Spanair accident at Madrid
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Ministry in charge of airports explains to the goverment what happened:
13.10: Airplane taxies to begining of runaway 36L.
13.25: Ground control grants permission to T/O. The pilot decides to go back to parking area instead for the temperature probe problem we all know. Spanair informs airport that it's going to switch planes. Later calls back to say it will continue to use the same one for the flight.
14.15: Plane taxies again for new TO.
14.23: Traffic control authorizes TO from 36L.
14.25: Official time for the accident. Tower control warns airport fire squad when they notice smoke.
14.26: Tower control warns airport operations. Another tower also sends out the call.
14.28: Fire squad locates the first pieces of the airplane and confirms the accident. They warn about difficulties to access the area due to the smoke and fire. They start dealing with the fire and rescuing victims.
14.29: Airport emergency protocol is activated: calls to 112 (911), etc.
14.30: Calls to internal airport resources. Dispatch of all medical personnel present at the airport.
14.32: Direct calls to City of Madrid specialised rescue system SAMUR (Samur - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia).
14.33: Calls directly to city of Madrid firefighting squad (already warned by 112) to agree on meeting point and facilitate access to T4 and directions to place of accident.
14.42: External help begins to arrive. First external assests to reach T4 were 5 firefigthing trucks. (Madrid airport, like most airports in large cities, is kind of in a remote area, although not as far away from the city as some other airports).
14.43: Airport Calls placed to civil aviation accident commissions to coordinate.
More rescue assests start to join efforts from then on.
07.00 Aug 21: Civil Aviation Accident Commision authorizes the use of the runaway involved in the accident for normal operation.
13.10: Airplane taxies to begining of runaway 36L.
13.25: Ground control grants permission to T/O. The pilot decides to go back to parking area instead for the temperature probe problem we all know. Spanair informs airport that it's going to switch planes. Later calls back to say it will continue to use the same one for the flight.
14.15: Plane taxies again for new TO.
14.23: Traffic control authorizes TO from 36L.
14.25: Official time for the accident. Tower control warns airport fire squad when they notice smoke.
14.26: Tower control warns airport operations. Another tower also sends out the call.
14.28: Fire squad locates the first pieces of the airplane and confirms the accident. They warn about difficulties to access the area due to the smoke and fire. They start dealing with the fire and rescuing victims.
14.29: Airport emergency protocol is activated: calls to 112 (911), etc.
14.30: Calls to internal airport resources. Dispatch of all medical personnel present at the airport.
14.32: Direct calls to City of Madrid specialised rescue system SAMUR (Samur - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia).
14.33: Calls directly to city of Madrid firefighting squad (already warned by 112) to agree on meeting point and facilitate access to T4 and directions to place of accident.
14.42: External help begins to arrive. First external assests to reach T4 were 5 firefigthing trucks. (Madrid airport, like most airports in large cities, is kind of in a remote area, although not as far away from the city as some other airports).
14.43: Airport Calls placed to civil aviation accident commissions to coordinate.
More rescue assests start to join efforts from then on.
07.00 Aug 21: Civil Aviation Accident Commision authorizes the use of the runaway involved in the accident for normal operation.
Last edited by justme69; 30th Aug 2008 at 11:39.
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snowfalcon2
Also please consider that only the passenger weights are unknown; weights of the empty airplane, the fuel and cargo are already available with high precision. Passenger weight is on the order of 25-30% of the airplane's total weight.
Weighing the fully loaded airplane pre-takeoff, assuming a 2% accuracy, is therefore about equally accurate as obtaining the passenger weight with about 7% accuracy. Evidently the present system works well enough so that the proposed airplane scales would not be a cost effective improvement.
Also please consider that only the passenger weights are unknown; weights of the empty airplane, the fuel and cargo are already available with high precision. Passenger weight is on the order of 25-30% of the airplane's total weight.
Weighing the fully loaded airplane pre-takeoff, assuming a 2% accuracy, is therefore about equally accurate as obtaining the passenger weight with about 7% accuracy. Evidently the present system works well enough so that the proposed airplane scales would not be a cost effective improvement.
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katya1971 posted:
Oh yes, I´ve got surprised also, but the thing is that when I asked the same question, he told me that in some places the depth was more than a meter and a half!
And of course, they where unconscious too.
C'mon agusaleale...the river is SO small...
And of course, they where unconscious too.
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I will be most surprised if the cause is found to be anything other than the fact that the Flaps were raised instead of the the Gear. The least complex fault is generally the most likely.
It may well be that there are other mitigating factors such as the weight, the wind or maybe others but these should not have been sufficient, even collectively, to have produced the catastrophic event which occurred.
It may well be that there are other mitigating factors such as the weight, the wind or maybe others but these should not have been sufficient, even collectively, to have produced the catastrophic event which occurred.
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PanzerJohn/Daily Mail;
Yikes.. so this is what STOWED means.... 
