Spanair accident at Madrid
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"And a question to the guys in the know: how is a RAT probe heat fault to be 'isolated'? is there a switch on the IP? or can it only be done by pulling the relevant CB, with the known consequences..."
Need to see more circuit diagram..........Item like that would normally have it's own protection. If it went short circuit you wouldn't want it taking out all the probe heating when the fuse/cb popped.
But as far as this is concerned the probe heat was working it seems.
Need to see more circuit diagram..........Item like that would normally have it's own protection. If it went short circuit you wouldn't want it taking out all the probe heating when the fuse/cb popped.
But as far as this is concerned the probe heat was working it seems.
RAT probe has it's own cb see my post at #1944 it is overall controlled by the Right stall vane and static port heater switching then via air/ground switching. The only prfactical way to isolate the RAT probe is to pull and cap the cb. Physical disconnection is possible but would take a lot more time.
Guys and girls,
Thank you all for the inputs and thoughts.
But,
The RAT heating working on the ground should NOT have anything (alone) to do with the cause of the accident.
OK, they returned because it was heating on the ground.
They MEL-ed it, maybe the wrong way, because the heater was not inoperative! It was working just fine!
Question should be; did maintenance do the correct procedure?
All of this has nothing to do with a flapless (slats?) take-of! (besides the TOWS) but i donīt think you can blame MD/BOEING/SPANAIR-procedures/MAINTENANCE for pilots trying to get airborne not configured as briefed.
I know, a lot of things will come together and will have some kind of a influence of the whole accident.
For me the question remains: Why did they try to get airborne without flaps without having the proper speeds for that? Rush? Overconfident?
Thank you all for the inputs and thoughts.
But,
The RAT heating working on the ground should NOT have anything (alone) to do with the cause of the accident.
OK, they returned because it was heating on the ground.
They MEL-ed it, maybe the wrong way, because the heater was not inoperative! It was working just fine!
Question should be; did maintenance do the correct procedure?
All of this has nothing to do with a flapless (slats?) take-of! (besides the TOWS) but i donīt think you can blame MD/BOEING/SPANAIR-procedures/MAINTENANCE for pilots trying to get airborne not configured as briefed.
I know, a lot of things will come together and will have some kind of a influence of the whole accident.
For me the question remains: Why did they try to get airborne without flaps without having the proper speeds for that? Rush? Overconfident?
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El Pais article 21/9
Excellent article, it has it all: Civil Aviation approved Spanair SOP without the Boeing recomendation, Mapjet (incident Lanzarote) informed CAIAC of their conclusions and recomendations in January this year, still no CAIAC report on this incident etc.
Interesting detail: (ARE) because the cb's are being pulled very often by maintenance personnel to put the a/c in air logic on the ground, the white ring got dirty and it being in a remote area of the panel, it was easy for pilots to overlook that it was not put back...
The article cites Mapjet who claim that they got away with their flapless takeoff because of the higher power of the MD83, lower TOW, head wind and crew action (deploy flap)
I m sure a lively public debate will start now in Spain...
Interesting detail: (ARE) because the cb's are being pulled very often by maintenance personnel to put the a/c in air logic on the ground, the white ring got dirty and it being in a remote area of the panel, it was easy for pilots to overlook that it was not put back...
The article cites Mapjet who claim that they got away with their flapless takeoff because of the higher power of the MD83, lower TOW, head wind and crew action (deploy flap)
I m sure a lively public debate will start now in Spain...
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A final horror scenario..
I really hope I'm wrong about thisone...
Looking at the video of the final stages of the accident, it has been
puzzling me how far and fast the acf plunged through the terrain.
We know that;
- The pilots engaged the reversers shortly after impact
- The #1 reverser got deployed
- The #2 reverser was stowed/inop
- The reverser buckets/mechanisms detached from the engines shortly
after impact.
Lets say the pilots engaged the reverser(s) shortly after impact in an
attempt to slow the acf down. Then the #1 reverser bucket gets
ripped off shortly after.
- Wouldn't this engine now produce FORWARD thrust?
With regard to the #2 reverser, it was stowed as we know. However,
what would happen if the pilots (in panic) tried to reverse thisone?
Would this #2 engine also produce FORWARD thrust?
