BA038 (B777) Thread
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mmmayday38
Just need to tell you that I'm in the middle of the school run at the moment; but will respond to this later on, as soon as I can.
Even from day one, when only the sketchiest details were available, I always thought the crew must have been something very special and now I know it. I have to hold my hand up though and admit that I remain strangely unconvinced as to the reasons why and how your engines let you down so badly. Maybe it was an entirely new phenomenon, but the published reason gives this engineer goose bumps.
But that's not your worry. All the very best for you in the future and I really hope I end up flying in very close formation with you one day.
Roger.
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The salient "hypothesis" has to do with many hours of flight through very cold temps, in this case very cold temps. 038 flew at 38k for some time, and had poured most of its fuel through the engines by the time AT requested high thrust at short final. This high thrust value was attained and maintained for many seconds, so conclusion 1: the narrowest part of the fuel passage even if it was partially occluded by ice, was sufficient to provide fuel for the thrust selected.
Evidence was noted of cavitation concurrent with interruption of fuel flow, suggesting the fuel passage was plugged sufficient to cause rollback, hence conclusion 2: Ice had collected at some point upstream of HP pumps, Preventing flow, though 1.03 and 1.02 epr were noted. The engines continued to run.
Photographic evidence of surface accumulation of "Ice" on the interior of the fuel line was noted post test. Ice packed around the entry port of the HE was also demonstrated.
Hypothesis: Ice accumulation was allowed by a combination of factors suggesting that it was allowable quantities of water contamination of fuel building up over long hours of cruise flight that was responsible for the "plug at the face" of the FOHE which prevented fuel flow.
Having lain dormant as "sticky Ice" right up to throttle refusal, how did it arrive at the Inlet matrix? A number of possibilities come to mind. Warming temps at let down? Sudden increase of flow, lessening of hydraulic pressure? Vibration of pylon tree and FOHE on the shroud at first Increase? Since it was AT throttling up, my 'guess' is that extreme vibration associated with high thrust shook loose the Ice that choked the flow that prevented normal operation. Similar quantities/temps. caused the seeming "simultaneous" loss of power that was initially so startling, but that in hindsight seems reasonable enough.
These are questions that come to mind without assigning any mysterious characteristic to the fuel. Were these tested? Were they assumed? Look, either it is mysterious and more work (much more) needs to be done, or it is actually a straightforward case of a very rare combination of unlikely factors combining to cause starvation.
The major portion of the body of work done by the investigators is misleading, insufficient, inconclusive, and patronizing. The Chinese Fuel could have been crap, but it was shown that in spec fuel was found remaindered in 038. The Trent may need a more thorough re-engineering relative to fuel system (to include the airframe), including HP prior to FOHE, Bypass, Recirculating Spill, etc. How would anybody know? Because Boeing and FAA say so? They've not addressed this. Personally, I like the 757 for my trips to Hawaii.
The bolding is not meant to be aggressive, but I needed something stronger than italics, this is a very frustrating accident.
Then there's DELTA. What if cavitation had caused both FOHE cannisters to collapse over the Rockies?
bear
Evidence was noted of cavitation concurrent with interruption of fuel flow, suggesting the fuel passage was plugged sufficient to cause rollback, hence conclusion 2: Ice had collected at some point upstream of HP pumps, Preventing flow, though 1.03 and 1.02 epr were noted. The engines continued to run.
Photographic evidence of surface accumulation of "Ice" on the interior of the fuel line was noted post test. Ice packed around the entry port of the HE was also demonstrated.
Hypothesis: Ice accumulation was allowed by a combination of factors suggesting that it was allowable quantities of water contamination of fuel building up over long hours of cruise flight that was responsible for the "plug at the face" of the FOHE which prevented fuel flow.
Having lain dormant as "sticky Ice" right up to throttle refusal, how did it arrive at the Inlet matrix? A number of possibilities come to mind. Warming temps at let down? Sudden increase of flow, lessening of hydraulic pressure? Vibration of pylon tree and FOHE on the shroud at first Increase? Since it was AT throttling up, my 'guess' is that extreme vibration associated with high thrust shook loose the Ice that choked the flow that prevented normal operation. Similar quantities/temps. caused the seeming "simultaneous" loss of power that was initially so startling, but that in hindsight seems reasonable enough.
These are questions that come to mind without assigning any mysterious characteristic to the fuel. Were these tested? Were they assumed? Look, either it is mysterious and more work (much more) needs to be done, or it is actually a straightforward case of a very rare combination of unlikely factors combining to cause starvation.
