Spanair accident at Madrid
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wings1011: were you crew on that Lanzarote flight? If not, could you tell me the crew's "origin" (i.e. were they spanish Air Comet crew or austrian MAP?)
BTW, thanks for your posts. I started researching this Spanair accident after seeing how the CIAIAC hasn't mentioned any details about OE-LMM in over a year.
BTW, thanks for your posts. I started researching this Spanair accident after seeing how the CIAIAC hasn't mentioned any details about OE-LMM in over a year.
Last edited by justme69; 17th Sep 2008 at 01:33.
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Nope-Not crew during that flight
MAP
were at that time operating around 5-7 MD 80, but I actually think only 1 of them that is still operated by them OE-IKB is actually leased and operated by them, the others had various owners and were only " flying for them "
The crew came from everywere at that time, USA,various caribbiean islands,Europe and ASIA with all kinds of differences. Anyway all with proper official documents.
The proper nationalities for each position could be found in the filed report.
Regards
Wings 1011
were at that time operating around 5-7 MD 80, but I actually think only 1 of them that is still operated by them OE-IKB is actually leased and operated by them, the others had various owners and were only " flying for them "
The crew came from everywere at that time, USA,various caribbiean islands,Europe and ASIA with all kinds of differences. Anyway all with proper official documents.
The proper nationalities for each position could be found in the filed report.
Regards
Wings 1011
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Thanks 1011 
I asked because I was just curious if that was a regular national flight or not. A friend of mine witnessed that incident first hand.
The poor guy threw himself to the ground when he saw the airplane flying so erratically barely over the building were he works right in front of the runaway ...
BTW, I don't know where to find the reports filed for that incident ... Do you?
I asked because I was just curious if that was a regular national flight or not. A friend of mine witnessed that incident first hand.
The poor guy threw himself to the ground when he saw the airplane flying so erratically barely over the building were he works right in front of the runaway ...
BTW, I don't know where to find the reports filed for that incident ... Do you?
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WOW switch
Just thinking out loud and to ask for clarification from the experts. If the A/C thought it was flying because of a faulty WOW switch, would the TOCW still operate? If not, then the C/B issue is possibly a red herring?
It seems hard to believe however that such a simple problem could lead to such a disaster and there there is no redundancy inbuilt?
It seems hard to believe however that such a simple problem could lead to such a disaster and there there is no redundancy inbuilt?
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Hmmm ... now Spanair declares that, because both pilots left the cockpit for several hours, they were suppossed to check the TOWS alarms again for this flight.
And they said they did, according to Spanair. But they did it before the first return to gate.
And they didn't do it again afterwards, when they finally took off, as they had not left the cockpit for a long period, as their procedures called for.
They insist that the MD recommendation after Detroit to make this check prior to each take off, was never made mandatory, not even by the FAA in the USA, and that, regardless, they were never made aware of it and their procedures were approved by spanish civil aviation authorities.
And they said they did, according to Spanair. But they did it before the first return to gate.
And they didn't do it again afterwards, when they finally took off, as they had not left the cockpit for a long period, as their procedures called for.
They insist that the MD recommendation after Detroit to make this check prior to each take off, was never made mandatory, not even by the FAA in the USA, and that, regardless, they were never made aware of it and their procedures were approved by spanish civil aviation authorities.
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OK...someone mentioned "chink" power and that pros would know what this meant.
I don't know what it means and I was the first to indicate the relationship between a RAT probe heated on the ground and loss of takeoff warning.
so, please, tell me, a pro, what CHINK power is.
ALSO, some people just don't get this idea:
the RAT probe being heated on the ground meant that the plane ''thought'' it was in the air. Pulling the RAT heater CB didn't do anything to the ground control relay etc. THE PLANE ALREADY THOUGHT IT WAS IN THE AIR and another CB didn't need to be pulled...
RAT heating on ground equals SYMPTOM...mechanic cured symptom but not disease (plane thinking it was in the air).
other human factors made the crew forget to move the flap handle...I blame poor training by the airline...and a copilot with 1000 total hours? and a brand new captain, though with previous experience. A military pilot...maybe a fighter pilot used to only flying alone and no CRM .
PLEASE, if you move a handle, watch the gauge and don't let go of the handle until the gauge reads what you want it to.
I don't know what it means and I was the first to indicate the relationship between a RAT probe heated on the ground and loss of takeoff warning.
so, please, tell me, a pro, what CHINK power is.
ALSO, some people just don't get this idea:
the RAT probe being heated on the ground meant that the plane ''thought'' it was in the air. Pulling the RAT heater CB didn't do anything to the ground control relay etc. THE PLANE ALREADY THOUGHT IT WAS IN THE AIR and another CB didn't need to be pulled...
RAT heating on ground equals SYMPTOM...mechanic cured symptom but not disease (plane thinking it was in the air).
other human factors made the crew forget to move the flap handle...I blame poor training by the airline...and a copilot with 1000 total hours? and a brand new captain, though with previous experience. A military pilot...maybe a fighter pilot used to only flying alone and no CRM .
