Spanair accident at Madrid
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A picture that may be of interest:
From La Vanguardia: http://imagenes.lavanguardia.es/lava..._JR2908080.JPG
From La Vanguardia: http://imagenes.lavanguardia.es/lava..._JR2908080.JPG
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Milo, I do believe you're right! The inspection panel on the top of the Horizontal Stab can be seen in both shots. Well done!
So how come the shots of the complete tail show it largely intact
[IMG]
[/IMG]
So how come the shots of the complete tail show it largely intact
[IMG]
[/IMG]
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Nothing on the wing comes close:
[IMG]
[/IMG](ppppilot
"Look at those slots in the leading edge. Impossible to be a wing"
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New simulator test with "real" weather, weights, speeds & location.
No matter how many times I try this, with slightly different
reverser unlock times, the end result is always more or less
the same as the real scenario.
I'd be VERY surprised if the right reverser is not somehow involved
in this.
Below is the typical result of a reverser clamshell unlock around V1.
Thrust Reverser unlock at V1, MP4 video clip
(Apologize for the wrong airline paint in the video, it by NO MEANS has anything to do with this)
XPM
No matter how many times I try this, with slightly different
reverser unlock times, the end result is always more or less
the same as the real scenario.
I'd be VERY surprised if the right reverser is not somehow involved
in this.
Below is the typical result of a reverser clamshell unlock around V1.
Thrust Reverser unlock at V1, MP4 video clip
(Apologize for the wrong airline paint in the video, it by NO MEANS has anything to do with this)
XPM
BarbiesBoyFriend;
The question is unanswerable except by the outcomes and that will last years if not decades - yes, they will have insurance for contingencies but "who pays" will be a very long and expensive battle.
The involved (prosecutorial or defendant) parties will be:
- the airline and all managerial staff related to this accident as well as all all those involved in Spanair's and SAS's MD83 operations;
- the airline's directors and almost certainly SAS and their shareholders;
- individual passengers and families and their lawyers,
- lawyers representing class action lawsuits;
- manufacturer of the aircraft and all sub-contracted manufacturers;
- the operating crew and crew representatives;
- maintenance personal and representatives;
- all training staff as well as training syllabi and programs;
- the airport authority and possibly ATC;
- the fire and rescue people and representatives;
- the Spanish regulatory authority, (for certification and regulatory matters);
- every document within all these separate organizations will be audited and examined closely for correctness and guidance, beginning with the immediate documents, (Aircraft AOM/FCOM - SOPs, MEL, Master MEL) and a full, detailed examination of the safety and operating culture of the airline and the owner's airline, SAS.
For those unfortunate enough to be close to any such tragedy, they will know that twenty years is not an unreasonable time to see final resolutions and settlements, although main battles will have been completed earlier. Suicides occur (as did within maintenance personnel in the Alaska 261 accident off Los Angeles), lives and families are destroyed, corporations may cease to exist.
A bleak, but frank picture of what is to come. The message is abundantly clear to airline owners (shareholders) and management alike, (or ought to be if both accountable groups know and understand the business they're in - some don't, or at least behave as though they don't know.
The dynamics of safety work are subtle and therefore not easily perceived. So much of human behaviour is "normal" and the desire for "normal" very strong.
Denial of "inconvenient" data or information is possible even in high-risk endeavours either because "nothing happens" despite such data being presented (or the organization even being warned of high-risk), or the "normalization of deviance", twin subtleties that few in operations either comprehend or appreciate even given the introduction (here in Canada) of SMS "training"...(1-day wonder-courses). Denial - rather the "passive invisibility of risk", is more prevalent than we would expect. The enticement to normalize deviance because "nothing happens" for years, is very strong especially when the high pressure to reduce costs are involved and also especially because "risk" is not a "thing" which can be "photographed", enumerated or quantified in the same way say, fuel costs, can be.
Few managers understand safety principles but they know the costs very well and hear about them all the time from those senior within the organization and, if only to reduce/deflect "flack" from above, adhere to or carry out the message to those lower down).
I've mentioned many times, two very good books on these very important but not-easily grasped subjects - Diane Vaughan's "The Challenger Launch Decision", and Starbuck's and Farjoun's, "Organization at the Limit". "Fine-tuning the Odds Until Something Breaks" by Starbuck and Milliken is an introduction to this kind of perception, so greatly required yet almost completely missing in airline managment's understanding of the business.
Would they have insurance for that?