This is how I used to fix my car 20 years ago. Might be a bit more advanced
method used here, but wire certainly doesn't like vibrations,
bending and temperature changes. Could definitely be a chance the
wire somehow came off when takeoff thrust was set after having been
stressed for 3 days.
I guess there would be no warning lights on the panel since the
system was deactivated.
This also means it maybe could have been a "partial" bucket
deployment which explains the extra runway use.
Another possibility is that only the upper half bucket deployed
which could explain the initial left wing drop reported by one passenger,
since this would direct the thrust on the right engine down.
Attach the "In flight reverser deploy checklist".
XPM
However, instead of repairing the fault, mechanics used wire to block the sheet which directs the air flow as a temporary measure. This was in line with Spanish air safety regulations.
This is how I used to fix my car 20 years ago. Might be a bit more advanced
method used here, but wire certainly doesn't like vibrations,
bending and temperature changes. Could definitely be a chance the
wire somehow came off when takeoff thrust was set after having been
stressed for 3 days.
I guess there would be no warning lights on the panel since the
system was deactivated.
This also means it maybe could have been a "partial" bucket
deployment which explains the extra runway use.
Another possibility is that only the upper half bucket deployed
which could explain the initial left wing drop reported by one passenger,
since this would direct the thrust on the right engine down.
Attach the "In flight reverser deploy checklist".
XPM
Last edited by XPMorten; 30th Aug 2008 at 09:02.
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yeap I have had numerous chaps try and raise the flaps as against the gear.....now on the 737 and airbuses I think the leading edges stay out irrespective of position below a certain speed...148kts? Whats the Story on the MD?
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agusaleale
The relatives of the victims of the Spanair flight will never know the conversations betwen the pilots that are recorded in the black boxes, because they are submitted to a "confidentiality code", said Javier Mendoza, Spanair´s vicedirector to one hundred of relatives in Hotel Auditorium in Madrid. He showed them the photos and draws of the black boxes and their position in a plane like the one that suffered the accident. "The recordings will never become public", insisted, and will only be used for investigations to be done by the comission designed to study the case.
The relatives of the victims of the Spanair flight will never know the conversations betwen the pilots that are recorded in the black boxes, because they are submitted to a "confidentiality code", said Javier Mendoza, Spanair´s vicedirector to one hundred of relatives in Hotel Auditorium in Madrid. He showed them the photos and draws of the black boxes and their position in a plane like the one that suffered the accident. "The recordings will never become public", insisted, and will only be used for investigations to be done by the comission designed to study the case.
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el #
On the investigations side, I learn from Spanish media, that Spanair had denied relatives access to CVR recording, meaning it has been listened already by someone.
On the investigations side, I learn from Spanish media, that Spanair had denied relatives access to CVR recording, meaning it has been listened already by someone.
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overthewing
(I've spent years of my professional life untangling problems where the real cause is often nothing to do with the visible symptoms, and something about that warning light niggles me.)
(I've spent years of my professional life untangling problems where the real cause is often nothing to do with the visible symptoms, and something about that warning light niggles me.)
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I think this was in 1987
Location: Romulus, Michigan
Airline: NWA Northwest Airlines
Aircraft: McDonnell Douglas Super MD-80 (MD-82)
Registration: N312RC
Fatalities/No. Aboard: 154:155 +2
Details: The aircraft stalled and crashed during takeoff from Metro Airport. A 4-year-old girl was the only survivor. Slats and flaps not extended. Crew's failure to use taxi checklist to ensure flaps and slats were extended. Lack of electrical power to the aircraft takeoff warning system.
Airline: NWA Northwest Airlines
Aircraft: McDonnell Douglas Super MD-80 (MD-82)
Registration: N312RC
Fatalities/No. Aboard: 154:155 +2
Details: The aircraft stalled and crashed during takeoff from Metro Airport. A 4-year-old girl was the only survivor. Slats and flaps not extended. Crew's failure to use taxi checklist to ensure flaps and slats were extended. Lack of electrical power to the aircraft takeoff warning system.
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justme69
-They say Barajas Airport is 610m above sea level. They quote temperature as being 28º (I've read 29º and 30º on different places).
-They say Barajas Airport is 610m above sea level. They quote temperature as being 28º (I've read 29º and 30º on different places).
Until you factor in the excess temp over tarmac. Formula One racers know ALL about this.
Just another potential cause. It usually takes several for an accident.
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Rananim Post 1282:
Well said re checklist handling. I would add one extra item:
Pilot reading "challenge" to look at the switch in order to ensure that the response (usually from the PF in most SOPs) matches the actual position of the switch/control etc.
In the past week, I have been very disappointed to find 3 different FOs that I flew with, none of whom looked/checked to see if my responses were actually in agreement with switch positions. This really is the final "closing of the loop" in 2-crew operations where different people perform some or part of the actions. It is necessary as one cannot always rely on good error-tolerant design to always catch the problem. A takeoff configuration warning system has been standard on transport category a/c for many years, but it's not much use if the power to it is lost, for example.
Checking that the flap lever is actually firmly in the takeoff detent is a good habit as is visually checking anything that can be seen. It just might save your neck one day.