PLEASE, if you move a handle, watch the gauge and don't let go of the handle until the gauge reads what you want it to.
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Instead of pointing the finger at training, and crew experience, I would be looking at time pressures, and perhaps the crew "expediting" to keep the operation moving.(FTL limits maybe?)...as to letting it accelerate and flying it off, it would take some awareness on part of the crew as to why the aircraft was not behaving normally, and not likely they ever realized why the aircraft was stalling, therefore an increase in AOA in an attempt to lift off would have been intuitive..sure the facts will emerge..until then we learn from this incident, not cast aspersions on the crew or airline..there but for the grace of God go any of us.
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Sevenstrokeroll:
Thanks and, yes your earlier input had stuck in my mind. So I assume that there is no redundancy and with a faulty WOW switch the TOCW would be U/S? Is this normal on all aircraft types?
the RAT probe being heated on the ground meant that the plane ''thought'' it was in the air. Pulling the RAT heater CB didn't do anything to the ground control relay etc. THE PLANE ALREADY THOUGHT IT WAS IN THE AIR and another CB didn't need to be pulled...
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Flaps/Throttle
Ironbutt57:
.
Tes I do agree with your comments BUT shouldn't it also be intuitive in such a stall to command Flaps 15 and Firewall throttle?
therefore an increase in AOA in an attempt to lift off would have been intuitive
Tes I do agree with your comments BUT shouldn't it also be intuitive in such a stall to command Flaps 15 and Firewall throttle?
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BUT shouldn't it also be intuitive in such a stall to command Flaps 15 and Firewall throttle?
For almost every (and probably all) types I have flown, the primary stall recovery action is to lower the nose and "unstall" the wings. Power/reconfiguring are the backup actions post stall recovery (you might do the actions simultaneously, but their effect is later particularly in a jet). Lowering the nose on liftoff and land back on is too drastic to "teach" / "mandate", IMHO (even though it might be used in extremis).
We are in a takeoff situation - you have pretty much full thrust, and you assume you have Flaps... so the actions you mandate are somewhat inappropriate as a "drill". They are entirely appropriate should we choose to takeoff flapless or at half power... but this is not the intention.
Please also NB that a stick shaker on departure is an "interesting event". History might teach one to ignore the stick shaker and just fly the aircraft - see TWA Tristar @ JFK and even a recent VS747 incident. At a critical phase of flight, a stick shaker could be very distracting - and a good chance spurious. As above, you can only assume you are taking off with the correct performance and configuration.
I still think you are attacking this the wrong way. If the aircraft did takeoff Flap/Slatless, then the "system" failed - a combination of aircraft design, regulators and crew. The "solution" is not to "blame" anyone (blame is not the purpose of accident investigations), but to prevent future occurrences. In turn, I do not believe that will be solved by "teaching" crews to fly out of such situaitons - in many cases I suspect it would be impossible anyway
The solution is to prevent a Flap/Slatless takeoff in the first place...NoD
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From a certain large Aircraft Manufacturer (begins with B) for Stall / Terrain situations:
In addition for it's most populous type with a Stall:
I am not saying the above actions (Firewall TLs, add Flap) are not going to help. I am saying that the immediate use of them at the first sign of trouble is contrary to various documentation and therefore will not be trained to / expected of a crew 
NoD
* Overboost or “Firewalling” the thrust lever should only be considered during emergency situations when all other available actions have been taken and terrain contact is imminent.
DO NOT attempt to change flaps or landing gear configuration until after recovery
NoD
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In such an incredibly short period of time the reactions will be instinctive and they will either work or they won't. I'm sure you wouldn't get much time to think about it or try anything else.
In such an fearful and unplanned situation and such a short time-span, the brain loses the capacity to "think and do" and merely reacts. Those reactions can be unpredictable but recurrent training moulds them - but you can only do this for certain events at certain times.
This is all well and good but the point some people are missing is that you can't train muscle memory for every eventuality. Training for "forgot to deploy flaps with no working TOCW after returning to the gate for maintenance" would be about as useful as training for a complete engine failure at 500 feet on the climb out (in my opinion anyway).
You can't mitigate every risk, you have to give priority to these things in order of likelihood of occurrence and effect of occurrence.
In such an fearful and unplanned situation and such a short time-span, the brain loses the capacity to "think and do" and merely reacts. Those reactions can be unpredictable but recurrent training moulds them - but you can only do this for certain events at certain times.
This is all well and good but the point some people are missing is that you can't train muscle memory for every eventuality. Training for "forgot to deploy flaps with no working TOCW after returning to the gate for maintenance" would be about as useful as training for a complete engine failure at 500 feet on the climb out (in my opinion anyway).
You can't mitigate every risk, you have to give priority to these things in order of likelihood of occurrence and effect of occurrence.
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NOD:
And. therefore not intuitive.Yes, understood and I stand corrected. Thanks.
I'd truly appreciate your comments on the earlier question regarding the WOW/TOCW issue?