The involved (prosecutorial or defendant) parties will be:
- the airline and all managerial staff related to this accident as well as all all those involved in Spanair's and SAS's MD83 operations;
- the airline's directors and almost certainly SAS and their shareholders;
- individual passengers and families and their lawyers,
- lawyers representing class action lawsuits;
- manufacturer of the aircraft and all sub-contracted manufacturers;
- the operating crew and crew representatives;
- maintenance personal and representatives;
- all training staff as well as training syllabi and programs;
- the airport authority and possibly ATC;
- the fire and rescue people and representatives;
- the Spanish regulatory authority, (for certification and regulatory matters);
- every document within all these separate organizations will be audited and examined closely for correctness and guidance, beginning with the immediate documents, (Aircraft AOM/FCOM - SOPs, MEL, Master MEL) and a full, detailed examination of the safety and operating culture of the airline and the owner's airline, SAS.
For those unfortunate enough to be close to any such tragedy, they will know that twenty years is not an unreasonable time to see final resolutions and settlements, although main battles will have been completed earlier. Suicides occur (as did within maintenance personnel in the Alaska 261 accident off Los Angeles), lives and families are destroyed, corporations may cease to exist.
A bleak, but frank picture of what is to come. The message is abundantly clear to airline owners (shareholders) and management alike, (or ought to be if both accountable groups know and understand the business they're in - some don't, or at least behave as though they don't know.
The dynamics of safety work are subtle and therefore not easily perceived. So much of human behaviour is "normal" and the desire for "normal" very strong.
Denial of "inconvenient" data or information is possible even in high-risk endeavours either because "nothing happens" despite such data being presented (or the organization even being warned of high-risk), or the "normalization of deviance", twin subtleties that few in operations either comprehend or appreciate even given the introduction (here in Canada) of SMS "training"...(1-day wonder-courses). Denial - rather the "passive invisibility of risk", is more prevalent than we would expect. The enticement to normalize deviance because "nothing happens" for years, is very strong especially when the high pressure to reduce costs are involved and also especially because "risk" is not a "thing" which can be "photographed", enumerated or quantified in the same way say, fuel costs, can be.
Few managers understand safety principles but they know the costs very well and hear about them all the time from those senior within the organization and, if only to reduce/deflect "flack" from above, adhere to or carry out the message to those lower down).
I've mentioned many times, two very good books on these very important but not-easily grasped subjects - Diane Vaughan's "The Challenger Launch Decision", and Starbuck's and Farjoun's, "Organization at the Limit". "Fine-tuning the Odds Until Something Breaks" by Starbuck and Milliken is an introduction to this kind of perception, so greatly required yet almost completely missing in airline managment's understanding of the business.
Last edited by PJ2; 30th Aug 2008 at 19:39.
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Have you tried the no-flap scenario?
Quoting lomapaseo:
From what I have seen with numerous DC9 series takeoff stalls (many due to ice on no-slat aircraft) the biggest problem was the loss of lateral control and/or roll just out of ground effect. True the aircraft may climb but not all the wings wish to follow and once you catch a wing tip it's all over.
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pj2
I think you might be wrong.
the slats come out in less than 2 seconds...haven't timed it
and I do think that if the reverser deploys the throttle goes to idle, it is the reverser throttle/lever that would throttle the engine up once in reverse.
I think you might be wrong.
the slats come out in less than 2 seconds...haven't timed it
and I do think that if the reverser deploys the throttle goes to idle, it is the reverser throttle/lever that would throttle the engine up once in reverse.
sevenstrokeroll;
Could very well be - I haven't flown the MD80, only the DC9.
The slats came out on the '9 quite quickly I agree, but not 2 seconds - I suspect closer to four; Flaps "15", (if I recall) would take longer but again I'm guessing. But to your point, even just the slats out would lower the stall speed substantially, (it's worth 30 to 50kts depending upon type of aircraft).
If someone current on the MD80 could confirm that the throttles are brought to IDLE thrust if an uncommanded deployment of the reverser is sensed, that would help understanding - thanks.
I understand that the reverse lever increases engine speed once reverse selected - that's the way it works on most
, however on the Airbus 320 series, the thrust lever itself is brought back from the IDLE position into the reverse regime. The 330/340 series uses conventional levers attached to and extending forward of, the thrust levers.
I think you might be wrong.
the slats come out in less than 2 seconds...haven't timed it
and I do think that if the reverser deploys the throttle goes to idle, it is the reverser throttle/lever that would throttle the engine up once in reverse.
the slats come out in less than 2 seconds...haven't timed it
and I do think that if the reverser deploys the throttle goes to idle, it is the reverser throttle/lever that would throttle the engine up once in reverse.