The major portion of the body of work done by the investigators is misleading, insufficient, inconclusive, and patronizing. The Chinese Fuel could have been crap, but it was shown that in spec fuel was found remaindered in 038. The Trent may need a more thorough re-engineering relative to fuel system (to include the airframe), including HP prior to FOHE, Bypass, Recirculating Spill, etc. How would anybody know? Because Boeing and FAA say so? They've not addressed this. Personally, I like the 757 for my trips to Hawaii.
The bolding is not meant to be aggressive, but I needed something stronger than italics, this is a very frustrating accident.
Then there's DELTA. What if cavitation had caused both FOHE cannisters to collapse over the Rockies?
bear
Last edited by bearfoil; 11th Feb 2010 at 18:57.
I just want to add my thanks to Mmmayday38 for the excellent insights he has shared with us along with my admiration for having done so well.
That day looking out the window produced a result that many engineers and pilots on simulators over several months could not improve upon
That day looking out the window produced a result that many engineers and pilots on simulators over several months could not improve upon
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Thanks for the support guys...appreciated.
Thanks for some great replies to the ‘army of 1’ and although they are very accurate (ta CaptPlaystation #3009 & 3015, Baron Rouge #3131, Pettifogger #3034) with some good insight into the atmosphere in the f/d that day; I feel that SFLY needs me to say it so he can adhere to some other posters’ advise? (CaptPlaystation #3002 and Tima9x #2999 !!) 
Again SFLY, Boeing tried all angles of dangles and differing AoAs with differing airspeeds, on the G/S and below it, to try and get further; they couldn’t. So if it appears to you that the a/c staying on the G/S until nearing the stall was wrong, it did not detrement the distance flown at all.
I can’t find the actual post anymore (there have been a few posts deleted by the mod with regards to me!!) but someone mentioned about the lack of throttle usage on the approach. On the BA38 this was my attempt at performing a CDA (continuous descent approach) into LHR... something BA pride themselves for doing well at. On the day, it was fairly gusty below 5000’ with winds in the region of 25-35kts, so the continuous descent was a little more challenging, so as not to level fly at 3000’ over the city to intercept the glide, and of course throttling up in the process! I was pleased with my CDA, as we were spot on the glide on localiser intercept I think. However, in hindsight this was perhaps even more fortuitous, as had we throttled up and the fuel flows had increased, this could well have caused an earlier rollback; this time at 3000’ over London city! Of course being clean we would have glided much further... anyway, I’ve lived through all these scenarios ever since in my dreams, day and night! Anyway, enough of the ‘ifs’....
On the BA38 approach at approx 1200’, I was PH and at this height the throttles danced around a gust with the usual trend arrow throwing up about a 10kt surge in speed. I mentioned this to John, and said something like “that wasn’t me, it’s the a/t doing there thing”... meaning they’re reacting as usual to the gusts. Then I added, “It might be a good idea to keep the a/p in a bit longer than usual until the wind dies down across the terminal”...”Good idea” came his reply. SA shared and understood.
At about 800’ John took control and said “I have control”...”You have control”, I added.
Between the rollbacks John shared with me his problem with the throttles (splitting at this point), but then as the left engine suffered it’s rollback, the throttles married up again, so would appear normal for a while.... until at 430’ ish, we knew the required power was not being delivered.
“Pete I can’t get any power” from John, “It looks like a double eng failure” from Conor. I was looking at the eng instruments , and , yes it looks like double eng failure but isn’t. The Insts were blank but the demand line was at max. No warnings...that’s very odd, I thought.
I then elected to leave John in control... because he was a competent pilot and could carry on whilst I used the available resourses and managed the situation.
I first of all went for the continuous ignition (I’m sure I said “**** it’s a roller”... but never heard it on the CVR) but of course being RR there wasn’t one!! So I turned the switch to ‘start’ anyway seeing as my hand was there. I scanned the fuel panel to check the pumps were still on. Continuing down the panel I checked the fuel gauges ... still over 5 tonnes in each wing, pretty much balanced. Back to the throttles, again pushing them forward manually, they were firewalled. Checked the speed brake lever wasn’t out. Checked the fuel switches were running. Checked the fire handles were down.
As I was pushing down on the fire handles, “Airspeed Low” master caution....nasty sound!