Airmanship is just a list of good habits that other good airmen taught us as we learned the profession. Unfortunately we're not born with it.
Most of all, ensuring that the FO feels fully confident in calling out anything that (s)he's not happy with is essential to proper CRM. This can only be provided by the Captain's attitude.
Many thanks to PJ2 for all his (always) considered and informative responses to every technical discussion in particular the TAM accident and this one. What a pity to hear that he's now retired. Hopefully not lost to the profession. Thank you sir and I and many others hope to continue to hear and learn from you.
Sid
Well said re checklist handling. I would add one extra item:
Pilot reading "challenge" to look at the switch in order to ensure that the response (usually from the PF in most SOPs) matches the actual position of the switch/control etc.
In the past week, I have been very disappointed to find 3 different FOs that I flew with, none of whom looked/checked to see if my responses were actually in agreement with switch positions. This really is the final "closing of the loop" in 2-crew operations where different people perform some or part of the actions. It is necessary as one cannot always rely on good error-tolerant design to always catch the problem. A takeoff configuration warning system has been standard on transport category a/c for many years, but it's not much use if the power to it is lost, for example.
Checking that the flap lever is actually firmly in the takeoff detent is a good habit as is visually checking anything that can be seen. It just might save your neck one day.
Airmanship is just a list of good habits that other good airmen taught us as we learned the profession. Unfortunately we're not born with it.
Most of all, ensuring that the FO feels fully confident in calling out anything that (s)he's not happy with is essential to proper CRM. This can only be provided by the Captain's attitude.
Many thanks to PJ2 for all his (always) considered and informative responses to every technical discussion in particular the TAM accident and this one. What a pity to hear that he's now retired. Hopefully not lost to the profession. Thank you sir and I and many others hope to continue to hear and learn from you.
Sid
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Green-dot;
Xander posted that comment at #1280 - I haven't flown the MD80 series, just the DC9-10 and 30 series. I don't want to answer for him but I think the following comments you made are correct:
Quote:
What you are explaining is that on the MD82, in case of a TR unlocked/deployed during take off, the affected thrust lever will not retard to idle, will not disengage auto-throttle (if applicable) and there is no alert inhibit above 80kt upto 1000ft AGL? In other words if i understand you correctly, the thrust lever will remain in the position as commanded and there is no alert inhibit any time during any of the take off phases?Unquote
I agree with these statements and I think xander's comments are correct.
The MD80 fleet-type is not a FADEC-equipped engine installation. FADEC controls the reverse deployment on the 320/340 fleet types, (CFM56 installation) and has the capability to reduce the engine to IDLE if it senses an unlocked reverser.
Xander posted that comment at #1280 - I haven't flown the MD80 series, just the DC9-10 and 30 series. I don't want to answer for him but I think the following comments you made are correct:
Quote:
What you are explaining is that on the MD82, in case of a TR unlocked/deployed during take off, the affected thrust lever will not retard to idle, will not disengage auto-throttle (if applicable) and there is no alert inhibit above 80kt upto 1000ft AGL? In other words if i understand you correctly, the thrust lever will remain in the position as commanded and there is no alert inhibit any time during any of the take off phases?Unquote
I agree with these statements and I think xander's comments are correct.
The MD80 fleet-type is not a FADEC-equipped engine installation. FADEC controls the reverse deployment on the 320/340 fleet types, (CFM56 installation) and has the capability to reduce the engine to IDLE if it senses an unlocked reverser.
I would think, the MD82 not being FADEC equipped, there would be a provision in the mechanical interlock to retard the thrust lever to idle in case of an uncommanded TR deployment. Apparently this is not the case on the MD82.
Also I understand there is a difference in operational philosophy between the type I have worked on (Fokker 70 and 100) which inhibit certain alerts- and the MD8x series which apparently do not inhibit certain alerts during some stages of the takeoff phase.
Regards,
Green-dot
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Whatever system logic you have on different types, shouldn´t a warning as essential as an uncommanded TR deployment always come on? I would find it rather strange if that annunciation wouldn´t come on until climbing through 1000' ?
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"(and if so, does the leading edge detail show anything useful?)
Well yes it does. It shows the slats were in TO position, but were ripped away during the crash. Those two "arms" you see, sticking out of the holes on the leading edge, attach to the inside surface of the slat panel.
Well yes it does. It shows the slats were in TO position, but were ripped away during the crash. Those two "arms" you see, sticking out of the holes on the leading edge, attach to the inside surface of the slat panel.
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The flaps are still there, down to about 15 (hence the hole to the right of the aileron, and the ridge of the flaps. Another part of the wing is to the back right of the photograph (follow the hose). Same story.
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And with that went the most common speculation......
Where to now?
Would an open reverser with TO thrust applied drag this plane out of the air? An open bucket and idle thrust has proven manageable in the past.
Would an open reverser with TO thrust applied drag this plane out of the air? An open bucket and idle thrust has proven manageable in the past.