The pilots would offcourse not know the reverser buckets were missing
and have no idea they instead of slowing the acf, added thrust!
The obvious reason for speculating is offcourse that this
might have had a significant impact on the tragic outcome of this accident.
If this was the case, they were doomed to disaster.. .
XPM
Looking at the video of the final stages of the accident, it has been
puzzling me how far and fast the acf plunged through the terrain.
We know that;
- The pilots engaged the reversers shortly after impact
- The #1 reverser got deployed
- The #2 reverser was stowed/inop
- The reverser buckets/mechanisms detached from the engines shortly
after impact.
Lets say the pilots engaged the reverser(s) shortly after impact in an
attempt to slow the acf down. Then the #1 reverser bucket gets
ripped off shortly after.
- Wouldn't this engine now produce FORWARD thrust?
With regard to the #2 reverser, it was stowed as we know. However,
what would happen if the pilots (in panic) tried to reverse thisone?
Would this #2 engine also produce FORWARD thrust?
The pilots would offcourse not know the reverser buckets were missing
and have no idea they instead of slowing the acf, added thrust!
The obvious reason for speculating is offcourse that this
might have had a significant impact on the tragic outcome of this accident.
If this was the case, they were doomed to disaster.. .
XPM
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What about the flap alarm 2 days before the crash ?
I did not find discussed in the thread the statement (allegedly based on first-hand evidence) that the maintenance log has an entry, 2 days before the crash, reading "Sistema auto slat falla cuando se extienden los slats" (auto slat failure upon slat extension); a failure that according to the article recurred on subsequent flights.
El sistema de despegue falló dos días antes de la tragedia / EL MUNDO
What exactly is this "auto slat failure" warning?
TIA - a puzzled engineer
El sistema de despegue falló dos días antes de la tragedia / EL MUNDO
What exactly is this "auto slat failure" warning?
TIA - a puzzled engineer
Last edited by EvaR; 22nd Sep 2008 at 16:36.
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That's terrible, XPMorten. I also hope you're wrong, and that the turbine with the blocked reverse had some system that somehow impeded that perverse behaviour...
But you are probably, terribly right, I fear...
XXXavier
But you are probably, terribly right, I fear...
XXXavier
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With regard to the #2 reverser, it was stowed as we know. However,
what would happen if the pilots (in panic) tried to reverse this one?
Would this #2 engine also produce FORWARD thrust?
what would happen if the pilots (in panic) tried to reverse this one?
Would this #2 engine also produce FORWARD thrust?
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TWT
Grabbed a notch of flap after some serious ar#e twitching.It's not something I'm very proud of and still gives me shivers when I think about it.You asked so there you have an honest answer.
Grabbed a notch of flap after some serious ar#e twitching.It's not something I'm very proud of and still gives me shivers when I think about it.You asked so there you have an honest answer.
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TU-154
In the mid-90's I flew Balkan Airlines (Tu-154) from Harare (Zimbabwe) to the UK stopping 4 times. Plane completely full of pax, high altitude runway, though fortunately very long. Plane rotated but did not take off. Nose was lowered, engine noise increased noticeably and we continued for several seconds more before second rotation and liftoff, right at the end of the runway. Most anxious moment I have ever had as a passenger. I wonder now if flaps/slats were incorrectly set, but I am not sure of this type. Anyone know more about this Tupolev type and configuration?
That's terrible, XPMorten. I also hope you're wrong, and that the turbine with the blocked reverse had some system that somehow impeded that perverse behaviour...
But you are probably, terribly right, I fear...
XXXavier
But you are probably, terribly right, I fear...
XXXavier
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raredata
Kudos to you for bringing that to pprune. That could easily have been the end of you and your pax.
The flaps on my a/c are so slow that your 'recovery' would not have time to work.
I've learnt from this thread.
I always triple check we've got flap out now before pushing the levers up.
Kudos to you for bringing that to pprune. That could easily have been the end of you and your pax.
The flaps on my a/c are so slow that your 'recovery' would not have time to work.
I've learnt from this thread.
I always triple check we've got flap out now before pushing the levers up.
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Dug the dog, you are incorrect.