And the first audible warning that was heard in the flight deck. I sternly said “Airspeed Low” in my best attention grabbing voice, looking over at John he was concentrating hard and was in control. We were on the G/S and the speed had naturally dropped back. The descent rate started to increase and was at 1800 fpm. Looking out the window, we were heading for Hatton Cross and the r/w was flying up the screen! I needed to reduce the drag, as easy as that, otherwise we were all toast. I changed the flaps.
John was in and out of the stick shaker, perfect, he was still controlling the a/c well, and I could see we might actually clear the road. Plane sorted, path sorted (as best I could) and now the people? It was 200’.... I won’t do a “brace”, the passengers are sitting happy and relaxed. Kegworth flashed through my thoughts and the amount of limb breaks produced by bad bracing of the passengers. I’ll do a Mayday to look after them... I might not be able to after we crash, who knows?
That’s roughly how it went... SFLY; but lots lots more thinking in between; but if I wrote it all, it would be quite a bit of my book ! Not that I’d be expecting you to want to read it.
None of us heard the warnings after “Airspeed Low”... the GPWS or the A/P disconnect; it was an intense period of the flight and we didn’t hear ‘useless’ warnings that we knew were non-actionable. I remember wanting to do a g/a instinctively at Airspeed low!!
I’m actually pleased the a/p stayed in until it did; it helped to get us as far as we did I think. Boeing didn’t get further from that point doing anything else. I said before, if I’d known we’d not get power back, I’d have selected lower flap sooner, at 500’ I think we’d have greased it on . I love hindsight and now knowing what a rollback is!
I believe that a pilot handling with his hands on the control column is in control, a/p in or not, as long as the a/c is doing what the pilot wants it to be doing. If it doesn’t, do something about it, using a/p or not! John was in control of the a/c and when it wasn’t doing what he felt comfortable with he did something about it. I have no problems with John’s actions that day. I had half a glance at the picture every now and again and was happy with it (you know what I mean) but would have said something to him if I hadn’t been.
Basically this is what a lot of the other posts have said this afternoon, but I’ve added some frilly bits!
Info for 'Suninmyeyes'... I can't post any links about it (cos that would be advertising) but the book's hopefully out in approx 6-8 weeks? As we are having to self publish, as no publisher wanted it, it will be sold mostly through my website (again can't 'URL' it here cos of adverts) but some of you might have found it? I'll have to buy the books upfront, and am thinking of about 500. I've got a few requests off my site, so I'm guesstimating
Again SFLY, Boeing tried all angles of dangles and differing AoAs with differing airspeeds, on the G/S and below it, to try and get further; they couldn’t. So if it appears to you that the a/c staying on the G/S until nearing the stall was wrong, it did not detrement the distance flown at all.
I can’t find the actual post anymore (there have been a few posts deleted by the mod with regards to me!!) but someone mentioned about the lack of throttle usage on the approach. On the BA38 this was my attempt at performing a CDA (continuous descent approach) into LHR... something BA pride themselves for doing well at. On the day, it was fairly gusty below 5000’ with winds in the region of 25-35kts, so the continuous descent was a little more challenging, so as not to level fly at 3000’ over the city to intercept the glide, and of course throttling up in the process! I was pleased with my CDA, as we were spot on the glide on localiser intercept I think. However, in hindsight this was perhaps even more fortuitous, as had we throttled up and the fuel flows had increased, this could well have caused an earlier rollback; this time at 3000’ over London city! Of course being clean we would have glided much further... anyway, I’ve lived through all these scenarios ever since in my dreams, day and night! Anyway, enough of the ‘ifs’....
On the BA38 approach at approx 1200’, I was PH and at this height the throttles danced around a gust with the usual trend arrow throwing up about a 10kt surge in speed. I mentioned this to John, and said something like “that wasn’t me, it’s the a/t doing there thing”... meaning they’re reacting as usual to the gusts. Then I added, “It might be a good idea to keep the a/p in a bit longer than usual until the wind dies down across the terminal”...”Good idea” came his reply. SA shared and understood.
At about 800’ John took control and said “I have control”...”You have control”, I added.
Between the rollbacks John shared with me his problem with the throttles (splitting at this point), but then as the left engine suffered it’s rollback, the throttles married up again, so would appear normal for a while.... until at 430’ ish, we knew the required power was not being delivered.
“Pete I can’t get any power” from John, “It looks like a double eng failure” from Conor. I was looking at the eng instruments , and , yes it looks like double eng failure but isn’t. The Insts were blank but the demand line was at max. No warnings...that’s very odd, I thought.
I then elected to leave John in control... because he was a competent pilot and could carry on whilst I used the available resourses and managed the situation.
