the PFD in the Airbus A320/A330/A340 (and I suspect the A380) series as "Green dot" speed. I am unsure if there is such a presentation for the B777, (My manual doesn't seem to indicate any). Unless it's changed the B767 does not have such an indication. So some types provide the crew with immediate best lift-drag speed information.

This information would be for an undamaged, clean (uncontaminated) wing with different slat-flap configurations but not with landing gear extended or partial slats/flaps (abnormal config).

The Gimli crew relied upon timing their rate of descent (by timing how long it took to loose 1000ft) as there is no IVSI in the standby group. They then used radar distance to the drag strip to judge the rate of descent. The aircraft was kept intentionally slightly high and when they knew they could make the strip, the captain side-slipped the aircraft just like a Piper Cub.

Not sure how the Azores A330 was flown as I'm not sure the data is available in any report, (anyone?). The A330 fuel leak trouble-shooting procedures were changed after that incident.

What needs revisiting perhaps is what caused the requirement to glide in the first place and I think the Gimli and Azores incidents have been addressed. I know the SAS MD80 accident was a dead-stick but can't recall the details. The DC9 in Florida was dual engine damage if I recall - not much to be done there except the usual caution regarding staying away from thunderstorms. Other than the present incident and the Pinnacle RJ which suffered core-lock after the engines flamed out at 410, (crew messing with the airplane on a non-rev flight - both killed), what other dual engine failures have we seen?

p51guy

I agree, the crew did a perfect job of reconfiguring to a cleaner approach configuration and added 50 meters to their impact point. The last three second flap addition would only possibly help the flair lowering the stall speed and increasing lift. Adding them before the flair would have been detrimental. If they didn't get all the way to full maybe what ever they got would help some. Since nobody trains for this situation because it never happens now that it happened why not put ourselves in their position and think of the alternatives available?

lomapaseo

I don't mean to be pedanic here and only hope to continue contributing possible facts for whatever discussion points folks want to make.

The DC9 you mention I suspect was SO242 in Georgia and it could have been landed if the crew had known about the closest airstrip.

Then there was the Avanca B707 near JFK .that almost landed except for rising terrain and trees.

There was The Ethiopian B737 in Bar har dar. That was landed in a swamp off airport but caught a ditch on the skid out.

The SAS MD80 was pretty much a controled landing save for some tree tops, at least they missed the large rock in the field.

The Tacca B737 on a levey

And the Austrian F100 in a snow covered field.

I have no message myself, so pick and choose from these survivable accidents yourselves to make a point.

None of the above were ETOPs operations and engine reliability had nothing to do with them. They all involved being overwhelmed with common cause problems , birds, rain-hail-ice, or fuel starvation.

PJ2

Thank you, lomapaseo; I knew there were more but am focussed on other things at the moment. cheers, - PJ2

fotoguzzi

Four engines, no fuel.

Green-dot

lomapaseo wrote:

Correction. It was an Austrian F70 that landed in a snow covered field. Although the long flight duration in moderate icing in connection with low engine thrust was a factor, the main cause was that the bonded joints of the ice impact panels of both engine cases failed. The ice impact panels detached, due to poor bonding, and became trapped in front of the outlet guide vanes of the low pressure compressor. This affected the airflow in the by-pass duct in such a way that the engines produced little thrust.

With regards to the BA038 incident, hats off to Peter Burkill and his crew. 30 seconds to impact with no time to reconsider the choices made, to me indicates they made the right choices and all aboard survived. All other options discussed remain theory.

Just as many others, I am interested in Peter's upcoming book and will certainly buy a copy.


Regards,

Green-dot

captplaystation

PJ2, to the list add Ryanair in Ciampino (birdies) & 2 or, was it 3 ? 737 classics a few years back who lost both in heavy rain/hail.
1 restarted & resulted in new underwear (UK? ) the other (Indonesia? ) ended up in a field. The third (? ) was the Taca refered to by a previous poster methinks. Normally CFM solved that one with new procedures & higher flight idle speeds . . . but .