As a Loadmaster years ago, I was on a Zantop L188 at Arlanda, as the 3 man crew hurtled down the runway the audible flap warning horn went off and saved much embarrasment !!!, A rapid exit to the left and taxy back to the hold with tail between legs.
Why..because they were all so engrossed in chitter chatter, that they missed the checklist item. The F/E was English...talked a lot ( Still does ! )...and was responsible for the call..and he is still flying with DHL.
Another loadie friend of mine took off on a JBQ L188 out of Coventry at MTOM where they had forgot the flaps, HE said Warwick Castle looked mighty big that day and that the Electra was a mighty forgiving beast.
Thread drift..apologies..but even a 3/4 man crew can balls up
As a Loadmaster years ago, I was on a Zantop L188 at Arlanda, as the 3 man crew hurtled down the runway the audible flap warning horn went off and saved much embarrasment !!!, A rapid exit to the left and taxy back to the hold with tail between legs.
Why..because they were all so engrossed in chitter chatter, that they missed the checklist item. The F/E was English...talked a lot ( Still does ! )...and was responsible for the call..and he is still flying with DHL.
Another loadie friend of mine took off on a JBQ L188 out of Coventry at MTOM where they had forgot the flaps, HE said Warwick Castle looked mighty big that day and that the Electra was a mighty forgiving beast.
Thread drift..apologies..but even a 3/4 man crew can balls up
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Thanks raredata and freightdoggy for you honest contributions.
We all appreciate it.
And remember, I personally DO NOT BLAME THE PILOTS and consider it an "honest" mistake on their side (with the information I have in hand, it seems they did try to follow the checklist reasonably appropiately).
Between the pilot and the copilot they had about 22 years of flight experience (it takes two to tango, albeit 19 from the pilot and only 3 for the copilot). And, presumably, they only forgot to flip this one important switch just once.
They are not the only pilots in the world to ever forget it. They are just the ones that, every 10 years of so in the industry, have other factors aligned to produce the result (TOWS inop unkwoningly, wind/weight/density/thrust, unable to recorver, etc).
Hopefully mandatory TOWS tests before each flight and other measures will be implemented that makes it harder for everyone to make this kind of mistakes in the future.
And today, it's been a month and two days from the date of the accident. And against their own regulations, as it's common with them, the CIAIAC adds another case in which not even a preliminary report has been published (this month, they have about 5 cases "overdue").
Remember that nobody expects these preliminary FACTUAL reports to be highly accurate or contain much information. Just to state facts that, as of today, are fairly well known and proven, without drawing (necessarily if it's too early) conclusions etc.
But no. They have to keep everything "ultrasecret" (if it was up to then) and not publish anything until "they, the experts" consider when and what we mere mortals can know and what WE CAN'T.
We all appreciate it.
And remember, I personally DO NOT BLAME THE PILOTS and consider it an "honest" mistake on their side (with the information I have in hand, it seems they did try to follow the checklist reasonably appropiately).
Between the pilot and the copilot they had about 22 years of flight experience (it takes two to tango, albeit 19 from the pilot and only 3 for the copilot). And, presumably, they only forgot to flip this one important switch just once.
They are not the only pilots in the world to ever forget it. They are just the ones that, every 10 years of so in the industry, have other factors aligned to produce the result (TOWS inop unkwoningly, wind/weight/density/thrust, unable to recorver, etc).
Hopefully mandatory TOWS tests before each flight and other measures will be implemented that makes it harder for everyone to make this kind of mistakes in the future.
And today, it's been a month and two days from the date of the accident. And against their own regulations, as it's common with them, the CIAIAC adds another case in which not even a preliminary report has been published (this month, they have about 5 cases "overdue").
Remember that nobody expects these preliminary FACTUAL reports to be highly accurate or contain much information. Just to state facts that, as of today, are fairly well known and proven, without drawing (necessarily if it's too early) conclusions etc.
But no. They have to keep everything "ultrasecret" (if it was up to then) and not publish anything until "they, the experts" consider when and what we mere mortals can know and what WE CAN'T.
Last edited by justme69; 22nd Sep 2008 at 13:53.
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I personally DO NOT BLAME THE PILOTS and consider it an "honest" mistake on their side (with the information I have in hand, it seems they did try to follow the checklist reasonably appropiately).