I first of all went for the continuous ignition (I’m sure I said “**** it’s a roller”... but never heard it on the CVR) but of course being RR there wasn’t one!! So I turned the switch to ‘start’ anyway seeing as my hand was there. I scanned the fuel panel to check the pumps were still on. Continuing down the panel I checked the fuel gauges ... still over 5 tonnes in each wing, pretty much balanced. Back to the throttles, again pushing them forward manually, they were firewalled. Checked the speed brake lever wasn’t out. Checked the fuel switches were running. Checked the fire handles were down.
As I was pushing down on the fire handles, “Airspeed Low” master caution....nasty sound!
And the first audible warning that was heard in the flight deck. I sternly said “Airspeed Low” in my best attention grabbing voice, looking over at John he was concentrating hard and was in control. We were on the G/S and the speed had naturally dropped back. The descent rate started to increase and was at 1800 fpm. Looking out the window, we were heading for Hatton Cross and the r/w was flying up the screen! I needed to reduce the drag, as easy as that, otherwise we were all toast. I changed the flaps.John was in and out of the stick shaker, perfect, he was still controlling the a/c well, and I could see we might actually clear the road. Plane sorted, path sorted (as best I could) and now the people? It was 200’.... I won’t do a “brace”, the passengers are sitting happy and relaxed. Kegworth flashed through my thoughts and the amount of limb breaks produced by bad bracing of the passengers. I’ll do a Mayday to look after them... I might not be able to after we crash, who knows?
That’s roughly how it went... SFLY; but lots lots more thinking in between; but if I wrote it all, it would be quite a bit of my book ! Not that I’d be expecting you to want to read it.
None of us heard the warnings after “Airspeed Low”... the GPWS or the A/P disconnect; it was an intense period of the flight and we didn’t hear ‘useless’ warnings that we knew were non-actionable. I remember wanting to do a g/a instinctively at Airspeed low!!
I’m actually pleased the a/p stayed in until it did; it helped to get us as far as we did I think. Boeing didn’t get further from that point doing anything else. I said before, if I’d known we’d not get power back, I’d have selected lower flap sooner, at 500’ I think we’d have greased it on . I love hindsight and now knowing what a rollback is!
I believe that a pilot handling with his hands on the control column is in control, a/p in or not, as long as the a/c is doing what the pilot wants it to be doing. If it doesn’t, do something about it, using a/p or not! John was in control of the a/c and when it wasn’t doing what he felt comfortable with he did something about it. I have no problems with John’s actions that day. I had half a glance at the picture every now and again and was happy with it (you know what I mean) but would have said something to him if I hadn’t been.
Basically this is what a lot of the other posts have said this afternoon, but I’ve added some frilly bits!
Info for 'Suninmyeyes'... I can't post any links about it (cos that would be advertising) but the book's hopefully out in approx 6-8 weeks? As we are having to self publish, as no publisher wanted it, it will be sold mostly through my website (again can't 'URL' it here cos of adverts) but some of you might have found it? I'll have to buy the books upfront, and am thinking of about 500. I've got a few requests off my site, so I'm guesstimating
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We definitely want it below £10. We think it could be around the £9 mark.
The manuscript is with the publishers now and they could only give us a rough idea for how much it costs to print a 5x8 book with 73000 words, paperback, approx 20 b+w photos. Until they have prepared a full layout they cannot say for definite how much per book to print, so until that point we don't have a definite cost but a ball park figure.
This book was written for our sons to give them a factual account of why their little lives have changed so drastically. I am sure when they are old enough to want to know, we would have been a bit hazy on events. We are not wanting to make a huge profit and would love to make enough to cover out costs.
We didn't want to put a huge mark up on this as some people will be interested in the aviation part and not much else, others will be interested in all of it. Either way if people are wanting to buy a copy then we are honoured that you could be that interested.
The manuscript is with the publishers now and they could only give us a rough idea for how much it costs to print a 5x8 book with 73000 words, paperback, approx 20 b+w photos. Until they have prepared a full layout they cannot say for definite how much per book to print, so until that point we don't have a definite cost but a ball park figure.
This book was written for our sons to give them a factual account of why their little lives have changed so drastically. I am sure when they are old enough to want to know, we would have been a bit hazy on events. We are not wanting to make a huge profit and would love to make enough to cover out costs.
We didn't want to put a huge mark up on this as some people will be interested in the aviation part and not much else, others will be interested in all of it. Either way if people are wanting to buy a copy then we are honoured that you could be that interested.