The slats came out on the '9 quite quickly I agree, but not 2 seconds - I suspect closer to four; Flaps "15", (if I recall) would take longer but again I'm guessing. But to your point, even just the slats out would lower the stall speed substantially, (it's worth 30 to 50kts depending upon type of aircraft).
If someone current on the MD80 could confirm that the throttles are brought to IDLE thrust if an uncommanded deployment of the reverser is sensed, that would help understanding - thanks.
I understand that the reverse lever increases engine speed once reverse selected - that's the way it works on most
, however on the Airbus 320 series, the thrust lever itself is brought back from the IDLE position into the reverse regime. The 330/340 series uses conventional levers attached to and extending forward of, the thrust levers.
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and I do think that if the reverser deploys the throttle goes to idle, it is the reverser throttle/lever that would throttle the engine up once in reverse.
So if the air/ground logic works as it should ground idle is all you will get if a TR should deploy on departure without weight on wheels.
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I haven't flown the MD80, only the DC9.
Pretty much the same bird to handfly, the great improvement was the autoslats and the fmc on the MD80 family.
With the right maintenance and management it's a solid workhorse.
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The right reverser was Deactivated and stowed.
Unsure what they mean by "deactivated", but I assume that hydraulics and electrics were set INOP.
So, I doubt you would get the same systems behavior
from THIS reverser unlocking as you would from an active one....?
As for "stowed", according to mechanics (Daily Mail) they used wire to secure it.
XPM
Unsure what they mean by "deactivated", but I assume that hydraulics and electrics were set INOP.
So, I doubt you would get the same systems behavior
from THIS reverser unlocking as you would from an active one....?
As for "stowed", according to mechanics (Daily Mail) they used wire to secure it.
XPM
Last edited by XPMorten; 30th Aug 2008 at 22:01.
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I have trouble getting too much info about the intricacies of the MD-82 thrust reverser. But what I do know is that there is no electrical or mechanical command of any kind to bring it to idle if a reverser unlocks.
What I can see is that the buckets are held in place by overcenter linkages. That by itself makes it pretty difficult for them to inadvertently deploy. When the reverser levers are moved to the idle revers detent, 3000 psi actuators move the links overcenter and deploy the reversers.
What I can't see from our manuals is:
1. Can the reverser lever be pulled to the reverse detent with the throttles above idle?
2. Is there an isolation valve which prevents hydraulic pressure to the actuators when in airborne mode?
Xander
Another thing that I find very important. If the MD80 touched down with it's tail first. There MUST be heavy scrapes in the dirt where the MD came down if the reverser was deployed. When the reversers are deployed, they will hit the ground before the tail does. So for me it all reverts back to the no slat takeoff scenario.
What I can see is that the buckets are held in place by overcenter linkages. That by itself makes it pretty difficult for them to inadvertently deploy. When the reverser levers are moved to the idle revers detent, 3000 psi actuators move the links overcenter and deploy the reversers.
What I can't see from our manuals is:
1. Can the reverser lever be pulled to the reverse detent with the throttles above idle?
2. Is there an isolation valve which prevents hydraulic pressure to the actuators when in airborne mode?
Xander
Another thing that I find very important. If the MD80 touched down with it's tail first. There MUST be heavy scrapes in the dirt where the MD came down if the reverser was deployed. When the reversers are deployed, they will hit the ground before the tail does. So for me it all reverts back to the no slat takeoff scenario.
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Well XPMorten i dunno if you have any experience in a transport category aircraft like the MD80.
If a thrust reverser is set inop it's written in the tech log and we brief it as a part of the pre departure briefing (we do the same before landing).
It is possible that other pilots have other experiences than i have, but in the 35 years that i have been operating jets i have never had a inop reverser deploying in flight or at the ground, and we do fly around alot with a TR inop.
I think that the answer to this tragic accident lies elsewhere than an open reverse bucket.
Will await for the final report!
Inop over and out
If a thrust reverser is set inop it's written in the tech log and we brief it as a part of the pre departure briefing (we do the same before landing).
It is possible that other pilots have other experiences than i have, but in the 35 years that i have been operating jets i have never had a inop reverser deploying in flight or at the ground, and we do fly around alot with a TR inop.
I think that the answer to this tragic accident lies elsewhere than an open reverse bucket.
Will await for the final report!
Inop over and out