I am not saying the above actions (Firewall TLs, add Flap) are not going to help. I am saying that the immediate use of them at the first sign of trouble is contrary to various documentation and therefore will not be trained to / expected of a crew
I'd truly appreciate your comments on the earlier question regarding the WOW/TOCW issue?
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Quote:
I still think you are attacking this the wrong way. If the aircraft did takeoff Flap/Slatless, then the "system" failed - a combination of aircraft design, regulators and crew. The "solution" is not to "blame" anyone (blame is not the purpose of accident investigations), but to prevent future occurrences. In turn, I do not believe that will be solved by "teaching" crews to fly out of such situaitons - in many cases I suspect it would be impossible anyway The solution is to prevent a Flap/Slatless takeoff in the first place...
I do agree nevertheless I wonder:
Apparently the Aircraft was able take off and fly in that configuration - why could she not be kept airborne (at least in ground effect)
My explanation (please comment):
During the rotation the Aircraft reached an angle of attack creating enough lift to become airborne. The PF rotated further to a pitch which would have been right in correct TO Configuration.
Lift was not enough to allow a climbing flightpath instead the plane stayed in ground effect. Therfore this further rotation produced an angle of attack in the full stall regime. Given the low altitude, NTOP already selected and time available for realising the problem there was no practical chance of escape.
I still think you are attacking this the wrong way. If the aircraft did takeoff Flap/Slatless, then the "system" failed - a combination of aircraft design, regulators and crew. The "solution" is not to "blame" anyone (blame is not the purpose of accident investigations), but to prevent future occurrences. In turn, I do not believe that will be solved by "teaching" crews to fly out of such situaitons - in many cases I suspect it would be impossible anyway The solution is to prevent a Flap/Slatless takeoff in the first place...
I do agree nevertheless I wonder:
Apparently the Aircraft was able take off and fly in that configuration - why could she not be kept airborne (at least in ground effect)
My explanation (please comment):
During the rotation the Aircraft reached an angle of attack creating enough lift to become airborne. The PF rotated further to a pitch which would have been right in correct TO Configuration.
Lift was not enough to allow a climbing flightpath instead the plane stayed in ground effect. Therfore this further rotation produced an angle of attack in the full stall regime. Given the low altitude, NTOP already selected and time available for realising the problem there was no practical chance of escape.
Warning Toxic!
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Disgusted of Tunbridge
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People are hanging onto false leads and not letting go. How do we know they didn't firewall the throttles? Moving flap would make no difference- they had crashed back before the flaps would have moved into position. Once you are in a stall situation, the only thing that is going to get you out of it is altitude and power. No clever techniques that might have worked on an overpowered naval fighter will do it.
Someone is hung up on the fact the flaps were deployed for the first take off. Well- it appears they did the after landing check and taxied back in with flaps retracted as they should. Then in the rush to leave for the second attempt, it appears the flaps were left retracted.
We really need some of the non-flyers in this thread to just watch and learn if they want to, and not try and come up with answers! 92 pages, most of it complete guff!
Someone is hung up on the fact the flaps were deployed for the first take off. Well- it appears they did the after landing check and taxied back in with flaps retracted as they should. Then in the rush to leave for the second attempt, it appears the flaps were left retracted.
We really need some of the non-flyers in this thread to just watch and learn if they want to, and not try and come up with answers! 92 pages, most of it complete guff!
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Quotes from the TWA Report (stick shaker on liftoff):
Related to this accident, "awareness of ... flap configuration" might be the key... However, in a system that is designed to check Takeoff Flap is correctly set on more than 1 occasion (? with us there is a check prior Taxi, and 2 checks in the "Pre-Takeoff checks") the crew cannot really be of any other mindset than the Flaps are correctly set...
Therefore the logic of the TWA Report, applied to this accident (and assuming the stick shaker did go off?) would be that the crew may well have, even should have, assumed it to be false.
NoD
There is no specific training for stall encounters immediately after liftoff from the runway.
Based on their awareness of airspeed and flap configuration, the pilots should have concluded that the stickshaker was a false stall warning.
Therefore the logic of the TWA Report, applied to this accident (and assuming the stick shaker did go off?) would be that the crew may well have, even should have, assumed it to be false.
NoD
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Apparently the Aircraft was able take off and fly in that configuration - why could she not be kept airborne (at least in ground effect)
If this takeoff was Slat/Flapless, read the NW report - hardly able to climb, and very hard to control in roll...
I'd truly appreciate your comments on the earlier question regarding the WOW/TOCW issue?
NoD
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Many posts ago, there were comments about the military method of timing the take off against distance travelled.
Sorry, just a humble Piper/Cessna type, but if the aircraft was clean, would it not have accelerated abnormally fast, and in an extra 500 metres ground roll it should have been well past Vr or even V2.
Sorry, just a humble Piper/Cessna type, but if the aircraft was clean, would it not have accelerated abnormally fast, and in an extra 500 metres ground roll it should have been well past Vr or even V2.