The Book
Hey Mods!
Would it be possible to freebie an ad for PB's book -- or make a deal for each copy sold via PPRuNe?
Would it be possible to freebie an ad for PB's book -- or make a deal for each copy sold via PPRuNe?
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If it sells a few million I'll be looking for a cut if you quote from my "posts", well , jeez I am Scottish.
Cheers, well done for everything, keep your spirits right up there & good luck wherever you end up flying next, but for chrissake never say " at my last airline"
Cheers, well done for everything, keep your spirits right up there & good luck wherever you end up flying next, but for chrissake never say " at my last airline"
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count me in for ten copies, please!
P.B. I've done 2 books self publishing. The hard part for me is selling the books, believe me, you will have no trouble with that at all. A lot of people will want to read your story, so if I were you don't underestimate demand.
And a tenner a book usually works well, be sure and cover your costs.
The detail on your recent post that most amused me was "the runway was flying up the screen!" When my dear departed husband was flying an early solo in his K-8 at the age of 65, we watched in horror as he just barely managed to hop over the hedge. Said he, " I was told that I was undershooting if the reference point was moving up the canopy.....EVERYTHING was moving up the canopy......!"
If you'd like any help with the book, PM...
Mary
And a tenner a book usually works well, be sure and cover your costs.
The detail on your recent post that most amused me was "the runway was flying up the screen!" When my dear departed husband was flying an early solo in his K-8 at the age of 65, we watched in horror as he just barely managed to hop over the hedge. Said he, " I was told that I was undershooting if the reference point was moving up the canopy.....EVERYTHING was moving up the canopy......!"
If you'd like any help with the book, PM...
Mary
What is obvious from the last couple of day's posts that not only is Captain Burkill a consummate professional*, he's also a complete gentleman.
Haven't you, just. Thank you, Peter.
I'm yet another punter for the book - no question.
*As are SFO Coward, FO Magenis, the ATCO (whose name I've failed to Google - sorry), Heathrow RFFS, AAIB and, clearly, many others.
Originally Posted by Mmmayday38
...but I’ve added some frilly bits!
Thank you, Peter.I'm yet another punter for the book - no question.
*As are SFO Coward, FO Magenis, the ATCO (whose name I've failed to Google - sorry), Heathrow RFFS, AAIB and, clearly, many others.
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Even then, they cannot have been sure that they would not get the power back. There is no big red flag that pops out and says ‘sorry chaps, that’s it for today.’ So it was entirely reasonable to continue to follow the ILS glidescope, whether assisted by the autopilot or not. There is no suggestion in the report that the PF was not monitoring the approach with hands on the yoke.
Some 34 seconds before touchdown, at 430 ft agl, the commander announced that the approach was stable, to which the co-pilot responded “just”. Seven seconds later, the co-pilot noticed that the airspeed was reducing below the expected approach speed of 135 kt.
According to the report it's not until about 7secs later (300ft ?) that speed drops below Vref, and even then PF is probably still thinking/hoping thrust will kick in any second now...
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Guys.
The reason we discuss stuff like this on pprune is that it is informative.
Plainly, due to this accident, peeps have learned that pulling the flaps in will, in certain circumstances, get them nearer to where they're going.
No bad thing.
Hopefully they have also learned that if you lose all your thrust on final, like FR did at Rome, the a/c will stall in unless you take the autopilot off.
No bad thing.
Pprune is many things. But it's not a 'love in'.
NO shame at all to the crew, but a 777 is a 777.
And £160m is just that.
As someone above posted. Fly the aircraft. Yourself.
The reason we discuss stuff like this on pprune is that it is informative.
Plainly, due to this accident, peeps have learned that pulling the flaps in will, in certain circumstances, get them nearer to where they're going.
No bad thing.
Hopefully they have also learned that if you lose all your thrust on final, like FR did at Rome, the a/c will stall in unless you take the autopilot off.
No bad thing.
Pprune is many things. But it's not a 'love in'.
NO shame at all to the crew, but a 777 is a 777.
And £160m is just that.
As someone above posted. Fly the aircraft. Yourself.
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though 1.03 and 1.02 epr were noted. The engines continued to run
Peter, the EPR data is interesting. On my ac type we fly N2 RPM as the main power parameter on our approaches. Typically, with flap 45 and engines spooled up this would typically be 83 - 84 % N2.
What would have been a `normal` spooled up EPR value for the B777 at 750` AGL? In other words, in percentage terms, how much thrust was `missing`?
Peter, the EPR data is interesting. On my ac type we fly N2 RPM as the main power parameter on our approaches. Typically, with flap 45 and engines spooled up this would typically be 83 - 84 % N2.
What would have been a `normal` spooled up EPR value for the B777 at 750` AGL? In other words, in percentage terms, how much thrust was `missing`?
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Stanley Eevil,
Interesting you use N2? Assuming you are flying a type with hi-bypass fan engines, you use a parameter for a section of the engine that produces around only 20% of total thrust? I assumed most operators use N1 for a GE or EPR for a PW/RR? Obviously not. You learn something every day on here.
Interesting you use N2? Assuming you are flying a type with hi-bypass fan engines, you use a parameter for a section of the engine that produces around only 20% of total thrust? I assumed most operators use N1 for a GE or EPR for a PW/RR? Obviously not. You learn something every day on here.
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Page 139 of the final report:
Boeing Non-Normal Situation Guidelines for automated approach monitoring, issued March 2009 (not mentioned in the AAIB report):
Actions of the co-pilot
The co-pilot initially believed he had disconnected the autopilot at the intended height on the approach in order to carry out a manual landing on Runway 27L. However, as the aircraft descended through 600 ft he became aware of a problem with the engines, indicated by a split in the thrust lever positions. It is likely that, in attempting to understand the sudden and unprecedented problem with which he was presented he was distracted and thus omitted to disconnect the autopilot at this point.
Engine power had now reduced to a level at which the aircraft was losing airspeed and it started to descend below the glideslope. As the autopilot had remained engaged it attempted to maintain the ILS glide path by increasing the aircraft’s pitch attitude. This led to a further gradual reduction of airspeed, the initial ‘airspeed low’ master caution and the eventual triggering of the stall warning stick shaker. It was at this stage the co-pilot promptly pushed the control column forward, leading to the disconnect of the autopilot. However, the aircraft was now only 150 ft above the ground
The co-pilot initially believed he had disconnected the autopilot at the intended height on the approach in order to carry out a manual landing on Runway 27L. However, as the aircraft descended through 600 ft he became aware of a problem with the engines, indicated by a split in the thrust lever positions. It is likely that, in attempting to understand the sudden and unprecedented problem with which he was presented he was distracted and thus omitted to disconnect the autopilot at this point.
Engine power had now reduced to a level at which the aircraft was losing airspeed and it started to descend below the glideslope. As the autopilot had remained engaged it attempted to maintain the ILS glide path by increasing the aircraft’s pitch attitude. This led to a further gradual reduction of airspeed, the initial ‘airspeed low’ master caution and the eventual triggering of the stall warning stick shaker. It was at this stage the co-pilot promptly pushed the control column forward, leading to the disconnect of the autopilot. However, the aircraft was now only 150 ft above the ground
• NON-NORMAL RECOGNITION:
o The crewmember recognizing the malfunction calls it out clearly and
precisely.
• MAINTAIN AIRPLANE CONTROL:
o It is mandatory that the Pilot Flying (PF) fly the airplane.
• ANALYZE THE SITUATION:
o Any further action should only be initiated after the malfunctioning
system has been positively identified.
o The crewmember recognizing the malfunction calls it out clearly and
precisely.
• MAINTAIN AIRPLANE CONTROL:
o It is mandatory that the Pilot Flying (PF) fly the airplane.
• ANALYZE THE SITUATION:
o Any further action should only be initiated after the malfunctioning
system has been positively identified.
Peter
Send Adrian Swire and Rod Eddington a copy of the book with a note.
If you need their addresses, PM me.
All the best and look forward to seeing you out this way.
Turn a deaf ear to the naysayers, you have been closer than any of us to the edge and proved that line guys can get the job done.
There is no way I would have taken the a/c off the F/O in a situation like yours either, unless I was working for an outfit that puts 500hr people in the RHS.
Good luck .. you and Sully are in the same class.
BTW, where can I buy 10 copies?
Send Adrian Swire and Rod Eddington a copy of the book with a note.
If you need their addresses, PM me.
All the best and look forward to seeing you out this way.
Turn a deaf ear to the naysayers, you have been closer than any of us to the edge and proved that line guys can get the job done.
There is no way I would have taken the a/c off the F/O in a situation like yours either, unless I was working for an outfit that puts 500hr people in the RHS.
Good luck .. you and Sully are in the same class.
BTW, where can I buy 10 copies?
Last edited by VR-HFX; 14th Feb 2010 at 23:51.